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Abstract 
 
Islamic Finance in the Global Economy: An Exploration of Risk 
Management and Governance within Shariah Finance 
 
 
Seng Kiong, Kok 
 
 
Islamic finance has grown in prominence and is now widely regarded as a viable alternative 
to conventional, mainstream finance. However, this rapid growth has been accompanied by a 
number of pertinent issues relating to the alleged unfavourable performance of Shariah-
compliant indexes, the limited availability of risk management tools and the framework of 
governance and regulatory standards with the Islamic banking and financial system.  
 
This thesis seeks to assess the state of both performance and development of risk 
management within the Islamic financial system. It investigates these issues through a variety 
of methods such as quantitative portfolio creation and econometric modelling of 
diversification benefits, theoretical development of a financial risk management tool and 
qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews on the perceptions of how governance and 
regulatory standards affect both the performance and financial innovation within Islamic 
finance. 
 
The results presented in this study provide robust arguments for the inclusion of Islamic 
indices within conventional portfolios both from a performance and diversification standpoint 
thus vindicating the viability of Islamic finance not only as an investment option but also a 
risk management option. Moreover, the research puts forward a new structure for an Islamic 
call-option, based upon risk-sharing rather than risk-transfer, which highlights the benefits of 
constructing financial risk management products through Shariah-compliant rules. Finally, 
the research also underlines the consensus of market participants behind central regulatory 
standards to enhance stable and continual growth and development of the Islamic financial 
system. 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background of study 
The growth of Islamic banking and finance has been very remarkable within the spectra of 
modern finance. In just over seventy years, modern Islamic finance has grown from initial 
experiments in Islamic nations to a fully fledge, viable financial system with a net worth of 
over $950 billion (Ernst and Young, 2011a; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007).  
 
Moreover, the growth of Islamic finance has not been limited to traditional Muslim hubs such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia in the Far East and Dubai and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) region but has also spread into more conventional financial 
centres (Shubber, 2008). Large financial hubs ranging from Hong Kong, Singapore, the 
United Kingdom and America have all seen substantial growth in the infrastructure and 
initiatives to support and adopt Islamic finance as a viable complementary and alternative 
financial system (Iqbal, 1997; Warde, 2000; Sundararajan and Errico, 2002). This rapid 
growth has seen the proliferation of the services and products offered by modern Islamic 
finance and this includes deposit taking facilities, the issue and sale of shares and bonds, 
Islamic insurance, Islamic mortgages and an increasing number of complex Islamic financial 
contracts (Jobst, 2007).   
 
With this significant growth of Islamic finance into more mainstream financial systems, there 
is an increased need to understand the performance, structure and interaction of Shariah 
financial products and services with that of their conventional counterparts. Existing research 
such as El-Gamal (2006), El-Sheikh (2000), Karbhari et al. (2004) and Dar and Azami (2010) 
have indicated that whilst Islamic finance is quickly being adopted as an alternative financial 
 2 
system much is still being learnt about products and financial services being provided under 
the Shariah finance umbrella. Much of this existing research focuses upon issues pertaining to 
both risk management and governance under a Shariah financial framework. 
 
As highlighted by Iqbal and Mirakhor (2002) and Sundararajan and Errico (2002) the growth 
of Islamic finance and its increasing prominence within the global economy could lead to 
increased risk within the Shariah financial system leading to a greater need for the 
development of risk management tools and structures to meet the needs of market 
participants (Dar and Presley, 1999). However, the development of risk management tools 
and financial innovation within Islamic finance is a contentious issue as there is the 
requirement, unlike conventional finance, to draw a balance between financial and religious 
principles (Derigs and Marzban, 2008). Moreover, the growth and development of Islamic 
products and services  across the Islamic financial system has meant that there is increased 
criticisms pertaining to product structures and the scope with which these products and 
services adhere to fundamental Islamic beliefs (El-Gamal, 2006, El-Hawary et al., 2004). 
 
Proponents of Islamic finance believe that many of the issues relating to the development of 
risk management and Shariah finance as a whole relate to concerns about corporate 
governance and regulatory standards within the Islamic financial system (El-Hawary et al., 
2004, 2007). These concerns are based mainly upon the fragmentation of the Islamic 
financial system (major Islamic financial hubs in Malaysia, GCC and UK) and divergences in 
regulatory standards. This regulatory divergence is not a new matter within the Shariah 
finance and the creation of central regulatory bodies has shown that concerted effort is being 
made by the Islamic financial system to address this concern (El-Sheikh, 2000). Whilst effort 
is being made to address the divergences in regulatory and governance standards there still 
 3 
exists some apprehension that the lack of uniformity within the Islamic finance could hamper 
overall growth  and be of increasing detriment to the development of the Islamic financial 
system in the future (Derigs and Marzban, 2008). 
 
1.2. Outline of the Key Areas of Research Significance 
A key focus of this research project is to examine aspects of Islamic finance from a 
conventional financial perspective. With the growth of Islamic finance into more 
conventional financial markets there would be significant value into examining aspects of 
Islamic finance from a conventional standpoint. It was thought that this research would 
provide a firmer understanding and new insight into Islamic financial concepts and issues 
pertaining to risk management and governance. 
 
Part of this examination includes an evaluation of the performance of Shariah-compliant 
indexes within a conventional portfolio of equity indices. Empirical literature is inconclusive 
with regards to the benefits of Shariah-compliant equity indexes for both Islamic and 
conventional investors. Empirical literature such as Hassan (2001), Hussein (2007) and 
Elfakhani et al. (2007) have attempted to compare the performance of Islamic and 
conventional equity indexes and have also found that there were not consistent arguments for 
outperformance by Islamic indexes and in some cases there was even an underperformance of 
Islamic indexes. The growth of Islamic finance has meant that in order to enhance its 
attractiveness as an alternative financial system there has to be some investment benefits for 
not only Islamic but also conventional investors. The existing literature has tried to illustrate 
this aspect but much of the empirical work focuses only on comparing Islamic against 
conventional equity indexes without consideration for basic investment strategies such as 
diversification and portfolio optimisation. This clear gap in the literature forms the first key 
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area of research. This study aims to examine the diversification and performance benefits of 
including an Islamic equity index through a cointegration and Markowitz portfolio 
optimisation analysis. Many investors understand the benefits of multi-asset portfolios and as 
such this study incorporates this understanding to the world of Islamic banking and finance.  
 
This leads on to the next key area of research as the growth of Islamic finance into more 
conventional, non-Muslim financial systems has meant that there is a need to develop 
financial instruments to deal with the proliferation of risks associated with growth. These 
include the lack of a risk management framework, increased liquidity risk and the lack of 
understanding new entrants into the Islamic financial market space. It should be noted that 
the increase of risks is not limited to Islamic financial hubs in conventional financial systems 
but also to Shariah finance in Islamic financial systems. There is an increasing amount of 
literature such as Dar and Presley (2000) and Jobst et al. (2008) highlighting the problems of 
risks associated to Islamic financing principles. Moreover, the opportunity cost of not 
developing a strong base for financial innovation is also a cause for concern with Islamic 
finance lacking a salient risk management culture (Noman, 2002). The development of risk 
management is an important process within any financial system, however, the swift 
advancement and acceptance of Islamic finance into mainstream financial systems has 
highlighted the apparent fallibilities of financial innovation with Shariah finance. 
Fundamentally, the growth of Islamic finance has resulted in the proliferation of risks such as 
market and default risk where traditional Islamic financial products did not provide adequate 
tools to address these risk types. 
 
The process of establishing financial innovation and a risk management framework is also 
made more difficult within Islamic law because of the prohibition of risk management 
 5 
structures such as derivatives. Kamali (1995, 1997 and 1999) has articulated strong views on 
the permissibility of derivative like structures in Islamic finance and has strongly suggested 
that derivatives provide a strong based for risk management, which should not be ignored by 
Islamic finance. Furthermore, an examination of the literature has yielded numerous new 
Shariah-compliant risk management tools, which recreate the risk management flexibility of 
conventional derivatives. However, many of these tools still abide by a risk-transfer modus of 
risk management despite the fact that a pivotal principle in Islamic finance is risk-sharing. 
The aim is to create a risk management tool that provides the flexibility of a derivative but 
incorporates the Islamic financial principle of risk-sharing. An examination of the existing 
literature reveals that there have been no attempts at creating such a structure thus indicating 
that this is an original contribution to knowledge. An investigation of the current state of 
financial innovation reveal several regulatory and governance issues. Throughout the 
empirical process of creating the new hybrid product structure, the researchers had to 
confront these regulatory and governance issues first hand. These issues were highlighted  in 
the literature as the development of new instruments (Dar and Presley, 2000; Jobst et al., 
2008), the composition of Shariah supervisory boards (El-Gamal, 2000), lack of transparency 
(Honohan, 2001), lack of uniformity (Chapra and Khan, 2000; Chapra and Ahmed, 2002), 
unclear definition of Shariah-compliance (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006), no clear definition of  
risk management framework (Dar and Presley, 2000), the lack of a lender of last resort 
(Hersh, 2011) and the future of Islamic finance.  
 
While the literature identifies these aspects as key concepts and issues of Islamic financial 
regulation and governance, the academic discussions are very much abstract and theoretical 
with little empirical evidence to validate these notions. This illustrates another gap in the 
existing knowledge within Islamic finance and formed the base of another key area of 
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research. Using the issues of regulation and governance highlighted in the literature, the 
research will try to determine if these issues are being faced by market participants through 
the use of semi-structured interviews. The interviews would be conducted with a mix of 
academic and practitioners and because of the niche and relatively new nature of Islamic 
finance, it was felt that the views of both academic and practitioners could be balanced by an 
interim group which comprised of both academic and practical knowledge.  A significant 
contribution to knowledge through this facet of the research study is to provide a synthesis of 
the views of market participants and existing literature on issues of Shariah regulation and 
governance. The research significance from this aspect of the study will be derived from the 
amalgamation of views from both market participants and existing literature to highlight the 
problems and the steps taken to curb the criticisms of Islamic financial regulation and 
governance. 
 
Summarily, there are three key areas within this research study. Firstly, the analysis of 
diversification and performance of Islamic equity indexes using conventional investment 
strategies. Secondly, the examination of financial innovation in Islamic finance and the 
creation of an entirely new risk management instrument. Finally, the research investigates the 
issues of Shariah regulation and governance and a validation of these views through the 
synthesis of actual market participant precepts and existing literature. What can be seen from 
all three key areas of research would be that the overall research study looks to provide 
further arguments in support for Islamic finance as a financial system which exists not only 
for Muslims but as a financial system that can be used and is viable for both Islamic and 
conventional market participants. 
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Figure 1: The thought progression of this research study with reference to the Key Areas of Research Significance 
Examination of Performance and 
Diversification Benefits of Islamic 
Finance 
•Islamic finance is not only for Islamic 
investors and should have benefits for the 
international investor within conventional 
mult asset portfolios. 
Analysis of Risk Management 
•Significant growth has illustrated new risks 
and a need for new risk management tools to 
deal with these risks 
•Creation of new  Shariah-compliant risk 
management instrument, which provide 
flexibility with risk-sharing 
Investigation of Issues of Islamic 
Financial Regulation and 
Governance 
•Aid with continual growth and development 
of the Islamic financial market 
•Analysis done by synthesizing theoretical 
issues with the views of market participants 
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1.3. Research aims/ objectives 
This research has 4 major aims namely, the examination of the development and growth of 
Islamic finance, the assessment and analysis of the performance of Shariah-compliant indexes 
within a conventional portfolio, the evaluation of the risk management and financial 
engineering capacity of Islamic finance and the investigation of regulation and governance 
under a Shariah regulatory framework. 
 
(i) An examination of modern Islamic finance 
This will involve a thorough examination of the basic principles of modern 
Islamic finance and will provide an overview of the Islamic finance system in 
relation to the products and services on offer, major activities and market 
valuation. Additionally, the study will attempt to draw parallels between Islamic 
finance and conventional finance with an extensive review of the historical 
development of Islamic finance. A review of the existing literature on Islamic 
finance and empirical research into the performance, risk management and 
regulatory and governance issues of modern Islamic finance will be undertaken to 
achieve this objective. 
 
(ii) The assessment and analysis of the performance of Shariah-compliant 
indexes within a conventional portfolio. 
This includes an analysis into the justification for the inclusion of a Shariah-
compliant index within a conventional portfolio. This would involve the use of 
hypothetical portfolios optimised under a Markowitz methodology to determine if 
there are any performance benefits. The performance will be assessed from a risk 
management and portfolio optimization perspective. Portfolios will be created 
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using a combination of Islamic, ethical and mainstream indices. These portfolios 
will then undergo a cointegration analysis to determine there are any underlying 
stochastic trends. Additionally, portfolios which exhibit no cointegrating vectors 
will then be optimised to test their risk-adjusted performance. 
 
(iii) Evaluation of Risk Management and financial engineering within Islamic 
finance 
This study will include a thorough investigation of risk management under a 
Shariah finance framework. It will evaluate existing risk management products 
and strategies and highlight problems associated to financial engineering within 
Shariah finance. Financial engineering or financial innovation under a Shariah 
framework faces a major obstacle of Shariah-compliance. This study will 
investigate the processes involved with financial innovation within Islamic 
finance. This facet of the research will essentially be a pen to paper exercise. The 
researcher will fundamentally dissect existing conventional and Islamic financial 
risk management tools and reconstruct a new Islamic risk management structure 
along the interpretation of existing Shariah-compliant rules. 
 
(iv) An exploration of the issues of Governance within the Islamic financial 
system 
Essentially, this objective seeks to establish the issues surrounding governance in 
Islamic finance. Additionally, the study wishes to determine the precepts of 
market participants on these issues of governance and possible remedial 
proposals. The scope of this objective will take to form of semi-structured 
interviews with that of market participants within Islamic finance. The 
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information garnered from these interviews will be synthesized form the precepts 
of the literature to provide a review of the current state of governance and 
regulatory standards with the Islamic financial system.  
 
1.4. Research questions 
(i) How does Islamic finance operate in the modern financial spectrum? 
The research attempts to present a conventional view of Islamic banking and 
finance in the modern economy. Essentially, it looks at trying to understand the 
central tenets of Islamic banking and finance. Moreover, the study also looks at 
the practical and academic development of Islamic finance and delves into the 
growth of Islamic finance from the medieval to the modern times. 
 
(ii) What are the diversification opportunities presented by Shariah-compliant 
equity indices? 
This questions forms part of the objective in assessing the performance of 
Shariah-compliant indices. Fundamentally, are there any diversification benefits 
from holding a Shariah-compliant index within a conventional portfolio? This is 
an evolution of existing literature pertaining to diversification. Much of the 
existing literature examines the performance benefits of ethical indices rather than 
Shariah-compliant indices. The portfolio in this part of the study will include a 
mainstream, an ethical and a Shariah-compliant index. Moreover, the study also 
geographically distinguishes between indices and portfolios were formed using 
American and British equity indexes. Portfolios were assessed using econometric 
cointegration to discover if there exists any underlying stochastic relationship 
between indexes. 
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(iii) What is the concept of risk management within Islamic finance and what are 
the various risk management vehicles available? 
The study intends to explore the risk management operation within Islamic 
finance. Are there similar risk management strategies and instruments in Islamic 
and conventional finance? An examination of existing risk management 
instruments will be undertaken and will look at the adequacy of these instruments. 
Moreover, the research will also include an evaluation of the current debate 
surrounding the exclusion of derivative-like instruments within Shariah finance.  
 
(iv) What is the scope for financial innovation within risk management under a 
Shariah financial framework? 
This aspect of the research project seeks to highlight the scope of financial 
innovation of risk management instruments under a Shariah framework. It 
highlights the in-roads being made in financial innovation in Islamic finance and 
presents the arguments advocating the need for continual development of financial 
instruments within Shariah finance. Additionally, in answering this question, the 
research also hopes to highlight discussions on the obstacles faced by financial 
innovators in Islamic finance. The research project will include proposals for a 
hybrid risk management instrument that promotes risk-sharing as opposed to risk 
transfer. 
 
(v) What are the current problems and future developments of the regulatory 
standards within the global Islamic financial system? 
This facet of the research aims to explore the issues surrounding the regulatory 
standards in Islamic finance. The literature has indicated that there is a lack of 
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uniformity of regulatory standards across the global Islamic financial hubs. It is 
further argued that this could lead to an uneven playing field between Islamic 
financial systems and is detrimental to the development of Islamic finance as a 
whole. Moreover, the use of Shariah-screens to promote the development of 
Islamic finance in non-Muslim financial systems has also come under scrutiny. 
Interviews will be used for this aspect of the research to gather the views of 
market participants on these regulatory issues and possible solutions. The 
interviews will include both academic and professionals within the field of Islamic 
finance in order to garner a well-rounded perspective. 
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis  
The study is laid out as follows. Chapter 2 provides readers with an insight into the history of 
Islamic finance. It charts the practices of medieval Islamic finance and documents the 
operation of Islamic finance during the medieval period. It highlights the differences between 
medieval Islamic and Western finance and provides arguments relating to the lack of 
adoption of Islamic finance during medieval times. The chapter then moves on to detail the 
beginnings of modern Islamic finance. Parallels and differences between medieval and 
modern Islamic finance will also be detailed within this chapter. Chapter 3 provides readers 
with an overview of the current Islamic financial system. This chapter illustrates the main 
financial activities of Islamic finance and examine the scope of these activities within 
reference to conventional finance. It explores the central principles of the Islamic financial 
system. It highlights the growth of Islamic finance within the modern economy and lists the 
significant financial activities of Islamic financial institutions. Additionally, this chapter also 
examines the fundamental financial concepts in Islamic finance and how these concepts could 
possibly be applied within Islamic financial contracts 
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Chapter 4 provides the literature review of the key areas of research of Islamic finance for 
this study. The literature review explores the existing arguments pertaining to risk 
management under a Shariah framework. The chapter begins by examining the existing 
thematic discourse on the performance of Islamic equity funds and the arguments pertaining 
to Islamic finance as a viable outlet for both conventional and Islamic investors. The section 
then goes on to review the existing debates on risk management and financial innovation 
within Islamic finance with a particular emphasis on Islamic derivatives. These discussions 
then lead on to issues of regulation and governance which dominate the global spectra of 
Shariah finance and the continual development of the Islamic financial system as a whole.  
 
Chapter 5 specifies the research methodology adopted for this research study. It records the 
research philosophy, approach and design of this project. Essentially, the first sections of this 
chapter provides the reader with the theoretical and academic grounding of the selected 
research methodology thus contextualizing the underlying research thought to a greater 
extent. This section will also examine the specific quantitative and qualitative analysis 
methods that were used during the course of the empirical work undertaken and provide 
justifications for the use of these selected methods. 
 
Chapter 6 chronicles the findings from the literature review and empirical work carried out. It 
offers a summative view of what was discovered over the course of this research project. This 
section also draws links to the literature to provide a rounded and validated perspective of the 
findings. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the discussions where the researcher provides and draws links across the 
central themes of this research project. The aim is to illustrate how the developments of 
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financial products and services of Islamic finance are influenced by regulatory standards and 
additionally how the innovation of these products and services also drive the regulatory 
process. Additionally, this chapter documents the original contribution to knowledge of this 
study. This section of the chapter will further highlight how the results have addressed gaps 
in the literature and the new findings that add to the existing pool of knowledge on Islamic 
banking and finance. This chapter will also underline the limitations of this research project 
as well as the scope for further research. Lastly, the chapter indicates the researcher’s own 
personal reflection from what has been learnt throughout this research process. 
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2. Islamic Financial History – Theory and 
Practice 
2.1. Introduction to Chapter 
This chapter initially aims to provide the reader with a description of the historical 
development of Islamic finance. Section 2.2. highlights the academic development of Islamic 
financial theory and examines the changing paradigm of academic thought in Islamic finance 
in its modern incarnation. Section 2.3. aims to provide a perspective of the growth of 
practical application of Islamic finance. The section is further separated into two subsections 
with the first (Section 2.3.1.) examining the working application of Islamic finance in 
medieval times and the second (Section 2.3.2.) indicating the practical aspects of modern 
Islamic finance. Section 2.4. provides summative remarks about this chapter. 
 
2.2. Islamic Academic Development – A Timeline  
The earliest forms of Islamic financial theory were deeply rooted in trying to replace interest 
based lending with profit sharing initiatives (Siddiqi, 2006). The main element of this theory 
was grounded in achieving fairness within each financial transaction where the divergence of 
risk-bearing between borrower and lender was seen as unjust. This argument is based on the 
principle of interest lending, where the borrower (customer) would bear the entirety of the 
risk of business while the lender (bank) would still receive fixed interest payments for the 
loan. It was argued that there was no justification for these ‘guaranteed’ interest payments if 
there was no guarantee of returns for the customer (Ghanameh, 1973). Much of the theory on 
Islamic finance during the 1970s sought to highlight the problems with interest based 
transactions on the financial system and suggested that economic ailments such as 
unemployment and inflation were attributed to interest (Hameedullah, 1936; Ahmed, 1972, 
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Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1999; Siddiqi 2006). The arguments presented by El Diwany (2010) in 
his book ‘The Problem with Interest’ can best illustrate the short comings of interest based 
transaction. El Diwany (2010) suggests that the use of interest based project evaluation 
techniques such as net present value (NPV) and its mirror image of discounted cash flow 
(DCF) distort the financial world and are “unlike the world that we live in”. He further argues 
that positive/negative NPVs are not the only factors that should influence the investment 
decision and that in the modern world humans place ameliorated value on aspects such as 
pollution and stress (El Diwany, 2010). It is difficult, but not impossible to place a monetary 
value on subjective features such as pollution and stress and whilst these arguments against 
interest based financing are not new, it indicates the drawbacks of interest financing 
methodologies. Fundamentally, the views expressed by El-Diwany (2010) are not entirely 
new but are rather an extension of the precepts found in seminal works such as that of Khan 
(1986). 
 
The 1980s brought with it the resurgence of fundamental Islamic values, which extend this 
ideology into the economic spectrum (Homoud and Rhummeud, 1985; Khan, 1986; Ashour, 
1999). There was a significant increase in awareness of Islamic Finance in the academic 
world of Islamic Banking and Finance and even saw the creation of a journal entirely 
dedicate to Islamic finance – the Journal of Research in Islamic Economics. Much of the 
literature during this period focuses entirely on explaining this “new” financial system to the 
world. Works such as Ahmed (1980) and Ahmed et al. (1983) highlight the major tenets of 
Islamic finance and its workings as a financial system. These discussions focused on 
highlighting the beliefs of Islamic economics and serve to elaborate on recommended 
patterns of economic transactions (Khan, 1986). Additionally, these works also described the 
central Islamic financial concept of riba and basically addressed to initial concerns of 
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whether Islamic finance was viable and if it could exist within the modern economic 
spectrum alongside conventional financial systems. 
 
Studies by Naqvi (1982) and Khan (1984), which examined the rationale of profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) under a standard mainstream financial framework, have shown that it is 
possible to exist in a financial system without interest. This involved arguments around 
agency theory and the circumvention of the principal-agent problem through an adequate 
remuneration package for the agent. In order to combat non-disclosure of profits on the part 
of the agent, it was stated that agents had to be rewarded for their honesty. The most notable 
development of the 1980s was the increased use of murabaha (cost plus financing) contracts 
in Islamic finance (Siddiqui, 2008). This proliferation of murabaha contracts was to dominate 
the spectrum of Islamic finance for the years to come with profit sharing agreements taking a 
back seat and only accounting for 10% of total operations. What murabaha contracts brought 
was capital certainty to the Islamic financial system, which essentially boosted their 
popularity amongst Islamic financial participants. Whilst the profit sharing modus of 
operation exhibited the Islamic financial desire for fairness and equality, murabaha contracts 
provided capital security.  
 
A simple murabaha structure would involve the lender (bank) purchasing a certain 
commodity for the borrower who would then proceed to buy this commodity from the lender 
at cost plus a certain mark-up. This mark-up is essentially seen as the fee with regards to 
establishing the contract and bearing the risk (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). The capital security 
is born out of the debt element of this structure. The lender/bank is guaranteed the payment of 
the cost plus some extra whilst the borrower is guaranteed the required commodity. 
Moreover, it provided additional security for the lender as the commodity was seen as 
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collateral and murabaha contracts were seen as ‘safer’ than traditional profit sharing 
agreements (Siddiqui, 2008). The growth of the murabaha contracts had significant 
implications on the development of Islamic finance and whilst some argue (Vogel and Hayes, 
1998 and Warde, 2000) its legitimacy and efficiency, its use spread significantly throughout 
the Islamic financial world. An analysis of these arguments about the legitimacy of murabaha 
contracts indicates that there exist two significant concerns involving risk-sharing and the 
rebranding of interest elements (Warde, 2000). A more quantitative study into the viability of 
incorporating PLS as the major form of financing as opposed to standard murabaha contracts 
in a financial system can be found in Presley and Sessions (1994). This study essentially took 
a model developed by Holmstrom and Weiss (1985) and incorporated the PLS element 
through an analysis of performance factors of the relationship between manager and bank 
within a murabaha contract. What was discovered from this study was that the informational 
asymmetry between manager and bank was more efficiently diminished under a PLS modus 
than standard debt financing procedures (Presley and Sessions, 1994). 
 
Nevertheless, the 1980s and 1990s saw murabaha contracts earned full recognition from the 
Islamic financial society. Although efforts were made to revive academic interest in the area 
of profit sharing, there was not enough of a response from the Islamic financial economy. 
This was based on the lack of certainty behind these contracts when it came to financial 
reporting. The fear of false reporting and/or outright deception was too great. This was 
posited that financial practitioners valued security over the prospect of returns (Siddiqi, 
2006). 
 
Moreover, there were also concerns as to the viability of the use of profit sharing initiatives in 
certain areas of financing. For example the viability of profit sharing contracts was 
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questioned when it came to financing public sector infrastructure projects. The argument was 
that while the cost of the projects was borne initially, it would take years for any profits to 
arise out of these projects (Siddiqi, 2006).   
 
The 1990s up until present day saw the continuous development of Islamic financial 
macroeconomic policy and the want for increased profit sharing initiatives within Islamic 
finance instruments. With the advent of the 21
st
 century there was also an increased focus on 
the development of several areas of Islamic finance, most notably risk management and 
governance. Within the realm of risk management, the concerns were for the lack of risk 
management instruments available to fund managers. In light of the financial crisis the use of 
murabaha and bai al-salam (purchase with deferred delivery) contracts to manage risk was 
insufficient. There have been some recent innovations (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1. for 
detailed description of product structures) that involve the use of multiple murabaha 
contracts, synthetic murabaha contracts as well as the structuring of an Islamic call option 
(wa’ad) (Dar and Azami, 2010).  
 
Additionally, concerns regarding governance have been highlighted and these issues relate to 
uniformity of the Islamic financial system as a whole. The development of regulatory 
standards has to keep pace with the rapid growth of Islamic finance since its first 
‘experiment’ in the 1940s. The propagation of new global Islamic hubs has meant that there 
are increased calls for further development of a standard code of conduct and guidance. The 
creation of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) in 1991 and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) just after the turn of the 
millennium has indicated that steps are being taken to address the growth and development of 
the Islamic financial system. 
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2.3. Islamic Finance in Practice - A Timeline 
Khan (2010a) has suggested that the pursuit of Shariah-compliance and the drive towards the 
prohibition of riba (usury) in Islamic finance is a relatively modern (post 1945) idea but let us 
consider what riba is again.  Riba or usury is the backbone of Islamic finance and is the 
source of much of the criticisms levied against the Islamic financial system (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2007). Remember that riba is not the prohibition of interest but rather the charging 
of excessive interest. The foundations of the modern financial system are built on interest 
financing and the implementation of a financial system which views interest as unimportant 
seem plausible in theory but not always successful in practice (see Shepherd, 1996). 
 
2.3.1. Islamic Finance in the Medieval Era 
Udovitch (1970) suggests several pertinent questions with regards to the charging of interest 
within the context of historical and modern Islamic finance. These include: 
 
1) To what extent was the prohibition of riba actually observed in actual practice? 
2) Did this prohibition of riba inhibit the conduct of economic life? 
3) Did it affect credit operations, money exchange and other operations associated with 
banking? 
 
It should be noted that medieval timeline dates from the 8
th
 till the 18
th
 century. Udovitch 
(1970) highlights that while Muslims existing in a medieval Islamic financial framework 
were prohibited from engaging in usurious activities, there existed Christian and Jewish 
minorities within the same financial system who were not limited by Shariah laws. While all 
three, Muslims, Christians and Jews, have specific religious laws prohibiting usurious 
activities there did not exist constraints preventing them from inter-religious dealings. As 
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such there really was no barrier to creating interest-bearing loans between them (Udovitch, 
1970). 
 
Whilst deposit taking generates two-thirds of modern Islamic financial revenue, this was a 
relatively foreign concept under a medieval Islamic financial framework. Deposit taking 
activities in this circumstance refer to interest-bearing deposits, where individuals deposit a 
sum of money with a bank that in turns safe guards it with some percentage capital growth 
annually.  The prospect of interest bearing deposits was and is still seen as usurious within an 
Islamic financial framework. The circumvention of having these interest payments by modern 
Islamic finance is very much through a murdarabah structure whereby banks invest the 
money deposited and share the profits and losses. In essence these profits/losses would be 
seen as the interest on a standard savings account. However, this structure would suggest that 
should investments make a loss, depositors would lose some of their “capital” injection, 
which nullified the prospect of a conventional savings account. In its current incarnation, 
deposit facilities offered by Islamic and Shariah-compliant banks essentially make a “good 
faith” payment annually as a proxy for conventional interest-bearing deposit account (Siddiqi, 
2006).  
 
Within the context of medieval Islamic finance, Fischel (1937) highlighted that a deposit 
taking institution was essentially seen as an entity that safeguards money and in essence 
neither institution nor customer should derive more of a benefit (interest payments) from this 
arrangement. In contrast, Western banks of that time not only granted monetary safe guarding 
services but were also allowed to invest these deposits. The returns from these deposits were 
used, partially, as interest payments to depositors but were mainly retained as earnings to the 
bank. The benefits of these interest-bearing agreements was not lost on medieval Islamic 
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financial institutions who in turn adopted a structure of tax-farming where a deposit loan was 
given in the promise that a lending institution would be able to collect the taxes from a 
designated area for a specified period of time (Fischel, 1937). 
 
In essence the concept of understanding deposit taking under a medieval Islamic financial 
framework should be extended to precepts of credit within the Muslim world. Postan (1928) 
demonstrates that credit played a major role in trade within the medieval economy and this 
was extended into the Islamic economy of that period (see Udovitch, 1970; Giotein, 1961; 
Giotein and Shemesh, 1967), where buying and selling on credit was accepted and widely 
accepted in commercial practices. Medieval Islamic finance not only outlines the 
methodology of dealing in credit but also makes provision for through credit instruments 
such as hawala (debt payment through a transfer of a claim) and suftaja (bill of exchange). It 
should be noted that although suftajas were designated as bills of exchange, they in fact did 
not involve any form of exchange of currency. It basically consisted of a payment of a certain 
amount of currency to a certain merchant bank and is therefore more similar to a modern day 
cheque. Aside from both hawala and suftaja there also existed a broad range of credit papers 
known as ruq’as, which also appropriated the functions of a modern day cheque, although in 
contrast to suftajas these were mainly used for short distance and petty payments. 
 
Additional acceptance of credit partnership (sharikat al-mafalis) also known as a partnership 
of the penniless, illustrates this wide acceptance of credit trades during this period (Udovitch, 
1970). Principally, this credit partnership involves two parties forming a single entity to buy 
on credit and then sell in hopes of generating enough revenue to cover the credit purchase 
with some left over as profits. The role of credit transactions was seen as pivotal towards 
economic activities and Udovitch (1970) suggested that the main purpose of any credit 
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partnership was the increase and creation of capital. The use of credit notices and services in 
medieval Islamic finance was in fact common practice on both a wholesale and retail basis 
where it was not exceptional for deferred payments. Granted that these credit services 
warranted a slight premium – two prices were usually quoted, one for cash transactions and 
one for credit transactions.  
 
This acceptance of credit agreements in modern Islamic finance however is slightly more 
difficult to perceive. While products such as Bai al-salam contracts are accepted, their use is 
not widely documented outside of agricultural transactions (Helliar and Alsahlawi, 2011; 
Kaleem and Wajid, 2009; Obaidullah, 2002). There is also evidence of a bai al-arboun (sale 
with deferred payment) where the buyer was granted a fixed period in which to decide to 
exercise the contract – a maximum of three days – however three days does not provide much 
benefit in terms of credit services. Moreover, the use of the bai al-arboun is widely 
disallowed in the Gulf States in the modern Islamic financial spectrum as it was stipulated to 
bring about gharar (uncertainty) (Dali and Ahmad, 2005; Obaidullah, 2002; Salehabadi and 
Aram, 2002; Obaidullah, 1998). The use of modern credit facilities such as derivatives 
instruments is explicitly disallowed within modern Islamic finance.  
 
This proliferation and acceptance of credit services in medieval Islamic finance encouraged 
the growth of international trade and as such lead to a requirement for currency exchanges 
and merchant banking services. Financial participants of that era, who were engaged in 
international trade, required a medium by which to exchange currencies or make payments in 
distant lands once goods were delivered. Udovitch (1970) highlights that money exchange 
services of that era were not undertaken by merchant bankers and money changers alone but 
rather any merchant with the ability to provide these services. This meant that the foreign 
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exchange market of that era held very little regulation and prices were governed by that of 
intrinsic value and the laws of supply and demand.  
 
Another pertinent question posed by Udovitch (1970), which goes a long way towards 
explaining the development of Islamic finance through the ages is, with the increased 
development and acceptance of both commercial and merchant banking services in medieval 
Islamic finance, why is it that there were no banks? There existed individuals who provided 
the services of a bank, albeit this was more a form of specialization. For example, one 
individual provides credit notes and another provides depository services but yet there existed 
no single financial entity that provided all these services under one roof unlike that of 
medieval Western finance. This, Udovitvch (1970) postulates, could be attributed to the strict 
meaning of deposit taking institutions and the loose structure of the money market of 
medieval Islamic finance. Additionally, it has been suggested that this lack of development of 
central banking entities was a question of social context. There was an increased importance 
place upon social relationships within these commercial activities. With all the development 
of credit notes and services these activities very rarely extended beyond social-personal 
relationship. This could have been a cause for the retardation of the growth and development 
of medieval Islamic finance. Moreover, Udovitch (1970) also indicates that while there were 
Arabic words for specific financial activities such as money exchange and loans, there was 
nothing describing the general framework of banking and finance. The focus on small 
intimate financial circles and networks basically meant that while this facilitated a smooth 
functioning of financial services within the medieval Islamic financial system, it in fact also 
limited its growth on the broader financial spectrum as these relationships could not be 
extended further to distant lands. 
 
 25 
From the comprehensive historical study of medieval Islamic finance provided by Udovitch 
(1970) it can be seen that the sluggish progress of Islamic finance was down to the fact that 
the financial system was based around close knit relationships and that these relationships 
failed to extend beyond a certain circle. The ability of Western financial systems of that 
period to engage in commercial activities that were not borne out of developing close ties 
meant that there was more scope for significant growth in international trade. Moreover, 
fundamental Western trading methods such as the development of international bankers 
meant that the closed relationships and trust between contracting parties were not required to 
safeguard and guarantee the success of a transaction. This allowed for more freedom of 
movement for the growth of Western financial systems whilst Islamic financial systems 
struggled to break out of the familial circle.  
 
Effectively, Islamic finance was not practiced on wide scale basis and was overshadowed by 
Western finance or what is accepted today as modern mainstream finance. The next major 
milestone for Islamic finance began during the post-World War II colonial period when many 
parts of the Islamic nation were, for the first time, able to govern themselves (Schaik, 2001). 
This led to widespread aversion for foreign social-political concepts and in turn created a 
strong inclination for a return towards traditional Islamic values (Schaik, 2001). The Marxist 
and capitalist concepts of Western finance were seen as very much foreign to the spectrum of 
Islam and this saw the adoption of the development of a financial system that was based on 
the theories and teachings of Shariah. This was the beginning of the modern Islamic financial 
system as we know it today (Khan, 2010a) 
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2.3.2.  The emergence of Modern Islamic Finance  
The first instances of modern Islamic Banking and Finance took place during the 1940s and 
1950s in Malaysia and Pakistan which involved small experiments with Islamic banks but it 
was not until 1960s that saw the creation of the Mit Ghamir Bank in Egypt and Tabung Haji 
in Malaysia that the global economy possessed modern Islamic financial institutions. With 
the capital growth of the Gulf States during the 1970s, due in part to the wealth of oil in the 
region, this period saw the creation of commercial Islamic banks such as that of Dubai 
Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House and Bahrain Islamic Bank. The growth of Islamic 
finance during this period also created an increased impetus within the realm of Islamic 
financial academia which in turn aided growth and development of Islamic finance on a 
global scale (Schaik, 2001). For the first time, modern financial systems were able to 
understand the concepts of Islamic finance and the operations of a financial system that 
existed without interest.  
 
The first half of the eighties saw the complete ‘Islamisation’ of the banking systems of both 
Iran and Pakistan while the second half of the nineteen eighties were not as favourable to this 
new financial system in the wake of unrest in the Middle East (Siddiqi, 2006). Over the next 
three decades from the early nineties up until present day saw the expansion and acceptance 
of Islamic finance into modern financial systems of the East and the West. Islamic financial 
hubs were created in large economics such as Japan and Hong Kong in the East to the United 
Kingdom and America in the West. A further development of the Islamic financial ethos was 
the adoption and provision of Islamic financial products within standard conventional 
banking, which in essence saw Islamic finance running in parallel to mainstream finance 
(Malik et al., 2011). However, the growth of Islamic finance through the current financial 
crises should not be overstated and while Islamic finance has experienced significant growth 
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since the turn of the millennia, expectations of development for the future should be 
grounded and modest. Figure 2 below provides a diagrammatic illustration of the temporal 
progression of Islamic finance from medieval to modern times. The red arrows denote major 
event of the Islamic financial timeline whilst the blue arrows highlight the use of major 
Islamic financial products and concepts of the respective periods.  
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Figure 2: Islamic finance: - A Timeline 
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2.4. Summative Remarks 
Chapter 2 aimed to provide the reader with a historical perspective of Islamic finance in 
practice. It highlights the operations of the medieval Islamic financial system and underlines, 
briefly, its day-to-day workings. What can be seen is that medieval Islamic finance has 
widespread acceptance of credit facilities and was built on close-knit trading relationships. In 
essence this was a significant reason for its decline through medieval times. These close-knit 
trading facilities were unable to compete with the informal trading relationships of medieval 
Western finance whose structure was more conducive towards developing international trade, 
banking and finance. The chapter has also examined the scope and beginnings of modern 
Islamic finance. Significantly, what was discovered was that modern Islamic finance did not 
truly begin until after the Second World War. Moreover, the chapter also highlights the 
introduction of prominent Islamic financial contracts and the shift of Islamic finance from 
PLS to debt-financing. Chapter 2 sets the scene for the following chapter, which provides an 
accompaniment of actual practices to Islamic financial theory. 
 
This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the practical and academic development 
of Islamic finance. It highlights the change in paradigm of Islamic financial thought with an 
initial focus on profit and loss sharing being substituted for debt financing and the growth in 
prominence of murabaha contracts throughout the Islamic financial world. In term of the 
development of the practical application of Islamic finance, what can be seen is that Islamic 
finance in the medieval world was significantly different from what is now accepted as 
modern Islamic finance. Nevertheless, the lack of growth in the prominence of medieval 
Islamic finance when compared the Western finance of that period was down to operation 
differences. Medieval Islamic financial systems existed in a spectrum of close knit business 
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relationships based on trust which made expansion into international trade difficult which in 
turn slowed its progress as a financial system. Modern Islamic finance came to fore after the 
Second World War and its growth has been steady ever since. 
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3. Overview of the Islamic Financial System 
3.1. Introduction to Chapter 
The following chapter aims to provide the reader with an overview of the literature behind 
Islamic finance and introduces the major themes of this research. Section 3.2. and 3.3. 
provides an introduction to the workings of Islamic finance, placing specific focus on riba, 
gharar and maysir (gambling). This research considers these three elements as central tenets 
of Islamic finance and the section considers current and key discourse around them. 
However, it should be noted that there are further doctrines of Islamic finance that will be 
documented in latter paragraphs of Section 3.2. Section 3.4. highlights the sudden growth of 
Islamic finance in the 20
th
 century providing a detailed analysis of the factors that contributed 
to this growth. It also provides an illustrative look at the proliferation of Islamic finance 
globally.  
 
Section 3.5. introduces the concept of Shariah-compliance and its continual development in 
Shariah financial systems. The section describes the types of Shariah windows and the 
criticisms levied against the use of these screens in the creation of Shariah-compliant 
products and services. The major activities and financing principles of Islamic Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) are explained in Section 3.6. with particular importance placed on the 
composition of PLS to Non-PLS modes of financing. Section 3.7. and 3.8., provide an 
introduction Islamic capital markets looking at Islamic bonds, equity and insurance 
respectively. Section 3.8. provides a summary of Chapter 3. 
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3.2. The Modern Islamic Financial System 
The growth of Islamic finance over the last 40 years has been rapid. More recently, during the 
1990s Islamic indices were created in both New York and London (Hussain, 2004; Hussein, 
2007). These indices consisted of companies who adhered to Islamic law and as such were 
not engaged in any services that were seen as haram (forbidden). Aside from this, the 
creation of a regulatory body, Islamic Financial Services Board and the issue of sukuks 
(Islamic bonds) further illustrate the development of this financial system to a point where it 
can no longer be ignored as a plausible outlet for potential diversification opportunities (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2007; El-Hawary et al., 2004).  
 
During the latter periods of the 20
th
 century there existed sufficient demand for Islamic 
banking which resulted in the creation of what is widely believed to be the world’s first 
modern Islamic bank, Mit Ghamir Local Savings Bank located in Egypt (Mayer, 1985; Kahf, 
2004). Since then the world of the Islamic financial system has evolved rapidly as traditional 
Western financial institutions realised the significant opportunities that such a system 
provided. The use of ‘Islamic windows’, where traditional Western financial institutions set-
up specialised entities to provide Shariah-compliant products to consumers, illustrated the 
importance placed upon the development of this infant financial system (Derigs and Marzban, 
2008; Grene, 2009). Examples of the use of these ‘Islamic windows’ can be seen from the 
creation of Citi Islamic Investment Bank in Bahrain by Citi Group (CitiIslamic, 2012). 
Additionally, the aggressive development into the Islamic financial market by institutions 
such as Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) would illustrate that this 
market can no longer be ignored as a viable investment outlet.  
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Over the past 6 years, the tumultuous economic environment of traditional Western markets 
has led many firms to seek diversification opportunities. As such, it could be considered that 
the ability for financial firms, in these stringent times, to be able to diversify into various 
other markets is one of significant importance in order to provide for an element of liquid 
security. Liquid security in this context refers to the ability to convert assets into cash. The 
growth of Islamic financial markets, as such, has not gone unnoticed over the years and has 
now matured into an industry that is currently worth $951 million (IFSL, 2010). However, 
the Shariah (Islamic Law) that governs these financial markets has to be carefully adhered 
with before any transactions for risk management purposes can take place. With elements 
such as riba, maysir and gharar not allowed under Shariah law there leaves a certain degree 
of greyness when it comes to risk management (Obaidullah, 1999).  
 
Islamic banking and finance operates on a profit and loss sharing (PLS) basis through 
concepts such as musharakah (equity partnership) and murdarabah (partnership) (Dar and 
Presley, 2000). Under these concepts financial institutions provide an element of finance to 
firms or private individuals, who will in turn make use of this capital injection. From this use 
of capital, either profits or losses are shared amongst the financier (financial institution) and 
financed (borrower). PLS contracting is considered a staple for Islamic institutions and it 
adheres to every aspect of Shariah. However, research done by Dar and Presley (2000) has 
suggested that only 20% of Islamic banking activities include aspects of PLS contracting. 
This research has also highlighted that much of the effort made by Islamic banks mainly 
concentrates around other Islamic products such as mark-up sales, leasing activities and 
financial partnerships (Khan, 2010b).  
 
34 
 
Let us consider one of the most widely use contracts in Islamic finance, a murdarabah 
(financial partnership), whereby two parties come together to engage in an investment. One 
party in the arrangement provides the capital, while the other party provides the expertise. In 
essence the former party acts as the sleeping partner. The profits and losses from the 
investment will be shared out in a predetermined ratio, which is agreed prior to contracting. A 
significant problem with this arrangement would be principal-agent issues. The party with the 
capital may not entirely share the same business sentiments as the party with the expertise in 
the running of the business. If the parties were substituted for a bank and a small business 
respectively, the bank would like to ensure that the small business is maximising its profit 
potential while the business maybe more focused on its customer experience. Now this is an 
extreme example but these concerns could possibly be alleviated through stringent credit 
checks. The fact that PLS essentially brings to fore principal-agent issues has meant that 
many Islamic banks are now engaging in practices that imitate that of their traditional 
Western counterparts.  These actions have had a mixed response within the Islamic and 
Western financial world (Presley and Sessions, 1994; Sarker, 1999; Jobst, 2009). Whilst 
some feel that Islamic financial systems are failing their Shariah obligations, others believe 
that the continual development of Islamic banking is a natural direction (Dar and Presley, 
2000). There is a need for a general evolution of Islamic finance to meet the requirements of 
today’s financial system. This is not to encourage a diluting of Islamic financial principles 
but an adaptation of their interpretation in trying to cope with an ever-changing financial 
world with new risks. 
 
A major area of Islamic financial activities would be in the area of sales. Unlike traditional 
Western financial systems, sales agreements under the canons of Islamic finance take on a 
different financial framework. Concepts such as murabaha and tawliya (trade at cost) may 
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seem similar to Western contracts but a strict Islamic stipulation would be that the seller of 
these products must also be the owner (El-Gamal, 2006). Therefore, ‘short’ selling of assets 
or commodities would be disallowed under the Islamic financial framework. Finally, another 
major activity of an Islamic financial system would be the development and maintenance of 
Islamic equities. In essence, these equities would be traded on a stock index and would 
encompass shares from firms that engage in halal (permissible) activities. So what essentially 
constitutes being halal? Now it would be easier to provide a list of what trading activities are 
prohibited and these include the sale of pork, investment banking services, assurance 
products, arms and munitions, tobacco, alcohol and drugs. However, there has been some 
criticism about companies belonging to these indexes. El-Gamal (2006) has stated that the 
use of Islamic screens in trying to determine if shares are Shariah-compliant is substantially 
subjective in nature. A more detailed explanation of these Shariah Screens/Windows is 
provided in Section 3.5. This in-turn has led to compromises being made about certain stocks 
and the subversion of critical Islamic laws. 
 
A recent ethical trend would be the concept of ‘green’ investments. ‘Green’ investments 
essentially involve the investment of funds into environmentally sound practices. Islamic 
finance is not so different from its Western counterparts in this sense. Maybe not in the same 
ethical context of ‘green’ investing but nonetheless the selection of investments to meet a 
certain criteria is of significant importance (Wilson, 1999). 
 
Islam suggests that there is a nexus between the Creator, man and the society on the basis of 
Divine Law that governs most aspects of life. It is based on this law that the rules surrounding 
Islamic finance are built (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). It could be said that Islamic finance 
would quintessentially be a financial system that prohibits interest. However, efforts to try 
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and explain this system of ‘no interest’ or the prohibition of riba are only a few decades old 
and in that time a considerable amount of literature has been published as highlighted in the 
review of the academic development of Islamic Banking and Finance in the previous chapter.  
 
As such, the concept of Islamic finance is built around the ideology of the Islamic religion 
and this has been its focal point 
 
 “… the strength of ideology determines the strength of rule-compliance, 
and therefore the strength of institutions, which, together with 
technology, determine the performance and efficiency of an economic 
system.” (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007, pg. 6) 
 
Non-interest banking or Islamic finance has been in existence for centuries. However, within 
the context of the modern economic world, its presence is widely regarded as developing, 
albeit at a rapid rate. As stated before, the laws that govern Islamic finance are derived from 
Shariah law, which are in fact Divine law based on the verses of the Koran.  
 
Although Shariah financial law, to a certain extent, is open to interpretation as to its severity, 
its intention is “for fair play and justice to all parties involved in the transaction” (Bacha, 
1999).  Having established these stipulations under the Islamic financial framework, the use 
of traditional Western risk management tools such as derivatives securities is still highly 
debatable. Many scholars such as Obaidullah (1999) and Bacha (1999) have suggested the 
need for an evolution of Islamic finance to take into consideration the use of these risk 
management tools as the economic environment surrounding Islamic finance is ever changing 
Adequate development of the system should, in the same instance as traditional Western 
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financial systems, be a proactive requirement rather than a reactive condition. A more 
detailed discussion of risk management under the Islamic financial framework is provided 
later in this study (See Chapter 5). 
 
3.3.  Riba, Gharar and Maysir 
Islamic finance, as its name suggests, adheres to the rules of Islam and as such seek to 
prohibit riba and prevent the onset of maysir and gharar. Riba or the charging of interest is a 
significant discussion point when it comes to Islamic financial activities, not only from the 
precepts of Islamic financial institutions but also from the perspective of Western mainstream 
financial systems. Islamic finance is widely known as non-interest banking within the 
mainstream financial world and much of the scepticism of mainstream financial participants 
about Islamic finance stems from this prohibition of riba. 
 
3.3.1. Riba 
Almost every financing method in today’s modern economic society includes some form of 
interest element. Place a deposit in a bank and interest is expected. Take a loan out from a 
bank and interest is paid. Lend to the government and once again interest is expected to be 
paid out. On a more macro-economic scale the foundations of sovereign lending and 
borrowing is built of the foundations of interest.  
 
Interest financing has been the system in place for the better part of two centuries and it plays 
a vital role towards an understanding of how the modern financial system works. The concept 
of interest creates a safeguard and remuneration package for both individuals and countries to 
lend to each other (Presley and Sessions, 1994). It also forms a standard measure of risk and 
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return. So how is it that a financial system could possibly believe that it could make do 
without interest? Under the Islamic financial model a structure was found that accommodates 
the lack of interest, albeit, not in the best of ways. It is not the interest percentage that is 
explicitly disallowed under Islamic finance. On the contrary, it is common to see elements 
such as the London Interbank Lending Rate (LIBOR) or even Eurobond lending rates 
existing is Islamic financial contracts (Khan, 2010a; Chapra, 2006).  
 
Even IFIs understand that these are the prevailing rates with which to structure financial 
products. The purpose of this new financial system is not to create arbitrage opportunities for 
global traders now is it? It is not the interest rates that cause a moral concern in Islamic 
finance but rather the fact that when financial institutions charge interest it is basically 
charging money for money (Khan, 1986; Ahmed et al., 1996; Choudhury, 1997; Chapra, 
2006; 2007). The concern for Islamic finance here lies in the tangibility of the product that 
individuals are being charged for and this is where the argument begins. Islamic finance 
views the charging and the paying of interest as essentially free money or money for money 
(Chapra, 2006). Customers for a bank place deposits in the bank and expect interest on their 
deposits for, what Islamic financial principals argue as no work in return for payment. Under 
Islamic finance, the real economy is the principal economy. Payment should only be made for 
a product or service in which both parties play an active part in achieving. This can once 
again be related back to bank deposits. In its staunchest of interpretations, depositors should 
receive no interest on any cash deposited as no work has been done to warrant this additional 
payment. Conversely, banks who lend to customers can only command the amount lent and 
not an additional interest payment.  
 
39 
 
It is possible to see the merits of the argument presented at hand as no individual would want 
to pay extra for an apple just because it was plucked personally, but that is how the modern 
economy works. It is not exploitation for a local grocer to charge extra for an apple that has 
to be transported, kept fresh and displayed in a store front to entice customers. These are all 
real and tangible costs in selling a product. With relation to banks and other deposit taking 
institution, interest rates are paid for risk being borne by the lenders so it is only fair to 
compensate for this risk taking. So theoretically speaking, is the Islamic financial model an 
overtly extreme stance on financial prudence? Yes and no. Yes in the sense that the Islamic 
financial system believes principally in the real market, where invariably real market 
activities will lead to stauncher controls on financial activities. The requirement of Islamic 
finance for proof of ownership before the sale of an item means that risk-seeking activities 
such as speculation are disallowed (El-Gamal, 2006; Iqbal, 2007). No short selling either in 
this case. It basically involves a more rigid stance on financing, risk management and 
investment banking. The emphasis of Islamic finance on having “real” transactions has meant 
that there is an increased importance placed upon profit-loss sharing (PLS) modes of 
financing and in fact most Islamic financial instruments can be broken up into participatory 
(PLS sharing) and non-participatory (Non-PLS sharing) subsets (Khan, 2010b).  
 
On the other hand however, riba is not only about the interest rate. More specifically, it is 
about the charging of excessive interest and in reality this argument is really about 
exploitation and how interest payments could result in detrimental outcomes in both the 
micro and macro economies (Chapra, 2007). The argument lies with the fact that the charging 
of interest will invariably lead to one party in the transaction absolving themselves of 
responsibility from the deal. A good example to illustrate the Islamic argument for riba is a 
standard repayment mortgage. After a ‘rigorous’ credit check, a bank provides a mortgage to 
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an individual. Should the customer default on payments the home is repossessed. This 
structure is considered as riba under Islamic finance as it is seen as money for money. The 
answer to this argument can be seen in the Islamic alternative to mortgages – hire purchase. 
Now hire purchase is not new to mainstream finance and is still widely used in the global 
manufacturing industry for the purchase of industrial machinery and its financing structure 
remains the same under Islamic finance. Bank buys house and lets it out to customer who 
then buys house off from the bank over a fixed period.  The fact that both parties have to 
actively engage in achieving their end goal – the bank having to ensure that the house is 
being taken care of and the tenant/owner having to ensure that payments are being made to 
guarantee a roof over his/her head – means that this agreement exists in the real sense (El-
Gamal, 2006). Both parties have a role to play in the fulfilment of this contract. 
 
Having this agreement exist in the spectrum of “real economic activity” essentially nullifies 
the concerns of the principle-agent theorem of debt financing. Both parties play an active part 
in the initial formation and the continual maintenance of the agreement and thereby should be 
rewarded accordingly. For the customer, the end result is a family/investment property and 
for the bank, the repayments plus “a little extra” every month are a justifiable profit for 
undertaking the risk of the hire purchase.  
 
It is possible to argue continuously and contentiously (see Dar and Presley, 1999; Chong and 
Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010b) about the fact that the Islamic financial methodology of structuring 
a financial product is just a rebranding and renaming of different elements of mainstream 
financial products and likewise that calling an apple by any other name does not change the 
fact that it is an apple. 
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As such the prohibition of riba in Islamic finance is not a prohibition of interest as a whole 
but rather interest financing. Prohibiting riba is mainly an exercise in trying to re-establish 
the real value of financial products by forcing these structures to actively exist in the real 
economic sense (Chapra, 2006; 2007). In essence Islamic finance is not trying to change the 
global financial market place but rather create a parallel financial system which focuses more 
on the real economy. 
 
3.3.2. Gharar and Maysir 
Aside from forbidding riba, Islamic finance also seeks to reduce gharar and maysir. It is 
possible to draw parallels between Islamic and mainstream finance at this juncture. The want 
to reduce the effects of uncertainty and gambling in any finance system are not limited to 
only Islamic finance but are also prevalent in the mainstream financial world. With the 
advent of the 21
st
 century and the development in information technology, there are now tools 
available to manage the levels of uncertainty and mitigate the detrimental effects of dubious 
speculative trades with the conventional banking and financial systems. The Islamic financial 
argument for the creation of uncertainty stems from the concept of jahl (lack of knowledge) 
and that this lack of knowledge is exacerbated by the proliferation of gambling (Bacha, 1999; 
Honohan, 2001; Smolarski et al., 2006; Mohammed and Tabatabaei, 2008). Gambling should 
not be confused with speculation but one can be excused for drawing similar underlying 
tendencies between the both.  
 
These arguments for speculation and gambling extend to that of the Islamic financial system. 
The fact that Islamic finance abides by the rules of Islam does not mean that market 
participants will not try to exploit the loop-holes and the fledgling governing foundations that 
exist in Shariah finance (Al-Dhareer, 1997). A core purpose of any financial system is the 
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creation of wealth and where there is money there will be people who will try anything to 
make it. 
 
Now the Islamic argument for uncertainty and gambling is that it arises out of jahl and aside 
from controlling gambling, this lack of knowledge can also be combated through the 
provision of information about products and services (Bacha, 1999). Due to the fact that 
Islamic finance is relatively new in the financial spectrum, many individuals, both 
practitioners and customers alike, have little knowledge of how Islamic financial products 
and services are structured (Maurer, 2002). This is not helped by the combination of a lack of 
information and the convoluted websites of these IFIs (Sundararajan and Errico, 2002). In 
order to combat this lack of knowledge more effort has to be made to “educate” the market 
about the position of Islamic finance. This should also work in the opposite direction and 
more effort has to be made to abate the inherent scepticism of mainstream market participants 
of Islamic finance (Iqbal, 2007; Wilson, 2007; Shaikh and Jalbani, 2009). 
 
3.4. The Sudden Growth of Islamic Finance 
With the inherent differences between Islamic and mainstream finance, one has to wonder 
about the sudden global interest in this fledgling financial system. Research has indicated that 
throughout the periods of 2000 up to 2008, Islamic finance grew by an average of 20% per 
year, with year on year growth improving up until the financial crisis (Ernst & Young, 
2011a). Islamic financial services and products were valued at upwards of $950 billion and 
Islamic financial hubs were being established in both Western (American, British and 
European) and Far Eastern (Japan and Hong Kong) economies (IFSL, 2010). The branching 
out of these hubs from their more traditional homes in Islamic countries such as Malaysia, 
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Indonesia, Pakistan and the Gulf States highlighted the sudden embrace of the mainstream 
economies for Shariah finance. This rapid growth can be attributed to a two-stage argument. 
 
The prominence of Islamic finance really took off during the boom years (1980s – 1990s) and 
more recently at the start of the new millennia. The global economy was experiencing an 
unusually strong bull phase. With this level of growth, there was an excess of capital in the 
market, which could be one of the causes of the quick development of Islamic finance. 
Institutions were always looking for new investment prospects and the size of the global 
Islamic population provided a market that was virtually untapped on a global scale. 
Additionally, the results of a well performing financial sector largely generate an increased 
level of consumption, which in turn results in an increase in manufacturing.  The rise of 
China’s manufacturing sector and consequently China’s oil consumption meant that oil rich 
countries in the Middle East were a hive of activity. This left Middle Eastern businessmen 
looking for investments that could, effectively, generate a return whilst observing their 
ethical, moral and religious beliefs (Shepherd, 1996). With an increasingly wealthy Gulf 
region looking for an alternative financial and banking system that adhered to their religious 
beliefs, it wasn’t long before other traditional mainstream financial systems saw the benefits 
and potential profits of setting up Islamic financial hubs.  
 
The strong ties of the Middle East with countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia have 
resulted in the rapid growth of Islamic finance in those regions. Moreover in the case of 
Malaysia, growth and development could also be attributed to government’s initiative of 
promoting Islamic finance to a population that comprised largely of a Muslim majority (Aziz, 
2006). Malaysia has been largely leading the way for the development of Islamic banking and 
finance in the Far East and over the past 30 years has developed a strong regulatory 
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foundation for Shariah finance. Initiatives such as the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and the 
Takaful Act 1984 highlight the strength of the development of the Malaysian framework for 
promoting Islamic Banking and Finance in the country as well as the region (Dar and Azami, 
2010). This stable regulatory standard has resulted in innovative developments within the 
Shariah financial industry with the creation of several Shariah exchange traded funds, unit 
trusts and sukuk issues (Dar and Azami, 2010). In 2004 measures, which taken to eliminate 
tax anomalies between Islamic and conventional finance, were included into the Federal 
Budget to bring Islamic finance to a more level playing field with conventional finance in the 
country (Dar and Azami, 2010). Figure 3 below illustrates key milestones in Malaysia’s 
development of Islamic Banking and Finance in the country. 
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Figure 3: Key Milestones in the development of Malaysia’s Islamic Capital Markets (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010) 
*bai’ bithaman ajil: deferred payment sale
01/01/1982 31/12/2009
1983
Malaysia establish its 
first Islamic bank. 
Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad (BIMB)
1990
First bai’bithaman ajil* Islamic
Debt security by Shell
MYR125 million
1994
First sukuk mudaraba 
by Cagamas Berhad
MYR30 million
01/01/2001
First global corporate 
sukuk ijara 
by Kumpulan Guthrie
2002
First global sovereign sukuk juara
By Government of Malaysia
US$60 million
2005
First sukuk musharakah
by One Capital 
MYR2.5 billion
2005
First to issue guidelines for Islamic REITs
2006
First exchangeable sukuk 
by Khazanah Nasional
US$70 million
2006
First global sukuk index
Dow Jones Citigroup Sukuk
2007
World’s largest sukuk issuance until date
MYR15.35 billion
By Binariang GSM
2008
First Asian Shari’a Exchange Traded Fund 
MyETF Dow Jones islamic Market Malaysia Titan 25
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The development and adoption of Islamic finance in the West, however, was a varied bag of 
experiences with the growth of Islamic finance mainly concentrated in the United Kingdom 
and European region. In the USA, until 2000, the growth and development of Islamic 
financial products and services grew at a steady rate however, in the wake of the September 
11
th
 attacks and the resulting War on Terror, Islamic finance quickly dwindled in the 
American economy (Khan, 2010a). This was the outcome of Muslims not wanting to invest 
in America for the war and Americans shying away from Islamic financial products and 
services due to its perceived associations to terrorism (Kahf, 2002 and 1999; Ali and Syed, 
2010). However, in either sense, every attempt was made to revive Islamic finance in the US 
with the launch of the Dow Jones Bursa Islamic Index, which was a joint effort between 
America and Malaysia and while early signs were positive, its success ultimately was 
undermined by a lack of global interest (Khan, 2010a). As can be seen from Table 1 below a 
major success story of Islamic finance in the West would be the UK with the birth of Islamic 
banks such as the Islamic Bank of Britain (Ainley et al., 2007; Wilson, 2007). Additionally, 
the launch of Shariah-compliant banking and financing services by more mainstream banks 
such as HSBC and Citi-group in the UK has also cemented its spot as the only Western 
economy in the top ten of market capitalisation of Islamic financial products and services 
illustrated in Table 2. 
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Number Located in Each Country 
UK 22 
USA 9 
Australia 4 
France 3 
S. Africa 3 
Switzerland 3 
Canada 1 
Cayman Islands 1 
Germany 1 
Ireland 1 
Luxembourg 1 
Russia 1 
Table 1: Islamic Banks in Western Countries & Offshore Centres (Source:IFSL, 2010) 
 
  Total Total 
    
  2007 2008 Banks Takaful Other Number of Firms 
Iran 235.3 293.2 290.6 2.6 --- 23 
S. Arabia 92 127.9 127.1 0.8 --- 20 
Malaysia 67.1 86.5 84.4 2.1 --- 37 
UAE 49.1 84 83 2.1 --- 18 
Kuwait 63.1 67.6 57.4 0.2 10 30 
Bahrain 37.4 46.2 44.2 0.4 1.6 34 
Qatar 21 27.5 25.3 0.4 1.8 16 
UK 18.1 19.4 19.4 --- --- 6 
Turkey 15.8 17.8 17.8 --- --- 4 
Bangladesh 5.7 7.5 7.5 --- --- 15 
Sudan 5.3 7.2 7 0.2 --- 22 
Egypt 5.7 6.3 6.3 --- --- 3 
Pakistan 6.3 5.1 5.1 --- --- 18 
Jordan 3.3 4.6 4.5 --- 0.1 6 
Syria 0.6 3.8 3.8 --- --- 2 
Iraq --- 3.8 3.8 --- --- 1 
Indonesia 3.4 3.4 3.2 0.2 --- 20 
Brunei 2.7 3.2 3.2 --- --- 1 
Others 7.2 7.1 6.5 0.4 0.2 26 
Total 639.1 822.1 800.1 8.3 13.7 302 
Table 2: Islamic Finance by Country (Source: IFSL, 2010) 
 
3.5. An Examination of Shariah-windows/screens 
The research has spoken about the proliferation of Islamic financial hubs globally in the West 
and the Far East but has not indicated how Islamic finance exists within these hubs.  Broadly 
speaking Islamic finance can exist in three different banking and finance models within any 
financial system (Khan, 2010a). The first model is basically the adoption of a completely 
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Islamic model where the entire financial system is purely Shariah-based, such as in Pakistan 
and Indonesia. The second model is a parallel banking system whereby Islamic and standard 
finance are offered in the market place. This is the model adopted by Malaysia who now 
possesses highly developed Islamic and mainstream financial markets offering Shariah-based, 
Shariah-complaint and traditional mainstream financial products. The third and final model of 
Islamic financial adoption would be a standard financial system incorporating and 
accommodating Islamic finance through the use of Shariah windows/screens. 
 
In recent years there has been significant development of Shariah-compliant funds that are 
now traded globally on developed exchanges such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). The creation of indexes such as the FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia EMAS and Hijara Shariah Index (quoted on the LSE) and a host of Dow Jones 
Islamic Indexes has meant that Shariah Compliant Indexes (SCIs) are now more readily 
available for the traditional Western, mainstream investor. These indexes essentially include 
companies that adhere to a number of criteria known as Shariah screens, which impose a 
halal standard on the activities of companies.  
 
Before going on to discuss what Shariah windows are, it will be best to make the distinction 
between Shariah-based and Shariah-compliant. Throughout this thesis, the author will make 
reference to Shariah-based products and Shariah-compliant products. Shariah-based products 
are based rigidly around the laws of Islam. In theory these are the “true” Islamic financial 
products as they fully abide to the rules of Islam. On the other hand, Shariah-compliant 
products are based on the Shariah standards of the Shariah/Islamic windows (Sundararajan 
and Errico, 2002). This is basically a relaxed interpretation of the rules of Islam to create and 
49 
 
foster the development of new Islamic financial products, which are able to deal with the 
rigours of modern global finance. It should be noted that Islamic financial systems are not 
forced to exist and operate at either standard’s spectrum of Shariah-based or Shariah-
compliance but rather these standards run in tandem. It is possible and very common for 
Islamic financial systems to have both Shariah-based and Shariah-compliant products on 
offer. 
 
As stated earlier Islamic banks exist in three different spectrums namely as Islamic banks that 
belong to a wholly Islamic financial system, Islamic banks that operate in a conventional 
financial system and conventional banks that offer Shariah-compliant products and services. 
The main issue for banks in all three categories would be Shariah governance. For the former 
two categories, Shariah governance would present itself in trying to ensure the Shariah 
integrity of the Islamic financial products and services that are being provided and to 
guarantee that business transactions of banks do not transcend into haram activities. For the 
latter category Shariah governance has more to do with the assessment of Shariah-
compliance. As Islamic finance has grown there has been a tendency to replicate 
conventional financial products using Shariah concepts that blur the line of Shariah-
compliance (see El-Gamal, 2006; Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998; Khatkhatay and Nisar, 
2007a; 2007b). Table 3 below highlights the Shariah-screens used by a Western financial 
system in assessing the Shariah-compliance of new Islamic financial products and services.  
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 DETAIL 
Main line-of-business screen 
Income from non-permissible activities 
has to be less than 5% of total revenue 
generated by a company 
Financial ratios screens: 
Liquidity screen 
 
The sum of accounts receivables, cash 
and short-term investments should not 
exceed 50% of the total assets (or market 
capitalisation) of a company 
Interest screen 
 
Interest income may not represent more 
than 5% of total revenue of a company 
Gearing screen 
 
The portion of total debt may not exceed 
a certain threshold (either 30% or 33%) 
of total assets (or market capitalisation) 
of a company 
Table 3: Description of main screens (Source: Obaidullah, 2009) 
Note: non-permissible activities (haram activities) include engaging in the sale of alcohol, tobacco, gaming, 
arms manufacturing, life insurance, pork and banking.  
 
These Shariah windows/screens can be broken up into two categories, namely line-of-
business and financial ration screens. Line-of-business screens make reference to the 
principal business activities of any institution. Should any more than 5% of total income arise 
from these principal business activities, the company is no longer Shariah-compliant under 
this screen.  What can be see is that line of business screens are qualitative in nature and 
although some objective (i.e. numerical) thresholds do exist such as the proportion of 
turnover generated by the forbidden activity (for instance alcohol is sold by airports but that 
is not the main line of business and therefore they account for a small proportion of their 
turnover), this type of screen may require a potentially subjective interpretation of Shariah 
law. This concern is shared by El-Gamal (2006) and Wilson (2004) who state that being 
subjective in nature, these line-of-business screens may be difficult to govern and may 
require continual monitoring. This monitoring and compliance with the screen, however, can 
only be reviewed in line with the frequency of official reports by companies as observed by 
Derigs and Marzban (2008).  
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Derigs and Marzban (2008) provide a useful review of the screens as defined by the Shariah 
boards of different organizations involved in offering Sharia-compliant indexes
2
. They find a 
high degree of similarity in terms of which industries are included and whether to totally 
exclude companies partially involved in haram activities. 
 
The financial ratios screen can be further broken up into 3 subsets including, liquidity, 
interest and gearing screens. As their names suggest these focus on the liquidity, interest and 
the gearing of the institution in question. With regards to liquidity, a company is required to 
maintain less than 50% of market capitalisation in cash and short term investments. Interest 
screen requires that no more than 5% of total income can come from interest revenue and the 
gearing screen demands that the portion of debt held cannot exceed a stipulated threshold. 
This limit is commonly set at either 30% or 33% but would depend on the various exchanges 
with their own interpretation of Shariah law (Khatkhatay and Nisar, 2007a). 
 
Although the financial (ratios) screens are relatively easier to implement, they still present a 
number of challenges. Similar in spirit to the capital adequacy requirements set out in the 
pillars of the Basel Accord, these financial ratio screens provide a (tentative) quantitative 
framework by which companies will be assessed. Some commonly used ratios in this context 
are a 33% threshold for company gearing or that total cash and interest bearing securities 
over total assets ratio should not exceed 33.33% (MSCI Barra, 2007).  
 
                                                 
2
 The Dow Jones Islamic Index Group, the Financial Times Islamic Index Series, the Standard & Poor's Islamic 
Index Group, the Morgan Stanley Capital International Islamic Index Series, Dubai Islamic Bank, the HSBC 
Amanah Fund, the Meezan Islamic Fund , the Amiri Capital Islamic Fund  and the Azzad Islamic Fund. Another 
well-known and cited Shariah screening process is of the Malaysian Security and Exchange Commission, which 
is, however, not included in the review since the guidelines defined are unique to Malaysia. 
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However, recent developments linking gearing to market capitalisation rather than assets, has 
attracted its fair share of criticisms (see El-Gamal 2006), for being too pro-cyclical, with 
companies (even banks) dropping in and out of SCIs, following the state of the stock markets.  
 
At this point it should be noted that these screens are not enforced separately or on an 
achievement basis where the fulfilment of one screen means a progression onto the next set 
of rules on the chain. Rather, both line-of-business and financial ratio screens are assessed in 
parallel. An institution will not be granted Shariah-compliant status if it passes the line-of-
business screens but fails on one of the financial ratio screens. However, from the slight 
relaxation of Islamic rules is can be seen that these windows construct a structure for easy 
translation of Shariah-based products into mainstream finance. Moreover, these windows also 
possess a set of rules that enable traditional financial instruments to be incorporated into 
Islamic finance (El-Gamal, 2006). It should also be noted that Shariah-compliant stocks are 
screened at a central level by institutions such as the Shariah Advisory Council and not by 
individual companies (Nisar, 2007)
3
. 
 
This manipulation of traditional financial products to create new Shariah-compliant 
instruments has greatly aided in the development of Islamic financial in keeping up to date 
with financing risk management and capital generation activities that are needed in any 
financial system. These Shariah-windows are set out by most major exchanges, as well as 
Islamic financial hubs, and each have a set of rules that are unique to themselves although 
there has been more centralization in the wake of criticisms of a lack of uniformity within the 
system. These rules are set out by a Shariah council, and consist of a less rigid interpretation 
of the laws of Islam (Khatkhatay and Nisar, 2007b).  
                                                 
3
 For an exhaustive analysis of the role of Shariah supervisory Boards please see DeLorenzo (2000) 
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For example, the Dow Jones Islamic index is a Shariah-compliant index formed based on 
these Islamic windows and contains companies that are deemed halal – so sale of pork, 
munitions, alcohol, insurance and financial products and tobacco. A demonstration of this 
less rigid interpretation of Shariah laws is seen in the inclusion of McDonalds in this Dow 
Jones Islamic index.  If one were to consider the global activities of McDonalds, they operate 
in almost every corner of the world. In countries such as Thailand, Switzerland and Japan, 
McDonalds sells pork burgers, which is a haram activity under Islamic law. Were this a 
Shariah-based index, McDonalds would not be allowed but the availability of Shariah 
windows has meant that all companies that do not conduct more that 5% of haram activities 
annually are eligible for inclusion into the index. This is just one example of how Shariah 
windows create opportunities for Islamic finance to develop within the modern financial 
world. The slightly less rigid interpretation of Islamic laws has enabled product designers to 
create financial instruments that enable Islamic finance to not only keep pace with the 
developments of the global economy but also address existing financial issues such as risk 
management and liquidity transfer (El-Gamal, 2006).  
 
What these Shariah windows allow for would be the flexibility afforded to product and 
service development by way of Shariah-compliance. Shariah-compliance is an important 
underlying regulatory issue in modern Islamic finance. As stated before, consumer 
confidence builds stability, which is pivotal towards the growth of a financial system. A 
feature of Islamic finance is that consumer confidence is built upon the fact that financial 
business conforms to their religious beliefs. Should this fail, the pillars upon which Islamic 
finance was built would crumble (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). As such the governance and 
regulation of Shariah-compliant standards are an essential part of modern Islamic finance. 
The job of assessing the validity of Shariah-compliance takes place at institutional level with 
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each institution that offers Islamic financial services having in-house religious advisors, 
collectively known as the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006).  
 
Shariah windows have come under immense scrutiny in recent years due in part to the 
decision making process as to what is and what is not Shariah-compliant. These decisions are 
undertaken by a SSB and individual institutions wishing to create Shariah-compliant products 
must seek approval from an in-house SSB as to its validity. It has to be made clear that the 
criticisms are not wholly against the Shariah windows but rather the composition of the SSBs 
that arrive at a decision as to the “Shariah-ness” of any new financial instrument (El-Gamal, 
2006).  
 
For a start, there is lack of disclosure as to the composition of board members. Each 
institution will have access to its own SSB. This SSB will oversee the Shariah-compliance 
decisions of all the company’s Islamic financial activities be it product development to 
service provision. There is a lack of transparency when it comes to disclosing who actually 
sits on these boards (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). Shariah scholars who are adequately 
proficient in the interpretation of both Islamic and financial law are few and far between and 
thus there are only a limited number. Moreover, Shariah-compliance is very much dependent 
on a Shariah scholar’s interpretation of Shariah law and thus “more lenient” scholars maybe 
increasingly sought after. This has created an inflated demand for “certain” Shariah scholars 
in what is being termed “Shariah-headhunting” or “Shariah-ala-carte” where companies 
explicitly seek out specific Shariah scholars based on how lenient their interpretations of 
Shariah law are. Another source of concern about the SSBs would be that due to the lack of 
Shariah scholars in the financial system, what occurs is an overlap of scholars on different 
boards of different institutions (Akhtar, 2006; Khan, 2007; Assem, 2009). This creates a 
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conflict of interest when rival institutions seek Shariah-compliance for financial instruments. 
This could come down to remuneration packages on offer and as a consequence start a 
bidding war between IFIs seeking the most moderate Shariah scholars in a want for quick 
Shariah approval of new products. These are the two main issues with the use of SSBs within 
the context of Shariah windows.  
 
It is argued however (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002), that these issues would sort themselves out 
on the basis of moral grounds. Shariah scholars that seek to profit from their position would 
quickly garner a reputation within the industry and this would eventually lead to a lack of 
faith in respect to interpretations. It has to be understood that, although it is a financial 
system, Islamic finance and its participants place a significant amount of emphasis on 
morality. Thus a Shariah scholar who decides to abuse the position would only be shooting 
himself in the foot. Moreover, this argument of morality and honesty forms a strong basis 
within the fundamental principles of Islam.  
 
The argument is that it would be highly unlikely for a scholar of Islam to disregard these 
principles for personal gain and is in fact a crude postulation that Shariah scholar would 
provide their services to the best pay package. Additionally, it also boils down to a concern of 
paying for a service. Let us consider university fees paid by students as an example of how 
this concern works. University fees do not guarantee a pass and a certificate at the end of a 
degree but rather provides the student with the privilege of studying at the respective 
institution.  If this argument were to be related to Shariah-headhunting what is derived is a 
picture whereby an IFI has paid for a Shariah-compliance judgement and it should in fact be 
known that this payment does not guarantee Shariah approval. 
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However, the Shariah scholars only form part of the composition of any SSB, with other 
members consisting of financial engineers and managers. Do these arguments favouring the 
fact that morality and honesty will sort out the problems of a conflict of interest apply to 
them? If Islamic finance was likened to ethical investing - ethical investors seek investments 
on socially responsible grounds. Yes, the main aim could still be to make a profit but the 
importance of that aim is shared with the want for an ethical investment. It is thus not solely 
about profit maximisation. Should that investment be no longer socially responsible the 
investor would more likely that not cease trading in that asset. This would apply to Islamic 
finance as well. Should there be any doubt with regards to the “Shariah-ness” of any 
investment or product, market participants would just not invest in it. 
 
It has been discussed how SSBs are a cause for concern with regards to Shariah windows, but 
doesn’t the fact that Shariah windows exist dilute the Islamic integrity of the financial system 
as a whole? Do note that Shariah-compliance is not a complete nullification of Islamic law 
but rather a slightly less rigid interpretation. In essence it provides an environment that 
fosters the growth and development of new financial products and instruments. It allows for 
innovative approaches to structuring Islamic financial products to meet the needs of the 
Shariah financial market place. However care has to be taken with the Shariah-compliant 
process. Whilst initial steps in mimicking conventional products could prove successful in 
terms of market adoption, this should not be taken for granted. Some of the risks faced by 
Islamic finance are different from that of conventional finance and innovation should also be 
directed at mitigating these risks. These Shariah screens should be seen as an opportunity for 
innovators to engineer financial products and services that would fit a conventional and an 
Islamic portfolio.  
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3.6. Islamic financial Concepts – What are the major financial 
activities of IFIs? 
Section 3.5. discusses the differences between Shariah-based and Shariah-compliant and it is 
only natural for the Islamic financial system to possess a mix of products that exist in both 
these arrays. This section will introduce the major Islamic financial activities as instruments 
available to market participants.  
 
Islamic financial activities mainly centre around three major sectors – deposit taking/ lending 
institutions for personal finance, equity investments and sukuks (Islamic bonds). With 
reference to Figure 4 below it can be observed that the majority of the $951 billion market 
capitalisation of Islamic finance services and products is in commercial banking (74%), with 
investment banking and sukuk issues taking up 10% each and the remainder in Islamic funds 
and takaful (insurance) services (IFSL, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 4: Growth of Islamic Finance (Source: IFSL, 2010) 
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Within these sectors there are a whole host of products that cater to the needs of market 
participants and these financial instruments can be further broken up into participatory 
(profit-loss sharing) and non-participatory (non-profit-loss sharing). Essentially, PLS 
financing methods are more in line with Islamic principles in trying to prevent riba (El-
Qorchi, 2005). However, it has been argued that this pursuit of riba has been a relatively 
modern Islamic financial development. This is to say that whilst the prohibition of riba is a 
central tenet of Islamic finance, the chase to eliminate it entirely from the financial system is 
very much a recent desire. What can be seen from the products above would be that although 
PLS financing is, to a certain extent, more riba-complaint, these contracts fail to provide a 
viable alternative when it comes to short-term financing and liquidity transfer. These 
attributes can be achieved far more efficiently through non-PLS modes of financing and in 
fact the bulk of financing and investment break down for the largest Islamic banks indicate 
that non-PLS forms of finance dominate the balance sheets as can be seen from Table 4 
below. 
 
   2006    2005  
    
% PLS 
% Non-
PLS 
% Other  % PLS 
% Non-
PLS 
% Other 
Large Islamic Banks        
Al Rajhi Bank 0.00 99.50 0.50  0.00 99.70 0.30 
Kuwait Finance House 20.10 78.40 1.50  22.70 75.10 2.20 
Dubai Islamic Bank 14.40 85.60 0.00  25.30 74.70 0.00 
Bank Islam Malaysia 0.70 99.00 0.30  0.79 98.80 0.40 
Table 4: Spread of PLS and Non-PLS forms of financing in the largest Islamic banks 
(Source: Khan, 2010a) 
 
There are several financial concepts that are central to the Islamic financial world. The most 
popular method of organising these concepts is by distinguishing between PLS sharing 
contracts and non-PLS sharing contracts (Khan, 1992). Moreover, it should be noted that 
each of these concepts could be a standalone financial instrument or they could be coupled 
59 
 
with different Islamic financial instruments to form new products. The structures for Islamic 
instruments could become increasingly complicated as fund managers modify structures to 
suit prevailing needs. 
 
3.6.1.  PLS financing concepts 
3.6.1.1. Musharakah (Equity participation contract)  
Figure 5: Musharakah Structure (Source: Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007) 
 
Figure 5 above illustrates a standard musharakah contract. In this structure the bank is not the 
sole provider of the capital investment but in fact both parties (bank and investor) contribute 
a percentage of capital towards the investment opportunity. Profits/losses are shared out at a 
predetermined ratio, usually set out before contracting takes place and based on the capital 
invested initially. The main uses of musharakah contracts are mainly for long term 
investment projects. As both parties contribute a capital sum to the investment both are in a 
position to exercise voting rights and participate in the management of the investment 
opportunity. 
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3.6.1.2. Murdarabah (Trustee financing contract)  
Figure 6: Murdarabah Structure (Source: Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007) 
 
This structure sees the partner 1/ bank (rab al-mal) providing the entire sum of capital to 
partner 2/ borrower (mudarib) who possesses the expertise and will undertake the day-to-day 
management of the investment. Once again profits and losses are shared out at a 
predetermined ratio set out before contracting. Many of the concerns about PLS sharing stem 
from this structure whereby the bank bears all of the financial risk of the capital injection. 
Moreover, this structure requires complete transparency between the parties and is concerned 
about the presence of non-disclosure/non reporting of profits. This risk can be reduced 
through a vetting process and a request for collateral before contracting. However, it should 
be noted that the lender (bank) is only entitled to a principle repayment should there be 
profits.  Should the investment yield a loss the lender bears a percentage of this and it does 
not constitute a default on the part of the borrower unless it can be proven that this loss was 
through mismanagement and negligence. 
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3.6.2. Non-PLS modes of financing  
3.6.2.1.  Murabaha (Cost-plus financing) 
Figure 7: Murabaha Structure (Source: Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007) 
 
This is the most popular financial contract within the Islamic financial world. It essentially, 
creates a mode of debt financing which provides a clearer cut form of financing. In this 
structure the lender will purchase the desired commodity/asset from a broker and then sell it 
on to the borrower at cost plus some mark-up. This contract is used for both long and short 
term financing projects. The mark-up on this sale on to the borrower will be tied into an 
interest rate such as LIBOR or US T-Bills and can also be determined based on the 
borrower’s credit rating. Two issues are persistent with this structure namely the value of the 
mark-up and the non-conformity of goods. With relation to mark up value, lenders must 
ensure that the prevailing interest rate used and any additional percentage attachment based 
on borrower credit rating does not tantamount to being excessive. Regarding non-conformity 
of goods, the borrower would be able to reject the goods, leaving the lender with ownership. 
However to combat this legal predicament, the lender is entitled to have the borrower act as 
an agent to verify the assets prior to acceptance. 
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3.6.2.2. Ijara (Islamic lease contract)  
Figure 8: Ijara Structure (Source: Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007) 
 
These lease contracts are similar to their mainstream counterparts. In this contract, the lender 
(bank) leases out the asset to the borrower for agreed lease payments. The borrower is also 
under no obligation to purchase the asset at the end of the specified lease period and the 
maintenance of the assets is the responsibility of the lender. The profit element for the lenders 
in this case arises from adding a certain percentage on to the overall value of the leased asset 
and collateral could also be required up front. An issue to consider with ijara structures 
would be the percentage added on although it has been accepted to match Islamic financial 
law as the return is unique to each individual asset.  
 
3.6.2.3. Istisna (Contract of exchange)  
Figure 9: Istisna Structure (Source: Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007) 
 
The istisna structure pertains to an exchange of goods at a specified date for a specified price. 
These items being exchanged should be produced/ constructed to a certain specification, for 
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example a building being built. This contract is mainly used for large industrial or 
infrastructure projects and can be seen as a structure used for government borrowing. 
 
3.6.2.4. Salam (Differed delivery)  
The bai al-salam was established fundamentally to facilitate agriculture transactions. Under 
this framework a price for a commodity would be agreed up front and delivery of that 
commodity would take place at a pre-specified later period. This agreed price could either be 
paid up front or the value fixed for payment upon delivery. In either case the bai al-salam is 
the closest thing that Islamic finance has to a standard forward contract. Bai al-salam is 
general regarded as a permissible credit facility under a Shariah framework as elements such 
as commodity being sold, price and delivery date are all decided before contracting 
eliminating uncertainty. Although permissible bai al-salam structures are not very popular in 
Islamic finance due to two things. Firstly, these contracts require full payment for the 
commodity either up front or upon delivery. Secondly, markets price bay al-salam contracts 
in a similar vein to standard forward contracts with an interest element and as such some may 
regard this as riba (Obaidullah, 2002; Iqbal, 1999; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1999; Obaidullah, 
1998). 
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3.6.2.5. Tawarruq (Cash Sale)  
Figure 10: Tawarruq Structure (Source: Siddiqui, 2008) 
 
In its most basic form a tawarruq is where a borrower, also known as a mutawarriq in this 
contract, agrees to purchase a certain commodity/asset from the lender at an agreed price on a 
deferred payment basis. This commodity/asset is then sold on immediately at a price that is 
less than the agreed price between borrower and lender, essentially creating a debt. 
 
3.6.2.6.  Einah (Sale – Repurchase Agreement)  
Like bai al-salam, einah contracts have been causing slight controversy with regards to 
permissibility under Islamic financial jurisprudence. Islamic banks are able to transform a 
standard murabaha contract into an einah contract by keeping the identity of the broker and 
borrower the same as demonstrated in Figure 10 below. 
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Figure 11: Einah Structure (Source: Siddiqui and Athemy, 2008) 
 
Einah contracts are largely regarded as amounting to riba on the basis that is a combination 
of two or more contracts into a single transaction however the advent of modern Islamic 
banking has seen the adoption of Bai al-einah contracts by a few Islamic banks (Siddiqui and 
Athemy, 2008). 
 
3.6.2.7. Wa’ad (Promise to deliver)  
Within a financial context a wa’ad could also be described as a unilateral promise or the 
assurance of one party (the producer) to deliver the goods in the future. In its currency 
incarnation in modern Islamic finance, the wa’ad based on a murabaha contract is 
enforceable in a conventional court of law. Since the wa’ad is a unilateral promise, the 
Shariah requirements of ownership and knowledge or price and time before trading do not 
apply (Razali, 2008). The standard wa’ad structure is described in the diagram below. 
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Figure 12: Wa’ad structure (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010) 
 
Under this structure Party A promises to deliver a certain amount of goods at a certain price 
to Party B in the future. In return Party B pays a non-refundable fee (similar to an option 
premium) for this service. Upon maturity Party B could elect to hold Party A to the promise 
or waive the contractual obligation of the structure. In essence this is similar to a holder of an 
option exercising or not exercising the option contract (Dar and Azami, 2010).  
 
The wa’ad is a relatively new contract within the Islamic financial spectrum but is becoming 
increasingly accepted as Shariah-compliant (Razali, 2008; Qazi, 2012). A wa’ad allows 
institutions to synthetically proxy the payoff of a standard call option. This basically, enables 
the holder of this wa’ad to decide if the contract in question is going to be exercised.  The 
availability of this choice, some argue (Noor and Aripin, 2010), violate the gharar 
requirement of Islamic finance. In trying to prevent gharar the specifications of all contracts 
in Islamic finance must be agreed upon prior to trading. The fact that the holder of this 
contract is given a choice has created an element of uncertainty to the transaction.  The 
research will discuss the stance of Islamic finance on the acceptance of derivative securities 
in Chapter 5, but in essence derivatives are explicitly disallowed under a Shariah framework 
due precisely to this creation of uncertainty. However, some argue that the inherent benefits 
of derivatives within any financial system should outweigh their detriments and in fact 
promote growth and liquidity transfer within the Islamic financial system (Mohammed and 
Tabatabaei, 2008). 
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3.6.2.8. Arboun (Earnest money contract)  
Figure 13: Arboun Structure (Source: Hassan and Lewis, 2007a and 2007b) 
 
The diagram above depicts an arboun structure. The purchaser pays a percentage deposit to 
the owner for the right to purchase an asset at a future date. Should the purchaser elect to go 
through with the contract, the deposit is taken away from the sale price of the asset at the 
future date. Should the purchaser decide not to proceed with the contract, the deposit is 
foregone. The percentage deposit could be seen as similar to an option premium. However 
consideration must be given to the fact that an option’s premium is not deductible from the 
eventual price.  
 
The arboun contract is not very popular within the Islamic financial spectrum due to views 
(Hassan and Lewis, 2007a and 2007b) on its permissibility. This concern is due to the fact 
that the percentage deposit (or what would be the premium) is conditional on the transaction. 
However, this basic concept does form a strong basis from which to build Islamic risk 
management instruments. 
 
3.7. Islamic capital Markets 
The foundations of the modern Islamic capital market can be traced back to the 1970s with 
the creation of the “first” commercial Islamic bank – Dubai Islamic Bank. Since then, there 
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have been large steps made in the development of concepts such as asset management and 
Islamic funds during the 1990s, which were bolstered by the establishment of AAOIFI. The 
new millennium saw the issuance of the first Islamic bond (sukuk) and the creation of Islamic 
investment banks. The propagation of aspects such as Islamic investments has highlighted the 
need for increased development of liquidity management products in Islamic finance (Ismal, 
2010; Dar and Azami, 2010).  
 
These developments are not only being encouraged from the GCC regions and large Islamic 
banking centres such as Malaysia but also from more mainstream sources. With the current 
financial crisis there has been increased emphasis from mainstream financial participants for 
safe investment opportunities. With the prohibition of speculation, the impact of the financial 
crisis was seen to have had a “dulled” effect on the variability of performance of Islamic 
financial funds (Farooq, 2009).  The performance of emerging markets over these financial 
crises – a product of lower leverage positions – is also an argument for the development of 
Islamic capital markets and the growth of these products into mainstream financial systems. 
Figure 14 highlights the major capital market sectors available within the Islamic financial 
spectrum. 
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Figure 14: Islamic Capital Market Products (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010) 
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3.7.1.  Islamic equity markets  
Islamic equities are essentially stocks and shares in companies that are deemed halal under 
Shariah-compliant screening process. Companies which engage in business activities that 
include gambling, sale of pork, alcohol, tobacco, pornography, arms and munitions are all 
seen as haram (prohibited). Additionally, companies who derive a large proportion of income 
from interest based activities are also excluded and these include financial entities such as 
banks and insurance companies. The growth of Islamic finance outside of traditional Muslim 
economies has meant that the use of Shariah screens has become increasingly important to 
the global Islamic financial system. These screens are used to create Shariah-compliant 
indices, which include identified Shariah-compliant stocks and shares.  
 
This first Islamic equity index was launched in Malaysia in 1996 and this was succeeded by 
the Dow Jones Islamic Index in 1999 (Dar and Azami, 2010). The growth of these Islamic 
indexes has been steady with a market capitalisation of $709 million as of July 2009. It 
should be noted that Shariah-compliant companies need not necessarily be Islamic companies 
and could be prominent, global, non-Islamic institutions.  The popularity of Islamic equities 
can be seen from the proliferation of Islamic indexes on the Dow Jones where Shariah 
screening processes are applied to the stocks and equities of countries such as China and 
Malaysia resulting in the creation of the Dow Jones Islamic Market China/ Hong Kong Titans 
30 and the Dow Jones Islamic Market Malaysia Titans 25 (Dow Jones, 2012). Exchanges 
such as the FTSE have also established similar Shariah-compliant indexes such as the FTSE 
SGX Shariah index, FTSE DIFX Shariah Index and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index (FTSE, 
2012). While in the East the Hang Seng Exchange has the Hang Seng Islamic Investment 
Series (Hang Seng, 2012). 
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3.7.2. Islamic Funds  
As can be seen in Figure 13 there are large variety of Islamic funds however their general 
characteristics remain the same. All Islamic funds are managed according to the rules of 
Shariah and the investments made by each fund should be halal. All funds are subject to two 
basic conditions:  
 
1) The return on the investments of any funds are calculated on a pro-rata basis 
2) The fund can only invest in Shariah-compliant investments. 
 
The first Islamic fund, Dana Al-Aiman, and the first Islamic equity fund, Arab-Malaysian 
Unit Trust, were launched in Malaysia in 1963 and 1993 respectively (Dar and Azami, 2010).  
 
The growth of mutual funds in the mainstream financial system has been steady since 2002, 
growing at an average rate of 17.5% per annum until the end of 2007. 2008 brought with it 
the height of the financial crisis causing a drop in the overall value of global funds from 
£26.1 trillion to $19 trillion. The continuing struggles of the global economy has meant that 
these funds have grown at a more modest rate when compared to the pre-crisis period and as 
of Q1 2011, the global market capitalisation of global mutual funds stands at $25.6 trillion 
(Ernst & Young, 2011a). This is indicated in Figure 15 below. 
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Figure 15: Global Mutual Fund Market Outlook (Ernst and Young, 2011a) 
 
The Islamic fund market accounts for a small percentage of the global marketplace but has 
seen consistent growth even through the financial crisis. From the period of 2005 until 2010 
Islamic funds grew, on average, at a rate of 11.36%. However, the data does indicate that 
average growth over the financial crisis (2008 – 2010) did slow to around 6% and the bulk of 
the growth preceded the global crisis (Ernst & Young, 2011a and 2011b). The current market 
capitalisation of Global Islamic Funds stands at $58 billion with over 700 funds operating 
globally. This is demonstrated in Figure 16 below. 
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Figure 16: Islamic Fund Performance (Ernst & Young, 2011a) 
 
The performance of these Islamic funds has been attributed mainly to global market 
performance and as financial systems begin the reversion from the volatility caused by the 
financial crisis, there is indication of a continuing steady, modest performance of Islamic 
funds nonetheless. The growth of new funds has slowed, with only 23 new funds launching at 
the end of 2010 (Ernst & Young, 2011a). The research by Ernst & Young (2011a) also 
indicates a strong sentiment by market participants of Islamic finance to deposit money with 
banks as opposed to investing in Islamic funds. With the estimated value of Islamic financial 
assets at just over $1 trillion, Islamic funds only account for 5.6% of this ($56 billion).   
 
There has been a strong push in the promotion of Islamic funds by banks, financial 
institutions and government bodies with notable centres of excellence such as Bahrain, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Ireland. Whilst the former three have a strong grounding of 
Islamic values, the surprise here is Ireland. Although its status as a centre of excellence in 
Islamic finance is not built around the provision of Islamic services and products, its status as 
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a financial tax haven have meant that there is significant development of Islamic investments 
in the Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC) (Dar and Azami, 2010). All three, Bahrain, 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have a well-developed Islamic fund market with 87,145 and 131 
established Islamic funds respectively. 
 
There are several types of Islamic funds and they can be segregated into specific investment 
spectrums. Figure 14 highlights the types of Islamic funds ranging from conventional equity, 
index and commodity funds to murabaha and ijara funds. Islamic Equity, Index and 
Commodity funds are only allowed to invest in shares, indices and commodities that are 
deemed Shariah-compliant. Shariah Private Equity funds and Shariah Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REIT) provide pooled investment vehicles allowing investors the right to become 
partners of the fund. Private Equity fund invest in stock and shares with REIT engage in 
property development. Shariah-compliant Hedge Funds are relatively new (Dar and Azami, 
2010). Whilst conventional hedge funds are high risk, high return with offset of risk against 
hedging strategies using derivatives, this is highly incompatible with basic Islamic financial 
principles. However, the use of salam contracts as forwards has meant that Islamic finance 
has been able to engineer a Shariah-compliant alternative to conventional hedge funds. 
Shariah-compliant Exchange Traded Funds provide market participants with a cheap option 
for low risk, low cost, high liquidity and diversification. These funds essentially track the 
Shariah-compliant index that they are based upon. Finally, Murabaha and Ijara funds are in 
fact funds that invest in both murabaha and ijara contracts. These funds deal with the 
potential profits arising from establishing cost-plus financing and leasing contracts. 
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3.7.3. Sukuks 
Sukuks or Islamic bonds are not modern Islamic finance phenomenon and in fact their lineage 
can be traced back to medieval Islamic finance where governments remunerated soldiers in 
cash and in kind. This ‘in kind’ was known as a sukuk al-badai (commodity coupons) 
(Kamali, 1997). These sukuk holders would be able to claim, upon maturity, a certain amount 
of commodity. Moreover, sukuk holders were also able to sell on their claims for 
commodities, highlighting that these sukuks were tradable instruments.  
 
Sukuks function in similar fashion to their mainstream counterparts whereby they act as long-
term loans to the issuing company. The differences here lie with how these sukuks are sold 
and their capital growth opportunities. With standard bonds, issuance is based upon a par 
value (in the UK usually £100 or in America $1000) on which coupon payments are made 
yearly. These coupon payments are a percentage based upon the lending rate at that point in 
time, e.g. LIBOR. Bonds are mainly sold at either discounts or premiums. Discount bonds are 
sold at a price that is lower than their face value as these bonds provide no annual cash flows 
(coupon payments) and because there are no annual returns, bondholders will receive the face 
value upon maturity. On the other hand, bonds sold at a premium provide an annual coupon 
payment thus creating some income generation over the life of the bond. Institutions wishing 
to generate capital through a bond issue do not have to issue them through a separate entity. 
With Sukuks as well, institutions themselves are unable to issue the bonds outright as this 
would amount to riba. The most commonly used sukuk issuance structure would be where the 
issuing institution sets up an ad hoc financial entity known as a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV). 
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The structure of the modern financial sukuk is slightly more complicated and the model is 
demonstrated in Figure 17 below. 
 
Figure 17: Sukuk Structure (Dar and Azami, 2010) 
 
Under this structure, the owner/customer enters into an agreement with a third party (Special 
Purpose Vehicle) to sell some goods. The SPV acts as an agent/trustee on behalf of the 
investors who will eventually be the holders of the sukuk. It is essentially the SPV that issues 
the sukuk on behalf of the customer. Investors will place their money with this SPV who then 
purchases an asset, which it will then lease to the borrowing institution whilst at the same 
time providing the finance as well. The lease payments made by the borrowing company to 
the SPV and from SPV back to investors will be set up so that they approximate a certain 
accepted lending rate such as LIBOR + X%. This rental income is distributed to the sukuk 
holders. Upon maturity, the customer will buy back the asset from the SPV who will then 
distribute the principal amongst the sukuk holders. Now before screaming riba in this 
scenario, it has already been discussed that trying to approximate a certain interest rate return 
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does not amount to riba. Essentially, to want to make as much money as an investment 
banker does not make you an investment banker. 
 
This structure is also known as an Ijara sukuk and as shown in Figure 7 there are various 
combinations of basic Islamic financial concepts such as murabaha, musharakah and 
murdarabah sukuks on offer. These sukuks can be divided further into two subsets: variable 
and fixed income sukuks. Both ijara and murabaha sukuks are based on a debt security and 
are therefore classed as fixed return as can be seen from the periodic rental payments made 
by the customer. On the other hand, both musharakah and murdarabah sukuks depend on the 
performance of their specific contracts and as such coupon payments for these sukuks are not 
guaranteed. However, it is possible for the customer to maintain coupons should there be a 
shortfall over a particular period.  
 
There has been a recent development in the global sukuk industry, which involves the 
creation of hybrid sukuks which combines incomes stream for both variable and fixed return 
sukuk structures. Essentially, these hybrid sukuks will have infinite combinations of ijara, 
murabaha, musharakah and murdarabah contracts (See Dar and Azami (2010), Chapter 9 for 
a more detailed examination of the various sukuk structures) 
 
The first sovereign sukuk issuance was undertaken by Malaysia in 2002 for a value of $600 
million and in the wake of this successful issue other notable Islamic financial centres started 
issuing their own – Qatar, for a value of $700 million in 2003 and Pakistan for a value of 
$600 million in 2005. Initially, these sukuks were based on the concept of bai bithaman ajil, 
which is similar to einah. The price of a certain asset as well as the profit margin is agreed 
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now with delivery taking place at a later date. However, with calls for standardization, the use 
of ijara is now the most common structure (Dar and Azami, 2010).  
 
Global sukuk issuance grew steadily from 2002 until the end of 2007, reaching a value of $33 
billion. With the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 sukuk issuance retracted significantly to 
just under $20 billion. However, the market for sukuks picked up again through 2009 and 
reached a high of $53 billion in 2010. With the growing concerns in the global debt market 
and the difficulties faced by sovereign debt issues the sukuk market withdrew in the first 
quarter of 2011 and currently stands at around $20 billion (Ernst & Young, 2011a). There has 
been large scale acceptance of sukuks not only from global Islamic financial institutions but 
also from mainstream financial participants. This is highlighted by the creation of a rating 
system by Moody’s, which is similar to that of its mainstream bond rating system. Table 5 
below highlights the rating of the largest sukuk issues at the moment. This system works on 
an asset backing system, which is similar to the variable and fixed income distinction given to 
the various sukuks. Asset backed sukuks essentially possess a fixed income guarantee 
payment mechanism. On the other hand a non-asset backed sukuk has to guarantee coupon 
payment and is, more importantly, based on the credit quality of the asset class.  
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Issuer 
Issuance 
Amount 
(Mil. US$) 
Moody's Rating 
1 ADIB Sukuk Co. Ltd. 5,000 A2 
2 DIB Sukuk Co. Ltd. 750 A1 
3 DP World Sukuk Ltd. (Obligor: DP World) 1,500 A1 
4 
Dubai Sukuk Centre Ltd. (Obligor: DIFC 
Investments LLC) 
1,250 A1 
5 EIB Sukuk Co. Ltd. Programme 1,000 A1 
6 
Golden Belt 1 B.S.C. (Obligor: Saad Trading 
Cont. & Fin. Serv. Co.) 
650 Baa1 
7 
JAFZ Sukuk Ltd. (Obligor: Jebel Ali Free 
Zone FZE) 
2,043 A1 
8 Malaysia Global Sukuk Inc. 600 A3 
9 MBB Sukuk Inc. (Subordinated) 300 A3 
10 
NIG Sukuk Ltd. (Obligor: National Industries 
Group) 
475 Baa2 
11 
Qatar Alaqaria Sukuk Co. (Obligor: Qatar Real 
Estate Inv. Co.) 
300 A2 
12 Sarawak Corporate Sukuk Inc. 350 Baa1 
13 Sun Finance Ltd. 1,368 Aa3/A3/Baa3/NR 
14 DB Sukuk Ltd 5,000 A3 
15 Tamweel Sukuk Ltd 272 A3 
16 
Tamweel Residential ABS CI (1) Ltd., of 
which: 
210 Aa2/Baa1/Ba3/NR 
  Total amount of Sukuk issuances rated by 
Moody's: 
21,068 
 
Table 5: Moody’s Sukuk Rating List as of 2009 (Dar and Azami, 2010) 
 
Current trends in the sukuk market have been extensively affected by the weakening of the 
Dollar and the Euro. This could result in the issuance of Sukuks in local currencies within the 
GCC region. The sukuk industry has also seen a slowdown in corporate issuances whilst the 
forecast is the opposite for sovereign sukuks with issuances predicted to rise. However, the 
market does highlight the difficulties with sukuk offers and the effects of the financial crisis 
in the West can be seen in the restructuring of debt obligations of Dubai World in 2009 
(Cochrane and Pimentel, 2009) 
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3.7.4. Takaful (Islamic insurance)  
It will be difficult to discuss Islamic equity funds and risk management structures without at 
least mentioning takaful or Islamic insurance. Takaful is one of the fastest growing sectors in 
the Islamic financial world with numbers coming in at 26% annual growth, which is 11% 
higher than the conventional insurance market. However, these estimates are mainly for 
“Islamic” economies concentrated in the Gulf Region and the Middle East. Growth of Islamic 
insurance in more mainstream economies is relatively more modest with expected annual 
growth in the region of 4% (Dar and Azami, 2010). The proliferation of institutions offering 
an Islamic alternative to conventional finance has also risen and as of January 2009 stands at 
162 institutions. Takaful, like its mainstream counterpart, comprises of general insurance, 
medical and health, accident and education. 
 
So why is there the need to develop a separate form of insurance? In its conventional 
incarnation, insurance is prohibited under Shariah financial rules on a number of grounds. 
Firstly, the use of interest rates in determining the insurance premiums that are required by 
policy holders (Wahab et al., 2007). This is seen as riba as there is no sufficient justification 
for percentage premium chargeable, although there have been counter arguments suggesting 
that risk calculators provide some justification towards respective premiums. Secondly, 
would be the inherent uncertainty of the conventional concept of insurance where premiums 
are used to pay out on claims as and when they are made. This is seen as excessive gharar 
under an Islamic financial framework. Finally, would be the problems of maysir in 
conventional insurance. Shariah finance essentially sees the pay-out on claims and the 
investment of premiums to generate access returns, within conventional insurance, as 
gambling (Wahab et al., 2007).  
       
  
 
81 
Takaful companies offer essentially three types of Islamic insurance – murabaha, wakala and 
a combination of both murabaha and wakala – however regardless of the model the 
underlying structure remains the same (Dar and Azami, 2010). Unlike conventional insurance 
where premiums are pooled and invested and should a claim arise, it will be paid out of this 
pool. Under the Shariah financial framework, policy holders essentially pay a premium and 
the takaful companies will invest these premiums in a Shariah-compliant manner (i.e. 
tangible Shariah complaint assets/contracts). The returns of these investments will be 
repatriated into a group takaful fund, which is similar to a conventional insurance pool. 
Claims made by policy holders are taken out of this fund but it should be noted that this 
group takaful fund belongs to the policy holders (Siddiqui and Athemy, 2008). As such, 
should there be any excess from the investments made by the takaful company, this excess 
return will be shared out amongst the policy holders. Moreover, should there be insufficient 
funds in the pool to cover claims; the takaful company will have to make up the losses (Dar 
and Azami, 2010). 
3.8. Summative Remarks 
Chapter 3 has also provided a description of the major Islamic finance concepts and 
essentially split these concepts into PLS and Non-PLS modes of financing. The chapter also 
provides an overview of the products and services available in today’s modern Islamic 
financial system with emphasis being placed upon Islamic capital products such as Islamic 
funds and Islamic bonds (sukuks), Islamic risk management products and a brief description 
of Islamic insurance (takaful).  
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4. Review of Existing Literature 
4.1. Introduction to Chapter 
The following chapter documents the existing academic arguments surrounding the key areas 
of research of this study. The progression of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2. provides 
an overview of risk management in Islamic finance. It highlights the growth of Islamic 
finance and the arguments relating to its performance for both Islamic and conventional 
investors. It presents the evolution of academic research into the performance of Islamic 
equity indexes and the academic conclusions. These arguments about performance set the 
scene which leads on to the analysis of the literature behind risk management. The section 
provides arguments for the need for further development of new risk management tools and 
the underlying debates about financial innovation and the inclusion of derivative structures 
within Islamic finance. Section 4.2.1. illustrates the current state of financial innovation 
within Islamic finance by documenting existing derivative-like structures within Islamic 
finance suggesting that there is definitely scope for financial innovation within Islamic 
finance. Section 4.3. leads on from Section 4.2. Where it was highlighted in Section 4.2.one 
of the main issues relating to risk management and financial innovation is regulation and 
governance in Islamic finance, Section 4.3. expands on the disputes of governance and 
regulation surrounding Islamic finance. Section 4.4. tie the issues presented in the literature 
review and provides the reader with an overview of the progression of this research study. 
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4.2. Risk Management in Islamic Finance 
The advent of Islamic finance into the 21
st
 century has been widely accepted into the modern 
economic spectrum as a viable source of diversification and investment prospects. The 
growth of this financial system over the past decade has illustrated its ‘pulling’ power 
amongst mainstream Western financial institutions so much so that major Islamic financial 
hubs are being established throughout the global economic centres from New York and 
London in the West to Singapore and Hong Kong in the East.  
 
The development and growth of the banking and finance sector over the past two decades has 
meant that the risks faced by financial institutions have changed. These risks are not limited 
to mainstream Western finance but extend into the realms of Islamic banking and finance 
(Makiyan, 2008). Traditionally, the risks encountered in Shariah finance consisted primarily 
of credit and market risks but today’s financial markets possess a whole array of possible 
risks (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). As can be seen from Figure 18 the types of risk associated 
to Islamic finance are similar to that of mainstream finance with the exception of Shariah 
risk, which arises in trying to adhere to Islamic financial standards.  
 
The prospect of Shariah risk is also significantly associated to reputational risk under a 
Shariah financial framework and the problems associated to SSBs and that the stability of the 
Islamic financial system is based on participant confidence. In fact, the creation of Shariah 
risk would directly stem from the criticisms of SSBs with regards to their composition and 
transparency (Ahmad and Karim, 2008). Moreover, any doubts as to the integrity of SSBs 
would eventually filter down to the products and services that the Islamic financial system 
provides. The Shariah integrity of these products and services are based upon the judgements 
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of the SSB. How this ties into reputational risk is on the basis of moral participation in the 
financial system. Participants of the Islamic financial system desire products and services that 
meet their social and moral requirements when it comes to investing whilst at the same time 
generating some capital growth. Any concerns with regards to religious integrity could and 
would be highly detrimental towards the reputation of Islamic financial institutions. 
 
Should we also consider the work conducted by Cihak and Hesse (2010) who examined the 
financial stability of Islamic and conventional banks it can also be understood why risk 
management is Islamic finance is such a pertinent issue. Fundamentally Cihak and Hesse 
(2010) looked at the individual banking data for 77 Islamic and 397 commercial banks and 
further broke the banks down by size – small and large bank comparison. The conclusion of 
this work provided an interesting perspective on as it indicated that ‘small’ Islamic banks 
were financially stronger than ‘small’ conventional banks and ‘large’ Islamic banks were less 
financially stable than ‘large’ conventional banks. Moreover, this study also asserted that 
‘small’ Islamic banks were financial stronger than ‘large’ Islamic banks. The notion of size-
related financial soundness between large and small Islamic banks was attributed the 
increased credit, liquidity and prudential risk that were easier to maintain within a smaller 
Islamic financial institution (Cihak and Hesse, 2010).  Additionally work by Ariffin et al. 
(2009) who surveyed 28 Islamic banks in 14 different countries discovered that whilst there 
was increased prudential risk in terms of Shariah-compliancy and supervision much of the 
risk associated to Islamic financial institutions were similar to their conventional financial 
counterparts. This questionnaire study fundamentally examined the view of market experts 
and their experiences within financial risk management with the Islamic financial world. 
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Moreover, Makiyan (2008) provides a good summary overview of the major financial risk 
issues faced by Islamic institutions in today’s modern economy. From a conventional 
financial perspective issues such as continual development of financial instruments and 
markets, the creation of a lender of last resort and an adoption of a uniform regulatory 
standard are common financial risk themes to any developing economy and financial system 
let alone the Islamic financial system. However, Shariah-adherence and compliance also 
exacerbate certain well known financial risk but also create specialised risk to the Islamic 
financial system most notably PLS risk based on Islamic financial precepts and liquidity risk 
(Makiyan, 2008). The concept of risk and risk management under a Shariah financial 
framework will be examined in the following paragraphs.  
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Figure 18: Risk Profile of an Islamic Financial Institution (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010) 
Risk Profile of Islamic FInancial Institutions 
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An IFI seen as selling or marketing products and services which are not entirely Shariah-
compliant or have been instigated to be approved by a Shariah scholar, whose religious 
integrity is being questioned, would quickly lose its principal customer base. 
 
Risk management in Islamic finance can be surmised into a single word: change. With the 
advent of the 21
st
 century, Islamic finance and more importantly Islamic risk management has 
to change to contend with the modern financial world. The rules pertaining to risk 
management under an Islamic framework differ to those of traditional Western finance and 
the use of derivatives as risk management tools. For example the basic premise of short 
selling or selling what is not possess is a strong tool in establishing hedging positions. The 
ability to short sell would allow a risk manager the opportunity to hedge against a price fall 
by locking in a price now. Moreover, the availability of derivative instruments such as futures 
and options have meant that this hedging ability has been compounded through the easy 
availability of standardized financial risk management tools. Whilst conventional finance 
offers short selling or cash settled risk management structure Islamic finance has a succinct 
requirement for proof of ownership within any financial structure and transaction. Whilst this 
principal requirement means that all risk is kept in the “real financial” sense and one can see 
the benefits of this, is also  proves to be a cost towards the overall financial risk management 
structure (Bacha, 1999; Jobst et al., 2008).  
 
Additionally, the time span allowed in exercising derivative such as futures and options is 
another ‘luxury’ not afforded in Islamic finance. Both conventional financial futures and 
options have standardised maturity dates and in the case of American options; the flexibility 
to exercise any time prior to expiry is an added benefit. The cash-settlement nature of 
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derivatives also allows for a more dynamic approach to risk management with risk managers 
being allowed to adjust positions based upon changing market conditions (to close out open 
positions in either futures or options, the risk manager trades the same number of contracts in 
the opposite direction). However, even with these discrepancies in the availability and use of 
risk management tools between conventional and Islamic finance, the principles of risk 
management still remain intact (Dali and Ahmed, 2005).  
 
It is not a question of nullifying the risk element of participants within the financial system as 
systematic risk will always exist, but mitigating and justifying the amount of risk exposure 
that has been the central focus of risk management (Bessis, 2002). Risk management has 
always been about establishing a level of certainty and this principle extends to risk 
management in Islamic finance. Therefore, change here does not relate to the fundamentals of 
risk management but rather the use of new products and concepts to fulfil its need.  
 
From a conventional financial perspective the advent of a new, alternative financial system 
fundamentally illustrates portfolio diversification opportunities. Moreover with the 
proliferation of risks associated to particular industries, regions or other demographical 
classifications, the financial sciences have never been one to shun a new risk management 
opportunity.  
 
Early incarnations of academic literature into assessing the diversification and performance 
benefit of Islamic finance essentially pigeon holed Islamic equity products with that of ethical 
financing equity products. It is not difficult to see why as both require a screening process 
based on a certain criteria of beliefs. These early works seemed to suggest that the screening 
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processes involved with that of ethical financing were likely to alter the characteristics of the 
assets in terms of performance return and diversification benefits (Rudd, 1981; Grossman and 
Sharpe, 1986). More specifically, Rudd (1981) argues that the inclusion of a screening 
process invariables adds a constraint to the overall investments spectrum thus introducing size 
and selection biases. This, he further elaborated, would result  with the deterioration in long-
run performance (Rudd, 1981). These findings were supported by that of Grossman and 
Sharpe (1986) who examine the impact of a screening process on South African stocks. What 
was found was that the exclusion of South Africa-related stock, on average, was detrimental 
towards portfolio performance.  
 
However, the findings were not entirely conclusive as the inclusion of a bias towards South 
Africa-free portfolio greatly increased portfolio returns (Grossman and Sharpe, 1986). More 
recent work such as that of Sauer  (1997); Diltz (1995); Statman (2000, 2008) and Bauer et al. 
(2005) seem to advocate that a screening process should have no overall effect on the 
performance and diversification benefit of a portfolio. Diltz (1995) implemented an ethical 
screening criterion to 28 common stock portfolios and found no significant deviation in 
performance. Bauer et al. (2005), who tested a database containing 103 mutual funds from 
Germany, UK and the US, found that screened investment underwent a catching up phase but 
exhibited no difference in performance in terms of risk and return.  
 
However, as the Islamic financial industry grew, both in size and in prominence within the 
global financial world, the knowledge and understanding of Islamic financial screening 
processes became more apparent to market participants. What was realised was that whilst 
there was a distinct similarity in terms of the screening process, the screening criteria differed 
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greatly between that of ethical and Islamic equity indices (Khatkhatay and Nisar, 2007b). 
This new knowledge allowed for a significant development in the research conducted into the 
performance and diversification benefits of Islamic equity indices. It should be noted that 
much of the empirical literature focuses predominately on Shariah-compliant equity indices 
which were essentially stock and shares of conventional multinational companies trading on 
conventional indices such as the London Stock Exchange or the Hang Seng. What makes 
these conventional shares Islamic is the Islamic screening processes documented in Chapter 
3, Section 3.5. 
 
The literature on SCIs can be divided into two main areas: one compares the performance of 
SCIs to other ethical funds, while the other to more mainstream indexes, from which some 
SCIs were derived.  
 
Elfakhani et al., (2005) for instance argue that much of the past literature has compared and 
contrasted the returns of Islamic funds to ethical funds as a means to assess their relative 
performance. Indeed, before information was widely and readily available on Shariah and 
Shariah-compliant indexes, many researchers used ethical funds as a proxy for the 
performance of Shariah indexes (see for instance Luther et al., 1992 and Kreander et al., 
2005). Seminal work by Luther and Matatko (1994) and Hamilton et al. (1993) examined the 
performance of British and American ethical funds and the results were not significantly 
varied. Luther and Matatko (1994) discovered that the there was marginal out performance of 
British ethical funds over the market index of the Financial Times All Share Index. Moreover, 
this benchmark outperformance was seen to improve when compared to more obscure, 
smaller capped benchmarks rather than large market indexes. The results from the Hamilton 
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et al. (1993) study seemed to provide more robust arguments towards improved average 
returns using an ethical screening process. The study compares 32 ethical and 170 
conventional funds over a 9-year period from 1981 – 1990 and illustrates that average returns 
ethical funds out perform conventional funds. 
 
However, findings for consistent significant outperformance of ethically screened financial 
assets are not present and evidence can be seen from the works of Gregory et al. (1997) and 
M’Zali and Turcotte (1998). Gregory et al. (1997) fundamentally expanded the scope of 
Luther and Matako (1994) and used matched paired analysis on British ethical and 
conventional funds. What was discovered from this study was that it was the age of the fund 
that had an impact on its overall performance rather than the screening processes involved. 
This provided an interesting aspect of the research as it conclusions collude and confirm that 
of early studies into the impact of equity screening processes on overall performance 
(Grossman and Sharpe, 1986). M’Zali and Turcotte (1998) adopted the tired and tested 
method of comparing risk adjusted returns using standard performance indicators such as 
Jensen (1968), Treynor (1965) and Sharpe (1966). This work compared 10 ethical funds 
against 17 conventional funds and found that out of the 10 only 4 ethical funds showed risk 
adjusted outperformance. More recent studies into the equity screening process have also 
been divergent in the conclusion pertaining to outperformance of the screening processes. 
Beer et al. (2011) demonstrated that both ethical faith-based screened equity indexes 
possessed higher volatility that the market indexes - a view that is also advocated by the 
seminal works of Sauer (1977) and Statman (2000). On the other hand Lyn and Zychowicz 
(2010) examined the monthly returns of 36 faith-based and ethically screened mutual funds 
from May 2001 to Feb 2008 and found that faith based screening processes outperformed 
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ethical screening processes and both enjoyed marginally better performance than the market 
index.  
 
Sadeghi (2008) evolves the standard template for performance evaluation slightly and adopts 
an event-study methodology towards assessing the effects of the screening process. The daily 
price bid – ask spread and volume for 88 ethically screened, publicly traded companied were 
taken the mean cumulative abnormal returns were estimated. What was found was that 
screening results in better performance but the study also goes on to indicate that screened 
companies experienced a larger bid – ask spread when compared to their conventional 
counterparts. It was postulated that could be correlated to the amount and quality of 
information pertaining to conventional, unscreened companies. 
 
As mentioned before the other main area of research involves a comparison of Sharia-
compliant indexes with more mainstream, conventional indexes. For instance Hussain (2004) 
compared the FTSE Global Islamic Index to the FTSE All-World Index over a sample period 
of 1996-2003. His results show that the Shariah-compliant index consistently outperformed 
its counterpart in bull markets whilst it underperformed the FTSE All-World Index in bear 
markets. Moreover, Hussain (2004) study also indicated that by and large the use of Islamic 
screens, described above, failed to adversely affect the performance of Shariah-compliant 
funds. 
 
A follow-up and more comprehensive study conducted by Hussein and Omran (2005) 
examined the performance of various Shariah funds. This study confirmed the findings of the 
Hussein (2007) study and suggested that the performance of Shariah-compliant funds was due 
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to investment selection when it came to deciding which companies would be included in the 
fund. 
 
More recent work by Hashim (2008) also validates the findings of Hussein and Omran (2005) 
and Hussein (2007). Hashim (2008) essentially looked at the monthly returns for the FTSE 
Global Islamic, FTSE All-World and FTSE 4 Good indexes from January 1999 to May 2007. 
Additionally, it proxies the Morgan Stanley All Country Index as the benchmark and used 
LIBOR as the risk free rate of return. Hashim (2008) estimated the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) for each of these indexes and compared both alpha and beta coefficients. The 
findings from the study indicate does outperformance by the Islamic over the ethical index 
and matched performance between the Islamic and Market Index, however, the beta or risk 
measures of these indexes cannot be ignored. What was found was that the screening 
processes used by both the Islamic and ethical indexes created more risk – a finding that is 
similar to that of Rudd (1981) and Schröder (2007). Schröder (2007) found that there was no 
statistical difference in the performance of 29 SRIs (socially responsible investments) for 
stock indexes over the period covering 1991 until December 2003.  In particular he found that 
the indexes did not show any superior performance (Jensen alpha tended to be zero) and that 
the joint hypotheses that alpha = 0 and beta = 1 was not rejected but beta tended to be higher 
than one, showing a relatively higher degree of risk. Hashim (2008) does provide some 
explanation towards the increased risk and suggests that the advent of the dot.com bubble 
could have resulted in returns that were not stationary thus have and underlying effect of 
ameliorated beta/ risk coefficients.  
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Merdad et al. (2010) takes the risk-adjusted analysis a notch further by looking at differences 
in performance during market up-swings (bull markets) and market down-swings (bear 
markets). The study examined 28 mutual funds managed by HSBC Saudi Arabia of which 12 
were Islamic and 16 were conventional. The data encompasses the period of January 2003 to 
January 2010 and assess the risk adjusted returns via standard portfolio performance 
measures. The findings of this study echo that of Abdullah et al. (2007) and Alam and 
Rajjaque (2010) and seem to indicate that the use of Islamic screening processes resulted in 
rather interesting patterns in terms of temporal performance. What was found form these 
studies was a distinct underperformance by Islamic equity indices during a market bull and 
full phase/ cycles and an over performance during a market bear phase/ cycle.  
 
The arguments put forward in terms of explaining these time-based differences in 
performance came down to the screening processes with Islamic equity indices excluding 
financial institutions, such as banks, whose performances are highly correlated to that of the 
overall financial system. Moreover, the increase dependence of Islamic financial institutions 
on real assets has meant that market swings have a lagged effect on the performance. 
Additional work was conducted on these temporal performance effects of Islamic equity 
indices by Hayat and Kraeussi (2011). The paper measures the risk and return for a sample of 
145 Islamic equity funds over 2000 to 2009. The findings concluded that this facet of over 
performance during market bear phases by Islamic equity indexes was not consistent and in 
fact there was increased under performance during the financial crisis when compared to a 
conventional equity benchmark. Furthermore, it was suggested that investors looking at the 
investment prospects of Shariah-complaint equity products could benefit from more 
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diversified spectrum of Islamic equity offerings such as ETFs or tracking funds rather than 
individual equity holdings (Hayat and Kraeussi, 2011). 
 
A slightly different approach was taken in the research conducted by Albaity and Ahmad 
(2008) who used a vector autoregressive approach to assessing the performance of an Islamic 
and conventional index. The indexes in this context were the Kuala Lumpur Syariah and 
Kuala Lumpur Composite indexes respectively.  Daily returns from 1999 – 2005 were used 
for this study and KLIBOR (Kuala Lumpur London Interbank Offered Rate) was used as the 
risk free proxy. Whilst this was a study comparing Islamic against conventional equity index, 
the results were the exact opposite to that of the Hashim (2008) study and indicated that the 
Shariah index underperformed when compared to the conventional index. It was suggested 
that this underperformance could be attributed to the relative age of the equity constituents 
found with the Shariah index. The relatively young age of the constituents meant that they 
were more susceptible to market moves.   
 
Girard and Hassan (2008 and 2011) have provided evidence that there was no difference in 
performance between Shariah-compliant indexes and non-Islamic indexes.  This study made 
use of a paired matching analysis, where the performance of the Dow Jones Islamic Indices 
was matched against seven similar non-Islamic counterparts over the period of January 1996 
to November 2005. This study also included a test for cointegration to determine the 
existence of a relationship between the Islamic Indices and their non-Islamic counterparts. 
What was found was the Islamic and non-Islamic funds were co-integrated therefore 
potentially limiting the scope for portfolio diversification.  
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In terms of risk and diversification benefits of Islamic indexes, the concerns surrounding the 
relatively volatility of Islamic and Shariah-compliant financial products essentially spawned 
another branch of research looking into both the efficiency and thus the riskiness of these 
Islamic funds. This can be seen in the works of Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007), Bader et al. 
(2008) and Saad et al., (2010). Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) stands out for adopting an 
advance value-at-risk methodology which fundamentally involved the use of a risk metric 
calculation and the estimation of both a Student’s T-APARCH and a skewed Student’s T-
APARCH on the Dow Jones Islamic Index.  This study looked at the monthly returns from 
1996 to 2005. What was found from this study was the Dow Jones Islamic index possesses 
less risk than the benchmark market index. Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) essentially 
highlighted that this increased performance in terms of lower risk was down to the principles 
of PLS adopted in Islamic finance. The notion of risk-sharing was shown or suggested to 
have contributed to lower risk levels as this risk was spread amongst market participants 
albeit not evenly, but allowed for better risk performance than direct risk-transfer of 
conventional finance. These findings seem to support the traditional Islamic financial view on 
PLS and its benefits (Ahmed, 2009; Kayed and Hassan, 2011; Chapra, 2008). 
 
The results from both the Bader et al. (2008) and Saad et al. (2010) studies, however, have 
shown the exact opposite of Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007). Both these studies adopted a 
DEA analysis to assess this level of risk and efficiency between Islamic and conventional 
financial institutions. Bader et al. (2008) examined the performance of 43 conventional and 
37 Islamic banks over the period of 1990 – 2005 in 21 countries and found no difference in 
the overall efficiency of these banks. Saad et al. (2007) focused on comparing Islamic and 
conventional unit trusts and analysed performance efficiency ratios such as portfolio turnover 
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and management expense ratios and concluded that Islamic mutual funds were just as 
efficient as their conventional counterparts.  
 
What can be seen from the evolution of the research on the performance of Islamic against 
conventional would be that there seems to be no conclusive output that suggests a consistent 
outperformance of Islamic over conventional finance. Moreover, in what could be seen as 
research that throws another question into this existing mix of research would be work 
conducted by Hoepner et al. (2011). This study looked at 265 Islamic equity indexes over 20 
countries and found not only performance differences between Islamic and conventional 
finance but also correlation between performance and development of the Islamic financial 
market place. The conclusions from this study suggest that Islamic funds in developed 
Islamic markets outperform international benchmarks and conversely Islamic funds in less-
developed Islamic markets underperformed when compared to international benchmarks. 
Hoepner et al. (2011) eludes to developed Islamic markets to those of Malaysia and the 
Middle-East which have a more developed based of Islamic assets and tools and less-
developed to Western Islamic hubs such as the United Kingdom and developed centres of 
financial excellence that offer Islamic services such as Hong Kong and Singapore.  
 
Principally, the Hoepner et al. (2011) study further expands the characteristics of Islamic 
financial performance. Additionally, what can be seen from the literature would be the growth 
in prominence of Islamic finance as not only an investment outlet for Islamic investors but 
through the use of a screening process, has become a viable investment for mainstream 
conventional investors. This rapid growth as not only an insular financial system but also one 
that research has shown is a viable alternative to conventional finance has meant that there 
       
  
 
98 
has been an increased call for the further development of Shariah-compliant risk management 
strategies and instruments within Islamic finance.   
 
The nature and structure of risk management tools within Western finance have been 
developed, studied and engineered for the better part of a century whilst literature pertaining 
to explaining Islamic risk management concepts is only two decades old (Elfakhani et al., 
2005). Moreover, this relatively young age of Islamic banking and finance has meant that 
there is also little development of a formal risk management culture (Chapra and Khan, 2000) 
and unlike mainstream finance, Shariah finance lacks the wide variety of risk management 
instruments to contend with the risks highlighted in Figure 18. All risks are time dependant 
and the lack of risk management instruments such as derivatives in Shariah finance has meant 
that it is difficult to manage this temporal aspect of risk. It should also be noted that much of 
the existing literature does suggest that Islamic banking and finance faces similar risks to that 
of its conventional counterpart (Noman, 2002). Hassan (2009) suggests rather than Shariah 
risk being the prevalent risk type in the Islamic financial system, it is in fact, foreign 
exchange, credit and operating risk that dominate the Islamic financial spectrum. 
 
Khan and Bhatti (2008a) suggest that the conceptual paradigm of Islamic banking and finance 
has to change to meet its modern financial needs. Predominately, it is advocated that Islamic 
banking and finance can learn a lot form the conventional finance in terms of product 
development and risk management. There is also a basic need and market requirement for 
further development of both risk management tools and strategies and leading central 
regulatory bodies such as the Islamic Financial Services Board have been working towards 
establishing a stronger, more robust and standardized framework for Islamic financial 
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innovation (Hesse et al., 2008). This view for market need is also shared by Iqbal (2007) who 
highlights that Islamic finance, in its current incarnation, possesses all the necessary 
preconditions that would foster the continual and rapid development of new financial 
instruments. These factors have included aspects such as the push towards liberalization, 
deregulation and privatization of the global Islamic financial system (Bacha, 2004). Khan and 
Bhatti (2008b) highlights a perfect example of the changing conditions of the global financial 
scene to accept and incorporate Islamic financial as a parallel banking system. This example 
comes in the form of the changing of tax laws in the UK to make it possible for Islamic retail 
banking to operate. Fundamentally, these tax laws were amended to accept the financing 
implications of PLS within many Islamic financial structures. Moreover, the recent trend of 
Shariah-compliant innovation has meant that there is increased opportunity for Islamic 
financial innovation. These, coupled with the growth of Islamic finance in more conventional 
financial hubs have meant that there is a convergence of need and requirement of new 
financial instruments and market environment nurturing the development of these instruments 
(Bassens et al., 2010).  
 
Not everyone is in acceptance of these market conditions however. Chui and Newberger 
(2006) surveyed the spectra of Islamic financial markets and found that it was increasingly 
difficult to offer new products to customers. Fundamentally, this raised questions about the 
apparent need for new Islamic financial instruments but rather posited that there was an 
unyielding want for financial development rather than actual need. Al-Salem (2009) also 
suggests that whilst the conditions are right for financial development, innovation in the form 
of new tools and instruments is still limited. This was put down to the fact that the conceptual 
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framework for financial innovation was still very new and the divergent interpretations of 
Islamic law made it difficult. 
 
Pushing on from arguments pertaining to a need for new Islamic financial tools arising from 
its rapid development and inception into conventional finance, Dar and Presley (2000) have 
suggested a more introspective argument for financial innovation within Islamic finance. 
Aside from having to manage the need for new risk management tools to contend with the 
proliferation of additional risk from integrating into a conventional financial system, there is 
also a need to establish these tools to contend with the vulnerabilities of Islamic finance in the 
modern economy. The emphasis and dependence on both PLS and debt financing modes have 
created an inability to deal with these new risk types and the illiquidity of Islamic tools and 
assets could essentially lead to a similar situation that is currently being faced by countries 
such as India (Malik et al., 2011). 
 
With reference to the Islamic financial principles described in Chapter 3, participatory 
principles that engage in a PLS modus are too rigid to provide the flexibility to deal 
dynamically with certain types risk. From a risk management point of view both musharakah 
and murdarabah contracts require two parties that share similar risks to come together to 
form an agreement to share out this risk or share out an asset that would hedge against this 
risk. It would be, to a certain extent, time-consuming and difficult to find a counterparty that 
shares the same type and amount of risk. However, many Shariah financial contracts are over-
the-counter (OTC) and could be tailored to suit the needs and requirements of both parties. 
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Thus this only really leaves the non-participatory instruments. What can be seen from their 
structures would be that both bai al-salam and bai al-muajjal resemble very much 
mainstream forward contracts. 
 
The use of forward contracts in Islamic finance is allowed, albeit with strict preconditions that 
physical ownership of goods be proven and payment be made up front (Al-Suwailem, 2006). 
This is financial hedging in its most basic form, which illustrates the need for the 
development of more dynamic risk management tool tools within the Islamic financial 
system. Whilst forward contracts allow firms to lock in a price, these contracts are mainly 
formed privately between two contracting parties (Bacha, 1999). Without a third party to 
monitor and ensure delivery, counterparty and default risks become an issue. As both options 
and futures are traded on managed exchanges, the problem of counterparty risk is overcome 
(Bacha, 1999). The exchanges act as the intermediary and now bear the risk, which it 
minimizes through the margining and marked to market processes. If the argument against the 
use of derivative in Islamic finance is the fact that it breeds gharar (see Saleem, 2006; Seif, 
2009) then the conventional exchange traded derivative paradigm should effectively remove 
this element (Bacha 1999).  Exchanges act as the intermediary within the derivative markets 
and in the case of options, the use of daily marking to market and maintenance margins would 
nullify much of the counterparty risk, which in essence would be removing gharar from the 
market spectrum. Moreover, the standardization of option contracts in terms of maturity dates 
and face values would also serve to lessen the overall level of gharar in the transaction. The 
precepts of looking at the positives of derivatives from and Islamic perspective are very much 
lacking in today’s modern Shariah-compliant world (Mokhtar and Laldin, 2009). In this work, 
Mokhtar and Laldin (2009) suggest that Shariah-compliant screening processes can 
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approached from two directions – positive and negative Shariah screening. A negative 
approach is what defines Islamic finance in the global financial spectrum and involves the 
orthodox prohibition of riba and prevention of gharar and maysir whilst the positive approach 
looks at financial decisions that promote social egalitarianism, justice and ethics. Mokhtar 
and Laldin (2009) have shown that much of the Shariah-compliant decisions are based 
predominately on negative screening processes rather than positive processes. Additional 
work by Ebrahima and Rahman (2005) has also illustrated that use of standardized futures 
contracts also demonstrate pareto-optimality over more traditional Islamic financial salam 
contracts. In this regard it could be further argued that the standardized approach adopted by 
modern derivative exchanges brings about a more succinct notion of equality over traditional 
Islamic financial products. While this could lead to tentative arguments for inclusion of 
Islamic derivatives under the guise that they are excellent management tools, in that they 
allow for the management of contingent liabilities, which relates back to the temporal 
argument of risks, it cannot be denied that derivatives do advocate a certain level of moral 
hazard. 
 
Derivatives such as options and futures have been the topic of much scepticism ever since 
their inception into the Western financial world (see Kreitner, 2000 and Swan, 2000). This 
early scepticism stemmed from the fact that many derivatives were cash settled and thus 
lacked the ‘real’ economic characteristics of a proper tool for hedging.  
 
Additional scepticism arose from an economic perspective with concerns directed at the 
speculative nature by which derivatives could be traded. The ability to separate an asset from 
its risk allows the commoditisation of the risk element and fundamentally breaches the 
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Islamic tenet of preventing gharar. By commoditising this risk element, it creates a separate 
market between underlying financial contract and the risk and it is seen to result in the 
proliferation of risk and uncertainty. This essentially allows investors to leverage positions 
and fundamentally trade risk (Buffet, 2002). The ability to separate asset and risk makes 
derivatives significantly susceptible to small changes in the market and amplifies a 
company’s exposure to an abnormal amount of risks, which could have severe consequences 
for any economy from a macro perspective (Buffet, 2002 and Steinherr, 2000).  The issue 
here lies with the commoditisation of risk and if this risk is borne by individuals who desire it 
or by individuals who cannot adequately manage it (Steinherr, 2000).  
 
Moreover, derivatives allow for the creation of artificial risks-rewards structures and this 
encourages the proliferation of possible arbitrage and speculation (Tumpel- Gugerell, 2003). 
This ability to create artificial payoffs is a major concern for Islamic finance and Shariah-
compliant financial innovation. Known in the Islamic financial system as hiyal or artifices, 
the impact of these synthetic payoffs via the combination of the payoffs of combining 
different option classes cannot be discounted and should be a case for consideration during 
the financial engineering process (Kayed and Hassan, 2011). These speculative trades through 
derivative are felt to affect the price of the underlying which in turn would distort the 
economy making it more volatile (Summers and Summers, 1989). This is once again a 
violation of the Islamic financial principles of preventing uncertainty and the gambling within 
the financial system. However, the literature pertaining to this issue is inconclusive. Whilst 
some studies (Jochum and Kodres, 1998 & Pilar and Rafael, 2002) indicate that there is no 
influence or even positive influence of derivatives on the spot markets, others (Hodgson and 
Nicholls, 1991) suggest otherwise. Jochum and Kodres (1998) applied a SWARCH (Markov 
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Switching Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) to measure the volatility of the 
dollar spot exchange rates of the Mexican peso, Brazilian real and Hungarian forint and their 
respective futures contracts. The unit of measure in this study was daily spot rates from the 1
st
 
of January 1995 to the 28
th
 of February 1997. Whilst the VAR analysis does indicate some 
volatility spill over from the futures to the spot market, the SWARCH results suggest that 
there is a null effect (neither positive nor negative) from futures markets on spot positions. 
Pilar and Rafael (2002) approach the issue using a GARCH and EGARCH methodology and 
analyse the introduction of derivative trading on the Spanish IBEX-35. The period of analysis 
was October 1990 to December 1994. Fundamentally, a dummy variable was used to proxy 
the introduction of derivative trading in 1992 on the IBEX-35. What was discovered from this 
study was that the underlying volatility of the equity markets essentially improved with the 
introduction of the derivative market, essentially a vindication of seminal work by Stoll and 
Whaley, 1987 and Kyle, 1985. The table below further highlights the empirical studies behind 
the impact of derivatives and their impact on the underlying markets. 
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Author(s) Date Underlying Derivative Method Employed Effect on Underlying 
Conrad 1989 Equity Options Event study Price increase, decrease in volatility 
Stephan & 
Whaley 
1990 
Equity 
 
Options 
Multiple time-series 
analysis 
Cash market leads the option market 
Detemple & 
Jorion 
1990 Equity Options Event study Confirms Conrad; finds cross effects 
Stucki & 
Wasserfallen 
1994 Equity Options Event study Confirms Conrad 
Shastri, Sultan & 
Tandon 
1996 Currency Options Bivariate GARCH Spot volatility decreases 
Clifton 1985 Currency Futures Correlation Increase in spot volatility 
Edwards 1988 Stock index Futures Event study Decrease in spot volatility 
Ely 1991 Interest rate Futures 
Varying parameter 
model 
Spot market not affected 
Schwarz & 
Laatsch 
1991 Stock index Futures 
Bivariate random 
walk 
Futures reduce mispricing 
Bassembinder & 
Seguin 
1992 Stock index Futures 2-equation system Decrease in conditional spot volatility 
Kawaller, Koch & 
Koch 
1993 Stock index Futures Granger causality 
Increase in volatility strengthens market 
relation 
Chatrath, 
Ramchander and 
Song 
1996 Currency Futures GARCH, VAR Increase in spot volatility 
Jabbour 1994 Currency Futures 
CIP, regression and 
specification tests 
Futures provide good spot rate predictors 
Crain & Lee 1995 Currency Futures Granger causality Transfer of volatility 
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Darrat, Rahman 
and Zhong 
2002 Equity Futures EGARCH 
Transfer of volatility but spot is inherently 
volatile regardless 
Yang, Yang and 
Zhou 
2012 Equity Futures GARCH Bidirectional dependence on volatility 
Kim and Ryu 2014 Equity 
Futures 
 
VAR(1)-asymmetric 
BEKK-MGARCH 
Bidirectional causal relationship 
Pilar and Rafael 2002 Equity Futures and Options 
GARCH, EGARCH 
and GJR 
Decrease in underlying volatility 
Table 6: Empirical Literature on the Effects of Derivatives on the Underlying Spot Markets 
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The interdependent relationship of risk as well as the interdependent nature of economies 
would mean that speculation could compound the problems over an entire panel of financial 
systems. As Kenneth Arrow (1971) suggested “… the situation may actually be worse than 
without speculation…” (p. 24). Additionally, the association of derivatives as one of the 
significant causes of the recent financial crisis has not aided the arguments for the inclusion 
of derivative like structures in Islamic finance. Arguments for securitization of Islamic 
financial contracts have taken knock ever since the use of mortgage-backed securities was 
seen as one of the major ‘evils’ of the financial crisis. 
 
The Islamic view on the permissibility of derivative instruments such as futures and options is 
a divided one. Whilst certain schools of thought have outspokenly illustrated their disregard 
for the use of derivative instruments, the reasons for prohibition are mixed at best (see Table 
6) (Bacha, 1999). Opponents of derivatives within Islamic finance seem to argue the 
perspective that the Islamic financial paradigm, and with it the prohibition of derivatives, 
could have prevented the current financial crisis (Ahmed, 2009). These fundamental 
arguments stem from the encouragement of PLS modes of financing that is seen to suggest 
social egalitarianism. Moreover, the use of complex financial contract such as derivatives 
would invariably lead to increased exploitation and corruption within the Islamic financial 
system (Chapra, 2008; Siddiqi, 2006). Both Desai (2008) and Brewster (2008) further put 
forward that the exclusion of derivatives in Islamic finance has meant that the destabilising 
effects of the current financial crisis were significantly muted on the Islamic financial system. 
However, it should be noted that whilst the effects of the financial crisis were muted, the 
Islamic financial system was not immune to these effects. Whilst the asset composition of 
Islamic equity markets means the exclusion of financial institutions resulted in the smoothing 
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the underlying effects of the financial crisis (Girard and Hassan, 2008), the increased 
dependence of Islamic finance on real assets meant that any smoothing was gradually eroded 
as the effects of the financial crisis permeated past the financial assets into the real markets. 
 
Another argument stems from the fact that a derivative is detached from the underlying asset 
and as such a value cannot be justified for the premium or the view that an option benefits the 
buyer more than the seller (Kamali, 1997). This disregards for the premia of option contracts 
relates back to the argument against riba and option premiums are seen as free money but if 
the issue is indeed considered, the nature of option premiums are dependent upon the 
volatility and risks in the marketplace. In this regard the option premium could in fact be 
considered justifiable remuneration for taking on a certain amount of risk (Jobst, 2007). 
 
Moreover, the literature (Obaidullah, 1999 & Smolarski et al., 2006) seems to suggest that a 
major stumbling block for derivative structures in Shariah approval would be the association 
of futures and options to maysir (gambling). The apparent fallibilities in using derivatives as 
part of a risk management strategy lie with the fact that it is an excellent speculative tool. 
This is a central theme in understanding the use of derivatives in Shariah finance. One of the 
major problems with the inception of derivatives within the Islamic financial framework 
would be that it is extremely difficult to differentiate between risk management and 
speculation (Bacha, 1999). The speculative abilities of derivatives arise from the way they are 
structured and the nature by which they are traded – value derived from an underlying asset 
and cash settled. Additionally, within the realm of risk management short selling is common 
game. However, under an Islamic framework, it has to be shown that there is a line of 
ownership and that aspects such as price, time and quantity must be finalised before the trade 
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(El-Gamal, 2006). Speculation under Shariah is seen as gambling (gharar) and thus explicitly 
disallowed.  
 
If one of the major concerns of Islamic finance is the lack of certainty (gharar) and that this 
arises out of a lack of knowledge (jahl) (Askari et al., 2009) and therefore it is the belief that 
gharar is brought on by a lack of information. However, does this not then become a matter 
of learning? If this is the case, the problems pertaining to a lack of information regarding the 
trading of derivative instruments could be circumvented by the creation of organised 
exchanges as documented above (Smorlaski et al, 2006).   
 
In what was the most extensive study of its kind, Kamali (1995; 1997; 1999) examined the 
permissibility of modern option contracts in light of Islamic Commercial Law. His 
conclusions suggested 
 
 “…there was nothing inherently objectionable in granting an option, 
exercising it over a period of time or charging a fee for it, and that 
options trading like other varieties of trade is permissible mubah and as 
such, it is simply an extension of the basic liberty that the Quran has 
granted…” (pg.36)  
 
Moreover, an additional benefit of derivatives would be that it allows for the management of 
contingent liabilities, which relates back to the temporal argument of risks. Kamali (1995) 
suggests that the underlying benefit of derivatives should also be considered within the 
debates of its inclusion with the Islamic financial system. Fundamentally, these debates 
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should not only centre on speculation but rather also see the risk management merits of 
potential Islamic derivative structures. The notion of maslahan argued by Kamali (1995, 1997 
and 1999) would relate back to the positive screens suggested in the work of Mokhtar and 
Laldin (2009). 
 
In an extension to his 1995 and 1997 work, Kamali (1999) further expands his debate for 
derivatives in Islamic finance. In what was research design to suggest a framework for the 
Malaysia Islamic financial system, Kamali (1999) highlighted, from an Islamic perspective, 
that the notion that derivatives ‘devour the properties of others’ is untrue. Moreover, fact that 
derivatives promote gharar is also untrue on the basis that there is mutual consent of both 
parties in the contract to its specifications (Kamali, 1999). Further to these point Kamali 
(1999) does assert that the success of Islamic derivatives would depend on trading volume 
and it is in this volume that the efficiencies demonstrated from organised exchanges will be 
derived.  Additionally, the pressing issue of the underlying benefits from using derivatives as 
risk management tools is also vehemently pushed. 
 
In relation to this debate about the positives behind Islamic derivatives, there is also scope in 
trying to develop a product where risk mutuality is present through a combination of two or 
more other Islamic risk management instruments. The Western concept of delta hedging to 
gamma hedging can be applied to risk management within the Islamic spectrum so that 
mutual benefit is derived from both parties. However, as far as the research is concerned, 
there seems to be a lack of literature surrounding the combination of Islamic products to 
produce a specified return (See Obaidullah, 1998; El-Gamal, 2005 and Choudhury, 2009). 
One suspects that it could be down to the creation of hiyal (artifices) (Obaidullah, 2005; 
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Chapra, 2008). A combination of products may not necessarily yield a product that abides by 
Shariah.  
 
Derivatives are significant risk managing tools that allow an individual to hedge against the 
temporal risk associated to an underlying asset. If the Islamic argument against derivatives is 
that they attempt to detach time from property then there is a question as to whether risk 
management is viable within this financial system. These arguments however, are divergent 
at large. Whilst many advocates (See Kamali, 1995, 1997, 1999; Salehabadi and Aram, 2002; 
Smorlaski et al. 2006) of derivative-like structures in Islamic finance tend to avoid the 
temporality argument, it cannot be avoided that derivatives are excellent risk management 
tools. The suggestions that derivatives encourage speculation and gambling (Obaidullah, 
1999), the researcher feel are harsh. The research has illustrated the difficult beginnings of 
derivatives even within the Western financial world where speculation, to a certain extent, is 
rife and allowed. However, if one were to consider it in its entirety there is nothing inherently 
non-speculative about Islamic finance. Yes, Islamic finance does not encourage speculation 
but as a financial system, there will always be an element of risk in an uncertain future. Risk 
is a generalised condition whether or not derivatives are present. It should be known that the 
development of derivative-like risk management tools is for the purposes of risk management 
and none other (Kamali, 1999).  
 
Moreover, in an age where information is available at large, can arguments for jahl really be 
that prevalent? Jahl or ignorance may, to a slight degree, bear more significance for the 
private individual dealing with banks as such but between multinationals, can blame for 
ignorance really be subverted when resources are provided to learn? (Obaidullah, 1999) 
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There is also another side to this argument on derivatives, which arises from the various 
schools of Islamic financial thought. Siddiqui (2008) illustrated that the lack of consensus 
between Islamic scholars about the permissibility of derivatives has meant that there are 
differing financial engineering frameworks for different Islamic financial systems.  
 
What can be seen from these arguments is that the prohibition of derivative instruments under 
a Shariah financial framework is based upon differing interpretations of Shariah and the 
understanding of these instruments but there has been little objection to the way with which 
options and futures are structured and traded (Bacha, 1999). The research recognises that 
whilst this is a significant argument for the scope of Islamic derivatives, it is also a regulatory 
argument, which would have significant implications on not only derivatives but also Islamic 
financial innovation and the global Islamic financial system as a whole. As such this issue of 
regulatory uniformity and Shariah-compliance will be discussed later in this chapter in the 
section that evaluates the issues surrounding Shariah governance and regulatory challenges. 
 
The Islamic financial system cannot be seen through the eyes of Western finance. Islamic 
finance is a twenty-first century phenomenon. It is not a twenty-first century Western 
phenomenon. As this research has progressed we have realised that the spectrum by which 
Islamic finance evolves cannot tantamount to Western standards. However, the need for 
Islamic finance to develop itself to suit, not a Western world, but a globalised financial world 
is there. Change like risk and uncertainty is the only certain aspect of finance. To have 
traditional values deal with modern day calamities would be calamitous in itself. True 
innovation takes place in the presence of boundaries but there must be a want for change. 
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The following section provides an illustration to the current state of Islamic financial 
innovation. It highlights many of the arguments put forward above for the need for continual 
development and also the growth of market driven financial engineering. The financial 
structures below emphasize the innovative possibilities through the use of Islamic financing 
principles to fundamentally recreate the flexibility of conventional derivative like structures. 
4.2.1. Derivative-like Instruments in Shariah Finance 
Whilst the arguments against the use of derivative products continue, there have been 
innovative developments in risk management tools in Islamic finance. There has been a 
recent trend for the development of Shariah-compliant products (Wilson, 2007).  
 
The ever growing nature of Shariah finance has resulted in a new ‘’breed’’ of Shariah-
compliant products. There is a quickly developing chasm between Shariah-compliance and 
conformity to Shariah. What can be seen from the structures and application of these tools 
would be that they bear a striking resemblance to traditional Western options and futures. 
However, while these products are supposedly Shariah-compliant products, some, such as the 
bai al-arboun, are widely disallowed by Shariah scholars (Maurer, 2001). The following 
section of this research is going to be split into two parts, with the first part looking at Islamic 
tools that resemble options structures and the second part looking at Islamic tools that 
resemble futures. 
 
This section will highlight several key Islamic contracts when it comes to risk management. It 
describes several innovative developments with Islamic risk management tools using 
fundamental Islamic financial concepts. The research has identified key Islamic financial 
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concepts in Section 3.6. and from those murabaha, wa’ad, salam and arboun are seen as the 
most used within the Islamic risk management spectrum. From these concepts there have 
been significant innovations when it comes to Shariah-compliant risk management tools. 
However, before examining these new developments in Islamic risk management tools, two 
key issues must be considered – liquidity and credibility.  
 
Liquidity is an important element within the financial world and mainstream financial 
institutions are able to generate liquidity through  
 
i) The interbank lending network  
ii) Government securities  
iii) Lending to corporate customers  
iv) Keeping cash at hand.  
 
The issue of liquidity is more pertinent to Islamic financial institutions as the first three 
methods described above are seen as riba and the last does not yield any benefit (Chapra, 
2006; 2007;  Dar and Azami, 2010). Therefore, this only leaves keeping cash in hand as a 
possible option out of the four stated above. However, keeping too much cash in hand may 
not be a viable option and could indicate and inefficient use of resources. The inability to 
generate liquidity quickly within Shariah finance has meant that there is increased liquidity 
risk for Islamic financial institution (Akhtar et al., 2011). As such it is important for the 
development of these Shariah-compliant risk management instruments to first protect against 
liquidity risk and secondly aid in the creation and generation of liquidity mobility (Ali, 2004). 
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The development of Islamic financial instruments and services must be to a standard as to be 
seen as a credible alternative to conventional finance. This is not a question of competition 
but more of keeping pace (Noman, 2002). The issues of credibility relate towards the 
governance of the Islamic financial system as a whole looking at the uniformity and 
transparency of the regulatory standards in the global Islamic financial system. Financial 
innovators within Islamic finance have to contend with two major requirements. Firstly, 
ensuring that the product or service produces a beneficial financial output and secondly 
certifying that the product and service abides by Shariah-compliant rules and regulations. 
This relates back to El-Gamal’s (2005) arguments about substance and form of Islamic 
financial services and products discussed in Section 3.5. Islamic financial instruments should 
serve to provide a viable financial service but without nullification of Islamic values (Bacha, 
1999). However, at the same time the chase to be Shariah-complaint should not devalue the 
financial integrity of the product or service. These arguments about form and substance are to 
a certain extent paradoxical, but the underlying principle is that there should be a balance 
between the two and the optimal situation would be where innovation produces a product that 
is both competitive in the financial sense and abides by Shariah regulatory standards (Bacha, 
1999; El-Gamal, 2003). 
 
Many of these Shariah-compliant derivatives are based upon combinations of multiple 
murabahas to create swap contracts, use of wa’ads as options and salams to create forward 
contracts. With regards to salam, it is structured as a standard forward where a price is agreed 
now and delivery takes place at a later date. The use of arboun in Shariah-compliant 
derivatives is virtually non-existent as concerns over its Shariah permissibility mean that it is 
not widely accepted as a viable Shariah-compliant concept and instrument (Bacha, 1999; 
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2005; Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009). The following sections highlight some innovative use 
of murabaha and wa’ad contracts to recreate the payoff and financial characteristics of 
mainstream derivative contracts.  
4.2.1.1. Cross-currency swap 
 Figure 19: Shariah-compliant Cross Currency Swap (Source: Dusuki, 2009; Dar and 
Azami, 2010) 
 
A conventional cross-currency swap combines the exchange of the principal loan along with 
an interest rate swap. It essentially involves three stages whereby stage one comprises of the 
initial loan principal is exchanged at a certain currency, stage two is the continual exchange of 
interest rates for the specified currencies and stage three is the final exchange of the principal 
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loans once again. The effects of interest swapping are not permitted under Islamic finance and 
therefore the structure of the Shariah-compliant cross-currency swap involves the use of 
multiple murabaha contracts. Moreover, there is also the requirement that there is ownership 
of the specified currencies before contracting takes place. As such the structure is made 
slightly more complicated with the inclusion of brokers to fulfil the link of ownership of the 
specific currencies. The structure of the Shariah-compliant swap is illustrated in the diagram 
above. The numbers in the diagram indicate the steps and direction of trades involved within 
the structure. 
 
The first murabaha contract known as a term murabaha involves the bank purchasing a 
commodity at Currency A (1) and immediately selling this on to the counterparty (2). Both 
steps (1) and (2) are denominated in Currency A. The counterparty will pay for the 
commodity from the bank through the primary term murabaha on deferred payment scheme, 
where the payment dates and amounts are agreed upon beforehand. Each of these payments is 
a portion of the pre-agreed profit element with the final payment being the actual cost of the 
commodity. Upon receipt of the commodity the counterparty sells this on for Currency B – 
steps (3) and (4). 
 
The second murabaha contract is known as a reverse murabaha. Within this part of the 
agreement, the counterparty purchases a commodity from a broker at Currency B and 
immediately sells this onto the bank – steps (5) and (6). Both these steps are denominated in 
Currency B. The bank then agrees to pay for this commodity through the reverse murabaha 
on a deferred payment basis. Once again these deferred payments have pre-agreed sums and 
dates and each of these payments is a portion of the profit of the second murabaha with the 
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final payment being the actual cost of the commodity. The bank then sells this commodity on 
to a broker to generate an amount of Currency A – step (7). 
 
It should be noted that the commodities sold under both murabahas – term and reverse – 
should have the same value. Moreover, the sale of these commodities by both bank and 
counterparty should be to two different brokers. The use of this structure first took place in 
2006 when Citigroup designed a currency swap to aid Dubai Investment Group in hedging its 
investment in Bank Islam Malaysia (Bendeich, 2006) 
4.2.1.2. Profit rate swap  
 Figure 20: Shariah-compliant Profit Rate Swap (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010; 
Yankson, 2011) 
 
The structure in the diagram above is a basic Islamic profit rate swap and like its traditional 
counterpart allows the transformation of fixed rate into floating rate and vice versa. This 
structure involves the use of two murabaha contracts – a straight term murabaha and a 
parallel reverse murabaha. Steps 1 to 4 involve the straight murabaha where the floating rate 
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payer purchases commodities from Broker 1 (Step 1) and sells these on, at a mark-up, to the 
fixed rate payer (Step 2) who then sells them on to Broker 2 (Step 3). The money from the 
sale of the commodities is used repay the initial murabaha at fixed intervals and with fixed 
amounts (Step 4). Under the term murabaha structure, the payment for the commodity from 
floating to fixed rate payer will take place under a deferred payment basis. This completes the 
transformation from floating rate to fixed rate. 
 
Steps 5 to 8 illustrate the parallel reverse murabahas. Each of the arrows in the diagram 
above for step 8 is in fact a secondary reverse murabaha contract (SRMC). The first SRMC is 
entered into when then initial primary term murabaha is initiated. For these SRMCs to work, 
the fixed rate payer purchases commodities from broker 2 and sells these immediately to the 
floating rate payer who then sells these commodities on immediately to broker 1 – Steps 5, 6 
and 7. Payment by the floating rate payer for the commodity is a single payment for each of 
the SRMCs and includes the value of the commodity for the relevant SRMC and a profit 
element linked into an appropriate interest rate – e.g. LIBOR. These SRMCs will be entered 
into to match the deferred payments in the initial term murabaha – Step 8. As each of these 
SRMCs could be considered separate and with the profit element tied into an interest rate this 
fulfils the floating element of the swap. This structure was first introduced by Standard 
Chartered Saadiq, when in 2006 it entered into a three year profit rate swap with Aref 
Investment Group A.E.K in Kuwait worth $150 million (AMEInfo, 2006). 
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4.2.1.3. Total return swap 
 Figure 21: Shariah-compliant Total Return Swap (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010) 
 
In conventional finance a total return swap involves a contract where one party pays a set 
rate, which could be based on fixed or variable interest rates, and the counterparty makes 
payments based on an underlying asset. The benefit of such a structure is that it allows the 
prospect of gaining exposure to an asset class without having to own it. The diagram above 
illustrates how two wa’ads can be used to create a structure that is similar to a conventional 
total return swap. 
 
Under this structure, a Special Purpose Vehicle, the Issuer in the diagram above, issues 
certificates to investors at a certain price – steps (1) and (2). The cash generated from this is 
used to acquire a pool of Shariah-compliant assets, which is the underlying asset in the swap. 
The certificate holders gain exposure to this underlying through two mutually exclusive 
wa’ads between SPV and bank. In wa’ad 1 the Issuer promises to sell the underlying onto the 
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bank at a certain price. In wa’ad 2 the bank promises to purchase the pool of assets at a 
certain price. It should be noted that only ever one of these wa’ads will be exercised. 
 
Upon maturity, there are two possible scenarios.  
 
- Scenario 1: Should the wa’ad sale price be higher than the value of the pool of assets 
– then the Issuer will exercise wa’ad 2 – Step (6). 
- Scenario 2:  Should the wa’ad sale price be lower than the value of the pool of assets 
– then the Bank will exercise wa’ad – Step (5). 
 
This wa’ad sale price will then be used to remunerate the certificate holders. In essence, 
similar to a conventional total return swap, the certificate holders in the structure above are 
technically swapping the payoffs of the pool of Shariah-compliant assets with that of the 
wa’ad sale price. 
 
The details of industry usage are vague, however what is known is that the double wa’ad 
structure has been used by Deutsche Bank in the structuring of a total return swap but details 
such as amount and dates are not available (Risk, 2008). 
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4.2.1.4. FX option  
 Figure 22: Shariah-compliant FX Option (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010) 
 
Conventional options give the holder the right but not the obligation to buy/sell a particular 
currency at a designated date in the future. Within the Islamic financial context, the wa’ad 
can be used in the same context as a conventional call option (Qazi, 2012). However, it 
should be noted that these Islamic options cannot be traded, as they are in mainstream 
finance, as this would amount to maysir. Islamic options are still a debatable Islamic financial 
instrument due mainly to the fact that they can be used as a speculative tool. Examiners of the 
legal premises of the wa’ad contract such as Al-Masri (2002), Wisham et al. (2011) and Bello 
and Hassan (2013) have indicated that the acceptance of the wa’ad is still controversial. This 
inherent controversy with regards to the wa’ad structure stems from the differing 
interpretations of Islam from the various schools of Muslim thought (see Ayub, 2011 and 
Ghoul, 2011). As highlighted by Firoozye (2009) in his seminal work on describing the 
various schools of Islamic thought, 
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“While classical jurist has a wide range of opinions on this matter – from 
deliberate failure to uphold a wa’d being morally reprehensible (Hanafi, 
Hanbali, Shafi’I majority opinions), to being legally actionable subject to 
the promise suffering loss due to reliance upon the promise (similar to 
promissory estopple, the opinion held by majority Malikis), whereas 
modern jurists have for the most part said it is cause for legal action if it 
is a wa’d given with specific conditions.” ( pg. 6) 
 
Moreover, there is a fine line between risk management and speculation, which fuels the 
discussions about the permissibility and validity of Islamic options (Bacha, 1999; 2005; Y-
Sing, 2009). However, it should it noted that whilst there is increasing literature examining 
the legal implications of using the wa’ad as an Islamic financial tool or in the context of this 
research, as a risk management instrument, the views on the permissibility of wa’ad contracts 
in the global Islamic financial scene are divergent at large.  
 
The diagram above highlights the use of a wa’ad as a currency option in Islamic finance. 
With any option, there are always two possible outcomes, which are determined by the value 
of the spot market and the option strike price. Considering that this is a call option, should the 
spot price be more than the exercise price, the wa’ad is said to be in the money and as such 
will be exercised by the bank. Scenario 1 in the diagram above demonstrates this. In this case, 
the client agrees to sell a particular amount of currency. The bank pays a non-refundable fee 
(option premium) for the right but not the obligation to purchase this currency against another 
at a future date (settlement date). Since the option is in the money at maturity, the bank 
accepts the promise to sell on the part of the client and purchases the currency. 
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In Scenario 2, the spot price is lower that the exercise price of the wa’ad at maturity and 
therefore, the wa’ad is classed at out of the money. In this situation, the bank will not take the 
client up on the promise to sell the currency and will send a cancellation notice. The non-
refundable fee is still paid which is similar to a conventional mainstream currency option. 
Should the spot price match the exercise price of the wa’ad at maturity, the wa’ad is said to 
be in the money and it would not make a difference to the bank if they exercised the wa’ad. 
The use of Shariah-compliant FX option was first seen in 2009 when the Gulf Finance House 
announced a hedging deal with Deutsche Bank worth over €30 million. This hedge involved 
an in-house Shariah-compliant option developed by Deutsche Bank (AMEInfo, 2005). 
 
4.2.1.5.  Short selling 
 Figure 23: Short Selling using Arboun (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010) 
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Short selling in the conventional financial sense is basically selling an asset that is not owned 
by the seller. Therefore, there is no proof of ownership and large elements of uncertainty with 
regards to price and delivery. As such, in its conventional state, short selling is not 
permissible under a Shariah financial framework. However, it is possible to emulate the 
characteristics of a short sale through the use of the arboun and salam concepts in Islamic 
finance. 
 
The diagram above illustrates how a short sale can be achieved using an arboun contract. In 
the structure a hedge fund will advise the prime broker to sell an option to purchase “S” in 10 
days to a client (in this case the value of “S” is $100). The client pays $70 for this option to 
purchase “S” – Steps (1), (2) and (3). The client is therefore long asset “S” and the prime 
broker is short “S”. Simultaneously, the prime broker enters into an arboun contract with the 
hedge fund to where the hedge fund will deliver “S” in 10 days. The cost of the arboun is $68 
with $2 being the spread. This $68 can be seen as the initial deposit in the arboun contract – 
Step (4). Moreover, this arboun is conditional on whether the option is exercised by the 
client. If on day 10 the client wishes to exercise the option, the client will pay the remaining 
$30 (the overall value of “S”) to the prime broker. This triggers the arboun and the hedge 
fund will have to purchase “S” from the market and deliver it to the prime broker who will 
pass it on to the client – Steps (6), (7) and (8). The prime broker will pay the hedge fund the 
remaining $30. The short selling aspect arises from the relationship between broker and 
hedge fund where in essence the through a broker and use of option, the hedge fund has 
essentially sold “S” for $100 but will only deliver in 10 days’ time. 
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 Figure 24: Short Selling using Salam (Source: Dar and Azami, 2010) 
 
The diagram above demonstrates how short selling can also be replicated using a salam 
contract. Under this structure, the hedge fund will advise the prime broker to sell “S” to a 
client for $100. The client will take delivery of “S” in 10 days’ time – Steps (1), (2) and (3). 
Simultaneously, the prime broker will enter into a salam contract with the hedge fund to 
deliver “S” in 10 days. The prime broker will pay $98 for this salam contract with $2 being 
the spread. 
 
On day 10, the hedge fund purchases “S” from the market and delivers it to the prime broker 
who in turn delivers it to the client.  
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The use of both arboun and salam structures to emulate the financial characteristics of short 
sales very much resemble standard forward contracts but this is down to the way in which 
both arboun and salam operate as Islamic financial concepts. Both these concepts are in 
essence more like for like with forward contracts. 
 
Bai al-salam contracts are subjected to several conditions listed below (Bacha, 1999): 
 
1. Full payment by the buyer at the time of effecting sale 
2. The underlying asset must be standardizable, easily quantifiable and of 
determined quality 
3. Salam contracts cannot be based on a uniquely identified underlying. 
The item must be standardizable. 
4. Quantity, quality, maturity and place of delivery must be clearly 
enumerated in the Salam agreement  
5. The underlying asset or commodity must be available and traded in the 
markets throughout the period of the contract 
 
These stipulations lead to several criticisms of the salam structure. The need for full payment 
beforehand by the buyer increases the element of one sided counterparty risk associated with 
non-delivery (Bacha, 1999). Moreover, there is also the problem of double-coincidence which 
in itself would impose what many would call an unnecessary transaction cost (Bacha, 1999). 
Double coincidence arises out of the fact that one party must desire what the other party is 
selling before an agreement can be made to contract. The effort required to find a buyer 
would relate to the unnecessary transaction costs. This problem is not normally associated 
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with futures and options as the exchange acts as the third party intermediary – a buyer to a 
seller and a seller to a buyer. 
 
The description of derivative-like instruments above is by no means exhaustive. However, 
they do provide tentative arguments for the further development of risk management 
structures. One of the main problems with all the products above would be that, in trying to 
adhere to their specific requirements they are unable to fulfil the role of a true derivative 
when it comes to risk management. It is felt that there is further scope to expand the ideas and 
development of risk management instruments in Islamic finance. Moreover, whilst the 
structures above illustrate the significant steps in Islamic financial innovation, the use of the 
instruments listed above is still not widely accepted across the Islamic financial hubs. The 
lack of uniformity with regards to standards, regulation and governance has meant that 
financial innovation under a Shariah framework has to contend with not only Shariah rule but 
also a lack of clarity of these rules. The following section presents the academic debates 
about issues of regulation and governance which have an impact on the entire Islamic 
financial system. 
 
4.3. The perspective of governance in Shariah finance 
Recent financial events have brought back arguments relating to financial regulation and 
supervision. The need for regulators to establish adequate rules for financial players has once 
again been pushed into the spotlight. With the apparent failures of regulatory and supervisory 
roles being blamed for the recent financial crisis (see Crotty, 2009), the need for sound 
financial supervision in order to establish market confidence amongst the financial 
marketplace is of significant importance. This need stretches from conventional finance into 
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the spectrum of Islamic finance as well. These regulatory challenges will invariably have an 
impact on the overall spectrum of Islamic financial corporate governance, which would have 
a substantial underlying effect on the confidence of Islamic financial participants. As we shall 
discuss in the following paragraphs issues of institutional and systemic regulation, 
transparency, uniformity and stakeholder rights these facets are very much similar to 
conventional corporate governance concerns. Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) provides an insight into 
the Islamic financial issues pertaining to corporate governance and compares OECD and 
Islamic Corporate Governance Principles (see Table 7). 
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Principle 
Number 
OECD Principles and Annotation Islamic Principles 
1 Insuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
 Promotion of transparent and efficient markets with 
rule of law and division of responsibilities. 
 Promotion of business within ethical framework of 
Shariah 
 Believes in profit and loss 
 Primacy of Justice and social welfare with social and 
spiritual obligations 
 Prohibition of interest 
2 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 Basic shareholder rights 
 Participation in Decision-making at the general 
meetings 
 Structures and arrangements markets for corporate 
control 
 Ownership rights by all shareholders including 
institutional shareholders 
 Consultative process between shareholders and 
institutional shareholders 
 Property as trust from God 
 Sole Authority is God 
 Society as stakeholders 
 Accountability not only to stakeholders but also to 
God, the ultimate owner 
3 The equitable treatment of shareholders 
 Protection to minority and foreign shareholders  Just and fairness of value 
 Equitable distribution of wealth to all stakeholders and 
disadvantaged members in the form of Zakat and 
Sadqa 
 Social and individual welfare with both spiritual and 
moral obligation 
 Sensation and equality 
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Table 7: Comparison of OECD and Islamic Corporate Governance Principles (Source: Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009) 
4 The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
 In creating wealth, jobs and sustainability of financially 
sound enterprises 
 Islamic accountability to Falah and social welfare 
orientation 
 Haram/ Halal dichotomy in transaction 
 Social & individual welfare from both spiritual and 
material 
 Consideration to whole community 
5 Disclosure and Transparency 
 Matters regarding corporation 
 Financial situation 
 Performance, ownership and governance 
 Accountability with Shariah compliance 
 Socio-economic objectives related to firms' control 
and accountability to all its stakeholders 
 Justice, equality, truthfulness transparency 
 wider accountability with written as well as oral 
disclosure 
6 The responsibilities of the board 
  Strategic guidance 
 Monitoring of management 
 Accountability to company and stakeholders 
 Accountability not only to company or board or 
stakeholders but also to Allah the ultimate authority 
who leads to welfare and success 
 Holistic and integrative guidance 
 Negotiation and co-operation 
 Consultation and consensus seeking for each decision 
with related stakeholders 
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The growth of Islamic finance, not only as a financial system for Muslims, but as a financial 
system for all mainstream customers has meant that there is a greater demand for the 
development of more a transparent and uniform set of rules and regulation. 
 
The need for adequate financial regulation and supervision stems from the want of a stable 
financial system. The consolidation of stability within any financial system has a powerful 
influence on the determinants of economic growth and development (Llewellyn, 2006; Taylor 
and Fleming, 1999). Economic aspects such as market confidence, capital generation and 
efficient resource allocation are seen as vital towards the development of any economy 
however their existence depends extensively on the initial systemic stability of the financial 
system which is back by a concise and consistent regulatory standard (Llewellyn, 2006). The 
recent global financial crisis along with the Asian financial crisis of 1997 illustrates how poor 
regulation could lead to market instability and could impact upon annual economic growth 
and development in the short to medium term. Additionally, market instability introduces 
elements of uncertainty that could be detrimental to the economy as a whole over the long 
term period (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001). 
 
Financial regulation and supervision has always been a topic, which has echoed throughout 
many an academic and professional arena. The fine art of striking a balance between over-
regulation of financial systems against an over-relaxed financial system has always been a 
subject of debate (Llewellyn, 1999). What justifies good regulation and governance? What 
should be regulated and how?  Moreover, there is also the issue of who should bear this 
regulatory undertaking. Should this responsibility belong to a centralized body or should it be 
enforced at an institutional level?  
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Regulatory and supervisory development within conventional, Western finance has had 
decades to grow, evolve and form to sufficiently appease the needs of the modern economy. 
Numerous problems have been encountered, financial crises have been experienced and 
financial scandals have been exposed. Lessons have been learnt about the damage poor 
financial regulation can inflict upon any financial system (see Boyd et al., 2000; Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 2002). So how does this translate to the Islamic financial spectra? 
 
The unique characteristics of Islamic finance do not absolve it from the usual problems that 
plague the regulatory and supervisory facet of a financial system (El-Hawary et al., 2007). On 
the contrary more emphasis is placed upon the development of an adequate regulatory 
standard within the context of Islamic finance. Islamic banks and financial service providers, 
like their Western, conventional counterparts, experience the same issues relating to 
regulation and governance. Barth et al. (2002) highlights these as: 
 
i)  regulating banking activities and commerce links 
ii)  regulating domestic and foreign bank entry  
iii)  regulations on capital adequacy 
iv)  deposit insurance design  
v)  supervision  
vi)  private-sector monitoring of banks and  
vii)  government ownership of banks. 
 
The experiences of Western finance have helped many a developing financial system to learn 
and identify weaknesses within any economic system and the framework by which to 
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succinctly deal with these problems has been established. Additionally, there exist instances 
where the emphasis of conventional regulatory standards may differ from that of Shariah 
finance. In cases such as these, whilst the emphasis maybe different, the regulatory standard 
remains the same. For example Islamic banking is also known as non-interest banking with 
the financial system’s disregard for usury. Gharar and maysir also place additional 
stipulations upon all financial dealings within Islamic finance. These impositions mean that 
there is less emphasis on the regulation of credit/ interest rate risk as transactions that bear 
these risks are specifically disallowed under the rules of Islamic finance (Akhtar et al., 2011). 
With more prominence placed upon ‘real’ transactions, the emphasis on regulation shifts 
towards default risk (Sundararajan, 2007). The problem of regulation and governance within 
Islamic finance lies firmly with adapting existing regulations to protect clients to a similar 
level to that of their Western counterparts, whilst at the same time maintaining a balanced 
playing field so that neither Islamic finance nor conventional finance are disadvantaged 
(Wilson, 2000).  
 
The issues of governance in Islamic finance can be argued on two fronts – Shariah-
compliance and the uniformity of Shariah-compliant standards. As stated before (Hersh, 
2011) there exist three categories of Islamic Banks  
 
i) Banks who belong to a wholly Islamic financial system  
ii) Islamic banks who belong to a conventional financial system and exist alongside 
conventional banks  
iii) Conventional banks who offer Shariah-compliant products and services through 
Islamic windows  
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Whilst banks belonging to categories i & ii have to apply, staunchly, the strict Islamic code 
towards their financial activities, there exist problems of regulating Shariah-compliance in the 
third category of banks. The offer of Shariah-compliant products and services through Islamic 
windows was a significant development towards the growth of the Islamic financial system in 
mainstream finance. It allowed trusted mainstream banking and financial brands the 
opportunity to offer products to not only Muslims but also conventional consumers. By using 
established names in the economy, it was a significantly easier task building consumer 
confidence in these new products (Alserhan, 2010). However, as the Islamic financial system 
has seen substantial growth over the past decade, the products on offer blurred the line 
between Shariah-complaint and conventional interest bearing instruments but this was only to 
be expected (El-Gamal, 2005; Derigs and Marzban 2008). Initial Shariah-compliant products 
on offer comprised mainly of Islamic mortgages (murdarabah) and deposit taking activities.  
 
However, with the growth of the Islamic financial system, there came a demand for more 
evolved products that would meet the needs of Islamic risk management and investment. This 
development has led to the inception of Islamic instruments such as multiple wa’ad and 
layered murabaha. Whilst the underlying edict behind these products claims to be Shariah-
compliant they are not in essence inherently Islamic. This has resulted in arguments between 
Shariah-based and Shariah-backed banking where the instruments described above belong to 
a Shariah-based category (see El-Gamal, 2006; Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998; Khatkhatay and 
Nisar, 2007a and 2007b). Moreover, whilst these products are Shariah-compliant, they are not 
entirely accepted amongst the different Islamic financial systems.  
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Shariah-compliance is an important underlying regulatory issue in modern Islamic finance. 
As stated before, consumer confidence builds stability, which is pivotal towards the growth of 
a financial system. A feature of Islamic finance is that consumer confidence is built upon the 
fact that financial aspects of the system conforms to their religious beliefs. Should this fail the 
pillars upon which Islamic finance was built would crumble (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). As 
such the governance and regulation of Shariah-compliance standards are an essential part of 
modern Islamic finance. The job of assessing the validity of Shariah-compliance takes place 
at institutional level with each institution who offers Islamic financial services having in-
house religious advisors, collectively known as the Shariah Supervisory Board (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006). Whilst the name might suggest that the composition of these SSBs be 
entirely of religious, pious individuals, they are in-fact made up of a mix of religious scholars 
and financial practitioners whose job is to debate both the religious and financial 
underpinnings of each new service and/or product (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). The 
composition and running of these SSBs raises five main issues of a regulatory nature, namely 
independence, confidentiality, competence, consistency and disclosure. Each of these aspects 
will be examined in relation to regulatory issues that were raised in the empirical literature.  
 
With regards to independence, members of the SSB are appointed by Board of Directors and 
are supposed to hold an unbiased opinion of every potential product or service, which 
requires their judgement (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). However, the employment relationship 
between SSB and institution, along with respective remuneration packages, paint a faint and 
slightly negative picture of their independence. Situations may arise whereby stakeholders 
attempt to exert a certain influence on members of the SSB also known as ‘Fatwa shopping’ 
(Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). While this arrangement maybe frowned upon in a conventional 
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financial environment the argument that the ethical standards of SSBs should and would 
prevent such events from occurring is widely accepted. Should any underhand activities 
occur, this would severely damage the reputation and lead to due recourse. The argument that 
the benefits of influencing your SSB are outstripped by the detriments should deter or 
mitigate the regulatory problems of independence. 
 
This leads on to the issue of confidentiality. Another aspect of SSBs is the fact that members 
are allowed to sit on the SSBs of different companies. It is argued that this might lead to a 
possible transfer of information but once again the morality of SSB members should prevent 
this (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). However, it does bring about the next problem of 
competence. The lack of Shariah scholars has meant that there is a distinct lack of man power 
and new talent in the profession. Regulators have been busy promoting and establishing new 
incentives and schemes for training and recruitment to such a field. 
 
The consistency of judgements of SSBs has also been scrutinised, considering that assessing 
the viability if Shariah-compliant products and services is such a subjective science.  
However, empirical research conducted by the Council for Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institutions (CIBAFI) has shown that the diversity of judgements on Shariah-compliance is 
less that first anticipated. Out of 6000 fatwas sampled, it was found that 90% were consistent 
across banks (CIBAFI, 2009).  However, consistency not only entails consistency of 
judgements but also adoption of rules and regulation. By and large Islamic financial systems 
are left to govern themselves. Whilst there exists a set of generalised religious beliefs that are 
implemented to each financial system, much is down to the precepts of individual religious 
scholars belonging to that particular region. The interpretation of Shariah, differs from the 
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Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries and the Middle East to that of South East Asia 
and even that of Western economies (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Chapra and Khan, 2000). 
This has meant that while some products are allowed in one Islamic financial system, it might 
be disallowed under another. The lack of uniformity results in confusion and a potential 
problem of double standards, which could and would hurt the development of new 
implements in Islamic finance. While this issue might be difficult to tackle at institutional 
level, there have been calls for a central governing body to be established (Chapra and 
Ahmed, 2002; Chapra and Khan, 2000; El Sheikkh, 2000). 
 
Finally, we consider the issue of transparency. Every financial system prides itself on being 
open and disclosing the nature of most deals. While it may seem like a naive and 
overreaching ideal to have complete transparency, an adequate level would suffice to satisfy 
most market participants (Merton, 1990 and 1995). Regulatory standards in conventional 
finance require that all institutions publish annual reports pertaining to company performance 
over the year. Moreover, additional effort is placed into exposing all information pertaining to 
large trades and mergers and acquisitions. Board members are made known to stakeholders 
and the entire Western financial system attempts to portray itself as an open, ‘nothing-to-
hide’ economy. 
 
On the other hand however, transparency in Islamic finance is becoming an increasingly 
important issue (Honohan, 2001; Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). Many large transactions within 
the Islamic financial system are largely kept confidential. The recent near default by Dubai 
World on its sukuk (Islamic bond) placed great emphasis on transparency and regulation of 
Islamic financial products (IFSL, 2010). With the prohibition of interest based investments 
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the value of a sukuk is very much dependent upon the tangible underlying asset. This default 
was due to unfavourable market conditions impacting the value of the underlying asset. The 
issue of regulation that presented itself in the wake of this default was the lack of protection 
for sukuk holders as these bond holders have no explicit claim to the worth of the underlying 
asset and are unable to force a company to liquidate its position as a mode of recourse 
(Permatasari and Manurung, 2010). 
 
A major concern emphasized on the issue of transparency of Shariah finance would be that so 
far scandals and regulatory demises of any kind have yet to be tested within the courts (IFSL, 
2010). There is no fixed legislation and precedence to deal with these incidents. Moreover, it 
is surprising that most legal documentation pertaining to Islamic transactions are governed by 
English law, which may or may not be accepted in the country the agreement originated 
within (IFSL, 2010). Consumers have little or no access to information about how certain 
products are structured, how they are financed or the level of involvement of participants. 
Moreover, there is no fixed regulation that requires banks, even those providing Shariah-
compliant services, to publish reports about SSBs and the fatwas that have been granted. This 
only serves to dampen consumer confidence and should be an area that is tackled at a 
centralized level rather than an institutional level. 
 
The analysis on regulatory issues in this research study has so far focused on regulation and 
supervision at an institutional level. However, there persist issues on a broader scale that 
involve the entire Islamic financial system as a whole. As stated earlier, the adoption of 
certain Islamic products into specific Islamic financial systems is diverse. While markets such 
as that of Malaysia and the United Kingdom have a more liberal stance towards the inception 
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of new and more “Western” products, Islamic markets in the GCC adopt a stricter view on 
financial innovation (Smorlaski et al., 2006). This divergent view illustrates the differences in 
regulatory standards across the various Islamic financial systems. 
 
With each of the centralised Islamic financial hubs there exists a different interpretation of 
Shariah laws. This is put down to the fact that there exist 5 different schools of thought within 
Islam and each has its own understanding of Islamic law (see Table 8 and 9). This therefore 
creates different interpretations, which lead to different Islamic regulatory standards 
depending, on which Islamic financial market participants exist in. 
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Branch Numbers Belief 
Sunnis (can be further 
broken up into 4 subsets 
of teaching beliefs in 
Table 7 below) 
1 billion plus 
Follow the sayings, deeds and practices (Sunnah) of Muhammad. Emphasis on texts 
and legal interpretation. 
Shias 100million plus 
Believe Muhammad’s kin were his rightful successors, and that the last of a line of 
12 imams may reappear soon. Embittered by repression and terrorist attacks. 
Sufis 
Unknown (many Sufis 
practice in secret) 
Adhere to Islam’s mystical tradition; cultivate remembrance (dhikr) of God through 
asceticism and recitation of prayers. May be either Sunni or Shia 
Salafist/ Wahhabis 17million 
Imitate the earliest generations of Muslims and distrust later interpretations. Strict, 
austere Sunnis, maybe peaceful or violent, pietistic or political. Often followers of 
al-Wahhab, 18
th
 century Salafist teacher. Prevalent in Saudi Arabia. 
Ismailis 15million 
Disagree with other Shias about the line of spiritual succession after 8
th
 century, 
notable do-gooders, relaxed about religious rules. 
Alevis 10million 
Downplay formal Muslim rituals, stress sexual equality, overlap with the Bektashi 
mystical movement, leftist, fear Sunni majority. Based in Turkey. 
Ahmaddiyas 4million 
Revere a 19
th
 century Indian Muslim revivalist. Vigorous but oppressed in Pakistan 
and South Asian diaspora, keen builders of schools and hospitals. 
Alawaites 3million 
Emphasise the Shia imams, esoteric offshoot of Ismaili Shiism. Some rights overlap 
with Christianity. Rulers of Syria. 
Table 8: Muslim Traditions and Sects (Source: The Economist, 2012) 
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School Geographical Distribution 
Hanafi Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Jordan, China and Egypt 
Maliki North Africa, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain 
Shafi’i Yemen, Somalia, South East Asia, Jordan, Egypt and southern parts of India 
Hanbali Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
Table 9: Schools of Muslim Sunni Thought (Source: The Economist, 2012) 
 
The diversity of Islamic interpretation with regards to financial requirements is a serious 
consideration for the Islamic financial system as whole. As Islamic finance grows into the 21
st
 
century, its development to maintain pace with conventional finance would mean that there is 
an increased requirement for a centralised and uniform regulatory standard so as to avoid 
confusion and more so to build consumer confidence. There have been numerous calls for a 
more standardise approach to Shariah-compliant decision making with more focus placed 
upon regulatory consolidation and market harmonization between the various Islamic 
financial hubs (Hesse et al., 2008). Work conducted by Akhtar (2006, 2007), Khan (2007) 
and Ilias (2009) have suggested that the lack of a fundamental framework for Shariah-
compliance is hurting the development of financial innovation within the spectrum of the 
Islamic financial system.  
 
Essentially, products that are allowed in a particular Islamic financial market will not be 
allowed in a different Islamic financial market based upon the Shariah-interpretation of the 
scholars for that region. Khan (2007) suggests that the standardization of not only Shariah-
compliant but Shariah rules would aid the financial system and that there should be greater 
existence of the regulated use of diversity and flexibility. The diversity if the regulatory 
standards of Shariah-compliant Islamic finance can be seen in Table 10 and 11. What can be 
seen from the Shariah-compliant screening processes is that there are numerous differences 
when applying both the qualitative and quantitative screens depending on which Shariah-
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compliant market you belong to (Rehman and Masood, 2013). Thus, it is not only a 
difference in the fundamental schools of Islamic thought that affect the Islamic financial 
markets but also divergences in the way Shariah-compliant markets interpret these Islamic 
rules. Rahman et al. (2010) examined if there was a difference between the screening 
processes of the Dow Jones and Kuala Lumpur Islamic Indexes. The financials for 642 
companies which were deemed Shariah-compliant by the Shariah Advisory Council of the 
KLSE were examined and it was found that there were differences between the debt criterion 
and the underlying qualitative screening processes. Jobst et al. (2008) iterated that these 
inconsistencies do not only pertain to Islamic equity indices but also in sukuk issuance. 
Fundamentally, the divergences in the qualitative and quantitative screens in Table 10 and 11 
below have shown to hamper the structuring process of sukuks when it came to selecting the 
underlying asset. However, Jobst et al. (2008) does make the distinction that this lack of a 
regulatory framework and uniformity in Islamic finance is improving with the creation of 
institutional bodies such as the Islamic Finance Information Service (IFSI).  
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Activities SCM DJIM FTSE MSCI S&P 
Riba and 
Gharar 
 Financial 
services based on 
riba Stock-
broking of share 
trading in Shariah 
non-compliant 
securities. 
 Conventional 
insurance 
 Banks 
 Real Estate 
Holding and 
Development 
 Consumer 
Finance 
 Speciality 
Finance 
 Mortgage 
Finance 
 Full line 
insurance 
 Investment 
Services 
 Insurance 
brokers 
 Property & 
Casualty 
Insurance 
 Reinsurance 
 Life Insurance 
 Banking or any 
other interest 
related activity 
(excluding 
Islamic 
financial 
institutions) 
 Brokers 
 Life Insurance 
 Conventional 
financial 
services 
 Financials 
Non Halal 
products 
 Manufacture or 
sale of non-halal 
products and 
related products 
 Brewers 
 Distillers & 
Vintners 
 Food products 
 Food retailers & 
wholesalers 
 Restaurants and 
Bars 
 Alcohol, Pork 
and other non 
halal related 
products 
 Pork related 
products 
 Alcohol 
 Pork related 
products 
 Alcohol 
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Gambling  Gambling  Gambling  Gambling  Gambling  Gambling 
Immoral  Entertainment 
activities that are 
non-permissible 
according to 
Shariah 
 Broadcasting 
and 
Entertainment 
 Media Agencies 
 Hotels 
 Recreational 
Products and 
Services 
 Night Club 
Activities 
 Pornography 
and adult 
entertainment 
 Prostitution 
 Music 
 Hotels 
 Cinema 
 Adult 
Entertainment 
 Pornography 
 Advertising and 
Media 
(newspapers are 
allowed, sub-
industries area 
analysed 
individually) 
 Stem-cell 
research 
Other 
impermissible 
 Manufacture or 
sale of tobacco-
based products or 
related products 
 Other activities 
deemed 
permissible 
 Tobacco 
 Defence and 
Weapons 
 Tobacco 
 Arms 
manufacturing 
 Tobacco, 
Defence/ 
Weapons 
 Tobacco 
 Trading of gold 
and silver as 
cash on deferred 
basis. 
Use Qualitative 
Criteria only 
 No  Yes  No  No  No 
Table 10: Qualitative Shariah-compliant screens (Adapted from Rehman and Masood, 2013) 
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Denominator SCM DJIM FTSE MSCI S&P 
Debt Screen 
Debt   < 33% of Avg 
Market Cap 
 < 33% of Total 
Assets 
 < 33% of Total 
Assets 
 < 33% of Avg 
Market Cap 
Liquidity Screen 
Account Receivables   < 33% of Avg 
Market Cap 
  < 70% of Total 
Assets 
 < 49% of Avg 
Market Cap 
Receivables   + Cash    < 50% of Total 
Assets 
  
Interest Screen 
Cash + Interest 
Bearing Securities 
  < 33% of Avg 
Market Cap 
 < 33% of Total 
Assets 
 < 33% of Total 
Assets 
 < 33% of Avg 
Market Cap 
Interest income  < 5% of total revenue or 
profit before tax 
  <5% of Total 
Revenue 
  
Non Permissible Income Screen 
Non Permissible 
Income 
 Clearly prohibited income 
< 5% of total revenue or 
profit before tax 
 Unavoidable prohibited 
income < 10% of total 
revenue or profit before 
tax 
 Mixed rental income < 
20% of total revenue or 
profit before tax 
 Prohibited income from 
social good income < 
55% of total revenue or 
profit before tax 
  <5% of Total 
Revenue 
 <5% of Total 
Revenue 
 <5% of Total 
Revenue 
Table 11: Quantitative Shariah-compliant Screens (Adapted from Rehman and Masood, 2013) 
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The tables above provide and insight into the divergences of the Shariah-compliance process 
and there exists similar regulatory divergences in more traditional Islamic financial markets 
such as that of Malaysia and Iran shown in Table 12 below (Archer and Ahmed, 2003).  
 
Country 
Banking 
System 
AAOIFI 
Standards 
Islamic 
Banking 
Law 
Existence of Shariah 
Supervisory Boards 
Supervision 
Iran Islamic No Yes No No 
Jordan Dual IAS Yes Yes Consolidated 
Kuwait Dual IAS Considered Yes Consolidated 
Sudan Islamic Yes Yes Yes - 
Yemen Dual No Yes Yes No 
Malaysia Dual IAS Yes Yes Consolidated 
Table 12: Diversity in the legal, regulatory and supervisory arrangements (El-Hawary 
et al., 2007) 
 
El-Hawary et al. (2007) examined the diversity of regulatory standards within Islamic 
financial institutions and discovered that the Islamic financial system required more 
organisation rather uniformity. Fundamentally, this study suggested that through the 
organisation of Islamic regulatory standards the Islamic financial system would be able to 
develop in line with its religious principles as well as establish an adequate framework for 
risk management. 
 
Initiatives have been put in place to develop a centralised regulatory standard. Institutions 
such as the Bahrain-based Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institution and the Islamic Financial Services Board have been established to create a 
standardised regulatory and supervisory framework. The role of AAOIFI in terms of Shariah 
financial standardization is in terms of accounting standards although the institutions has 
taken on  more a central regulatory aspect by presiding over issues of Shariah-compliance 
rules and regulations by setting up two in-house SSBs – 15 member boards tasked with 
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standards and interpretations and overseeing consistency respectively (Monger and 
Rawashdeh, 2008). Moreover, AAOIFI have also taken on the role of developing conceptual 
framework for regulatory uniformity based around stakeholder theory. This stems from an 
inherent need to further develop Islamic accounting standards and streamlining Islamic 
accounting to fit the accounting practices observed by the US, UK and International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) (Sarea and Hanefah, 2013). Whilst these AAOIFI based SSBs 
have come under the same scrutiny and criticisms as the SSBs on other Islamic and 
conventional financial institutions – AAOIFI’s because board members are part-time – this 
is essentially an important steps at it indicates the market proactive stance towards continual 
development of regulatory and governance standards. Additionally, the IFSB have been 
tasked with,  
 
“…the provision of prudential standards and guidelines for international 
application by banking and supervisors in the supervision of Islamic 
banks.” (Hersh, 2011 pg. 56) 
 
These responsibilities stretch to include the creation of a framework by which to identify 
and quantify risk and minimum capital requirements. 
 
We have already dealt with SSBs at an institutional level and discovered that many of the 
criticisms stem from their inherent composition, transparency and uniformity of their 
decisions. The notion of SSBs has also been debated in a systemic context with many 
calling for the development of an environment that bolsters the development of the Shariah 
scholar base. A recent study by Farook and Farooq (2013) greatly advocates the 
development of a central accreditation process for new Shariah scholars thus guaranteeing a 
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much wider base on knowledge and alleviates the arguments of market stresses on the small 
pool of existing Shariah scholars and the conflict of interest from having similar SSB 
members on the different boards of varying Islamic financial institutions.   
 
Farook and Farooq (2013) have also put forward a framework for establishing a foundation 
for Shariah scholar qualifications. This framework centres around i) establishing educational 
and training institutions ii) industry wide design of curriculum iii) the formation of 
professional body and iv) address issues of a lack of talent in Shariah-compliance which 
would involve training individuals with a fundamental knowledge of conventional financial 
theory. This call for the accreditation of Shariah scholars is by no means a new proposal and 
Islamic finance analyst such as Wilson (2000) and Karbhari et al. (2004) have elucidated the 
need for the development of an accreditation process.  Both Wilson (2000) and Karbhari et 
al. (2004) have also indicated that this accreditation and growth in the talent base within 
Islamic banking and finance would also aid in the standardization process of the Islamic 
financial system. Using the framework set out in Farook and Farooq (2013) a universal 
accreditation process, it is hoped, would result in scholars who would share a similar 
interpretation of Shariah financial law. In roads are being made into establishing accredited 
qualifications for Islamic scholars and as it stands AAOIFI currently offers two courses of 
study – Certified Islamic Professional Accountant (CIPA) and Certified Shariah Adviser and 
Auditor (CSAA) (Monger and Rawashdeh, 2008). 
 
There have been further pushes towards developing a framework for the standardization of 
Islamic financial regulation. Once such suggestion for control would involve an evolution of 
the Basel Committee’s CAMELS rating standard to include Islamic financial institutions 
(Sarker, 2006).  The proposal put forward would see on and off-site supervisions of the 
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activities of Shariah financial institutions to ensure that they abide by the modified 
CAMELS standard (Sundararajan and Errico, 2002; Sarker, 2006). Invariably, the 
arguments for attaching Shariah regulation to a tried and tested conventional regulatory 
standard are to encourage market harmonization and allow for a uniform framework for 
operation.  
 
The creation of a central regulatory standard across the Islamic financial spectrum would 
also alleviate and address other pertinent issues on a system-wide basis. One of which 
would be capital adequacy levels of Islamic banks (see Noibi, 2004). A major business 
activity of Islamic banks would be as deposit taking institution. Whilst conventional banks 
are able to invest money from demand deposits to guarantee a fixed return to customers, 
Islamic banks are not afforded this benefit but rather work on a collective investment 
scheme where deposits are pooled (Errico and Farrahbaksh, 1998). As interest is disallowed 
these deposits work on a profit-loss sharing or wakala basis (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007).  
 
However, these are considered investment deposits and capital value is not guaranteed. 
Capital values are only guaranteed on demand deposits but these yield no return except for 
inflation. Considering that Islamic banks are not allowed to engage with interest bearing 
loans of any kind, their investment environment is hindered slightly. This raises issues of 
income generation and safeguarding consumer deposits. This prohibition of excessive 
interest also means that Islamic banks are more illiquid than most conventional banks. This 
raises the worry of capital adequacy in Islamic banks (Errico and Farrahbaksh, 1998). 
Whilst the concept established in Basel I, II and III remains the same there exist technical 
difficulties in assessing and measuring the types of risk faced by Islamic banks. For instance 
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with the concentration of Islamic banks’ investments in commodities and ‘real’ assets, they 
faced an increased market risk as opposed to their conventional counterparts (Hersh, 2011).  
 
Fundamentally, what can be garnered from these criticisms of this aspect of the Islamic 
financial regulation would be a call for improvements to the legal framework. This legal 
framework should support stakeholders in both Islamic banking and finance in traditional 
‘Islamic’ markets as well as the new breed of Shariah-compliant markets. This legal 
framework should include systemic consideration such as payment systems within Islamic 
banking and finance, the protection of depositors, Shariah compliance and the integration of 
Islamic finance within the global financial markets (Chapra and Khan, 2000). It is important 
to have a framework to support its customers and the existing confusion behind the ligation 
process for Islamic banking and finance is a substantial worry (Wilson, 2000). As seen from 
the near default of Dubai world there is a need to define where the legal remittance of 
Islamic finance belongs. Do customer rights exist within the realm of conventional or 
Shariah law? This issue is addressed during the empirical interviews with market 
participants.  
 
As such aside from uniformity there is also a distinct need for definition of Islamic financial 
legal recourse such as the financial tribunals and arbitration processes found in conventional 
finance (Wilson, 2000). Furthermore, legal processed have to be define so that they 
adequately regulate both banks and the products that are on offer. Hesse et al. (2008) offers 
possible solution to streamlining the legal framework for Islamic banking and finance calls 
upon a two-tiered perspective aimed primarily at integrating both the legal and regulatory 
processes with that of conventional finance. Moreover, is if further argued that both the 
legal and regulatory systems in conventional financial systems are flexible enough to 
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accommodate the inception of a parallel Islamic banking system (DeLorenzo and McMillen, 
2007). However, this cannot be achieved without the support of the government (Ahmed 
and Hassan, 2007) and examples such as the Malaysian Banking Act 1993, which altered 
conventional financial law to allow Malaysian Islamic financial institutions the ability to 
provide lending facilities using a murabaha system, illustrate the malleable nature of a 
conventional legal system to adapt to the needs of Islamic finance without disadvantaging 
conventional or Islamic participants. There are however interesting facets to this arguments 
about legal recourse in Islamic finance. Fadil (1994), in her presentation at the Info Centre 
Conference for Islamic Banking and Finance question if Islamic banks should be subjected 
to the same regulations off conventional banks. El-Sheikh (2000) takes this a step further 
and argues that Islamic banks should not be regulated by any authority but rather self-
regulated institutionally. Whilst Fadil’s (1994) arguments arise out of the lack of knowledge 
and the difficulties of managing Islamic law within conventional courts could be accepted it 
is difficult to see the sentiment of El-Sheikh’s (2000) postulation that Islamic banks should 
not be regulated by any authority. In both instances the arguments pertaining addressing the 
legal issues within conventional courts is taking shape with central regulatory bodies such as 
AAOIFI and the IFSB consulting of legal aspects (Sarea and Hanefah, 2013). With regards 
to the El-Sheikh (2000) perspective, one has to accept that both institutional and industry 
wide regulation is required. The arguments for universal, industry wide regulatory standards 
put forward by both El-Hawary et al. (2006) and Wilson (2003) are too compelling to 
ignore. Furthermore, empirical qualitative research by both Ghayad (2008) and Karbhari et 
al. (2004) have indicated that Islamic banks face increased competition from conventional 
banks; a systemic issue that must be addressed at industry level. 
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The need for an adequate framework to quantify risk and capital requirements and legal 
recourse is made of further importance by the lack of a lender of last resort (see Chapra and 
Khan, 2000; El Sheikkh, 2000). Conventional financial institutions enjoy the security of a 
highly established inter-bank lending network. Moreover, should that fail, there are always 
sovereign central banks who act as lenders of last resort. In a financial system such as that of 
Islamic finance, where inter-bank lending is underdeveloped due to a lack of available 
liquidity in the secondary markets a lender of last resort is of utmost importance.  
 
As shown in Dar and Presley (2000) and Noman (2002) the vulnerabilities of the 
dependence of Islamic finance on PLS and debt finance has meant that there is an increased 
exposure to credit and liquidity risk. The lack of formal framework and developed culture 
for risk management has meant that there is increased importance placed upon establishing a 
lender of last resort. In this day and age where conventional banks are failing even with the 
support of a lender of last resort, it should serve to provide an element of security to 
consumers. Ahmed and Hassan (2007) reinforce this need for a lender of last resort and 
highlight several pertinent issues with the current state of Islamic finance – both Shariah-
compliant and Shariah-based. Their analysis of Islamic banks in Bangladesh found that 
there is an underdeveloped network for interbank lending thus escalating the credit and 
liquidity risk already present. Additionally, there is a lack of support from governments and 
a discriminatory or underdeveloped legal framework that creates a significantly restrictive 
financial environment (Ahmed and Hassan, 2007). There has been considerable effort 
placed in addressing the level of credit and liquidity risk in Islamic finance. The 
development of new Islamic financial markets such as that of Mudharabah Interbank 
Investments (MII) in Malaysia indicate the industry’s want to foster an environment of 
lending and borrowing between Islamic banks (Wilson, 2008). The ‘Sukuk Salam Market’ 
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in Bahrain is another example of such a scheme set in place and encourages not only 
interbank lending/borrowing but also creates a market place for Islamic financial institutions 
to raise capital (Wilson, 2008). 
 
Although the literature does indicate the need for a lender of last resort there is a lack of 
articulation for who should undertake this role. Solé (2007) suggests that this role can be 
filled by that of conventional central banks but this would then mean that legal discrepancies 
should be settled in conventional courts who would not understand the Islamic legal 
implications of Shariah financial transactions. Siddiqui (2008) highlights that this role 
should be taken on by a large central regulatory body but would also lead to questions about 
a conflict of interests in terms of Shariah-compliant decision-making.  
 
Financial regulation, more so, financial regulation in a developing, alternative financial 
system, has always been a topic of debate. What can be seen from the literature is that the 
crucial challenge for the Islamic financial system would be to balance Shariah principles 
whilst adapting to the modern economic spectrum (Wilson, 2000). There is increasing 
support for Kane’s (1988) exploration of the regulatory dialectic within Islamic finance, 
which encourages the dynamic interaction between regulators and the regulated. Essentially, 
the regulatory process should be both reactive and proactive to foster its continual 
development. Regulators should strive to eliminate the polarisation of Islamic financial 
regulation on a global scale and at the same time engage in active dialogue with market 
participants. Additionally, market participants should also embrace the efforts being made 
by large Islamic financial regulatory bodies. This, it is argued by Kane (1988) and Wilson 
(2000), will invariably lead to increased development and growth of the Islamic financial 
system.   
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This aspect of the research has presented a perspective of the regulatory challenges faced by 
the Islamic financial system. Fundamentally, what can be seen is that Islamic finance faces 
an immense task in addressing both its institutional and systemic regulatory issues. 
Moreover, there is a distinct pattern surrounding these regulatory challenges and is the 
idiosyncratic relationship between the religious principles of Islam and the financial 
requirements of a financial system. This simple friction between the two facets is best 
reflected by Asutay (2007b) who describes the Islamic financial system as one that faces 
tension between establishing rules for social good advocated by religious values and the 
economic growth that is core to any financial system. Pollard and Samers (2007) further add 
to these arguments by suggesting that economic geographies dictate the development of the 
regulatory edicts suggested by the different Islamic financial hubs globally. Moreover, the 
issue is that religious norms are insufficient to change people’s economic behaviour in light 
of economic welfare and utility (Kuran, 1983 & 1995). 
 
This resistance between objective (financial needs) and subjective (social principles) would 
invariably create problems for Islamic financial corporate governance as highlighted by 
Abu-Tapanjeh (2009). Balancing the needs of Islamic corporate governance in light of 
social and economic needs of any financial system would be a challenge and steps are 
consequently being taken to adapt the conventional legal framework accommodate Islamic 
financial needs (Wilson, 2000). Moreover, theses changing needs should not favour either 
conventional or Islamic financial system but rather attempt to establish a level playing field 
for both (Wilson, 2000). Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) have advocated a stakeholder model of 
corporate governance, which is widely supported by the literature (Wilson, 2000; 
Safieddine, 2009, Hassan 2009). Bhatti and Bhatti (2010) have also rightly identified the 
Islamic notion of hisba (social good) as a possible model for Islamic corporate governance. 
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It centres on the very conventional governance principles of proper book keeping, disclosure 
of information and underlying transparency of the Islamic financial system. 
The creation of a uniform standard can only serve to aid the development of the Islamic 
financial system as a whole. Clearer guidelines would make it easier for new entrants into 
market as well as enticing more mainstream consumers. The issues of regulation and 
corporate governance highlight the need to bridge the gap between Islamic and conventional 
regulation and to create a standard to further encourage the development of confidence 
amongst market participants. What is clear from the literature however is that the 
development of this regulatory framework cannot diminish the fundamental socio-religious 
principles of the Islamic financial system. 
 
4.4. Tying the issues together 
With the volatility of mainstream financial markets, market participants will essentially seek 
new investment opportunities, firstly for diversification benefit and secondly stability 
(Wilson, 1999; Kok et al., 2009). There have been arguments that the financial systems are 
inter related and that the effects of a shock in one will be eventually felt by another further 
down the line (see Merton, 1990 and 1995; Eisenberg and Noe, 2001). So theoretically this 
should be no different for the Islamic financial system and truth it is not. However, the 
saving grace for market participants is the observed muted and numbed effects of the global 
financial crisis on Islamic finance (Farooq, 2009; Hassan and Dridi, 2010). Investment 
banking services and assurance products are explicitly disallowed activities in Shariah 
finance and as such, Shariah-compliant indexes do not include banks and insurance 
provident institutions. With any financial crisis, the first institutions to feel the brunt are 
banks (Hassan and Dridi, 2010). They are the source of capital for any economy and their 
main business is money and wealth. Moreover, with the volatility in the financial markets, 
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the investment banking arm of many banks were just not performing and in fact bleeding 
money more that generating it. Since insurance companies are explicitly disallowed from 
Shariah-compliant indices this lessens the effects of an economic shock. Insurance 
companies sit on a pool of cash and have a large exposure to various investment vehicles 
within any financial system and therefore, any financial shock is bound to have an effect on 
their performance (Hassan and Dridi, 2010).  
 
The exclusion of both investment banking and insurance from the investment spectrum for 
Shariah finance means that Shariah indexes provide a more stable investment platform. This 
is not to say that it was completely absolved of the effects of the global financial crisis, as 
evident from the stunted growth and lingering development over the past two years, but 
rather the effects are more manageable and volatility is reduced. So in essence forming a 
portfolio of Shariah-compliant indexes was not going to increase profit but rather reduce 
volatility. Empirical research has shown that whilst Islamic banks do not outperform 
conventional banks, they do provide diversification benefits. Research conducted by Kok et 
al. (2009) indicates that the inclusion of a Shariah-compliant index of shares in a risk-
adjusted portfolio yields a better Sharpe ratio than a portfolio with only conventional shares 
(see Kok et al., 2009).  
 
The fact that Islamic finance provides a less risky investment option during volatile 
economic times also serves to explain its growth over the past few years. Portfolio managers 
having to rebalance risk and return within funds have turned their attention to Islamic 
finance in the hopes of generating some stability. Whilst investing or forming a portfolio 
consisting of a Shariah-compliant equity index may not exactly generate profits, the 
smoothing effects that it has on the overall volatility is beneficial (Kok et al., 2009). If one 
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were to think about the benefits of contribution in the accounting sense, contribution does 
not lead to profits but rather a reduction in the cost and an improvement in short-term 
sustainability.  
 
Stating that Islamic indexes do not make money would be wrong but empirical evidence has 
shown that with the removal of financial and insurance institutions, Shariah-compliant 
indexes outperform standard indexes during bear periods/ market down turn and 
underperform standard indexes during bull periods/market up turn (Hassan and Dridi, 2010). 
 
The debates of risk management and derivatives and regulatory standards in Islamic finance 
are multifaceted – we can start from the interpretation of Shariah-compliant rules (see Noor 
and Aripin, 2010; Razali, 2008; El-Gamal, 2006), from the need for further development of 
Islamic risk management (see Wilson, 2007; Smorlaski et al., 2006; Maurer, 2001), for the 
want for a more socially orientated approach to financing (see Obaidullah, 2008; Obaidullah 
and Salem, 2008) or from the garnering of interest from the global financial community (see 
Kahf, 1999, 2002 and 2004 ; Zubair, 2005). 
 
These rules and arguments about form and structure have meant that is has been difficult for 
policy makers to address financial issues from an Islamic perspective. Moreover, the lack of 
a central regulatory board has also impacted the development of risk management in Islamic 
finance (El-Hawary et al., 2004). The Islamic Financial Services Board and Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions are the two main policy makers and 
so-called regulatory bodies for Islamic finance but even then these standards are only 
prescribed as opposed to enforced (Dar and Azami, 2010). The only country with a set of 
central rules for Islamic financial enterprise is Malaysia who is seen as the most lenient and 
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liberally open to Islamic financial policy making. The rules of Islamic finance in the Middle 
East and Islamic states such as Pakistan vary from region to region and depend largely on 
individual religious scholars and their interpretation of the Quran.  
 
This dichotomous regulatory standard has made policy making extremely difficult. The lack 
of unified rules and regulation has meant that whilst certain products may be deemed 
compliant in Malaysia, for instance, they may be prohibited in other countries. Additionally, 
there also exists a culture whereby should any doubt be cast upon a particular new financial 
instrument as to its “Shariah-ness” it would be, more often than not, deemed impermissible. 
 
Financial innovation in Shariah finance branches out into two subsets. One involves 
Shariah-based innovation, which involves the creation of an instrument that is completely 
Shariah – e.g. murabaha or musharakah. The other more along the lines of Western 
financial innovation is Shariah-compliant development (Khan, 2010b). Shariah-compliant 
innovation allows for some leeway in Shariah interpretation of financial laws, which in turn 
provide some flexibility to financial innovators – e.g. a reverse murabaha (Dar and Azami, 
2010).  
 
Shariah-compliance has been a recent trend and one can observe its benefits. Trying to, for 
the lack of a better term, amalgamate elements of mainstream finance with little 
diminishment of Shariah principles has provided a strong foundation for innovation and 
development of new products and services within the Islamic financial system. This allows 
Shariah finance to compete on a more level playing field with that of mainstream finance in 
aspects such as risk management and liquidity transfer.  
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Many will argue that many Shariah-compliant services and products are prohibited and are 
not truly Shariah (see Derigs and Marzban, 2008; DeLorenzo, 2000). Moreover, a more 
pressing issue would lie with the approval processes for Shariah-compliance. While one 
would not openly criticise the processes involved, there is concern regarding the individuals 
who administer them. Shariah-boards are appointed by large financial institutions such as 
HSBC to validate and approve new products and services for the Shariah finance market
5
. 
The problem lies with the use of similar Shariah board members for different companies. 
This brings up the issue of a conflict of interest as well as the fear that more lenient board 
members maybe “headhunted” for an easier approval process. Once again this would be 
grounds for a study into policy making within Shariah finance but it is a cause for concern 
considering the processes involved with the creation of a new product. 
 
Despite the issues outlined so far, however, over recent years, the development of Islamic 
risk management has progressed steadily with the creation of new Islamic risk management 
tools such as the wa’ad (promise) and parallel murabaha (cost plus sale) (Ebrahima and 
Rahman, 2005). The development of the wa’ad and its support within the Islamic financial 
community provides for an interesting picture on the progress of Islamic financial 
innovation (Razali, 2008). From an Islamic financial standpoint the wa’ad is a contractually 
binding promise to sell at a certain date for a specified price, a structure that is not unlike 
mainstream call options. The difference being, as opposed to mainstream call options, a 
wa’ad is legally and contractually binding meaning that should the agreement be reneged 
upon, legal action can be brought against the counterparty (Noor and Aripin, 2010). This 
new instrument clearly pushes the boundaries of Shariah-compliance and does show the 
willingness of Shariah finance to innovate and develop. Whatever the level of development, 
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the objective of these tools would be to provide a strong basis for risk managers to manage 
risk within the Islamic economy.  
 
The development of risk management strategies within Islamic finance has been relatively 
difficult. This can be attributed to two things. Firstly would be the constraints placed upon 
innovators by the laws of Shariah and secondly would be an alleged lack of need (Mohamad 
and Tabatabaei, 2008; Bacha, 1999). Shariah laws dictate every aspect of Islamic finance, 
which leads on to the following discussion on the constraints of Shariah law on financial 
innovation (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). This issue of innovation is best described by the 
form-substance argument suggested by El-Gamal, (2006). Imagine the form being the 
means and the substances being the end. If both are combined, a means to an end will be 
arrived at. However, under Shariah finance, neither may necessarily justify the other. Whilst 
the structure of a risk management tool is Shariah-compliant, its end result may not be. On 
the other hand the product of this structure may be Shariah-compliant, but the structure itself 
not. Many Shariah scholars would argue this point but most will also suggest that the 
substance is more important than the form.  
 
These rules and arguments about form and structure have meant that is has been difficult for 
policy makers to address financial issues from an Islamic perspective. Moreover, the lack of 
a central regulatory board has also impacted the development of risk management in Islamic 
finance (El-Hawary et al., 2004).Empirical research has shown that Islamic finance faces 
several pertinent regulatory challenges. The rapid growth of Islamic finance has meant that 
there have been calls for a streamlining of regulatory standards across the global Islamic 
financial front. The lacks of uniformity of current Islamic financial directives have created 
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uncertainty amongst market participants, which could damage the growth and development 
of Islamic finance. 
 
This chapter is meant to provide the reader with an overview of the current state of modern 
Islamic finance. It sets the foundations for this research project through an examination of 
existing empirical research and literature. 
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5. Research Methodology 
5.1. Introduction to Chapter 
This chapter of the research project sets out the methodological foundations of this study by 
exploring the theoretical foundations of different philosophies that can be applied to a new 
area of research such as Islamic banking and finance. The chapter further elaborates on the 
research approach design and strategy documenting the process of research underpinning 
the research methodology adopted by this study. This is presented as follows. 
 
Section 5.2. highlights the philosophical underpinnings of this study. It provides an 
introduction to the various research philosophies as highlighted by the literature and 
includes a justification for the selection of the appropriate philosophy. Section 5.3. details 
the research approach as prescribed by this research study. This section discusses the 
direction of the research and its use of theory. Sections 5.4. underlines the research design 
and strategy respectively. These sections will explain and introduce these concepts and 
justification for the selection of theory relating to these concepts. Sections 5.5. discusses the 
actual methods applied. will focus centrally on the three major themes of this research study. 
Section 5.5.1. will examine the methods for the analysis of the performance of Shariah-
compliant funds while Section 5.5.2. will illustrate the development and design of the 
Shariah-compliant risk management instrument and Section 5.5.3. will look at the methods 
used in the analysis of governance in Islamic finance and. Section 5.6. provides a few 
summative remarks about the methodology. 
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5.2. Research Philosophy 
Methodological arguments in the field of finance have been largely dictated by modern 
financial theory (MFT) and much of mainstream financial academia abides and appropriates 
towards a functionalist view of financial research (Ardalan, 2003). In essence this 
functionalist view suggests and encourages the use of a positivist research philosophy which 
advocates quantitative research methods and that the global financial environment be treated 
as, 
 
“…a place of concrete reality, characterized by uniformities and 
regularities, which can be understood and explained in terms of cause 
and effect…” (Ardalan, 2003, pg. 202) 
 
From this perspective of financial academic research, major financial theories such as 
efficient market theory, portfolio theory and option asset pricing theory were born (see 
Ardalan, 2003). However, to what extent does the research philosophy play in the 
formulation of these theories? Economist such as Hahn (1992) recognise the methodological 
philosophies and the arguments that are presented by these methodologies but dismiss it as 
practically irrelevant in the financial sense. The question posed here was ‘is there any 
practical benefit to financial practices in understanding the methodological philosophies of 
finance?” (Backhouse, 1992). 
 
The concepts of methodological philosophies that are appropriated in the social sciences, 
some argue (see Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Hoover, 1995; Hahn, 1992; Fisher, 1932) 
are difficult to implement within the field of finance and economics. The argument put 
forward is that these methodological underpinnings fail to advance the actual value of 
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finance and economics (Hoover, 1995) and in fact in an excerpt from his letter to the editor 
of the Royal Economic Society, Mervyn King (1992) quoted the opening paragraph of 
Irving Fisher’s presidential address to the American Statistical Association: 
 
“…it has long seemed to me that students of the social sciences, 
especially sociology and economics, have spent too much time in 
discussing what they call methodology. I have usually felt that the man 
who essays to tell the rest of us how to solve the knotty problems would 
be more convincing if he first proved out his alleged method by solving a 
few himself. Apparently those would-be authorities who are forever tell 
other how to get results do not get any important results themselves…”  
 
However, this is not to say that there is no value to the philosophical methodologies in 
financial studies. Having a profound understanding of the philosophies would allow for a 
slight mitigation of the practical mistakes that could arise as a result of practical application. 
These philosophies are not, so much, the main aspects of financial studies. This position is 
held by the application and practical study of financial concepts and the performance of 
these concepts in the real financial world. However, the research philosophies that dominate 
the academic world do aid in the understanding of these practical studies. They provide 
direction in the analysis of real world effects and aid in the reduction of biasness and 
mistakes (see Lawson, 1992 and 1994), an ethos covered in Blaug’s (1992) definition of 
methodology: 
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“…a study of the relationship between theoretical concepts and 
warranted conclusions about the real world; in particular, methodology is 
that branch of economics where we examine the ways in which 
economists justify their theories and the reasons they offer for preferring 
one theory over another; methodology is both a descriptive discipline – 
“this is what economist do” – and a prescriptive one – “this is what 
economists should do to advance economics” – Blaug, 1992, pg. xii 
 
Within the realm of academic research philosophy there exist two camps of purists – one 
advocating the use of purely quantitative research and the other expressing support for 
wholly qualitative research. The commonality between both camps would be an expressed 
scorn for a mixing of the methods and the endorsement of the incompatibility theory (Howe, 
1992). This incompatibility theory posits that both quantitative and qualitative research 
paradigms and methods cannot be mixed on the basis that the principal and foundational 
beliefs of both forms of research are founded on different sets of logic in the administration 
of academic research (Guba, 1990) 
 
Quantitative advocates (see Maxwell and Delaney, 2004; Schrag, 1992; Ayer, 1959) who 
subscribe to a positivist philosophy maintain that research in the social sciences should 
remain objective and as highlighted in Nagel (1986) that in the absence of time and context-
free generalizations the real causes of social scientific outcomes can be determined reliably 
and validly. 
 
Based on this positivist philosophy, academic researchers are required to eliminate their 
biasness and remain emotionally detached from the objects of their study (Tashakkori and 
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Teddlie, 1998). On the other hand there is the qualitative purist, who believes and applies 
either a constructivist or interpretivist philosophy to academic research. The view in this 
circumstance is that research and knowledge flow inductively from data (Guba, 1990) where 
all explanations are derived from observations and that both the researcher and the research 
subjects cannot be differentiated and will therefore be affected by the overall environment 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
 
For the purposes of this research study a pragmatist research philosophy has been adopted. 
The pragmatist approach is seen as the third research paradigm and was borne out of the 
quantitative and qualitative debates and aims to combine the strengths and minimise the 
weaknesses of both qualitative and quantitative research approaches (see Appendix 1 for a 
detailed overview of the strengths and weakness of quantitative and qualitative research).  
 
Pragmatism advocates the use of mixed method approaches combining the best of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods into single paradigm. However, the selection of any 
research philosophy would depend heavily on the research questions and objectives that 
have to be accomplished. It is these variables that should invariably decide the selection of 
the research methodology.  
 
The major aims of this research were to examine Islamic finance from a conventional 
perspective. The study focused on several pertinent issues in Islamic finance namely the 
performance and diversification benefits of Islamic funds, risk management under a Shariah 
financial framework and issue of governance and regulation within Islamic finance. With 
regards to analysing the performance and diversification benefits of Shariah-compliant funds 
(Research Objective No. 2), this facet of the study would have been best served through a 
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quantitative study. The notion of portfolio performance and diversification plays into all the 
strengths of a positivist, quantitative approach by testing a validated Markowitz approach on 
established quantitative data. In similar respite, the analysis of modern Islamic finance 
(Research Objective No. 1) and the analysis of the issue of governance in Islamic finance 
(Research Objective No. 4), these research objectives would have been best achieved using 
qualitative approach in terms of analysing the view of market participants. Examining risk 
management under a Shariah financial framework (Research Objective No. 3) required a 
more pluralistic approach and involved the use of both qualitative analysis, in terms of 
designing the product and understanding Shariah-compliant rules and regulations, and 
quantitative analysis, in assessing the payoff streams of the product. 
 
How does pragmatism fit into the overall equation of trying to achieve the objects and 
answer the research question? The classical pragmatist argument put forward by James 
(1907) essentially describes pragmatist problem solving using a hotel corridor as a 
metaphor. Consider an individual with an ailment searching for a cure and the various rooms 
contain a cure for that ailment. The individual will be the one that knows when the illness is 
cured and the ultimate test of the cure would be when the individual is no longer ill – the 
true value of the treatment. In essence, if the ailment were to be related to a research 
problem/objective and the treatments in the various rooms as the methodological paradigms 
then the pragmatist approach would advocate that every room is tried until a suitable answer 
is found. Moreover, pragmatism suggests a pluralistic view in that solutions can be drawn 
from various sources whether quantitative or qualitative (Bartle and Shields, 2008).  
 
Drawing inference and relating this argument back to this study, with relation to the 
assessment of the performance of Shariah-compliant funds, the research has theoretical 
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foundations based on modern portfolio theory (MPT) and from that theory an empirical 
analysis will be conducted. With regards to governance, it is a subject matter that is difficult 
to quantify but can be analysed qualitatively through the collection of detail-rich participant 
precepts. The need to adopt different styles of analysis highlights the pragmatist ethos within 
this research. However, the pragmatist approach is extremely beneficial and suited to the 
development of the new risk management tool. By using this research philosophy, 
inspiration, information and inferences can be drawn from various sources to further the 
understanding and therefore produce products that are more in line with Shariah-compliant 
rules than if a single pronged approach of either purely quantitative or purely qualitative 
been adopted. 
 
One of the major criticisms of the pragmatist philosophy when it comes to research would 
be the fact that it does not provide the best solution to conducting research but rather just a 
work around for existing problems (Hoover, 2004). This view is best reflected in the table 
below, which documents the inherent weaknesses of the pragmatist research philosophy and 
more specifically point 6 in the table. Fundamentally, the principal weakness of a pluralistic 
or a pragmatist approach would be that by allowing the basic premises of both qualitative 
and quantitative philosophy, it does not then form a robust underlying research philosophy. 
What the research approach is then left with is a somewhat ‘Jack-of-all’ trade’s answer that 
cannot be attached ontologically to either quantitative or qualitative approaches, weakness 
which can be seen in Table 13 below (Onwuegbuzie, 2002).  
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 Basic research may receive less attention than applied research because 
applied research may appear to produce more immediate and practical 
results. 
 Pragmatism may produce incremental change rather than more 
fundamental, structural or revolutionary change in society. 
 Researchers from a transformative-emancipatory framework have 
suggested that pragmatic researchers sometimes fail to provide a 
satisfactory answer to the question. 
 What is meant by usefulness or workability can be vague unless explicitly 
addressed by a researcher. 
 Pragmatic theories of truth have difficulty dealing with the cases of useful 
but non-true beliefs or propositions and non-useful but true beliefs or 
propositions. 
 Many come to pragmatism looking for a way to get around many 
traditional philosophical and ethical disputes (this includes the developers 
of pragmatism). Although pragmatism has worked moderately well, when 
put under the microscope, many current philosophers have rejected 
pragmatism because of its logical (as contrasted with practical) failings as 
a solution to many philosophical disputes. 
 Some neo-pragmatists such as Rorty (and postmodernists) completely 
reject correspondence truth in any form, which troubles many 
philosophers. 
Table 13: Weakness of Pragmatism (Source: Hoover, 2004) 
 
It has to be noted that research into finance, as is this research study, are predominately 
grounded within a positivist camp, advocating the use of multiple statistical and 
mathematical methods for validation as a singular insistence (Nagel, 1986). However, there 
is increasing research that is beginning to suggest that this need for quantitative validation 
through statistical and mathematical analysis is misguided (Downward and Mearman, 
2006). Heterodox economists such as Lawson (1988) have indicated that the notion of 
incorporating qualitative research into the spectrum of economics and financial research will 
result in a more rounded understanding of economic phenomena, thus illustrating the 
benefits of incorporating qualitative methods within the positivist dominated world of 
financial research. Whilst there still exists purists who will argue for the incompatibility 
theory of a mixed methods pragmatist approach, what can be seen, within the field of 
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economics, accounting and finance, would be an acceptance of the benefits of mixed 
methods research.  
 
Work such as that by Bartle and Shields (2008) who using a mixed method approach on 
public budgeting and financial management have suggested that while theory should guide 
practice, it should also be practice, which informs theory. Further justification for the use of 
mixed-methods research can be seen from the works of Modell (2005) and Lukka and 
Kasanen (1995) who examine the inclusion of qualitative methods within accounting 
research. Modell (2005) concluded that the combination of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods in a balanced fashion “enabled a broader range of validity threats to be addressed.” 
Lukka and Kasanen (1995) argue that the use of qualitative methods in accounting research 
fundamentally created results that were more generalizable in nature. 
 
Pragmatism is not a new approach within the field of economics, accounting and finance 
and is in fact over 130 years old (Bartle and Shields, 2008). The arguments about 
incompatibility of research methodologies will always exist but there also exists support for 
mixed methodologies and its practical explanation in the field of financial studies. As 
Walker (1930) put it, 
 
“If a budget clerk were to carefully search through the archives of public 
finance, economic theory and municipal government, he would find 
pitifully little to assist him in the all-important question of dividing up 
the city’s revenues. His adoption of rule-of- thumb devices to tide him 
past the crucial points is the most that could be reasonably expected... To 
understand municipal budget making it is necessary to visualize this 
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tremendous pressure that is being exerted from all sides – the pressure of 
organized interests, of ambitious department heads, of civic groups, of 
official prejudices, of the political potency of a low tax rate, even of 
public opinion where not represented by any of the above. The final 
budget will be the resultant of these forces and not the outcome of a 
dispassionate evaluation of the various functions.” (Walker, 1930, pg. 29)  
 
For the purposes of this research, the adoption of a pragmatist philosophy and being able to 
draw inferences from both quantitative and qualitative analyses have ameliorated the 
investigative process. In approaching the analytical process by not standing on either side of 
the quantitative/qualitative fence but rather through embracing the qualities and limitations 
of both has enabled, of this study, a more robust and rounded analysis in the achievement of 
the research questions and objectives. Principally, the use of a pragmatist approach to 
understand the major research objectives of the performance and diversification benefit of 
Shariah-compliant funds, risk management under a Shariah financial framework and 
understanding issues of governance and regulation within Islamic finance, it is believed, 
would not only provide a more rounded perspective of the issues but also a more practical 
perspective and benefit to the research surrounding Islamic banking and finance.  
 
5.3. Research Approach 
The research approach for any research study would depend on the explicit nature of theory 
with relation to the project (Saunders et al., 2009). Namely the direction of the analyses will 
be dictated by relative understanding of the theory at the beginning or at the end of the 
research project. There are essentially two central research approaches – deductive and 
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inductive (for graphical illustrations see Figures 25 for deductive and Figure 26 for 
inductive).  
 
 
Figure 25: Deductive Research Approach (Source: Trochim, 2006) 
 
 
The deductive approach encompasses the testing of theory. Fundamentally, a strong 
theoretical foundation is established through a review of literature and the testing of these 
theoretical foundations on practical variables that exist in the real world. This research 
approach is widely used in the more quantitative research projects and requires a structured 
methodology to achieve the replication of the theoretical study using real variables 
(Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
 
Figure 26: Inductive Research Approach (Source: Trochim, 2006) 
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On the other hand an inductive approach is all about building the theoretical foundation. The 
research study starts off with an outline of the variables that are to be analysed and from that 
analysis the theory generated. In essence it allows for flexibility in understanding how 
certain real variables react in the real environment without the constraints of theoretical 
implications. Table 14 below was adapted from Saunders et al. (2009) and provides a brief 
distinction of the differences between deductive and inductive approaches. 
 
Deduction Emphasises Induction Emphasises 
 Scientific principles 
 Moving from theory to data 
 The need to explain causal 
relationships between variables 
 The collection of quantitative data 
 The application of controls to ensure 
validity of data 
 The operationalization of concepts to 
ensure clarity of definition 
 A highly structured approach 
 Researcher independence of what is 
being researched 
 The necessity to select samples of 
sufficient size in order to generalise 
conclusions 
 Gaining and understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to events 
 A close understanding of the research 
context 
 The collection of qualitative data 
 A more flexible structure to permit 
changes of research emphasis as the 
research progresses 
 A realisation that the researcher is 
part of the research process 
 Less concern with the need to 
generalise 
Table 14: The major differences between deductive and inductive research approaches 
(Source: Saunders et al., 2009) 
 
It should be noted however that whilst the initial impression is that there is a rigid divide 
between both deductive and inductive approaches, this is not true. It is not only possible to 
combine both approaches but a coalescence of this divide can provide benefits towards the 
research study (Saunders et al., 2009). As such this research adopts a Hypothetico-
Deductive (Hypo-deductive) research approach, essentially combining both deductive and 
inductive approaches.  An illustration of the processes involved with this research approach 
is shown in Figure 27 below which is adapted from Sekaran (2003).  
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Figure 27: Hypothetico-Deductive Research Approach (Source: Sekaran, 2003) 
 
In essence, the hypo-deductive approach to research commences with an inductive 
perspective and involves observations of the academic environment surrounding the subject 
matter. With regards to this study the initial inductive perspective arises from the 
preliminary information gathering through a review of relevant literature. This review will 
survey the academic foundations of the development of Modern Islamic finance and will 
centre on the major themes of this research – performance and diversification benefit of 
Shariah-compliant equity indexes, risk management under a Shariah financial framework 
Observation 
Perliminary Infromation Gathering 
Theory Formulation 
Hypothesizing 
Further Scientific Data Collection 
Tirangulation Data Analysis 
 - Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis 
Deduction 
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and issues of governance and regulation within Islamic finance. Fundamentally, this 
preliminary survey of the literature will achieve objective one – a review of modern Islamic 
finance. This contextual foundation will allow us to formulate theories and hypothesis 
behind the major research themes. In trying to achieve research objective two, the study 
tests the performance and diversification benefits of Shariah-compliant indexes in America 
and the UK. The research wishes to establish if there are any performance and 
diversification paybacks from holding a Shariah-compliant equity index within portfolio of 
conventional equities – Research Objective 2.  
 
Additionally, the research seeks to understand the spectrum of risk management under a 
Shariah-compliant financial framework. Using the developed understanding from this facet 
of the study the research would then establish and develop a new risk management 
instrument under these Shariah-compliant rules – Research Objective 3. During the 
hypothesizing and theory formulation stage of the research approach the study discovered 
that the problems of regulation and governance highlighted in the literature were being 
experienced in trying to create the risk management instruments, upon which it was decided 
that further data collection pertaining to the precepts of market participants on issue of 
regulation and governance would be required to establish more robust arguments and 
analysis pertaining to the overall study – Research Objective 4. Fundamentally, 
triangulation analysis was conducted on the literature review, the empirical quantitative 
analysis and the qualitative investigation. Essentially, the underlying conclusions of this 
study aim to be confirmatory in nature. What can be seen from the hypo-deductive approach 
would be a move from initial inductive thinking to deductive thinking upon completion. 
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5.4. Research Design and Strategy 
The aim of this research project is to explore the development of Islamic finance in the 
modern economy paying particular emphasis to the areas of risk management and 
governance. One of the aims of this research is to assess the performance of Islamic funds 
by creating an artificial portfolio of equities, which included a Shariah-compliant fund.  
Additionally, the research also seeks new insight into the issues of governance in Islamic 
finance from differing perspectives and finally to determine if it would be possible to 
establish a new modus of risk-sharing risk management under a Shariah financial 
framework.  These research aims have a common theme across them in that they strive to 
pursue new insight into risk management and governance in Islamic finance. 
Fundamentally, the research design for this study is mainly exploratory. 
 
The research strategy adopted for this study will be both experiment and survey. The survey 
element will relate to the assessment of the performance of Shariah-compliant-fund and 
issues of governance. The experiment strategy is connected to the creation of a new Shariah-
compliant risk management tool.  
 
5.5. Methods 
As stated before, a pragmatist philosophy was adopted for the purposes of this research. 
Pragmatism advocates the use of pluralism or the implementation of varied views and 
approaches in trying to answer one’s research questions. This involves the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods in the research. This research project essentially 
embraces a mixed-methods approach and will provide further details in the following 
paragraphs. 
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This section is segmented into three subsections for each of the major objectives of this 
research study. Section 5.5.1 sets out the methods used for the assessment of diversification 
and performance of Shariah-compliant funds. Section 5.5.2. provides notes on the 
development process of the Shariah-compliant risk management tool. Section 5.5.3. details 
the methods used in discussing or examining the issues of governance in Islamic finance. 
 
5.5.1. Examining the Diversification and Performance of Shariah-
compliant Funds 
The first major objective of this research study was the assessment of the performance and 
diversification benefit of Shariah-compliant indices (Research Objective No. 2). The 
performance measure in this circumstance was not profit maximization but rather risk 
minimization through the creation of an efficient minimum-variance portfolio. 
 
The composition of the portfolio would include a mainstream index, an ethical fund index 
and a Shariah-compliant index. The weights attached to each of the indexes would be 
determined using a Markowitz (1959) portfolio optimization process. This essentially 
involved discovering the optimal weights for each index in the portfolio that would yield the 
smallest standard deviation or lowest risk. The optimisations were conducted using 
Microsoft Excel using a matrix multiplier method. The selection of a Markowitz (1959) 
optimization methodology was based upon similar reasoning presented in Derigs and 
Marzban (2009). In their seminal and revolutionary work looking at Shariah-compliant 
investment strategies, it was suggested that active portfolio management afforded by the 
Markowitz (1959) methodology allowed for the flexibility of portfolio composition 
selection based upon the investors risk profile. This methodology further allows for a more 
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practical view of portfolio selection. Initially, dependent upon the individual risk profile, 
there could be a substantial number of efficient portfolios. Allowing individual investors the 
opportunity to select the appropriate asset mix would prove valuable towards this study. 
Moreover, additional practical benefits would arise from the researcher controlling the 
optimization specifications in terms of reduction of complexity by reducing the optimized 
portfolio spectrum to a representative subset (Derigs and Marzban, 2009). The optimisation 
periods were set out to 2 years, 1 year, 6 months and 3 months optimisations. The evaluation 
between the various optimisations was through the use of the Sharpe ratio against a bench 
mark of a naïve buy and hold strategy of the mainstream for the optimisation periods. 
 
An additional layer of control was added to the optimization process by setting minimum 
threshold holdings for the mainstream index in the portfolio. Inspiration for this was drawn 
from the work of Laws and Thompson (2007). The notion that the research observes Islamic 
finance from a conventional perspective, it was thought reasonable to test an additional 
optimisation constraint which held that at least 50% of the portfolio would be held in a 
mainstream financial index. So in essence, the portfolios were optimised in two ways – 1) 
with free weights 2) with at least 50% in the mainstream index. Moreover, further general 
constraints were imposed which included no short selling or borrowing and that all wealth 
was absorbed into the portfolio composition. These general constraints were imposed upon 
both the optimization specifications. 
 
The sampling frame for the time series was the 1
st
 of January until the 29
th
 of June 2007. 
This study will employ the use of the returns for the mainstream indexes as a benchmark. 
The data for this research was obtained from DataStream and will include two Shariah-
compliant indexes, two non-Shariah indexes and two sustainability indexes.  
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These indexes are as follows, 
 
List of Indexes (1
st
 January 2001 up until 29
th
 June 2007): 
 
 Shariah-Compliant 
1) FTSE Global Islamic Index   (FTSEIS) 
2) Dow Jones Islamic Index (DJIMI) 
Mainstream Index 
3) FTSE 100 (FTSE) 
4) Dow Jones Industrial (DJ) 
Sustainability Indexes 
5) FTSE 4 Good Sustainability Index (FTSE4G) 
6) Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) 
 
The choice of this sample period is justified to avoid the effects of the financial crisis which 
could distort the results. As Islamic equity funds contain no banks the effects of the financial 
crisis could have been substantially muted and thus dramatically affect the results. The 
choice of the indexes is on the basis that each mainstream index (FTSE and DJ) is matched 
by a Sharia-compliant (FTSEIS and DJIMI respectively) and by a sustainability index 
(FTSE4G and DJSI). All indexes were transformed into logarithms discounting the impact 
of stationarity and creating elasticity measures. The interest rates for a 3-month British T-
Bill will be used as a proxy for risk-free interest rate. The unit of decision in this instance 
was the daily returns of the financial equity indexes. The use of American and British equity 
indexes was on the understanding that both countries constituted the largest markets for 
Shariah-compliant financial activity.  
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It should be noted that portfolio optimization methodologies operate best when the portfolio 
composition comprises of low (or better, negatively) correlated assets. For a two asset 
portfolio an adequate measure of this relationship would have been a standard correlation 
matrix. However, for the purposes of this research, the use of a multi-asset (more than two) 
means that a different methodology has to be used to determine the initial relationship 
between assets in portfolio. Due to its superior performance as a statistical measure, the 
Johansen cointegration procedure was selected. In terms of overall generalizability, the 
Johansen procedure allows for multiple cointegrating vectors which make it more applicable 
in the general sense over the Engle-Granger methodology. Essentially, cointegration 
analysis determines if there exists any underlying stochastic relationship between the equity 
indexes. The lack of cointegration would indicate the lack of a relationship thus indicating 
the possibility for the creation of an efficient portfolio under the Markowitz (1959) 
framework. 
 
All indexes were tested initially for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test. In order to carry out the cointegration regression, the indexes have to be integrated to 
the order of 1 or I (1). ADF test hypothesis are as follows: 
 
H0: δ = 0 (time series in non-stationary) 
H1: δ < 0 (time series is stationary) 
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Upon completion of stationarity testing, indexes were separated into the following groups: 
 
Group 1 :- LDJ, LDJSI, LDJIMI, LFTSEIS, LFTSE, LFTSE4G 
Group 2 :- LDJ, LDJSI, LDJIMI 
Group 3 :- LFTSEIS, LFTSE, LFTSE4G 
Group 4 :- LDJSI, LDJIMI, LFTSEIS, LFTSE4G 
Table 15: Index Groupings 
 
The grouping characteristics are defined as: 
 
i) Group 1: All selected indexes 
ii) Group 2: All selected Dow Jones Indexes 
iii) Group 3: All selected FTSE Indexes 
iv) Group 4: All selected ethical and Shariah-compliant Indexes 
 
The first step of the Johansen procedure requires that Vector Autoregressions (VARs) be 
generated for each of the groupings. These VARs will be used to establish the lag length 
structure of each of the groups. The Schwarz information criterion will be used for the 
determination of lag lengths (Koehler and Murphree, 1988). Under the Johansen framework 
there are two tests for multivariate cointegration – Trace and Max-Eigenvalue tests. Based 
on the literature (see Cheung and Lai, 1993), the Trace test is preferred over the Max-
Eigenvalue as it provides for more robustness when it came to the normality of data. The 
Trace test has joint hypothesis which are given below 
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1
st
 Test Hypotheses Set: Number of cointegrating vectors is equal to 0 
 
H0: r = 0 
H1: r ≥ 1 
 
2
nd
 Test Hypotheses Set: Number of cointegrating vectors is more than 1 
 
H0: r ≤ 1 
H1: r = 2 
 
Only index groups which exhibited no cointegration vectors were taken forward to the 
portfolio optimization process. The use of the Johansen cointegration procedure in this 
instance is twofold. Firstly, the lack of cointegrating vectors will be seen in the same slight 
as negative correlation for which portfolio optimization works best with. Secondly, the 
Johansen framework also allows for an analysis into the diversification benefits of selected 
index groupings. 
 
The next step was the creation of an optimised portfolio under a Markowitz (1959) portfolio 
optimization methodology. These optimisations were done for four different rolling 
windows, essentially, 2-Years, 1-Year, 6-Months and 3-Months. This would enable a 
dynamic calculation of the ratios above rather than having a static picture over the data 
period. The returns of the FTSE100 were taken as a benchmark.  The standard Markowitz 
(1959) methodology suggests that the risk associated to any particular portfolio is the sum of 
the risk attached to each individual asset and the combined risk of each asset in the 
portfolio. This is denoted by the formula below: 
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For a three asset horizon, the following formula can be expanded to yield: 
 
  
    
   
    
   
    
   
                             
 
For the amount of optimization required, it was decided that the use of matrix algebra via 
Microsoft Excel would be the most adequate in terms of ease and time. This process is 
demonstrated below for a similar three asset portfolio where    (
  
  
  
) are the weights 
invested in each of the three assets. Given as well that a covariance matrix can be generated, 
let this covariance matrix be Σ where, ∑  (
  
       
     
    
        
 
 ). We should also take a 
transpose of the weights invested in each of the assets,            . Using the 
formula given below, 
 
X’ΣX =          . (
  
       
     
    
        
 
 ) (
  
  
  
) 
 
we end up with  
    
   
    
   
    
   
                            . Once 
this was establish the solver function was used in Microsoft Excel to derive the minimum 
variance portfolio under the constraints and optimization criteria set out above. As stated 
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before the portfolios would be optimized with a) no constraints on the investment horizon 
and b) a mandatory 50% investment in the mainstream equity index. 
 
The use of traditional Jensen (1968), Treynor (1965) and Sharpe (1966) ratios to assess risk-
adjusted performance of the portfolios is widely practice. Justification for the use of these 
risk-adjusted measures of performance can be seen from the works of Elfakhani et al. 
(2005), Abdullah et al. (2007) and Girard and Hassan (2008 and 2011) in terms of Islamic 
equity indexes. Moreover, initial studies into the performance of ethical and mutual funds 
also abide by this methodology to measure performance (see Luther and Matako, 1994 and 
Hamilton et al., 1993). 
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Performance Measure Formula 
Jensen’s Alpha 
 
  (  )                
 
Treynor Index 
 
       
 
 
 
Sharpe Information Ratio 
 
       
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
                          
 
                       
 
                            
 
                         
 
                           
 
                          
 
                                      
 
Table 16: Risk Adjusted Performance Measures 
 
Jensen’s alpha essentially measures the performance between the actual and expected 
returns for a given portfolio. Fundamentally, Jensen’s alpha is an extension of the traditional 
single index (CAPM) model. Positive Jensen values indicate an outperformance of the 
actual against expected returns and negative Jansen values illustrate and underperformance 
between actual and expected returns along the securities market line (SML).  
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The use of the Treynor index is to capture excess returns for each unit of systematic risk 
borne by the equity portfolio. High Treynor values indicate better returns for a given level of 
systematic risk and vice versa. 
 
The Sharpe index, like the Treynor, assesses excess returns over a given level of risk. The 
difference here lies with the measure of risk. Whilst Treynor only accounts for systematic, 
market risk, The Sharpe Information index accounts for both non-diversifiable and 
diversifiable risk through the use of the standard deviation (σ) as a measure of portfolio risk. 
Once again a higher Sharpe ratio would indicate better risk adjusted performance. 
 
These performance measures will be compared against a naïve buy and hold of the 
mainstream indexes. The selection of which mainstream index will be dependent upon 
portfolio groupings. Should a portfolio comprise of both American and British equity 
indexes then both mainstream indexes from the two countries will be used. However, should 
the portfolio grouping consist only of equity indexes from American or the UK, then only 
the mainstream index from the respective country will be benchmarked against. This 
mainstream index will correspond to the country represented in the index grouping. 
 
5.5.2. Product Design and Development 
Running in tandem to the analysis on the diversification benefits and performance of 
Shariah-compliant indexes, a significant objective of this research would be to critically 
evaluate the state of risk management under Shariah financial framework. In additional to 
surveying the literature behind product design and development and risk management 
instruments within Shariah finance, this research intends to propose a new Shariah-
compliant risk management structure (Research Objective 3). 
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The methodology for the design and development of the new product was very much pen to 
paper. The initial understanding of Shariah-compliance was established through a review of 
the existing literature behind the subject matter (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.). What was seen 
from this review was that different Islamic financial hubs across the global economic 
spectrum possess varying regulatory standards. Predominately, much of the literature 
attributes these differences to the varying interpretations of Islam from the numerous 
Islamic schools of thought. Thus for the purposes of this research and for consistency, the 
Shariah financial standards adopted for this study consisted mainly of an understanding of a 
broad set of central Islamic financial values. Moreover, it should be noted that this broad set 
of Islamic financial values will derived from accepted Shariah-compliant financial rules and 
regulations. The specifications of the Shariah-compliant financial standards are set out in the 
paragraphs below.  
 
A key aspect of Shariah finance is the prohibition of riba. This was the principle starting 
point for the design of the product. In designing the product, every effort was made to 
ensure that there were no elements of riba and this was achieved by maintaining that the 
product existed in the real sense. Essentially, this involved paying strict attention to the flow 
of capital throughout the product structure to ensure that there was no additional creation of 
wealth by merely trading the product. Moreover, because of this respect for the real and 
tangible financial markets, the design process involved mapping out the payoff streams for 
every party involved in the transactions highlighting ownership throughout the two possible 
payoff states and processes have been taken to highlight, where possible, the movement of 
tangible goods within the product structure.  
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Attempts have also been made to streamline the product structure to a significant degree to 
ensure that only the required number of counterparties exists within the transactions. The 
mapping of the payoffs and streamlining of the processes essentially aided the design 
process when it came to dealing with arguments against gharar. Through this mapping 
process, the aim was ultimately to avoid, to an utmost degree, any uncertainties in the 
product structure. Unfortunately, it is slightly difficult to avoid questions of maysir or 
speculation due to the option like characteristics of the structure of the wa’ad. For the 
purposes of this research, it will be maintained that this product will only be used for the 
purposes of hedging and risk management. An additional consideration throughout the 
product design stage would be that all real commodities used in the product structure must 
be halal. 
 
In addition to the Shariah-compliant standards that have to be met during the design stage, it 
has to be understood that this is still a financial instrument and thus conventional financial 
consideration has to be accounted for. There was an increased worry about product 
inefficiencies leading to arbitrage opportunities which invariably is unfavourable from a 
conventional standpoint but it also invalidates the prohibition of riba. Much attention was 
paid to the product structure to ensure that it maintained the whole notion of a zero-sum 
game. Once again care was given to the payoffs of transaction parties and the movements of 
funds throughout the product structure. 
 
The product structure drew inspiration from two existing Shariah financial contracts – the 
musharakah and the wa’ad. In essence the wa’ad is a comparatively new contract in modern 
Islamic finance - new in the sense that the acceptance of the wa’ad concept in modern 
Islamic finance is a fairly modernistic innovation. Principally, the wa’ad is the Islamic 
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equivalent of a conventional call option and there are concerns over its validity from both a 
speculative standpoint as well as structurally as it allows contract holders the option to 
choose which creates a significant element of uncertainty. Nevertheless, proponents of the 
wa’ad structure have indicated that sellers of wa’ad are adequately remunerated for the 
bearing of the uncertainty or risk.  
 
It should be noted however, that the wa’ad structure as a risk management tool is very much 
still about risk transfer. It is a want for this study set out and try to create a risk management 
tool that adhered towards a risk-sharing mode of risk management which is more in line 
with the PLS characteristics that are so strongly advocated by the Islamic financial system. 
The closest existing Islamic financial contract that advocates risk-sharing is the musharakah 
and mudarabah  and steps were taken to amalgamate elements of both the wa’ad and risk 
sharing properties of the musharakah and mudarabah to create a risk management tool that 
essentially combines the risk managing flexibility of a call option with elements risk-sharing 
as opposed to complete risk transfer. 
 
However a significant consideration in the creation of the product structure and the 
methodology itself is the validity when it came to Shariah-compliance. It has to be 
understood that the Shariah-compliant approval process is through a Shariah Supervisory 
Board (SSB) of which access is limited. This is not unexpected due to the relative age of the 
industry and issues of conflicts of interest and commercial security. There was also a 
distinct worry about the creation of hiyal or artifices through the derivation of the product 
structure. The concern here would stem from the fact that by evolving the existing wa’ad 
structure to incorporate the risk-sharing element of a musharakah, this could invariably yield 
a non Shariah-compliant payoff. Moreover as stated before, throughout the design process 
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steps were taken to ensure that both product structure and payoffs met Shariah-compliant 
standards to the best of the researcher’s knowledge. 
 
5.5.3.  Issues of Governance 
The 4
th
 research objective of the study was to analyse the issues of governance in Islamic 
finance. In trying to explore the issues of governance in Islamic finance, an exploratory 
qualitative methodology was employed and this entailed the use of semi-structure interviews 
with individuals who possessed deep, extensive practical knowledge in the subject matter 
and ideally a mix of professionals and academics. The interviews consisted of questions that 
enquired about several pertinent themes on governance in Islamic finance as highlighted 
from the literature review. These themes consisted of the perception of Islamic finance from 
the perspective of conventional finance, the view of transparency, the examination of 
Shariah-supervisory boards, the role of lenders of last resort in Islamic finance and the 
further prospects and challenges of the Islamic financial system.  Unlike structured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews allow the researcher the option to vary the sequence 
of the themes based on the direction of the particular interview (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
Interview questions were established across these central themes and interviewees were 
allowed to speak freely about these issues. To determine the validity and reliability of 
questions several pilots were executed to refine interviewing technique, questioning 
sequence and if questions were achieving their desired effect. 
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5.5.3.1. Interview Sampling and Administration Methodology 
The sampling strategy adopted for this element of the research thesis was 
judgement/purposeful sampling. Using this strategy the research actively selects the 
interviewees that could provide the most comprehensive/ productive answers to the 
interview questions (Marshall, 1996). Critical case or purposeful sampling was adopted for 
this aspect of the research study. The decision to use a form of non-probability sampling for 
this component of the research was based on the specialised nature of the subject matter. 
Whilst Islamic finance is growing rapidly on a global scale and to a certain extent in 
academia, it is still very much regarded as a specialised, niche market. As such the 
researcher felt that the most beneficial views on issues of governance in Islamic finance 
would stem from the opinions of a selected and representative group of academics and 
professionals in the field. Initial research design for this aspect of the research project only 
called for the interview of academics and practitioners but it was realised that this could 
cause a perceptual bias towards either category.  
 
As such it was decided that an additional category of interviewee was required – one that 
understood both academic and practitioner perspectives. In essence this allowed for 
systematic triangulation of nodes in the sense that the research gathers views from three 
different sources – the Academic evaluation, the Practitioner outlook and the Academic-
Practitioner assessment. The inclusion of the Academic-Practitioner, the researcher felt, was 
valuable in balancing the views across the three interviewee groups.  
 
The aim of the sampling methodology was to achieve theoretical saturation of views. The 
notion of theoretical saturation of views is established in Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) 
seminal work on grounded theory. Fundamentally saturation is described as a process 
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whereby an interviewer continues to sample relevant cases until no new information arises. 
In terms sampling frame, there is no definite answer as to how many interviews are required 
to arrive at saturation point. Mason (2010) who examined five hundred and sixty post-
doctoral studies discovered that many PhD theses averaged around thirty-one interviews. 
However, what was further highlighted from the Mason (2010) study was that whilst thirty-
one was the average number of interviewees conducted for PhD studies, it did not 
necessarily result in saturation. Mason (2010) suggested that larger samples did not 
guarantee saturation and that saturation could have been achieved with samples as small as 
three interview candidates. Ritchie et al. (2003) and Guest et al. (2006) further support this 
view and suggest that sample size is not the only variable that has to be considered in terms 
of saturation. A study by Guest et al. (2006), which looked at women at high risk of HIV, 
found that saturation was attained after twelve interviews. This was put down to 
homogeneous nature of the interview candidates. The results of Guest’s (2006) twelve 
interview saturation point is also advocated by Francis et al. (2010) who discovered that no 
new precepts were generated after the first ten cases in theory-based research. However, we 
have to understand the inherent ambiguity with which saturation can be achieved as one of 
the limitations of this study. The specialised nature of Islamic finance could be further 
justification for the selection for the fourteen interviews.  
 
These interviews would be conducted with three types of individuals within the field of 
Islamic banking and finance – 1) Academic 2) Academic Practitioner 3) Practitioner.  
 
An ‘Academic’ would be an individual with expertise and significant publications in the 
field of Islamic finance. The ‘Academic-Practitioner’ would be an individual with some 
involvement in the academic field of Islamic finance. The ‘Practitioner’ distinction would 
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be given to an individual who has expertise in the practical field of Islamic Banking and 
Finance. 
 
The designation of these three groups is as follows: 
 
i) Academic: significant involvement in the academic field of Islamic banking and 
finance 
ii) Academic-Practitioner: significant involvement in the academic and practical 
field of Islamic banking and finance 
iii) Practitioner: professional involvement in the field of Islamic banking and 
finance 
 
Based on these three designations potential interview candidates were identified through 
numerous mediums. These included authors of journal publications, lists of professional 
selected as conference experts, detailed searchers of academic expertise through university 
profiles and detailed searches of quality knowledge capacity within Islamic financial 
institutions. Of this group of potential interview candidates the research will aim for a 
sample of thirteen interviews based upon the justifications found in Guest et al. (2006) for 
saturation points. These interviews lasted a maximum of 60 minutes were carried out either 
via phone or in person. Transcriptions of each interview are available in Appendix 1(Carr 
and Worth, 2001). 
 
The administration of each interview is as follows. Potential interviewees were contacted 
via email with information on the research scope. Assurances were made to ensure that 
participants understood that all information provided would be held in the strictest of 
         
 
195 
confidence and were for the sole purpose of this research only. Moreover, participants were 
afforded the option to opt out of the research at any point and all information provided 
would be destroyed (interview access documents can be found in Appendix 2). Once 
interviewees had agreed to a date and time, interviews were conducted over the telephone 
and recorded for analysis. At the beginning of each interview, the researcher introduced 
himself and the interviewees were once again briefed on the themes being covered as well 
as the safe guards on anonymity and information provided. The research also once again 
explained the reasons for the study and the reasons why the respondents had been selected. 
Once recorded, the interviews were transcribed and the transcriptions would be analysed 
using NVivo. The interview transcripts will be coded into nodes, which were then analysed 
for triangulation across all three groups of interviewees. 
 
In order to combat potential errors during the interview process, several measures were 
taken prior and during the interview process. Prior to actual interviews, several pilot 
interviews were carried out to ensure that questions did not lead interviewees and to 
ascertain that interview questions covered the stated themes on governance in Islamic 
finance. Moreover, all interviews were carried out only by the one researcher to reduce the 
amount interviewer variability (Saunders et al., 2009). Interviews were based around the 
themes identified by previous discourse as pertinent, further adding to the validity, 
consistency and generalizability of the research study. 
5.5.3.2. Interview Analysis Methodology 
As stated before the interviews will be analysed using NVivo and step were taken to ensure 
that the results generated from the analysis is valid. These steps involved running and initial 
pilot interview to assess the viability of the questions being asked. Based on the results of 
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these pilot interviews the question were refined and reworded to confirm that they did not 
lead the interview groups on their views of governance in Islamic finance. Moreover, all 
interviews were transcribed professionally and reviewed by both members of the 
supervisory team. Completed transcriptions were sent out to the relevant parties and 
crosschecked to ensure that accurate transcripts were produced. Any discrepancies or 
difference of views highlighted by interview candidates were incorporated into the 
transcripts. 
 
Aside from diagnostic processes to ensure the validity and reliability of the data collected, 
the actual analysis subscribes to the procedures seen in seminal works such as that of Miles 
and Huberman (1994) and Lillis (1999). Fundamentally, empirical qualitative research 
highlights the benefits of adopting a ‘quote-research’ method to analysing the interviews. 
Under this method of analysis, quotes from the interview transcription are taken as 
illustrative or confirming examples (Folkestad, 2008). Moreover, whilst a ‘quote-research’ 
method might provide a technique of analysis, it does bear several arguments as to its 
overall robustness as a singular approach to analysing interviews. In order to bolster the use 
of this ‘quote-research’ method, this study will implement, as well, a process based method 
of analysis that incorporates transcribed quotes. Following Lillis (1999) these process can be 
defined as: 
 
i) Data Reduction – development of underlying qualitative themes pertaining to 
governance and regulatory standards in Islamic finance. This fundamentally 
involved establishing the central themes of the underlying interviews as well as 
classifying these themes into nodes. The systemic classification of interview 
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themes into nodes allows for a more robust and certain qualitative analysis 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Erlandson et al., 1993) 
ii) Data display – seeking meaning amongst collected interviews. Once interviews 
were transcribed, themes across each interview were classed into their respective 
nodes that were set out in the ‘Data Reduction’ process above.  
iii) Conclusion – comparing, contrasting and triangulation of collected interviews 
and initial underlying themes and linking this to overall aims of the study. The 
coding of interview themes into nodes will allow the researcher to provide an 
informed perspective of interview candidates. Moreover, these nodes will be 
used to synthesize the views of interviewees with that of the empirical literature 
using a ‘quote-research’ analysis method. The conclusions will also indicate 
where saturation has occurred over the interview candidates. 
 
In order to aid the robustness of the study, this research has also evolved the tests for 
saturation developed in Francis et al. (2010) Francis et al. (2010) suggested a starting 
sample of ten interview candidates with a stopping criterion of three as a test for data 
saturation. Fundamentally, this test called for a review of data saturation of qualitative 
research at intervals of three interview candidates. For this study the research has essentially 
adopted the stopping criteria of three but has implemented this without a starting sample 
size. Essentially, the analysis will highlight commonalities in themes after three, six, nine 
and all interviews. The implementation of the Francis et al. (2010) test will provide a better 
picture of the saturated themes across the interview candidates and groups. 
 
Furthermore, the overall aim of this aspect of the research would be to fuse the perspectives 
of financial participants of Islamic Banking and Finance with that of the literature with 
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regards to governance and regulation. Essentially the research looks towards a saturation of 
views of the underlying themes for confirmation. This involves decomposing interviews and 
empirical literature and using an understanding of both to represent a view of the actualities 
of governance and regulatory standards in Islamic finance.  
 
5.5.4. Methodology Map  
Figure 21 below highlights the overall methodology map of the research project. Whilst the 
underlying research philosophy for this study lies with pragmatism, the methodology map 
illustrates the actual use of both quantitative and qualitative research methods within each of 
the empirical research chapters. The diagram aims to provide the reader with a better 
perspective at how the pragmatist philosophy ties into the overall research. 
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Figure 28: Thesis Methodology Map 
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5.6. Summative Remarks 
This chapter of the research project has set out the methodological foundations of this study. 
It initially indicates the philosophical direct of this study where, for the purposes of this 
research and with regards to the research questions and objectives, a pragmatist philosophy 
has been adapted. With Islamic finance being a comparatively new area in both academic and 
practical finance, the ability to draw inference from not only quantitative modes of analysis 
but also qualitative methodologies would provide greater and more robust insight into the 
questions that are being asked in this research. The chapter has further elaborated on the 
research approach, design and strategy.  
 
Following on from the pragmatist philosophy, which advocates pluralism and mixed 
methods, the hypo-deductive approach best suits this philosophy with the use of both 
inductive and deductive modes of thinking to arrive at a conclusion for the study. 
Additionally, the research design is fundamentally exploratory as this study aims to explore 
several pertinent issues in Islamic finance – namely performance, risk management and 
governance – and the development of the overall Islamic finance system in today’s modern 
economy. This study also adopts experiment and survey research strategies. The experiment 
strategy is illustrated in the creation of the new Shariah-compliant risk management tool and 
the testing of the performance of Shariah-complaint indexes. The interview strategy is 
implemented in the analysis of governance in Shariah finance with the use of interviews with 
both academics and professionals in the field of Islamic finance. The chapter further 
documents the actual methods of analysis for each of the research objectives. In assessing the 
performance and diversification benefit of Shariah-compliant equity indexes – Research 
Objective 2 – the study abides by a quantitative method of analysis. Equity indexes from 
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American and UK are initially split into predetermined groupings/portfolios and tested for 
cointegrating vectors to establish if there are any diversification opportunities. Portfolios that 
exhibited no cointegrating vectors were then optimized under a Markowitz (1959) framework 
to determine if the inclusion of a Shariah-compliant equity index within a conventional 
portfolio resulted in the outperformance of a conventional equity benchmark. 
 
In creating a new Shariah-compliant risk management instrument – Research Objective 3 – 
this facet of the research was very much pen to paper. The study established a broad 
understanding of fundamental Shariah-compliant rules. The divergent nature of Shariah-
compliant standards meant that in order to avoid confusion, the study abided by a general, 
common set of Islamic principles across the Shariah-compliant hubs. This circumvented 
prescribing to a single set of Shariah-compliant rules but rather provided for a structure that 
would be more generalizable in terms of Shariah-compliance. 
 
The study wanted to discover the views of market participants on the issues of regulation and 
governance within Islamic finance. It was decided that this would be best achieve through 
semi-structured interviews with the aim of attaining a saturation of participant precepts. With 
the specialized nature of Islamic finance, it was believed that the best method of sampling 
would be judgment sampling with a sampling frame of thirteen interviewees providing the 
saturation point. All interviews were analysed using NVivo and views were classed into 
predetermined nodes. These nodes were recognized as pertinent issues discussed in the 
existing literature on Islamic banking and finance. The following chapter will document the 
findings from the empirical research.  
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6. Findings 
6.1. Introduction to Chapter 
This chapter provides an overview of the findings from this research study. It is sectioned as 
follows. Section 6.2. highlights the findings from the literature review. Section 6.3. features 
the results of the examination of the performance of Shariah-compliant funds and Section 6.4. 
provides some interesting insights in the creation of the new risk management structure. This 
section is further broken down into subsections which highlight the payoffs of the hybrid 
structure to each of the parties involved. Section 6.5. emphasises the major findings on the 
analysis of the issues of governance in Islamic finance and breaks down the pertinent nodes. 
Section 6.6. and 6.7. will provide a summary of all the findings and concluding remarks 
which sets the scene for the discussions that will be found in Chapter 7. 
 
6.2.  Thematic Findings from Previous Discourse 
The review of literature presented in this research study will provide the reader with an 
overview of the development of Islamic finance in the modern economy. The literature 
begins with an introduction to the development of the Islamic financial system throughout 
medieval periods and its evolution into what is now known as modern Islamic finance. The 
thematic findings from the prevailing literature essentially achieve Objective one of this 
study. 
 
What can be seen in the literature review is that functional aspects of current thinking in 
Islamic finance were, in fact, during medieval periods, widely accepted as the core values of 
modern finance – for instance the building of financial relationships based on trust and 
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respect (Udovitch, 1970). There was wide spread acceptance of financial practices such as 
credit based notices in medieval Islamic finance, which is not presented in modern Islamic 
finance (Giotein, 1961; Giotein and Shemesh, 1967). These credit based notices were very 
similar to modern day’s bills of exchange or bills of landing. 
 
However, the literature (see Udovitch, 1970) does indicate that the bifurcation in the 
evolution of medieval Islamic finance with that of Western finance was down to the reality 
that medieval Islamic finance possessed an ingrained desire for close, personal trading 
relationships. The importance of these close trading relationships meant that the development 
of international trade for medieval Islamic finance was severely hampered when compared to 
the development of international trade of Western–styled finance, which was supported by a 
network of financial providence institutions or medieval banks established during that period. 
These banks enabled the growth of formal, impersonal credit lines, which did not require the 
formation of close knit trading societies but rather resulted in the proliferation of detached but 
trusted credit facilities. Whilst Islamic finance was steeped deeply in trade based on personal 
relationships, Western finance was developing a network of trade based upon financial 
relationships, which forms the foundation of today’s modern economic system. 
 
The resurgence for Islamic finance took place after the Second World War when for the first 
time large regions of the Islamic nation (re-) gained political independence and were able to 
govern themselves (Schaik, 2001). There were obstacles and reluctance of acceptance of 
Western financial concepts in those newly independent Islamic regions and there was a desire 
to return to more traditional Islamic values. Effectively, this want to return to something 
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familiar is seen as the birth of modern Islamic finance or the Islamic finance that is accepted 
in today’s economy (Khan, 2010b). 
 
Modern Islamic finance has grown substantially since the 1940s and this growth is not 
limited to Islamic nations such as Pakistan, Malaysia and the Gulf countries. There is strong 
infrastructure for growth in Western and Far Eastern economies such as the United Kingdom 
and Hong Kong (Schaik, 2001; Siddiqui, 2008). Steps have been taken to try and integrate 
Islamic financial precepts into the underlying regulatory and legal conventions of mainstream 
finance (Bassens et al., 2010). Moreover, there is indicative evidence suggesting that many 
legal systems are flexible enough to accommodate Islamic financial precepts (DeLorenzo and 
McMillen, 2007). A good example of this flexibility in accommodating Islamic financial 
principles can be seen from the evolution of UK tax laws in 2003, 2005 and 2006 to make it 
possible to provide Islamic mortgages (Khan and Bhatti, 2008a). This development and 
acceptance of Islamic finance in what is widely seen as more traditional mainstream 
economies has greatly aided in the overall image of modern Islamic finance. 
 
Modern Islamic finance is based around three central tenets – the prohibition of riba and the 
prevention of maysir and gharar. Moreover, all financial transactions have to be halal – this 
excluded dealings that included pork, tobacco, alcohol, munitions, insurance products and 
banking services (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2006). Financial contracts during the formative years 
of modern Islamic finance mainly suggest a PLS modus of wealth distribution however, the 
development and acceptance of the murabaha contract over the 1980s changed the landscape 
of Islamic financing (Ashour, 1999). The problems associated to PLS distribution – principal-
agent issues – led to the widespread acceptance of debt financing provided by murabaha 
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contracts (Naqvi, 1982; Khan 1984). Additionally, the benefit, ease and familiarity of debt 
financing exacerbated the acceptance and popularity of murabaha contracts, which till today 
remain one of the major forms of Islamic financing (Vogel and Hayes, 1998; Presley and 
Sessions, 1994).  
 
Whilst, the growth and development of the murabaha as one of the most widely used Islamic 
financing concepts has been beneficial to the Islamic financial system, it brought with it 
several issues. Firstly, the use of debt financing, while accepted, has always been seen as 
inferior to PLS which, many in the Islamic financial world see as more in line with Shariah 
principles (Kayed and Hassan, 2011). Supporters of a PLS modes of financing (Kayed and 
Hassan, 2011; Chapra, 2008) have indicated that this would result in a more efficient and 
equitable distribution of wealth and income and the building of more robust financial 
relationships. In light of the recent financial crisis and the impact of excessive debt financing 
on many financial institutions and sovereigns, there has been a throwback to the initial 
studies of modern Islamic finance and the arguments for PLS integration within Islamic 
financial contracts such as those presented in Naqvi (1982) and Khan (1984) have seen a 
resurgence. 
 
The providence of commercial and investment banking services make up the bulk of the 
major financial activities of modern Islamic financial instruments. This is due in part to 
another recent development of modern Islamic finance, the use of Shariah-windows where 
mainstream financial contracts and assets are assessed using several levels of Shariah-screens 
(Obaidullah, 2009). Assets and contracts that pass these screens are deemed Shariah-
compliant and can be actively traded by Islamic financial institutions. These Shariah-
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windows have been used to create Shariah-compliant indexes out of mainstream companies 
and some prominent examples include the Dow Jones Islamic Index and the FTSE Bursa 100 
Index (Khatkhatay and Nisar, 2007). These Shariah-windows have also resulted in the growth 
of financial innovation within Islamic finance and there has been great impetus in the 
development of Islamic financial instruments in the field of liquidity transfer and risk 
management (Jobst, 2007). Alongside, traditional Islamic financial contracts such as 
musharakah, murdarabah and murabaha, innovative steps have been taken to enable risk 
managers to actively manage modern financial risk. This has led to the creation of financial 
instruments such as parallel murabaha, Islamic swaps and call options (Dar and Azami, 
2010; Yankson, 2011). The notion of financial innovation being further pursued in light of 
the current financial crisis and as highlighted by Chapra and Khan (2002) Islamic finance 
possess no formal framework for risk management. In light of these risks, there have been 
increasing debates about risk management structures and the use of Islamic derivatives and 
whilst the arguments are still divided (Kamali, 1999; Seif, 2009) there is robust indication 
that there is a need for further financial innovation within Islamic finance (Hesse et al, 2008). 
 
This is no surprise as product development and risk management have been indicated in the 
literature as a significant issue in modern Islamic finance (Bacha, 1999; Dar and Presley, 
2000). The substantial growth of Islamic finance has meant that risk managers operating 
under a Shariah framework have had to contend with an ever changing and evolving gamut of 
financial risks. There have been calls for additional development of financial risk 
management instruments that would enable Islamic finance to keep pace with mainstream 
finance (Noman, 2002). However, one of the difficulties with financial innovation under a 
Shariah framework as suggested in the literature was down to the interpretation of Shariah-
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financial rules, the perceived need for the development of these instruments and the use of 
Shariah-windows. 
 
These use of these Shariah-windows have resulted in several criticisms mainly stemming 
from the subjective nature of ‘what is?’ and ‘what isn’t?’ Shariah-compliant (Bacha, 1999). 
Another issue raised with relation to Shariah-compliance was the nature and composition of 
the individuals that passed these judgements on Shariah-compliance (El-Gamal, 2006). The 
issue of Shariah-compliance was highlighted as one of the major issues in the governance of 
the Islamic financial system exacerbated only by the lack of uniformity across the global 
Islamic financial spectrum (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Chapra and Khan, 2000). The analysis 
of Shariah-compliant standards has indicated differing standards of governance and 
regulation in different Islamic financial hubs such as those in the West, the Gulf and the Far 
East (Rehman and Masood, 2013; El-Hawary et al., 2007). Predominately, this lack of 
uniformity results from the varying interpretation of Islam from the various schools of 
Islamic thought and there have been calls from both an academic and practical perspective for 
a clarification of Islamic financial edict (Wilson, 2000; Solé, 2007; Cihak and Hesse, 2008) 
and the creation of fundamental standardization of Shariah-compliant standards.  It was 
indicated that this lack of uniformity could have an effect on the stability and as such impact 
the overall confidence of the Islamic financial system (Jobst et al., 2008; DeLorenzo and 
McMillen, 2007) 
 
The findings from the literature essentially serve well to inform the empirical analyses 
conducted in this study. In the following sections, the empirical findings from the analysis of 
performance and diversification of Islamic financial equity indexes, Islamic financial 
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innovation and governance and regulatory challenges will be presented. At every juncture, 
attempts will be made to link both the empirical results to that of existing literature. 
 
6.3. Performance and Diversification of Islamic Equity Indexes 
Objective two of this research study looks to examine the performance and diversification 
benefits of incorporating a Shariah-compliant equity index within an optimised portfolio. 
Indexes were selected from both the Dow Jones and FTSE over the period of 1
st
 January 2001 
until the 29
th
 of June 2007. The unit of analysis is daily data and the results will be 
benchmarked against a naïve buy and hold strategy of the FTSE100 over the same period. 
 
The list of indexes selected is given below: 
 
List of Indexes (1
st
 January 2001 up until 29
th
 June 2007): 
 
 Shariah-Compliant 
1) FTSE Global Islamic Index (FTSEIS) 
2) Dow Jones Islamic Index (DJIMI) 
Mainstream Index 
3) FTSE 100 (FTSE) 
4) Dow Jones Industrial (DJ) 
Sustainability Indexes 
5) FTSE 4 Good Sustainability Index (FTSE4G) 
6) Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) 
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The logged returns were calculated for each of these indexes and the results of initial 
summary tests are presented in the table below: 
 
 LDJ LDJSI LDJIMI LFTSEIS LFTSE100 LFTSE4G 
Mean 0.0001280 -0.0000276 0.0001080 -0.0000385 -0.0000108 0.0000271 
Maximum 0.0615470 0.0755930 0.0446420 0.047959 0.0690270 0.0543960 
Minimum -0.0739620 -0.0681770 -0.0399640 -0.044224 -0.0631350 -0.0562520 
Std. Dev. 0.0101530 0.0145700 0.0090530 0.009930 0.0118860 0.0105930 
Skewness -0.0026200 -0.0293440 -0.0395240 0.030314 -0.1111860 -0.2393400 
Kurtosis 7.9995250 6.6035510 5.4105920 5.154067 6.7257820 7.2573490 
Jarque-Bera 1765.291 917.350 410.840 327.7665 983.870 1296.262 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 
Table 17: Summary Statistics 
 
 
The sample period for all six indexes was from the 1
st
 of January 2000 until 29
th
 June 2007 
using daily data as the unit of analysis, which yielded 1695 data points. An examination of 
the New York indexes (LDJ, LDJSI and LDJIMI) indicates that only the Dow Jones 
sustainability indexes (LDJSI) exhibited an average net loss over the period. On the other 
hand the analysis of the London indexes denote both the FTSE Islamic Index (LFTSEIS) and 
FTSE 100 (LFTSE100) as having negative average returns over the sample period. Whilst 
kurtosis is high in all indexes this is offset with volatility (standard deviation) being 
consistent and low across the board with all six indexes.  
 
Indexes were then organised into the following groups given below: 
 
Group 1 :- LDJ, LDJSI, LDJIMI, LFTSEIS, LFTSE, LFTSE4G 
Group 2 :- LDJ, LDJSI, LDJIMI 
Group 3 :- LFTSEIS, LFTSE, LFTSE4G 
Group 4 :- LDJSI, LDJIMI, LFTSEIS, LFTSE4G 
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The grouping characteristics are defined as: 
 
v) Group 1: All selected indexes 
vi) Group 2: All selected Dow Jones Indexes 
vii) Group 3: All selected FTSE Indexes 
viii) Group 4: All selected ethical and Shariah-compliant Indexes 
 
Diagnostic testing is required on the indexes prior to running the Johansen procedure for 
cointegration. This involved testing all indexes for stationarity. Note cointegration can only 
be done on series, which are integrated to the order of 1 or I (1) series. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was used to ascertain the order of stationarity of the series and is 
based upon the following hypothesis: 
 
H0: δ = 0 (time series in non-stationary) 
H1: δ < 0 (time series is stationary) 
 
The results are given in the table below: 
 
Variables I(0) (p-values) I(1) (p-values) 
 No Trend Trend No Trend  Trend 
LDJ  0.7283 0.3231 0.0000 0.0000 
LDJSI 0.5076 0.6265 0.0000 0.0000 
LDJIMI 0.8994 0.3584 0.0000 0.0000 
LFTSEIS 0.4690 0.6358 0.0000 0.0000 
LFTSE 0.6249 0.7312 0.0001 0.0000 
LFTSE4G 0.6544 0.5295 0.0001 0.0000 
Table 18: Results of Unit Root Tests at 5% Confidence Interval 
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What can be seen from the results is a rejection of the null hypothesis at I (0) indicating the 
presence of a unit root in level. The test was run again at I (1) and the results show an 
acceptance of the null hypothesis signifying that all series were stationary to the order of 1 or 
I (1) series. Being that all series were stationary at I (1) they were progressed to the next stage 
of the procedure. 
 
This stage involved the creation of Vector Auto Regressions in order to determine the lag 
length structure for the cointegration analysis. The indexes were split into 4 different 
portfolio groupings 1) All indexes 2) New York Indexes only 3) London Indexes only 4) 
Islamic and Ethical Indexes only. The Schwarz Information Criterion (SC) was used to 
determine lag lengths for each group and the results were as follows – three lags for Group 1 
and two lags for the subsequent groups. For the cointegration analysis the Johansen 
methodology was adopted and under this methodology the Trace test for cointegration was 
preferred over the Max-eigenvalue test on the basis that empirical literature indicates that the 
Trace yields superior results based on normality (Cheung and Lai, 1993). The hypotheses for 
the Trace Test are as follows: 
 
1
st
 Test Hypotheses Set: Number of cointegrating vectors is equal to 0 
H0: r = 0 
H1: r ≥ 1 
 
2
nd
 Test Hypotheses Set: Number of cointegrating vectors is more than 1 
H0: r ≤ 1 
H1: r = 2 
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The results of the Trace Tests are shown in Table 19. 
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0 119.7579 95.7537 0.0004 43.7997 42.9153 0.0407 28.8736 29.7971 0.0636 53.0457 47.8561 0.0150 
1 79.8772 69.8189 0.0063 23.9240 25.8721 0.0857 12.7785 15.4947 0.1232 23.4401 29.7971 0.2251 
2 47.8379 47.8561 0.0502 9.1961 12.5180 0.1686 2.7646 3.8415 0.0964 8.0885 15.4947 0.4560 
3 26.1426 29.7971 0.1245 - - - - - - 0.8286 3.8415 0.3627 
4 11.7864 15.4947 0.1675 - - - - - - - - - 
5 3.3227 3.8415 0.0683 - - - - - - - - - 
Table 19: Trace Test Statistics 
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Looking at the P-values Groups 1, 2 and 4 exhibited significance at a 95% confidence 
interval and a rejection of both null hypotheses for the Trace test thus indicating the 
existence of cointegrating vectors. With regards to the scope of this thesis the existence 
of cointegrating vectors indicates a long-term stochastic relationship thus nullifying the 
diversification benefits derived from forming an efficient portfolio of the indexes 
included in these groups.  
 
Group 3 was the only group, which did not indicate any significance at a 95% confidence 
interval suggesting an acceptance of the Trace null hypotheses, concluding that there 
were no cointegrating vectors and the possibility for diversification from forming a 
portfolio of these three indexes. Group 3 essentially comprised of the three London 
Indexes – FTSE 100, FTSE 4 Good and FTSE Global Islamic Index. 
 
Using these three series, the study further tests this diversification benefit by creating an 
optimised portfolio in order to analyse the risk-adjusted returns against a naïve buy and 
hold of the FTSE100. Considering that the study is looking at Islamic finance from a 
conventional financial perspective, it was deemed reasonable to expect a 50% investment 
in the conventional equity index. For a more robust analysis the study incorporates this 
into the optimisation procedure and two separate portfolios were created – one with free 
weighting for each of the indexes and the other constrained with 50% invested in the 
conventional equity index, which in this case is the FTSE100. Additional constraints 
included no short selling which is more in line with Shariah financial principles. The 
specification of the naïve buy and hold of the FTSE100 included a purchase at the start of 
the sample period (1
st
 Jan 2001) and sell at the end of the sample period (29
th
 Jan 2007). 
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The optimisation process used the Markowitz (1959) framework and optimisation periods 
included 2 year, 1 year, 6 months and 3 months. Optimisations were conducted using 
Excel’s solver function for minimum variance. The results presented below are the 
calculated annualised risk- adjusted returns for each of the optimisation periods. 
 
The results of the optimisation are presented below in Table 20: 
 
Period Statistics Jensen Treynor Sharpe 
2 Year Optimisation 
Average 
   
Constrained portfolio -0.0106 -0.0285 0.0443 
Unconstrained portfolio -0.0016 -0.0194 0.0601 
 
Average 
   
1 Year Optimisation    
Constrained portfolio -0.0080 -0.0460 -0.0423 
Unconstrained portfolio -0.0014 -0.0408 0.0169 
 
Average 
   
6 Mth Optimisation    
Constrained portfolio -0.0260 -0.0906 -0.0051 
Unconstrained portfolio -0.0138 -0.1060 -0.0122 
 
Average 
   
3 Mth Optimisation    
Constrained portfolio -0.0167 -0.0952 0.0349 
Unconstrained portfolio -0.0547 -0.1344 -0.0536 
     
BENCHMARK 
Average 
   
Naive buy and hold 0 -0.027 -0.145 
Table 20: Optimisation Results (Annualised Returns) 
 
The analysis will take on two forms. Firstly the study will look at comparing the 
optimisations over the various periods. It can be seen from Table 20 that risk adjusted 
performance appears to improve as the optimisation period becomes longer, although the 
deliberate omission of transaction costs should put these results in the right perspective. 
Whilst it is difficult to ascertain the true value of the transaction cost, as this would be 
tied into the volume and value of trade we can draw inference for this conclusion from 
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the amount of rebalancing required across the optimisation periods. For the two-year 
optimisation window, the portfolio would have to be rebalanced 3 times whilst for a 
three-month optimisation window the portfolio would have to be rebalanced which could 
invariably lead to higher transaction costs. Relatively speaking, the constrained portfolio 
performs better than the unconstrained portfolio over shorter optimisation periods. A 
possible explanation for this could be extracted from the findings of Hussein (2007) who 
suggested that Islamic equity indexes underperform their conventional counterparts 
during market bull phases. The sample period for this study explicitly ignored the 
financial crisis and observed a period of relatively strong global financial performance. 
The use of the mandatory conventional index investment constraint could have resulted 
in the capture of the excess performance over the period. In the former, each portfolio 
must contain at least 50% of FTSE, in the unconstrained portfolio the weights are freely 
chosen by the optimisation algorithm. The weights (apart from the FTSE100 in the 
constrained portfolio) are continuously re-assessed within the optimisation window.  
 
The theoretical arguments towards rebalancing of portfolios over these time horizons 
stems from the notion that should an investor not rebalance a portfolio it will invariably 
drift from its efficient frontier (Tokat and Wicas, 2007). Moreover, should transaction 
costs, taxation and temporal effects be taken into accounted, there are further variables 
that should be added to the rebalancing argument (Donohue and Yip, 2003). Looking at 
the risk-adjusted returns for portfolio, there is clear indication of better portfolio 
performance over a longer-term optimization horizon, however, it is difficult to ascertain 
if the principal cause of this is the exclusion of short selling or the constraint of 50% 
investment in the conventional index. One possible explanation for longer rebalancing 
horizons could be found in Hau and Rey (2008) who have suggested that portfolio 
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manager rebalance in light of combating volatility movements. The sample period was 
taken specifically to exclude the distortionary effects of the financial crisis and moreover 
also include a period of relative stable growth in the equity market spectra. This could go 
towards suggesting a longer term rebalancing horizon, as there is not a need to manage 
the inherent fluctuations. This facet of the research is not a central objective of the study 
but would definitely warrant further and future research. 
 
The second element of the analysis looks at comparing the performance of the optimised 
portfolio against a naïve buy and hold strategy of the mainstream (FTSE100) index. In 
this regard we consider the performance ratios.  
 
The Jensen, Treynor and Sharpe ratios for the benchmark, naïve buy and hold strategy for 
the FTSE100 are 0, -0.027 and -0.145 respectively. Considering the results in totality, the 
picture is mixed at best. Based upon Jensen’s alpha we see a consistent 
underperformance of the portfolios against the conventional, FTSE100 index, the same 
can be said for the Treynor index.  What is interesting, however, are the results for the 
Sharpe ratio. Being seen as the most robust measure of the three as it accounts for both 
systematic and unsystematic risk, it is indicative of better performance of the portfolios 
over the conventional mainstream index. Based upon the empirical results for the Sharpe 
ratio we can suggest that the inclusion of a Shariah-compliant equity index yields not 
only diversification benefits but also results in the out performance of a conventional 
equity index.  
 
These findings of mixed performance echo that of previous studies conducted by M’Zali 
and Turcotte (1998), Abdullah et al. (2007), Elfakhani et al. (2007) and Girard and 
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Hassan (2008 and 2011). However, what can be surmised form the results of this aspect 
of the empirical research would be that there are arguments for the inclusion of Islamic 
equity indexes within conventional portfolio. Compared the existing research, which 
mainly focus upon comparing the performance of Islamic against conventional equity 
indexes, the results from this study suggest that within a conventional portfolio there are 
diversification and performance improvements from incorporating a Shariah-compliant 
equity index.  
 
This empirical objective of the study looked towards discovering if diversification 
opportunities existed should a Shariah-compliant equity index be included within a 
portfolio of assets. These opportunities were defined by the lack of existence of 
cointegration among the indexes in a portfolio. It was found that by grouping a base 
index such as the FTSE100 along with a sustainability and Islamic index, diversification 
was possible.  
 
The results are mixed, but based upon the Sharpe ratio there is an illustration of a 
significant improvement in performance over that of just buying and holding the base 
index. Moreover, seeing that risk-reduction was the basis of the optimisation models used 
in this study, great emphasis was placed upon the weights attached to the FTSE Islamic 
fund, more often than not, when it came to achieving minimum variance.  
 
However, the researcher accepts the limitations of this exercise in determining 
diversification and performance. Optimisation periods could have been shortened to 
envelope a greater degree of information and greater emphasis would have been placed 
on realistic costs and problems involved with investing in Shariah funds. The inclusion of 
         
 
218
transaction costs would be a variable for inclusion in further studies as well as the 
problems associated achieving exposure to these funds. For further confirmation a larger 
scope of equity indexes could be taken into account with more varied groupings. Seeing 
that the inclusion of an Islamic index within a conventional portfolio can result in not 
only diversification but also a performance benefit this clearly indicates its status as a 
viable alternative for both Islamic and conventional market participants. These 
diversification and performance benefits, it can be argued, form a significant share of the 
arguments for the growing acceptance of Islamic finance as an alternative to conventional 
finance. This continual acceptance and growth has resulted in calls for the proliferation  
of risk management instruments which leads on to the next empirical facet of this study 
which involves the creation of a Shariah-compliant risk management tool. 
 
6.4. Creation of New Shariah-compliant Risk Management Tool 
6.4.1. The Structure of the Hybrid Product 
A significant objective of this study is the creation of a Shariah-compliant risk 
management tool. This facet of the research complements both the findings from the 
literature review and the initial empirical work looking at the performance and 
diversification benefit of the inclusion of a Shariah-compliant equity index with a 
portfolio of conventional indexes. 
 
This section details the findings from the processes involved with the creation of a risk 
management tool that adheres to Shariah-compliant standards. It is demonstrated as well, 
via the payoff streams that the structure could perform sufficiently well in the practical 
world. The main specifications of the instrument would involve not only trying to 
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achieve a sufficient hedge but also trying to incorporate an emphasis on risk sharing as 
opposed to risk transfer. This focus on risk sharing as opposed to risk transfer stems from 
the strong arguments presented in the literature for PLS and its support within the Islamic 
financial world (Kayed and Hassan, 2011).  PLS and Islamic finance advocates financial 
responsibility throughout financial transactions and it is believed that the choice to 
include an element of risk-sharing would further bolster these arguments for 
accountability. With the priority placed upon risk-sharing as opposed to risk transfer, the 
basis of the model will stem from the musharakah or partnership agreements.  
 
A basic musharakah is essentially a partnership contract where both parties actively 
engage in the investment and management aspects of the business venture. Profits and 
losses in this context are shared based on contributions to the business venture in the 
form of expertise, management and capital injection. These contributions need to be 
equal from each contracting party and the profits (and losses) will be divided 
accordingly. Like most Islamic financial contracts, the profit (or loss) sharing ratio will 
be decided initially within a master agreement to avoid problems of gharar. The structure 
of the musharakah is given below. 
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Figure 29: Musharakah Structure (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007) 
 
Both Party 1 and 2 agree to enter into a musharakah contract. The agreement to this 
musharakah will set out the proportion of investment that each party decides to include. 
The ratio of investment by each party will also determine the profit/loss that is shared 
amongst the two parties.  
 
Under this agreement, two parties form a partnership, under which profits and losses are 
shared out in a specified ratio. In its standard form it is not entirely a risk management 
tool and does not provide institutions with a hedging instrument but rather a way to share 
risk. Could this principle be applied within the spectrum of a partnership option where 
the call option writer shares the risk with the call option buyer? One possible model is 
illustrated below. 
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Figure 30: Hybrid structure combining wa’ad and murabaha contracts 
 
 
The designation of the parties in the structure above is as follows:    
- Party 1: Bank – organizer of the structure 
- Party 2: Customer – requires protection and seeks coverage from bank 
- Party 3: Wa’ad seller – facilitates the option element in the structure 
 
Summary of symbols: 
- 0: Party 1’s share of amount of commodity to be purchased 
- 1: Party 2’s share of amount of commodity to be purchased 
- 1: Premium for wa’ad (in some instances it could also be a down payment) 
- 1: cost plus mark-up price of murabaha  (lets set it equal to S0 + 
1
) 
- Q1: exercise price of wa’ad  (clearly above S0, but could include/ not include 
1
 if 
this is a down payment) 
- S0: spot price at time T0 
- S1: spot price at time T1 
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Party 2 is afraid of a rise in prices and wishes to protect itself. Within this hybrid 
contract, Party 2 contacts Party 1 (the bank, that may believe that price is going to fall) to 
organise a structure for protection against a rise in prices. Under the stipulations of this 
contract, both Party 1 and Party 2 enter into an agreement to share the costs and benefits 
of a wa’ad that is purchased from Party 3. The cost of the wa’ad (1) is split between 
Party 1 and Party 2 based on a predetermined ratio (0: 1) with exercise price (Q1). This 
ratio will also determine the spilt for the amount of tangible goods should the wa’ad be 
exercised. The nature of this split ratio will play a pivotal part towards the entire contract 
as it determines the proportion of each party’s payoff streams.  
 
At the same time, a murabaha is set up between Party 1 and Party 2 whereby it is agreed 
that at the expiry of the wa’ad option, Party 1 will sell its proportion of the commodity at 
cost plus some mark-up, which we set, without loss of generalisation as equal to 1 = S0 
+ 1, the same as the premium of the wa’ad. Apart from simplifying the algebra, both the 
mark-up and the premium will be known (and set) at the same time T0 and will enable the 
direct comparison of the hybrid product, with a straight murabaha and a straight wa’ad. 
This will be regardless of whether the wa’ad is exercised. Moreover, to adhere to the 
principles of Islamic finance the bank will purchase its share (0) of the commodity at 
time T0 at price S0 and retain ownership of it until T1.  
 
Should the wa’ad not be exercised, Party 1 will then pass its share of the commodity onto 
Party 2 for the agreed price inclusive of a mark-up (S0 + 
1
), whereas if the wa’ad is 
exercised, then Party 1 (the bank) will purchase its share (0) of the commodity from 
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Party 3, but sell it at S1 onto the market, while passing the commodity already in its 
possession onto Party 2. 
 
6.4.2. Payoffs for each of the parties 
The following paragraphs will illustrate the model in two different scenarios. It should be 
noted that this structure is for a call option and as such Party 2 is afraid of a rise in prices. 
 
Scenario 1: There is an increase in the spot prices for a commodity. Party 2 is going to 
exercise the wa’ad. 
 
Payoffs at time T0: 
- Party 1 pays premium to Party 3 = 0 x 1 
- Party 2 pays premium to Party 3 = 1 x 1 
- Party 1 (the bank) purchases 0 of the commodity at S0  
 
Payoffs at time T1: 
- wa’ad is exercised 
- Party 1 takes delivery of commodity and pays Party 3 = 0 x Q1 
- Party 1 sells its portion of the commodity onto Party 2 at cost plus some mark-up 
= 0 x X1 or 0 x (S0 + 
1
) 
- Party 1 sells its portion of the commodity at the spot price S1 
- Party 2 takes delivery of commodity and pays Party 3 = 1 x Q1 
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Scenario 2: There is a decrease in the spot prices for commodity. Party 2 is not going to 
exercise the wa’ad. 
 
Payoffs at time T0: 
- Party 1 pays premium to Party 3 = 0 x 1 
- Party 1 (the bank) purchases 0 of the commodity at S0  
- Party 2 pays premium to Party 3 = 1 x 1 
 
Payoffs at time T1: 
- wa’ad is not exercised 
- Party 1 sells its proportion of commodity to Party 2 at cost plus some mark-up = 
0 x X1 or 0 x (S0 + 
1
) 
- Party 2 purchases commodity from spot market = 1 x S1 
- Party 3 sells commodity on the spot market at S1Q
1
 
 
Tables 21 and 22 below provide a better illustration of the payoffs for each party in each 
scenario. 
 
*Note: Negative signs denote expenditure and a positive sign denotes revenue. 
Party 1 (Partner Bank) Party 2 (Customer) Party 3 (Wa’ad seller) 
T0: pay premium to Party 3 
-01 
Purchase a
0
 of commodity 
-0S0 
T0: pay premium to Party 3 
-11 
T0: receive premia from 
Party 1 and Party 2 
+01 + 11 
T1: -
0
Q
1 
+ 0(S0 + 
1
) + 
0S1 
T1:  -
1
Q
1 
- 0(S0 + 
1
) T1: +
0
Q
1 
+ 1Q1 
NET: +0(S1 - Q
1
) 
NET: -1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 -
0S0 
NET: (0 + 1) 1 + (0 + 
1) Q1 
Table 21: Scenario 1- Rise in prices and wa’ad is exercised 
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Party 1 (Partner Bank) Party 2 (Customer) Party 3 (Wa’ad seller) 
T0: pay premium to Part 3 
-01 
Purchase a0 of commodity 
-0S0 
T0: pay premium to Part 3 
-11 
T0: receive premia from 
Party 1 and party 2 
+01 + 11 
T1: +
0
(S0 + 
1
) T1: -
1
S1 - 
0
(S0 + 
1
) 
T1: +
0
S1 + 
1
S1 
 
NET:  0 
NET: -1S1 - (
0
 + 1) 1 -
0S0 
NET: (0 + 1) 1 + (0 + 
1) S1 
Table 22: Scenario 2 - Fall in prices and wa’ad is NOT exercised 
 
Tables 21 and Table 22 report the outcomes of the strategy in both cases when the wa’ad 
is exercised and when it is not. Table 23 presents the payoffs of the wa’ad seller. 
 
 (wa’ad exercised) (wa’ad NOT exercised)) 
T0 
T0: receive premium from 
Party 1 and Party 2 
(0 + 1) 1 
Purchase (0 + 1) of 
commodity 
-(0 + 1) S0 
T0: receive premium from 
Party 1 and Party 2 
(0 + 1) 1 
Purchase (0 + 1) of 
commodity 
-(0 + 1) S0 
T1 
T1: honour promise to sell 
commodity at Party 1 and 
Party 2 at agreed price Q
1
 
+(0 + 1) Q1 
T1: sell commodity at spot 
price S1 
+(0 + 1 ) S1 
NET: 
NET: +(0 + 1) 1  + (0 + 
1) Q1 - (0 + 1) S0 
NET:  +(0 + 1)(S1-S0) + 
(0 + 1) 1 
Table 23: Perspective from seller of a wa’ad (Party 3) 
 
Party 3 (the seller of the wa’ad) will gain: + (0 + 1) 1 + (0 + 1) Q1 - (0 + 1) S0 if 
the wa’ad is exercised as (Q1 + 1) > S0. 
 
However, if the price falls + (0 + 1) (S1 - S0) + (
0
 + 1) 1 the outcome depends on 
the size of the fall or in other words whether (S1 – S0) > 1. 
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The benefits of this structure for Party 3 will depend greatly on price at which they are 
able to purchase the commodity and sell on to Party 1 and Party 2. Moreover, there is no 
clear indication that ownership is required prior to entering into a wa’ad contract.  
 
However, more interesting comments may be drawn by comparing the case when the 
combined strategy (wa’ad plus murabaha with sharing) is compared with a straight 
wa’ad and no sharing. 
 
Table 24 illustrates the outcomes of the straight wa’ad.  
 
Straight wa’ad 
(wa’ad exercised) 
Straight wa’ad 
(wa’ad NOT 
exercised) 
Combined product 
(wa’ad exercised) 
Combined product 
(wa’ad NOT 
exercised) 
T0: pay premium to 
Party 3 
-(0 + 1) 1 
T0: pay premium 
to Party 3 
-(0 + 1) 1 
T0: pay premium to 
Party 3 
-11 
T0: pay premium to 
Party 3 
-11 
T1: EXERCISED 
-(0 + 1)Q1 
 
T1: NOT 
EXERCISED 
-(0 + 1) S1 
 
T1:  -
1
Q
1 
- 0(S0 + b
1
) T1: -
1
S1 - 
0
(S0 + 
1
) 
NET: 
-(0 + 1) 1- (0 + 1) 
Q
1
 
NET: 
-(0 + 1) 1 - (0 
+ 1) S1 
NET: 
-1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 -
0S0 
NET: 
-1S1 - (
0
 + 1) 1 -
0S0 
Table 24: Comparison with straight wa’ad (no sharing, no murabaha) from the 
point of view of Party 2 (customer) 
 
It is possible to see from Table 24 above that in the case that the wa’ad is exercised Party 
2 (customer) is better off in the combined product because the net outcome (expenditure) 
of the combined product when the wa’ad is exercised is: 
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-1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 - 0S0, which surely is less than - (
0 
+ 1) 1 - (0 + 1) Q1 as S0 is 
less than Q
1
. 
 
However, Party 2 (customer) is NOT better off with the combined product because the 
net outcome when the wa’ad is NOT exercised is: 
 
-1S1 - (
0 
+ 1) 1 - 0S0 that surely is less than - (
0
 + 1) 1 - (0+1) S1 as S1 is less 
than S0. 
 
Although we ignore the inter-temporal analysis, it should be noted that Party 2 is paying 
less at T0 in terms of the premium (i.e.  -
1
b
1
 instead of - (0 + 1) 1 of the straight 
wa’ad) 
 
Straight murabaha 
Combined product 
(wa’ad exercised) 
Combined product 
(wa’ad NOT exercised) 
T0: 
Agree purchase for mark-
up: (S0 + 
1
) at T1 
No Purchase of commodity: 
at T0 
T0: 
Pay premium to Party 3: 
-11 
T0: 
Pay premium to Party 3: 
-11 
T1: 
-(0 + 1)(S0 + 
1
) 
T1: 
-1Q1 - 0(S0 + 
1
) 
T1: 
-1S1 - 
0
(S0 + 
1
) 
NET: 
-(0 + 1)(S0 + 
1
) 
NET: 
-1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 -0S0 
NET: 
-1S1 - (
0
 + 1) 1 -0S0 
Table 25: Comparison with straight murabaha from the point of view of Party 2 
(customer) 
 
 
The comparison with a straight murabaha, in Table 25 above, shows that the customer is 
worse off when the price increases and the wa’ad is exercised because Q1 is larger than 
S0: 
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-1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 - 0S0 > - (
0
 + 1) (S0 + 
1
) or after some simplification –1Q1 > -
a
1
S0. 
 
The comparison with a straight murabaha shows that the customer is better off when the 
price decreases and the wa’ad is NOT exercised: 
 
- (0 + 1) (S0 + 
1
) > -1S1 - (
0
 + 1) 1 - 0S0 or after some simplification –
1
S0 > -
1S1 
 
As shown in Table 26, from the point of view of the bank, the comparison with a straight 
murabaha reveals a complex pattern. The bank secures a guaranteed mark-up (a
0 
+ a
1
) 1 
in the case of the murabaha. The outcome of the combined product as already explained 
depends on the size of the movement of the price of the commodity at time T1 (S1) and 
the agreed exercise price for the wa’ad which is +(0 + 1) 1 > + 
0
(S1 - Q
1
)  
 
The bank, however, has a zero outcome when the price decreases and the wa’ad is NOT 
exercised: 
 
+ (0 + 1) 1 > 0 
 
The bank therefore incurs a loss only when the price increases and in the case that Q
1
 is 
higher than S1, but certainly will incur the opportunity cost of not receiving the mark-up 
even when the price decreases and the wa’ad is not exercised. 
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Straight murabaha 
Combined product 
(wa’ad exercised) 
Combined product 
(wa’ad NOT exercised)) 
T0: 
Agree sale for mark-up 
(S0 + 
1
) 
Purchase commodity at: 
-(0 + 1) S0 
T0: 
Pay premium to Party 3: 
-01 
Purchase a0 of commodity: 
-0S0 
T0: 
Pay premium to Party 3: 
-01 
Purchase a0 of commodity: 
-0S0 
T1: 
+(0 + 1)(S0 + 
1
) 
T1: 
-0Q1 + 0(S0 + 
1
) + 0S1 
T1: 
+0 (S0 + 
1
) 
NET: +(0 + 1) 1 NET: +0 (S1 - Q
1
) NET: 0 
Table 26: Comparison with no sharing (straight murabaha) from the point of view 
of Party 1 (bank) 
 
6.4.3. Summative notes on the structure 
1) At every juncture of the innovation process attempts have been made to ensure 
that the product is Shariah-compliant. Based upon a broad set of Shariah-
compliant screening rules the product abides by: 
a. Commodity in question is halal 
b. There are clear lines of ownership 
c. Transaction contains no riba 
d. Wa’ad premia to bank is justified on the basis of organisation of contract 
and risk bearing. 
2) As highlighted above, the problems with compliancy to Shariah and the way in 
which the product is structured, as well as, the end hedge may lead to arguments 
about either its form or substance. Whilst is it felt that the use of risk-sharing is 
more in line with Shariah principles there are grounds on which to argue that the 
purchase of commodities does not amount to a plausible investment. The use of a 
musharakah and wa’ad in this manner may make it non-Shariah-complaint if it is 
deemed that there is no active management of the investment sum to justify the 
partnership in the first place. 
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3) Secondly, admittedly it is a complicated method to structure an option. The want 
for risk-sharing has meant that one additional party had to be included into the 
contact in what would otherwise be achieved with a straightforward wa’ad.  
4) The inclusion of Party 3, which accounts for the wa’ad element of the structure, 
creates additional uncertainty. Islamic finance requires proof of ownership of 
commodities before any sale can take place. Where possible, the structure has 
taken into account ownership of commodities before sale but the wa’ad element 
creates subjectivity as to whether ownership is required before the agreement of 
the wa’ad contract.  
5) Underlying Shariah-compliance can only be achieved through Shariah-
supervisory board. This would be scope for further research to ascertain if the 
product structure is in fact Shariah-compliant. 
 
This section has provided arguments for a possible Shariah-compliant risk management 
tool by applying the principle of musharakah (shared investment) to a combination of a 
wa’ad and murabaha contract. 
 
The combination of a wa’ad and a murabaha contract to create a hybrid risk-sharing 
approach to financial risk management has yielded mixed results when compared to 
straightforward wa’ad and murabaha contracts.  
 
When compared to the wa’ad alone, the hybrid contract was more beneficial to the 
parties when it was in the money but less when out of the money. Vice versa, when the 
hybrid was compared to a singular murabaha, it was less beneficial on the upside but was 
cheaper when the contract was out of the money. 
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For Party 2 (the customer) an initial benefit would be the lower wa’ad premium on the 
basis that is this shared with Party 1 (the bank). Moreover, Party 2 also benefits when the 
hybrid wa’ad is exercised but loses out when the hybrid wa’ad is not exercised. This is 
down to additional cost of the parallel murabaha that is set up between Party 1 and Party 
2. 
 
The benefit to Party 1 (the bank) is more complicated and will depend on several factors. 
Should the hybrid wa’ad be exercised the return for the bank will depend heavily on the 
spot price at expiry and the exercise price of the wa’ad. Furthermore, when the hybrid 
wa’ad is not exercised the bank receives nothing although the opportunity cost of 
entering the contract has to be considered.  
 
All in all, considering the hybrid risk management instrument in its entirety, the inclusion 
of a risk-sharing within the instrument structure has indicated that it is beneficial to the 
customer when the hybrid wa’ad is exercised. However, the inclusion of risk-sharing has 
meant that the contract is “more expensive” should the hybrid wa’ad not be exercised. 
This exercise in the incorporation of risk-sharing into a risk management tool has shown, 
tentatively, that there are benefits to be derived from moving away from traditional risk-
transference. 
 
This study set out to explore the scope of incorporating risk-sharing within risk 
management option-like tools under a Shariah financial framework and whilst the results 
do not provide a definitive argument of the advantages, they do illustrate the benefits of 
risk-sharing methodologies within financial instruments such as that of premiums and 
down payments. 
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As stated before every effort was taken to ensure that the hybrid instrument adhered to 
Shariah-compliant rules and regulation. However, during the innovation process what 
was discovered was that whilst there existed underlying religious requirements, there was 
not clear standardized framework as to what constituted Shariah-compliance for a 
particular region. As shown Chapter 4, Section 4.3., Tables 10, 11 and 12 there are clear 
divisions in Shariah-compliance framework within both Islamic and non-Islamic 
financial centres. The realization of the issues of standardization highlighted in the 
literature lead on to the next aspect of the research which further examines these issues of 
Shariah governance and regulation. 
 
6.5. Issues of Governance and Regulation 
Interviews were professionally transcribed and to ensure consistency and reliability were 
reviewed alongside by the supervisory team to ensure accurate contextualisation of issues 
and concerns. Transcripts were sent back to the respective parties to ensure that their 
views were captured in the transcription process. Any discrepancies were incorporated 
into the transcripts for accuracy.  
  
Transcripts were then imported into NVivo Version 12 for analysis. A number of key 
thematic areas or nodes that emanated from current discourse on the major issues of 
governance and regulation in Islamic finance were utilised in the analysis of interview 
data. These are detailed below:  
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- Alternative: Islamic finance as an alternative to conventional finance 
- Development of new instruments: the importance for the further development of 
new instruments in Islamic finance 
- Future: the future prospects and challenges for Islamic finance 
- Lender of last resort: the need for a lender of last resort in Islamic finance 
- Shariah supervisory board: issues pertaining to the role and composition of 
Shariah supervisory boards 
- Transparency: issues of transparency in Islamic finance 
- Uniformity: the standardization of Islamic financial governance and regulation 
- Interest-free: the perception that finance is purely interest-free 
- The perception of Islamic finance: how Islamic finance is viewed by operators 
in conventional finance 
- Diversity of instruments: are there enough financial instruments in the Islamic 
financial system currently 
- Risk: the risks faced by Islamic financial institutions 
- Shariah-compliance: issues pertaining to Shariah-compliance 
- Financial crisis: how has Islamic finance dealt with the financial crisis 
 
The aim of this aspect of the research was to examine if there was a synthesis of issues of 
governance and regulation presented in the literature and with that of experiences 
individuals who have an interest in the Islamic financial system.  
 
Only nodes that were triangulated and highlighted by the three interview groups were 
utilized and examined in deeper detail. The concept of triangulation revolves around 
having each of the nodes being confirmed by all three of the interviewee groups. 
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Fundamentally, once a node has been confirmed the uncertainty behinds its interpretation 
greatly reduces thus increasing both the reliability and validity of findings (Webb et al, 
1966; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003).  In addition to this, a number of key nodes 
achieved triangulation and consensus i.e. a unanimous acceptance by all interview groups 
and interviewees of a particular issue (see Table 27 below). This has not only enhanced 
robustness by triangulation but also further contributed to generalizability and reliability 
and in doing so achieved strong levels of saturation. The notion of data saturation within 
the context of this study is best defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as,  
 
“… the point at which no additional data are being found whereby the 
(researcher) can develop properties of this category. As he sees similar 
instances over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically 
confident that a category is saturated…” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, pg. 
65)  
 
Applying Francis et al.’s (2010) framework for saturation the research interviews 
undertook a range of iterations to achieve robustness in findings. Francis et al. (2010) 
advocated a starting sample of ten interviews with an additional three interview stopping 
point, this research utilizes the three stopping point with an initial sample of three 
interviewees. 
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Issues of Governance 
Saturation by 
Consensus 
over three 
candidates 
Saturation by 
Consensus 
over six 
candidates 
Saturation by 
Consensus 
over nine 
candidates 
Saturation by 
Consensus 
over all 
candidates 
Islamic Finance as an Alternative 
    
The Development of New Instruments 
• • • • 
The Future of Islamic Finance 
• • • • 
Interest-free Transactions 
    
The Perception of Islamic Finance 
• • • • 
The Diversity of Financial Instruments 
    
Lender of Last Resort 
• • • • 
Risk 
• • • • 
Shariah Supervisory Boards 
• • • • 
Shariah-compliance 
    
Transparency 
• • • • 
Uniformity 
• • • • 
Financial Crises 
 
• 
  
Table 27: Data Saturation by Consensus (Framework Adapted from Francis et al. 
(2010) 
 
The initial sample of three consisted of a candidate from each of the three interviewee 
groups – academic, academic-practitioner and practitioner. This was the subsequent 
pattern for the ensuing addition of candidates into the saturation sample – one interview 
from each of the three interviewee groups. This was to ensure a consistency of views 
building on enabling a holistic and reflective group to voice their opinions. 
 
Initial analysis with three interview candidates revealed a consensus across eight of the 
thirteen nodes. Expanding the interview analysis to three additional candidates revealed 
the node ‘Financial Crises’ to be of importance. To build upon this and to verify 
saturation against the Francis et al. (2010) framework, eight further interviews were 
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conducted. This led to data collection from a total of fourteen interviewees. Of note is at 
nine interviewees, saturation by consensus seemed to move away from results at six. 
Nonetheless, all fourteen interviewees seem to concur with the results highlighted at 
three interviewees.  Thus, aside from the additional node during the six candidate 
analysis, what can be seen from the table below is that there is saturation of eight nodal 
themes. To a certain extent it can be argued that saturation was achieved by the third 
interview candidate which is in line with the arguments presented in Mason (2010) and 
Guest et al. (2003) that larger samples need not necessarily guarantee saturation and that 
saturation could very well be similarly achieved through smaller samples. Based upon the 
results from the saturation test framework, the research will now examine these eight, 
saturated nodes to a greater detail. 
 
Table 28 below indicates the ranking of nodes based upon the number of references split 
by the three interview groups. What can been seen from the table is that ‘Transparency’, 
‘The Perception of Islamic Finance’, ‘Risk’, Uniformity’ and ‘The Development of New 
Instruments’ are seen as the major five issues, collectively, for all three interview groups. 
 
Issues of Governance 
Academic-
Practitioner 
Practitioner Academic Total 
Transparency 23 46 26 95 
The Perception of Islamic 
Finance 
30 28 21 79 
Risk 19 35 24 78 
Uniformity 13 24 35 72 
Development of New 
Instruments 
24 16 23 63 
Shariah Supervisory Board 18 16 15 49 
Future of Islamic Finance 9 15 16 40 
Lender of Last Resort 11 15 9 35 
Table 28: Node Ranking Based Upon Number of References 
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An illustration of this is given in the following diagrams below and provides a better 
view of the individual interviewee group node rankings based upon the number of 
references given to a particular node. 
 
 
Figure 31: Individual Ranking of Academic Nodes 
 
A
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d
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Uniformity - need for market harmonisation  
Transparency 
- cannot divulge all information about contract 
specifications 
Risk 
- understanding of subtle changes in the emphasis 
of different risks 
Development of New 
Instruments 
- Islamic finance not well represented and ensure 
that new products meet Shariah requiremnents 
The Perception of 
Islamic Finance 
- increasing knowledge amongst market place 
Future of Islamic 
Finance 
- growing but cannot be the answers to all 
financial problems 
Shariah Supervisory 
Boards 
- narrow base of scholars and this needs to be 
address 
Lender of Last Resort 
- need for lender of last resort but who should 
take on this role? 
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Figure 32: Individual Ranking of Academic-Practitioner Nodes 
 
Figure 33: Individual Ranking of Practitioner Nodes 
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The Perception of 
Islamic Finance 
- growing industry that is meant for everyone 
Development of New 
Instruments 
- lack of instruments and have to ensure that 
people know what they are engaging in 
Transparency - cannot divulge all information 
Risk 
- very conservative framework and ISlamic 
finance is not insulated from financial crises 
Shariah Supervisory 
Board 
- need for more Shariah scholars  
Uniformity 
- will be difficult to acheive harmonisation but 
there ar ebenefits to not being completely 
standardised 
Lender of Last Resort 
- need for lender of last resort. Possible 
candidate would be a mega Islamic bank. 
Future of Islamic 
Finance 
- very promising growth for the future. 
P
ra
ct
it
io
n
er
 
Transparency 
- transparency is relative and it is not as bad as 
people make it out to be 
Risk 
- similiar risks to conventional finance but 
different emphasis  
The Perception of 
Islamic Finance 
- very positive response from wider market 
place 
Uniformity 
- cannot have one uniform matrix in Islamic 
finance  and uniformity is improving 
substantially  
Development of new 
instruments 
- Islamic finance is new and slightly behind on 
the innovation. Have to ensure that new 
products abide by Shariah principles. 
Shariah Supervisory 
Board 
- distinct lack of human capital which has to be 
addressed by central regulatory bodies. 
Future of Islamic 
Finance 
- big scope for growth in not only Muslim but 
also non-Muslim markets 
Lender of Last Resort 
- there is a need for a lender of last resort but 
this is where the individual sovergn central 
banks come in 
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6.5.1. Perception of Islamic Finance 
What can be seen from the analysis is that there is increasing acceptance of Islamic 
finance within the conventional spectrum and this can be seen from the development of 
new Islamic banking avenues within Western financial hubs such as the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, the significant growth of academic literature since the 1980s 
pertaining to all aspects of Islamic finance from takaful (Islamic insurance) to hisba 
(Islamic book keeping) and financial innovation further illustrates this growing 
acceptance of the Islamic financial system. 
 
“The former Labour government were very interested in the social 
inclusion of Muslims so the idea that people weren’t getting mortgages 
because it offended their religious faith they saw as a problem.  They also 
saw a very clear economic agenda with it which is about positioning…”  
– Academic 
 
“… some people view it as sort of a niche industry, targeting Muslim 
communities in the world.  However, in practice, or even in theory, 
Islamic finance is targeting all the types of consumers, Muslims and non-
Muslims.  Some people view the industry as a sort of bringing foreign 
direct investments to each society or each country or the host countries.  
Some others view Islamic finance as a way of offering new banking 
services to certain segment of people, new products maybe generation of 
new jobs and contribution to the economy, so it has been viewed from 
many angles and many perspectives and I think it serves all these 
perspectives but it’s not considered as a niche industry for Muslims, it’s 
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an industry for everyone.”  
– Academic-Practitioner 
 
“In general they [the financial markets] view it positively, in particular I 
think in 2008 and the financial advisors, people in general they started, 
you know, looking at Islamic finance as maybe an ethical and different 
approach to finance.  There was a huge interest from the media regarding 
Islamic finance and how Islamic finance was different from the 
conventional and how it works and this is evident basically here in the 
UK.”  
– Practitioner 
 
While Islamic finance is growing rapidly, there is still a consensus between the groups on 
the distinct lack of knowledge in the wider financial industry. The overwhelming 
sentiment that comes across from all three groups of interviewees would be one that 
suggests that there could be more knowledge across the conventional financial industry 
about Islamic finance. 
 
“…I think there is increasing knowledge about Islamic finance by people 
in the financial system. Obviously, it depends on their seniority and the 
kind of bank that they are in basically but certainly in investment banking 
circles there is a fair amount of interest and knowledge of Islamic 
finance, certainly in London as we have a significant Islamic financial 
sector in London…” 
 – Academic 
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“…there is still a fairly high degree of ignorance about what’s involved. 
The thing that most people fasten on is of course this kind of obvious thing 
– the lack of riba, the lack of an interest rate denominated return…”  
– Academic-Practitioner   
 
“…I think that there is a mix of views. Some people see it, especially in 
the Western world, they see it as a real alternative to conventional 
financing, the conventional financial system and this view, I think, is 
becoming stronger with the waves of financial crises that we are 
receiving over the last 2-3 years. There is another group that has a view 
that it is something old-fashioned, it may not be adequate for the 21
st
 
century and they associate it to some terrorist activities or political 
agendas more than anything else. They do not consider it as a serious 
alternative; they see it as more of a threat to the Western culture and 
society. I must say that the latter of the two groups is much, much smaller 
in number. The general view is that it is actually something that is 
considerable as an alternative and it requires more research in how and 
why it behaves…”  
– Practitioner  
 
This concern about the lack knowledge is highlighted in numerous studies, most notably, 
Maurer (2002) and Pollard and Samers (2007), who highlight the anthropological notions 
of Islamic banking and finance. Principal behind these views is that transparency stems 
from a lack of knowledge of the Islamic financial system thus creating a false veil of 
opaqueness. 
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6.5.2. Risk 
Another issue addressed during these interviews was the risks faced by Islamic financial 
institutions – both present and future risks. The views here are consistent across all 
groups of interviewees. There were two sub themes to this question: i) the nature of risk 
borne by Islamic financial institutions ii) the risk faced by the Islamic financial system 
as a whole.  
 
In terms of the risk faced by Islamic financial institutions there was a large emphasis on 
Shariah-compliant investment being taken on by these Islamic financial institutions. 
These arguments for having to manage the types of risk further fuel the need for 
financial innovation and are in line with works of Dar and Presley (2000) and Chapra 
and Khan (2000). 
 
“…because of their different requirements of equity capital, you know, 
within, I don’t know why that is but that seems to be the case, they are less 
profitable, you know, and they’re less efficient which you can explain 
these because of their different internal religious requirements…”  
– Academic  
 
“Well the risk management framework is conservative in Islamic banks.  I 
work with Islamic banks and I work with conventional banks so what I can 
say that it’s more conservative in Islamic banks and I think this is for the 
sake of protecting investors, not for the sake of being like achieving low 
revenues, just we try to protect investors and I think the risk management 
framework does not allow you to go below investment rate in some cases 
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and consider the rating factors and fundamental analysis of each and every 
security or an investment vehicle as a major issue to be dealt with before 
putting the money somewhere or somehow.”  
– Academic-Practitioner 
 
“…biggest risk that they are facing is the concentration of their asset 
class.”  
– Practitioner  
 
With regards to the risk borne by Islamic financial system, the consensus between the 
three interviewee groups was that market participants have to be careful with the risks 
being undertaken in Islamic finance. While the fundamental principles of risk 
management remain the same there could be a different emphasis on the types of risk 
from conventional financing (Smorlaski et al., 2006).  
 
“I think in the Islamic finance, as a conventional finance, we should take 
consideration of the risk but what we call it in Islamic finance is a 
calculated risk.  You have to take consideration of the risk because you 
still have a risk when you have a partnership (musharakah) with your 
customer, if you open a business and you still have a risk for losing your 
money… you have to be careful with who you go to give the money…”  
– Academic  
 
“…all money is involved with other money which is why, you have in the 
global economy, the grave danger that risky trades in one sector, for 
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example the sub-prime effect, will affect transactions in other quite 
unrelated or apparently unrelated parts of the economy and many, many, 
many aspects of Islamic finance are actually exposed to the same market 
conditions as the global economy generally.”  
– Academic-Practitioner  
 
“The risks borne by Islamic finance are very similar to conventional 
finance but obviously there might be a separate importance placed upon 
different risks. In conventional finance this might be credit risk whilst in 
Islamic finance the emphasis will be on liquidity or default risk. Moreover, 
there is also the issue of Shariah-compliance and Islamic financial 
institutions have to take great care in ensuring that they adhere to Shariah 
principles.”  
– Practitioner 
 
6.5.3. Development of New Instruments 
With consideration for the proliferation of risks, interviewees were asked if they found 
that there was a need for further development of financial instruments within Islamic 
finance. This underlying theme was identified as one of the pertinent issues during the 
product development process whereby much of the literature suggested that the 
development of Islamic financial risk management instruments was slightly lacking.  
Both Chapra and Khan (2000) and Dar and Presley (2000) have indicated that the growth 
of Islamic finance has resulted in a proliferation of risks for Islamic finance thus 
requiring the need for further development for financial innovation under a Shariah 
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financial framework. All interview groups shared this view for further financial 
innovation: 
 
“The scope is still pretty good but the problem is that there are a lot of 
difficulties in the global economy basically with major restructuring 
occurring. Islamic finance is not terrible well represented than some of 
the faster growing markets and that is an issue.”  
– Academic  
 
“In terms of maybe in a way providing instruments and solutions for 
money markets shows in certain aspects Islamic banks are disadvantaged 
because they don’t have enough instruments maybe for money markets or 
short or long term liquidity and strong assets so there are still lots of work 
to be done.”  
– Academic-Practitioner 
 
‘…there is a lack of innovation maybe because Islamic finance is emerging, 
still emerging, it’s not developed, it’s not like the conventional, there is no 
real system, that is governed by, for example at the global level, not like the 
conventional…So there is lack of innovation definitely there is.  In terms of 
risk management yes there is also still I think they are way behind on how 
other banks are managing their risk and liquidity also so yes they are still 
behind.  Because it’s newer than the conventional but it will pick up, it will 
pick up soon.  It will have to pick up.”     
         – Practitioner    
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Whilst interviewees across all three groups concurred that there was a need for further 
development of Islamic financial instruments there was an interesting underlying sub-
theme to these responses and that was the notion that Islamic financial innovation cannot 
just mimic conventional financial instruments.  
 
 “It’s through being more transparent and greater linkage between the 
religious principles by which you stand and the products that you offer so 
everybody understands that linkage and not selling products or offering 
products which everybody knows are fictional in terms of the general 
Islamic principles…”  
– Academic  
 
“Sometimes you are getting in such a complex way of creating 
intermediary organisations to in effect handle all the risk and buy the 
outcome from you that sometimes it is very hard to see the wood for the 
trees in those things.”  
– Academic-Practitioner  
 
“If you are only repackaging the form of the product then fundamentally the 
problems that arise from the substance will still be the same. Changing the 
name of something does not make the problems go away. What you will be 
left with if Islamic finance continues in this direction would be the same 
problems of conventional finance such as the current financial crisis.”  
         – Practitioner 
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The existing literature on financial innovation such as El-Gamal (2008) has highlighted 
this aspect with regards to the debates on the permissibility of derivatives within Islamic 
finance (see Chapra, 2008; Ghayad, 2008; Siddiqi, 2006). It is interesting to see the tie-in 
to fundamental religion principles and having to balance these principles with the 
financial needs of the Islamic financial system (Choudhury, 2009). There is an extension 
of this basic balance of ‘religious-financial needs’ that is suggested in the work of Asutay 
(2007a and 2007b). This further brings the arguments for additional development of 
Islamic financial instruments into both the realms of risk management (Bassens et al., 
2010) and the governance of Islamic finance (Safieddine, 2009; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
1999). Moreover, the interview themes could be extended to match that of Kayed and 
Hassan (2011) and Seif (2009) on derivative type innovation within Islamic finance, 
essentially focusing on the concern over how Islamic financial instruments merely seem 
to mimic the payoffs of conventional instruments. Regardless of which there are pertinent 
calls for further development of Islamic risk management instruments as there is a clear 
market need and an opportunity cost to non-development (Hesse et al., 2008) 
 
6.5.4. Shariah Supervisory Boards 
Much of the arguments pertaining to the development of new instruments also extend to 
the decision of Shariah Supervisory Boards and the Shariah-compliant decisions that they 
make. Early criticisms of SSBs arose from arguments presented by El-Gamal (2005), 
who was highly critical of their composition of Shariah-scholars. He noted, with 
increasing, frequency that Shariah scholars were sitting on the SSBs of numerous Islamic 
financial institutions. El-Gamal (2005) suggested that this would call in question the 
validity of these decisions on the basis of a conflict of interest.   
 
         
 
248
The analysis of the interviews indicates that SSBs were regarded as an issue across all 
three interviewee groups. There is a consensus that the initial concern presented by El-
Gamal (2005) is greatly reduced by the increasing familiarity and knowledge base of the 
Islamic financial system. The criticisms levied by El-Gamal (2005) on the composition of 
SSBs are quickly diminishing as the number of Shariah scholars continue to grow and 
there is more expertise in the Shariah financial system. The views of the candidates seems 
to suggest that there was a need for an overlap of scholars on different boards as the 
expertise, in terms of number of scholars, struggled to keep pace with the substantial 
growth of the Islamic financial system during the early year of the new millennium.  
 
“…Well obviously most banks want to have the most prestigious scholars so 
they (Shariah scholars) tend to have a scarcity value and they are head 
hunted but the industry is open so others can come in so it is not impossible 
and others are coming in. The net is widening but obviously those on top, 
who have had a head start, are in a better position…”  
– Academic 
 
“… it’s more having scholars who are qualified and basically understand the 
legal, regulatory and the operation system of the financial system or the 
banking industry itself.  It’s not any Sharia scholar (who) would have these 
sorts of qualities or skills.  There are, for example, the typical or in a way 
traditional Sharia scholars.  Yes they are knowledgeable, they are qualified 
about Sharia but maybe they don’t have the required skills in order to apply 
this knowledge on the current financial system or products or maybe they 
don’t understand how it works fully so that in a way (it) will be an 
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obstruction for them.  That’s why maybe those scholars who have this sort 
of expertise and skill or maybe they have in a way the academic 
qualifications on both sides; economics, finance and at the same time they 
have the Sharia qualifications and the experience as well, there would be 
maybe more preferable or well known in a way in the industry and maybe 
taking on more responsibilities in terms of being on various Sharia 
supervisory committees.”    
– Academic-Practitioner 
 
“…It is a double digit annual growth and it is very difficult and very hard 
for the industry to manage this growth by providing the resources that will 
be required including human and financial resources etc. etc. [sic] and this is 
something that you cannot develop overnight…”  
– Practitioner  
 
A further discussion point to arise out of these interviews and one that is highly pertinent 
within the academic literature as well was the creation of a Shariah scholar qualification. 
There has been increasing amount of new research looking into this facet of Shariah 
governance that has indicated the benefits of having a standard of qualification which is 
very similar to that of professional bodies. Ghayad (2008) and a more recent study by 
Farooq and Farook (2013) illustrate these calls within the academic world for calls for 
accredited qualification for Shariah-scholars. The Farooq and Farook (2013) study also 
specifies a framework for establishing this qualification standard.  The responses were 
highly critical of this need for further expertise in the Islamic financial system and saw it 
as an opportunity to expand the knowledge base of Shariah finance. 
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“…we were looking at the role out of Islamic finance in the US and UK and 
one thing that becomes clear very quickly is the reliance on this very, very 
narrow base of Sharia scholars and you would talk to people about where 
those scholars come from and what qualifications you have to have and it’s 
very much a taboo subject and it’s not about educational qualifications or 
there aren’t any transparent criteria about  what you have to do to be a 
Sharia scholar, it’s shrouded in mystery and that’s part of the whole sort of 
cache of getting one of these positions, it’s about religious authority, it’s not 
about education per se or experience, so it’s famously opaque how certainly 
this tier of Sharia scholars, where they come from and how they’re formed 
and that’s been a huge issue because the industry has grown, there’s been a 
huge growing shortage of these scholars…”  
– Academic  
 
I’ve been in meetings where, you have two Shariah scholars sort of screaming 
at each other that the others ones got it totally wrong. There are two types of 
Shariah scholar that you would get on your board One will say “look this is 
the way I read it and I have to tell you that I think this is not right” and that's 
relatively rare. The number two kind of Shariah scholar is the one who will 
find a way of getting an apparently Shariah-compliant answer to what it is 
that the board wants to do anyway and that is why, of course everyone will 
tell you we can’t go around investing in pig meat or alcohol, nothing 
involving gambling and so on, you’re going to find money which comes 
ultimately from impeccable Islamic sources in all of those sectors. The way 
the thing works is very often you make sure you do approach someone who 
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you think is going to give you the answer you need. I think it is hard to put up 
a firewall against that kind of stuff.” 
 – Academic-Practitioner 
 
“When Islamic finance first started there was very much a lack of expertise in 
terms of Shariah scholars. With the growth that Islamic finance has 
experienced over the past few years, there has been a lot of emphasis on 
developing a larger expertise base which would mean that you will see new 
faces on different boards. For me it is not a question of similar members on 
different boards for the sake of a salary but rather there were just not enough 
people who possessed the knowledge. The central bodies have been making 
an effort to try and improve the amount of expertise in the area and it would 
also be good to have individuals who possess not only an understanding of 
Islamic finance but conventional finance.”  
– Practitioner 
 
The final view by the practitioner provide an interesting point suggesting that central 
bodies should take on this responsibility of providing a recognised qualification. Monger 
and Rawashdeh (2008) have highlighted that steps have been taken by AAOIFI in 
offering these qualifications. As it stands AAOIFI currently offers two different courses 
of study 1) Certified Islamic Professional Accountant 2) Certified Sharia Adviser and 
Auditor which are industry recognised. The issues presented about SSBs also encompass 
the debates about the transparency and uniformity of the Islamic financial system. 
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6.5.5. Transparency 
The issue of transparency within Islamic finance is widely debate within the academic 
literature. Both Honohan (2001) and Grais and Pellegrini (2006) provide a salient 
perspective into the overall transparency of the Islamic financial system calling it highly 
opaque and to certain extent secretive. What was clear from the interviews was that the 
level of transparency within Islamic finance as quickly improving with the level of 
growth and the increasing knowledge based.  Moreover, an interesting facet of this 
debate that was presented across all three groups was the notion that complete 
transparency is unattainable. The views presented suggest that Islamic finance could not 
be expected to be completely transparent when conventional financial systems had 
nuances of opaqueness in terms of contract specifications and confidentiality laws. 
 
“…obviously they don't put all the details; they put broad details of what 
goes on but they don't put details of the structures they are recommending 
to individual clients as that would be a breach of confidentiality and 
obviously they are going through some effort to tailor these things 
(products structures) to the needs of individual clients who are paying for 
this service. So, like any banking contract, it is not in the public 
domain…” 
 – Academic 
 
“I think maybe in a way some Islamic banks need to be more transparent 
and when I say more transparent in terms of products and I would say 
that maybe because of the regulatory requirement… In some parts maybe 
or maybe in other countries, this sort of requirement is less strict or not 
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adhered to fully… Maybe the competition would be a reason for that in a 
way that the bank doesn’t want to reveal everything, you know, because 
of the competition element.”  
– Academic-Practitioner 
 
“I am not saying that Islamic finance is fully transparent but the level of 
non-transparency that people talk about is not that bad and is quickly 
disappearing.” 
 – Practitioner  
 
“Transparency is relative and to different people transparency could mean 
different things and everyone has a different requirement of transparency. 
We cannot just say that we need more transparency for the sake of it. It is 
not like conventional finance is fully transparent and people still get on 
fine with the financial products”  
– Practitioner  
 
However, an interesting undertone to these views was the precept that transparency or 
the lack of it could be attributed to a lack of knowledge about the Islamic financial 
system linking back to debates presented by Ahmed (2009), Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) and 
Maurer (2001). Fundamentally, there was a synthesis of literature and interview themes 
suggesting that transparency could be alleviated by further informing the market space 
about Islamic finance and that a certain level of standardization was required to ease the 
confusion behind Islamic financial regulation. This leads on well to the next saturate 
node of ‘Uniformity’ 
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6.5.6. Uniformity 
Uniformity has been a contentious issue within the realm of Islamic finance and many 
arguments pertaining to criticisms of the Islamic financial governance and regulation 
stems from these debates about uniformity. The basis of this argument is the varying 
interpretation of Islam via the various schools of Islamic thought and has led to differing 
regulatory standards across the global Islamic financial system. Prominent works 
include Akhtar (2006, 2007) and Khan (2007) who provide strong arguments suggest 
that the lack of standardization across Islamic finance is substantially hurting 
development and growth. Further work by El-Hawary et al. (2007) has shown that there 
is a distinct divergence in regulatory standards. Moreover, more recent studies such as 
that of Farook and Farooq (2013) highlighted calls for the creation of Shariah-scholar 
qualification from an accredited, central awarding body to promote standardised rulings 
and improve the level of expertise in the Islamic financial system. The precepts 
collected from the interview candidates suggest that there is consensus amongst all three 
groups that there needs to be significant progress towards developing a salient 
fundamental regulatory framework. 
 
“… you have differences on what is allowed in some markets and what 
isn’t.  You’ve got the conflict between the various schools of 
interpretation.  If you don’t have harmonisation, you don’t have products 
that have been traded between markets, there’s a lack of liquidity, so 
keeping things opaque and having separate rooms, separate schools and 
separate interpretation is not going to lead to a deep market”  
– Academic  
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“Unfortunately the interpretation of the Sharia law varies among these 
boards so what is permissible in Malaysia may not be permissible in 
London.  What is permissible in Egypt may not be permissible in 
Malaysia because everyone has his own interpretation of the Sharia law 
or the Quran… and I think standardisation won’t be achieved easily in 
this arena…”  
– Academic-Practitioner  
 
“This is a major cause for concern but this issue is diminishing over time. 
If we were talking about the same issue a decade ago then it would have 
been a major cause for concern because of the regional schools of 
thought found in the Islamic world where Shariah is interpreted in 
slightly different ways.”  
– Practitioner  
 
A fascinating aspect from these interviews, however, was that they stopped short of 
calling for complete harmonisation of the financial system. Essentially, they accepted 
the benefits of a unified, fundamental regulatory framework but there were no clear 
advocates to complete uniformity. The following views further captured the principal 
tones 
 
“…but you don't want standardization because that will obviously 
preclude innovation – putting everything in sort of a strait jacket, then 
there is not much scope for devising new methods of doing things…”  
– Academic 
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“…we always like to talk about the need for more harmonisation but you 
must remember how many lawyers are making an awful lot of money out 
of the fact that there isn’t this harmonisation and that lack of overlap or 
harmony between different sets of regulations creates a lot of work which 
is very good for all sorts of people involved in financial services so 
making Islamic finance work in the UK regulatory context it creates jobs,  
it creates work for people… so people might complain about the lack of 
harmonisation but actually it’s a good thing for the people who have to 
work about”  
– Academic 
 
“…I think the essence of complex systems and the world financial 
system is a highly complex system, is that there is always diversity and 
diversity is emergent and you get both adaptive changes but you get 
‘acceptive’ changes and that is one of the reasons why learning after a 
disaster is often a pretty logical thing because what happens after a big 
disaster is that the pieces are still there but they are just put together is a 
different kind of array, different structure so my answer to it is I don’t 
think there ever will be one uniform matrix into which everything will 
conform…”  
– Academic-Practitioner 
 
“…most successful global brands have adopted the approach of 
customising to local scenarios such as HSBC with the slogan “The 
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world’s local bank”, even the menus of McDonalds has a twist of 
differences in different parts of the world…”  
– Practitioner  
 
As postulated by DeLorenzo (2000) the idea of a complete ‘one structure fits all’ 
regulatory standard is impractical and impossible. Further work by DeLorenzo and 
McMillien (2007) broach this issue from a conventional regulatory position and their 
findings have suggested that as opposed to Islamic banking creating a uniform standard 
there is scope and flexibility for conventional regulatory and legal frameworks in 
incorporating Islamic financial principles. These arguments and views from both 
academic literature and interviews seem to relate back to Kane’s (1988) view of the 
regulatory dialectic stressing the importance of the dynamic interaction between the 
regulators and regulated. This leads on to the next node which examines the role of a 
lender of last resort as a point of central regulatory reference. 
 
6.5.7. Lender of Last Resort 
The classification of this node arose from an examination of literature behind central 
regulatory bodies within Islamic finance and the calls for standardization. Academic 
research such as that of El-Hawary et al. (2007) and Archer and Ahmed (2003) 
illustrated the divergences in regulatory standards within Islamic finance and these 
discrepancies caused an increased concern in terms of customer protection and legal 
recourse (see Hersh, 2011; Noibi, 2004; Errico and Farrahbaksh, 1998). Essentially, this 
lender of last resort would act as a buffer for the Islamic financial system in order to 
improve levels of confidence. 
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Much of the literature (Noibi, 2004, Hersh, 2011) highlight the need for a central 
regulatory board and as such the creation of a lender of last resort but there is little 
discussion of the creation of lenders of last resort across the various Islamic financial 
hubs. The observations from conventional finance suggest that this is the method 
adopted and there is no one centralised lender of last resort for the entire conventional 
financial system. 
 
The common theme across all three interview groups clearly indicated that there was a 
need for lender of last resort but there was no definite indication as to where and who 
should undertake this responsibility. This is very much in line with the existing 
literature surrounding the idea of an Islamic central bank. Solé (2007) proposes 
sovereign central banks could adapt their role to fit this mould however the concern 
would then revert to the underlying Shariah-ness of the lender of last resort’s financial 
assistance. 
 
“…I think it’s very difficult to sort of think about Islamic central banks I 
suppose in the sort of abstract without thinking about which territories and 
legal contexts they’re actually going to be plot down in and how they 
again, they’ve always got this issue of adapting to what rules are already in 
place about how banks function and what they do if they get into 
difficulties so again it’s not like you’re sort of designing a system from 
scratch, you are always going into the context where there are other 
institutions that deal with…financial institutions have got into difficulty, 
what happens now? For the Islamic Bank of Britain it’s the Bank of 
England, that is their first port of call and then it’s, presumably whatever 
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funding streams they may have from the Gulf if they need to raise new 
capital beyond that, so there’s always going to be a particular context 
institutions have to be embedded in which will determine how they, you 
know what the lender of the last resort is and what it can be…”  
– Academic  
 
“Well I think we need a mega Islamic bank.  It’s either through IDB or 
through any other shareholding structure, we need a mega Islamic bank 
which is overseeing the whole industry and we need again to try to achieve 
this sort of regional standardisation.  I’m positive about it especially with 
expansion, with horizontal expansion of Islamic banks and if you look at 
Europe, for example, you’ll find lots of potential on this…”  
– Academic-Practitioner 
 
“For me it doesn't work because in the conventional industry, every 
country or every market has its own lender of last resort which is usually 
the central bank of the country. So either we are saying that the Islamic 
financial industry as a whole is just one market and its dynamics are 
completely identical from one and to the other only then I think we can 
think of having a central lender of last resort. If that is not the case, which 
it is definitely not in my view, then I think we cannot imagine having one 
lender of last resort for the whole industry…What I would suggest is we 
definitely need a lender of last resort but this is where the central banks 
have to be considered and they have to start moving towards a position 
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where they will be able to act as the lender of last resort for Islamic 
institutions in an Islamic way.” 
 – Practitioner  
6.5.8. Future  
The future of Islamic finance was clearly a saturate node within the interview analysis. 
There was clear agreement across all three interview groups that there was scope for 
further growth of the Islamic financial system on a global scale. These calls for growth 
have been presented in existing literature and can be seen in works of Iqbal (2007) and 
Bacha (2004) suggesting that the conditions are ripe for the growth of Islamic finance. 
 
“…I mean the industry is growing, it’s always going to be a niche, it’s 
not going to take over the global financial system or something, but it is 
an alternative way of doing things…” 
 – Academic  
 
“…I think the growth, if it is not exponential, it is very good and very 
promising and that will continue I think…”  
– Academic-Practitioner 
 
“…I think the overall perspective of Islamic finance is actually quite 
positive and very strong…there is big room for growth, I would say, 
internationally because it is not only the countries or the markets with the 
Muslim majority but it is also very relevant to the non-Muslim population as 
well…”         – Practitioner 
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An interesting thought that arose from garnering further perspectives on what this growth 
could be expected to be, yielded an interesting Academic opinion. Whilst the view was 
that Islamic finance would grow into the future there is a misconception from market 
participants and supporters of the Islamic financial system that it essentially a white 
knight during the financial crisis 
 
“Well I think some people sort of expect it as the answer to all the 
problems of the global economy and the conventional system but it’s not. 
Well obviously Islamic finance is trying to do things a different way but 
we have to be realistic about essentially where it is and where it’s heading 
and it makes a contribution to the debates but obviously it is unlikely that 
all the principals and all the ideas are going to be adopted internationally. 
Conventional banks are very strong willed companies and they are going 
to continue with the kind of activities that they have done.” 
 – Academic  
 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge this view is not widely address directly within 
existing literature. Wilson (2004 and 2007) provides a good overview of the expectations 
of Islamic finance in the UK and Europe. What can be seen however is the acceptance 
within the academic literature about establishing competitive ground between Islamic and 
conventional banks. Moreover, this competitive element can also be inferred from the 
development numerous studies looking at comparing the performance of Islamic and 
conventional indices (Girard and Hassan, 2008 and 2011; Elfakhani et al., 2005; Hussein, 
2007 just to name a few). Karbhari et al. (2004) and Ahmed (2009) highlighted the 
establishment of this level playing field as a major regulatory hurdle. 
         
 
262
6.6. Overview of Empirical Observations 
This empirical facet of the study sets out to examine the prevailing issues in the Islamic 
financial system. It aimed to accomplish this through an analysis of the literature along 
with the views garnered from interviews with academics and professionals in the field of 
Islamic Banking and Finance. Several pertinent issues were highlighted in the initial 
review of the literature surrounding governance in Islamic finance such as the perception 
of Islamic finance, transparency, risk, lender of last resort, uniformity, Shariah 
supervisory boards, the future of Islamic finance and the development of new 
instruments.  
 
Table 29 below provides an overview of the findings for this research study. It essentially 
breaks down the overall research thesis into its central themes and highlights the findings 
from the existing literature and the empirical research undertaken over the course of this 
project. The following table provides a summative view of the overall findings of the 
empirical analysis undertaken in this study.  
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Research Theme Findings 
1) The development of Islamic finance - a medieval and modern perspective 
i) The medieval Islamic 
financial system 
 Parallel integration of Islamic centred finance and other financial systems (what we now know 
as conventional, mainstream finance). 
 Although medieval Islamic finance adhered to Shariah rules, there was widespread acceptance 
of more traditional, “interest-bearing” mode of financing. 
 The exponential difference in the development of Islamic finance was down to the fact that 
the financial system was built around close-knit and establish trading relationships. This 
invariably led to obstacles in establishing international trade relationships during the medieval 
period. 
ii) Modern Islamic finance 
 The birth of modern Islamic finance took place after the Second World War when Islamic 
colonies were given the opportunity govern themselves. There was a want to return to more 
traditional Islamic values as opposed to adopting unfamiliar Western systems. 
 Concepts such as riba were strongly established as core values towards the creation of a 
modern Islamic financial system. 
iii) Risk management in Islamic 
finance 
 Adequate development of risk management strategies and tools pivotal towards the continual 
evolution of the global Islamic financial spectrum 
 Concerns regarding the obstacles presented by Islamic financial rules on financial engineering 
but it has to be understood that true financial innovation takes place in the face of these 
obstacles. 
iv) Governance in Islamic finance 
 Concern at the uniformity of regulatory standards of the global Islamic financial community 
and integrity of Shariah supervisory boards. 
 Different regulatory standards across different Islamic financial hubs could lead to regulatory 
uncertainty. 
 Composition of Shariah supervisory boards could lead to conflicts of interest. This is down to 
similar board members sitting on numerous Shariah boards for different financial institutions. 
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2) The performance of Shariah-compliant Indexes 
i) Diversification benefit of 
incorporating Shariah-
compliant index in a 
portfolio. 
 Dependant on the index composition. In this circumstance a portfolio comprising of the FTSE 
100, FTSE 4 Good and FTSE Global Islamic presented diversification benefits. 
ii) Performance of “Islamic” 
portfolio with that of 
conventional portfolio. 
 Based on the Sharpe ratio, the portfolio containing a Shariah-compliant index outperformed 
the market portfolio across every optimisation period. 
iii) Performance of constrained 
“Islamic” portfolio with 
unconstrained “Islamic” 
portfolio 
 No conclusive outcome as to whether a constrained portfolio with at least 50% investment in 
the mainstream index yielded better risk adjusted returns across the optimisation periods. 
3) Creation of Islamic Risk Management Instrument 
i) The structure 
 Hybrid combination of wa’ad with profit/ loss sharing characteristics of musharakah. 
 This was a step away from the more conventional risk transfer approach of traditional risk 
management instruments. 
ii) Performance when 
compared to more 
conventional Islamic risk 
management products 
(wa’ad and murabaha) 
 Benefits to wa’ad seller are dependent on the price of the commodity at expiry and the 
exercise price. 
 Customer benefits if hybrid wa’ad is exercised but loses out when hybrid wa’ad is not 
exercised. 
 Bank gains if hybrid wa’ad is exercised and the spot price at expiry is more than the exercise 
price of the hybrid wa’ad. However if the hybrid wa’ad is not exercised the bank encounters 
opportunity cost of engaging in contract but receives nothing. 
iii) Issues with the structure 
 Shariah compliancy cannot be truly determined.  Attempts have been made to adhere to 
Shariah-compliance rules to the best of abilities. 
 Complicated way to structure what is essentially achieve through the use of straight wa’ad 
contract. 
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iv) Overall evaluation of 
structure 
 The want for risk-sharing has made the structure more complicated with the involvement of an 
additional party. This invariably leads to “increased” costs. 
 However, when compared to a straight wa’ad and murabaha, the hybrid wa’ad outperforms 
when it is exercised but under performs when it is not exercised. 
4) The perspective of market participants on the issues of governance in Islamic finance 
i) Central themes organised by 
progression of issues 
1) Perception of Islamic finance 
2) Risk 
3) Development of New Instruments 
4) Shariah Supervisory Boards 
5) Transparency 
6) Uniformity 
7) Lender of Last Resort 
8) Future  
ii) Interesting Perspectives on 
these central themes 
 Islamic finance is growing rapidly and is now seen as a viable alternative but there is an 
agreement between the interview groups that there is still a lack of knowledge and more has to 
be done to address this issue. 
 There is distinct concern about the level of risk within the Islamic financial system that has 
been brought about this significant growth and new market participants should understand that 
whilst the risks faced by Islamic finance are similar to conventional finance there may be a 
different emphasis on specific types of risk. 
 More attention has to be paid to product development on the risk management front to 
contend with the proliferation of risks due to the significant growth. Interviewees made the 
distinction that financial innovation cannot be only about mimicking conventional financial 
payoffs. 
 This innovative process has to be aided by Shariah Supervisory Boards. Moreover, the issues 
pertaining to SSB composition are quickly diminishing and there are calls for accredited 
Shariah qualifications, which would also help with issues of transparency and uniformity of 
the Islamic financial system. 
 Issues of transparency are down to a lack of knowledge. Moreover, complete transparency 
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cannot be expected. 
 There is a want for a set of fundamental regulatory standards but once again there is 
agreement that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is impossible and could even preclude 
development and financial innovation in Islamic finance. 
 There are benefits from having a lender of last resort but there is no clear indication as to who 
should take on this role. 
 Islamic finance will continue to grow although the market has to be modest with its 
expectations. 
Table 29: Overview of Findings 
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6.7. Summative Remarks 
This chapter has provided a descriptive perspective of the findings of the research study. It 
highlights the major issues from the literature along with the results of the empirical work 
carried out over the course of this research study.  This, in essence, sets the scene for the 
discussions in the next chapter where links will be drawn across the central themes of this 
research 
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7. Linking the Debates – Conclusions 
7.1. Introduction to Chapter 
The following chapter contextualises the findings presented in this research study. The 
chapter brings together both philosophical and empirical aspects of this study and provides 
linkages across the three central themes of this research. Chapter 7 is set out as follows. 
Section 7.2. revisits the main issues that that were looked at in this research project, outlining 
the major research objectives achieved in each chapter and will cover the analysis of the 
performance of Shariah-compliant indexes, issues of governance in Islamic finance and the 
development of risk-management under a Shariah framework. Section 7.2. will draw linkages 
across these central themes and examine these major aspects of this research study not as 
individual facets but as interrelated components of Islamic finance. Section 7.3. illustrates the 
original contribution to knowledge of this research study. It highlights the gaps in the existing 
literature and the new findings from this study. Section 7.4. will highlight the limitations of 
this project and the potential for future research to be carried out around the area. Section 7.5. 
will present the concluding remarks on the findings of this research and the overall thesis.    
 
7.2. Summary and Conclusions 
7.2.1. The Growth of Islamic Finance through the Ages 
The development of Islamic finance from its medieval beginnings to its current status in the 
modern financial spectrum provides much food for thought. The descriptions of medieval 
Islamic finance provided by Udovitch (1970) paints the picture of a financial system that is 
fundamentally similar to what is known as modern Islamic finance. Both medieval and 
modern Islamic finance share regulatory standards that are governed by Islamic law and as 
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such both financial systems abide by the three central tenets of prohibiting riba, preventing 
maysir and thwarting gharar (Udovitch, 1970; Siddiqi, 2006). However, it is difficult to not 
see the differences caused by the temporal break between the two financial systems as well. 
As argued by Udovitch (1970 while Islamic finance existed to a significant degree in 
medieval times it did not possess the strict ‘riba-chasing’ characteristics that dominate the 
modern Islamic financial spectrum (Khan, 2010a). Instead, the medieval Islamic financial 
system is described as inclusive. It behaved in a way where on the one side Islamic values 
governed a financial system whilst on the other side it was encompassing of conventional 
trade and financial practices. A good example of the differences between medieval and 
modern Islamic finance would be the acceptance of credit finance. 
 
The systemic construct of medieval Islamic finance consisted of close-knit trading 
relationships and even within the context of international trade and finance, these 
relationships still played a significant part in overall trading practices (Udovitch, 1970). This 
invariably led to difficulties with regards to international trade within the medieval Islamic 
financial system, which was the cause of its eventual decline and the adoption of what is now 
called mainstream financial practices. The close trading relationships of Islamic finance 
created a substantial network of lenders and borrowers. Moreover, these trusted networks 
resulted in a trustworthy trading grid that could have been described as lower risk when 
compared to medieval Western finance. This network included brokers, lenders and 
borrowers who would facilitate the international trading requirements of market participants. 
Unfortunately, this close arrangement also meant that the medieval Islamic financial system 
was significantly more closed off to the wider trading economy when compared to Western 
finance of that time. Additional evidence that supports this argument for the steady decline of 
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medieval Islamic finance can be seen from the fact that medieval Arabic possessed words 
such as money lending or transfer of debts as well as words that were related to specific, 
personal financial transactions (Udovitch, 1970). However, there were no words that 
described the abstract and generic functions of any financial system and nomenclature such 
as banks and banking and finance were virtually non-existent.  
 
Essentially, the medieval Islamic financial system was unable to extract itself from the 
personal trading network that it was built around and fell victim to the lack of impersonal 
trading relationships that now pervades commerce, banking and finance. Trust was no longer 
required for security in light of standardized regulatory controls. Close trading relationships 
were not required to engage in trade as these were circumvented with the advent of brokers 
and agents. Therefore, the very foundations that made Islamic finance a success were also the 
cause of its eventual demise. Medieval Islamic finance’s comparatively narrow social 
structure impeded its ability to move towards a larger interconnected financial structure that 
was not built around social proclivities but rather a more informal organization of commerce 
and trade.  
 
What can be seen when comparing and contrasting medieval and modern Islamic finance is a 
distinct emphasis on riba within modern Islamic finance. This firm stance on riba would be a 
product of a few factors. Firstly, as stated before, there was a want for reversion towards a 
more traditional and familiar mode of financing (Schaik, 2001). This exacerbated socio-
economic push towards Islamic finance could have been a deliberate effort to differentiate 
itself from its more conventional financial equivalent by offering a banking and finance 
system that excludes a central conventional financial characteristic – interest financing. Much 
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of the early academic literature on Islamic banking and finance centralised around exploring 
and promoting the effects and benefits of an interest-free financial system (Ahmed, 1972; 
Khan, 1986; Ashour, 1999; Siddiqi, 2006). Moreover, a lot of this literature is not without 
merit and their arguments present an extremely convincing case. Removing interest from the 
equation of many financial transactions requires them to exist in the real economy and indeed 
tangibility and ownership is a central aspect of many Islamic financial contracts (El-Diwany, 
2010). Having a financial contract devoid of interest and existing in the real economy results 
in lower risk in the sense that both parties are forced to absorb responsibility for the 
transaction (Homoud and Rhummeud, 1985).  
 
However, whilst the benefits of interest-free banking were there, the elimination of the 
interest element in finance presented many problems itself – the intensification of 
counterparty risk and principal-agent problems (Vogel and Hayes, 1998, Warde, 2000). In the 
early years of modern Islamic banking and finance it was felt that the best solution to interest 
banking was a profit and loss sharing modus of finance and the use of musharakah and 
murdarabah contracts (Siddiqi, 2006). However, these contracts resulted in the increase of 
principal-agent concerns mainly as a result of mal-practice or the hiding of profits/losses. 
These problems led to the adoption of the murabaha contracts in the 1980s, which essentially 
transformed the landscape of modern Islamic finance. These murabaha contracts allowed 
market participants the benefits of debt financing, which essentially created a significantly 
more feasible way of structuring finance. It provided the parties involved with capital 
protection and trade modes of financing and alleviated all the problems associated with profit 
and loss sharing.  
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The advent of modern Islamic finance occurred with the end of the Second World War when 
with the withdrawal of colonial rule many Islamic regions were once again allowed to govern 
themselves (Schaik, 2001). This distinct sudden reversion of control meant that the 
conventional practices of their once colonial rulers were quickly seen as foreign and strange 
and this included financial practices. This unfamiliarity with Western practices resulted in the 
want to revert to a system that was more understood and widely accepted amongst the region, 
which gave way to the adoption of Islamic values to govern everyday life including 
commercial activities such as banking and finance. These initial experiments into the viability 
of an Islamic financial system took place in the 1960s with the establishment of an Interest-
free bank in Karachi and Tabung Haji in Malaysia (Schaik, 2001). 
 
Since that period Islamic finance has grown significantly with the creation of numerous 
Islamic financial hubs – in both the West and the East –and the proliferation of new financial 
instruments and product lines (Malik et al., 2011). What is now known as modern Islamic 
finance is valued at just over $1 trillion and is expected to grow four fold by 2016. The rise of 
Islamic financial hubs in both the East and the West has also shown the growing prominence 
of Islamic finance in the conventional market place (Malik et al., 2011).  
7.2.2. Performance and Diversification of Shariah-complaint Equity 
Indexes 
Shariah-complaint equity funds have been the source of much talk in recent years. These 
compliant equity funds use a screening process to filter out haram companies and as such 
these equity indexes explicitly exclude banking and insurance institutions and other entities 
that engage in haram activities to a certain standard. With the financial crisis much research 
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has been conducted on the performance of these Islamic indexes with reference to 
conventional indexes. What was found that Islamic indexes exhibited under-performance 
during bull market phases and over-performance in bear market phases (Hussein, 2007).  This 
should be of no surprise based on the composition of these Shariah-complaint funds. The 
exclusion of banking and insurance institutions would unvaryingly mean that the initial 
shocks of any financial crisis would be muted. The large exposures of both these types of 
institutions – financial and insurance – within the investment market place would mean that 
they would be the first to exhibit poor health should there be a detrimental shock to the global 
marketplace.  
 
In contrast, the benefits from propitious shocks to the marketplace would be experienced by 
these institutions initially. Referring back to unfavourable market shocks, this is not to say 
that Islamic finance would be completely insulated from the damages that a financial crisis 
could wreak on a financial system. It has to be understood that whilst Islamic indexes exclude 
the activities of banking and insurance from the funds on a principal level, capital outflows 
and inflows still arise from conventional, mainstream sources. In a sense, investors in Islamic 
funds need not necessarily borrow from an Islamic bank. Moreover, using the Shariah 
screening process means that whilst companies on the index are Shariah-complaint, they are 
not inherently Muslim and will actively invest in non-Shariah-compliant investments 
themselves. There is also an increased dependence of real assets due to the nature of Shariah 
financial requirements and it takes time for the effects of the financial crisis to filter down 
from the financial into the real markets (Hayat and Kraeussi, 2011). Therefore, these muted 
effects of financial shocks should only be regarded in the short-term. 
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There has been a substantial amount of research (for a full review of existing literature refer 
to Chapter 4, Section 4.2.) conducted into the comparing and contrasting the performance of 
Islamic against conventional funds and what appears would be a divergent view of whether 
the Sharia-screening processes make a difference to both risk and return. Whilst work by 
Elfakhani et al. (2007) and Hoepner et al. (2011) suggests that the Islamic equity indices 
possessed no outperformance over conventional equity indices, work by Abdullah et al. 
(2007) and Hussein (2007) seem to indicate that the performance of Islamic equity indices 
were dependent on market phases. What is common across the existing research was the 
distinct separation between Islamic and conventional indices with analysis looking at 
comparing Islamic against non-Islamic. The identification of this gap in existing research 
provided the inspiration for this research to examine the performance of Islamic equity 
indices not in isolation but rather as a component within a portfolio of assets.  The findings 
from the empirical analysis (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.) highlighted that there were not only 
diversification benefits from incorporating Islamic equity indices within a conventional 
portfolio but the inclusion of Sharia-compliant equity indices also resulted in improved risk 
adjusted returns when compared to a conventional equity index. Fundamentally, the inclusion 
of a Shariah-compliant equity index within a portfolio of assets demonstrated no long term 
stochastic relationship under a Johansen cointegration framework. Furthermore, assessing the 
risk adjusted performance of this portfolio using a Markowitz optimisation methodology also 
indicated superior risk-adjusted performance with the inclusion of a Shariah-compliant equity 
index. These outperformances over a conventional equity index could be seen over both a 
longer and shorter time span. These provides strong arguments towards the growing 
perception of Islamic finance as a viable investment and diversification opportunity for 
international investors and for both Muslim and conventional investors. It should be noted 
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that, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there have been no attempts in the existing 
literature to make this comparison of Shariah-compliant and conventional equity indexes 
using conventional portfolio optimisation methodologies. Much of the existing literature 
looks at a base comparison of Shariah-compliant against conventional equity indices only 
with no consideration for modern portfolio theory and the importance of multi asset 
portfolios. 
 
However, with the current economic conditions, conclusions for the performance of Islamic 
finance have to be modest. Interdependencies between financial systems have meant that 
whilst Islamic finance is slightly insulated from the effects of the financial crisis, it still 
experiences knock-on effects from conventional sources – both in terms of capital investment 
and volatility of investments (Chapra, 2008). Nonetheless, it should also be regarded as an 
opportunity for Islamic finance as individuals look for alternatives. Islamic finance may not 
change the spectrum of conventional finance but it does offer market participants an option 
when it comes to investments and finance (Ahmed, 2009). This could be another explanation 
for the growth of Islamic finance over the past decade. The analysis of the interviews 
conducted as part of this research also supports these views suggesting that market 
participants view Islamic finance very favourably although Islamic finance cannot be seen as 
the answer to all financial problems. 
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7.2.3. The Need for New Risk Management Instruments in Islamic 
Finance 
However, this rapid growth has brought with it a few problems, mainly with the management 
of volatility and the issues of governance – which are matters that are very much linked with 
each other. Examining the risk profile of Shariah finance, what can be seen from the risk 
profile of Islamic financial institutions would be that it experiences similar risks to its 
conventional financial counterpart with the exception being Shariah-risk (Makiyan, 2008). 
However, whilst the risk profiles of both Shariah and conventional finance are similar, the 
nature of the risk is different (Dar and Presley, 2000). The prohibition of riba has meant that 
all Islamic financial contracts have, as an important condition, proof of ownership before a 
transaction can take place. For a start, this invariably leads to increased commodity risk 
(Sundararajan and Errico, 2002) and moreover, the proof of ownership prior to contracting 
involves its own risks. This illustrates that whilst the risk types are the same the nature and 
occurrences of these risks are slightly different.  
 
The danger arises if there is a lack of understanding for the differences in the risk of 
conventional and Islamic financial contract. The underlying principal of risk management in 
both conventional and Islamic finance is a mitigation of risk but the methodology applied is 
different in both cases.  This has resulted in the calls for the provision of Islamic financial 
qualifications which were strongly pushed by both the literature (Ghayad, 2008; Monger and 
Rawashdeh, 2008) and from the interview analysis carried out. There was strong consensus 
amongst the three interviewee groups that Shariah financial qualification would not only help 
alleviate the lack of knowledge but also aid the uniformity of Islamic finance. With the vast 
amount of volatility in the economy today, there is no need for an additional layer of 
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uncertainty by trying to manage Islamic financial contracts in the same vein as conventional 
financial contracts.  
 
There has been additional criticism with the composition and structure of new Islamic 
financial risk management tools. These criticisms were also highlighted during the interviews 
and stem from the fact that many new Islamic financial instruments aim to mimic the 
characteristics of conventional financial tools. The literature  does indicate this phenomenon 
and the rise in popularity of Shariah-compliant financial instruments have meant that there 
are now more Islamic financial instruments that mirror their conventional counterparts 
(Kayed and Hassan, 2011; Seif, 2009, El-Gamal, 2008).  
 
Recent years have seen financial innovation in Islamic finance progress greatly and much of 
this innovation has been centred on the murabaha contract. Islamic profit rate and cross 
currency swaps are two good examples of the Shariah-compliant innovative process that 
involves the use of two murabaha contracts in tandem. As highlighted by Hesse et al. (2008) 
and Iqbal (2007) Islamic financial systems are working at establishing a robust framework for 
financial innovation and the conditions, such as liberalization and deregulation, are there for 
further development of new products 
 
The growing Shariah acceptance of the wa’ad as an Islamic financial contract has shown that 
there is greater enthusiasm in embracing financial innovation under a Shariah financial 
framework. However, using an Islamic call option in the form of the wa’ad is still a 
contentious aspect of Islamic finance as derivative structures are explicitly disallowed under a 
Shariah framework (Saleem, 2006; Seif, 2009).  The lack of ownership and high risk nature 
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of derivatives (see Steinherr, 2000; Summers and Summers, 1989) has meant that they are 
prohibited within Islamic finance although Mokhtar and Laldin (2009) have argued that there 
are risk management benefits from the use of derivatives. Moreover, empirical studies 
(Conrad, 1989; Crain and Lee, 1995) into the effects of derivatives on the overall risk 
spectrum are inconclusive. It does look like the benefits of derivative-like structures for risk 
management is not lost on Shariah financial innovation and new product structures such a 
Shariah-compliant profit rate swaps or Shariah-compliant FX options are making their way 
into the financial system.  
 
However, a lot of these products still operate on the basis of risk transfer and there seems to 
be a need for research aimed at creating new hybrid risk management structures that 
incorporated elements of risk sharing. The arguments for the adoption of risk sharing over 
risk transfer are there in the form of overall accountability and equality which related back to 
the roots of modern Islamic finance (Naqvi, 1982; Khan, 1984). Highlighting this gap in the 
literature the research essentially created a hybrid risk management tool which incorporated 
the mechanisms of a wa’ad and risk sharing. The hybrid structure articulated the flexibility of 
a call option with the benefits of a risk sharing modus. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge the specification of this structure were not highlighted in the existing literature 
thus signifying another gap in the prevailing knowledge. The payoffs for this hybrid were 
assessed and the results were indicative that risk-sharing did provide some benefit to 
contracting parties (the structure is described in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.). 
 
What was revealed from the analysis of the payoff was that when the hybrid product was 
exercised, the customer benefitted from the overall contract whilst the benefit to the bank 
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would be dependent on the spot price of the commodity upon maturity. For the customer, the 
benefit arose from the fact that he/she would be paying lower premiums initially and that the 
overall cost of the contract would be lower should the contract be exercise (see Table 25, pg. 
226).  
 
On the downside there is an additional cost to pay for this structure (this can be seen when the 
hybrid product is not exercised). The rulings are unclear as to whether ownership is required 
for a wa’ad contract and as such the research has account for both ownership and non-
ownership. When the hybrid product is not exercised, the requirement to purchase the net 
asset value from the bank to complete the contract resulted in it being more expensive than a 
straight wa’ad contract (see Table 24, pg. 225). The conclusions from the payoffs 
demonstrate the effects of the implementation of a risk-sharing modus within a product 
structure. What occurs is a fundamental reduction in the overall efficiency of risk 
management but what is returned is accountability and knowledge sharing. As the bank is 
part of the hybrid structure they would invariably bring better market knowledge which 
would have underlying benefits to the client who wishes to hedge a position in the first 
instance.  
 
The exercise in creating the hybrid product highlighted the possibilities of financial 
innovation in Islamic finance and, in essence, that initial concerns about a lack of risk 
management tools in Islamic finance were gradually diminishing. The progression and 
growth of Islamic finance in the eyes of conventional banking and finance has meant that 
there has been steady advancement on the risk management front. Furthermore, the 
development of Shariah-compliance rules has substantially improved these innovative 
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opportunities. However, these Shariah–compliance rule and regulations have constantly been 
cause for worry in the Islamic financial system and much of this concern (El-Gamal, 2006; 
Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998) relates to consistency and uniformity of these regulations – 
concerns that spill over into governance and regulation of the Islamic financial system as a 
whole. 
7.2.4. The Development of Governance and Regulation within Shariah 
Finance 
Governance and regulation play a significant role in any financial system in the sense that it 
creates and promotes stability through the building of consumer confidence (Llewellyn, 2006: 
Taylor and Fleming, 1999). What was discovered from the literature on governance and 
regulation was that there was a need for the further development of a regulatory standard that 
would clearly identify and protect the rights of market participants (IFSL, 2010; Wilson, 
2000). However, whilst the literature provides theoretical precepts of issues of governance 
and regulation there is little in the form of validation of these academic opinions. In lights of 
this gap in the literature, this study aimed to assess if actual market participants agreed with 
these hypothetical notions highlighted within the literature. 
 
What can be seen from the research is that many of these concerns about regulation and 
governance originate from debates involving the uniformity of global Islamic financial 
regulatory standards (Hesse et al., 2008). Regulators play a significant role within the Islamic 
finance system with regards to its promotion and development within the global economy. 
From the empirical analysis of the interviews, it was discovered that the need for uniformity 
of Islamic finance was a strong view held by both academics and professional.  In many 
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respects it was a vindication of the issues highlighted the literature. Having different 
regulatory standards for different regions is a fundamental result of the different schools of 
Islamic thought (see Tables 10, 11 and 12). However, this has given rise to different 
standards for different Islamic financial systems and invariably this leads to confusion within 
the global Islamic financial markets and the creation, to a certain extent, of an uneven playing 
field amongst the central Islamic financial systems (Akhtar, 2006; 2007). Market participants, 
based on simple bounded rationality assumptions, would seek out the Islamic financial 
market, which best suited their needs at any one time.  
 
This argument pertaining to an uneven playing field is further ameliorated in Shariah 
financial hubs, which provide Shariah-compliant financial services and products. Shariah-
compliance is assessed through Shariah-windows and what has been learned is that whilst 
certain products and services are allowed in one Islamic financial system, based on these 
Shariah-windows; it is disallowed in another (Rehman and Masood, 2013). Moreover, an 
additional criticism of these Shariah-compliance standards would be the composition of 
Shariah Supervisory Boards (SSBs), whose role is to administer these windows (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006). It has been argued that the structure of various SSBs comprise of similar 
members sitting on different SSBs. This led to apprehensions about Shariah-scholars being 
headhunted for their interpretation of Islamic financial law (El-Gamal, 2006). Essentially, 
scholars who had a more-lenient interpretation of Islamic financial law were the most sought 
after by financial institutions that required Shariah approval for a new product or service. 
This was initially a serious issue but what can be extrapolated from the literature (Jobst et al., 
2008) and the empirical research would be that this is a diminishing concern and in fact much 
was attributed to a lack of expertise in the Islamic financial marketplace.  During the 
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formative years of modern Islamic finance there was a slight lack of expertise with regards to 
Shariah-compliance law however, this is begging to change and as Islamic finance grows in 
popularity, there unvaryingly will be an influx of new expertise into the market place.  
 
Conversely, whilst the interviews demonstrated that market participants were strongly in 
favour for a fundamental set of regulatory standards, they did question the concept of all-
encompassing standardization of the global Islamic financial system. The interviewees 
affirmed the view that there should be, at a foundational level, elements of regulation have to 
be standardized, there were no calls for complete harmonization of the financial system and 
suggesting that there are some benefits from keeping some differences in the interpretation of 
Islamic financial law.  It would be impossible due to the differences between Islamic schools 
of thought and impractical as it would result in the retardation of financial innovation and 
development of the Islamic financial system as a whole (DeLorenzo, 2000). It is very much a 
sense of plummeting into the same pitfalls that have been experienced by conventional 
finance. The standardized nature of conventional finance has seen product development 
within the mainstream industry take on an evolutionary aspect as opposed to an innovative 
outlook.  
 
With that being said, many of the issues highlighted in both the literature and the empirical 
interviews concerning governance and regulatory standards in Islamic finance are being 
addressed. The expansion and the influence of the two large regulatory bodies – AAOIFI and 
IFSB - within the Islamic financial system are indicative of the progress that has been made 
by the Islamic financial system in trying to tackle these regulatory issues (Hersh, 2011). 
Essentially, both bodies are charged with the development of fundamental regulatory 
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standards across the global Islamic financial system with AAOIFI focusing on accounting 
standards and the IFSB concentrating on Shariah financial standards and codes of practice 
(Sarea and Hanafah, 2013). Moreover, recent developments between two major Shariah 
financial hubs – Malaysia and Saudi Arabia – have seen efforts being made to stream line the 
regulatory guideline between the two nations (Y-Sing and Ho, 2012). An interesting precept 
that arose from this research was the strong calls for a Shariah financial qualification (Farook 
and Farooq, 2013). These calls were echoed during the interview analysis with academic and 
practitioners suggesting that the creation of an accredited Islamic financial qualification 
would help alleviate the problems of uniformity and consistency by providing a foundation of 
knowledge. While these calls for qualification are not new (See Wilson, 2000; Karbhari et al., 
2004) it was interesting to understand that that was where the Islamic financial market was 
headed. 
 
Further development could take the scope of central regulation through a sovereign central 
bank, in essence bringing the support of Islamic financial institutions up to par with that of its 
conventional counterparts (Wilson, 2000). However, this could breed further issues with 
regards to the institution that would take on this role. There are favourable views that there 
should be a lender of last resort in Islamic finance within the literature (Solé, 2007; Ahmed 
and Hassan, 2007) and these views are reflected within the interviews with market 
participants within all three groups highlighting support for the provision of such a service. 
However, like the literature there is no consensus as to who should undertake this role with 
support for Solé’s (2007) suggestion for a central bank and Siddiqui’s (2008) proposition that 
this role should be filled by a central regulatory body such as that of AAOIFI or the IFSB.  
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It can be seen from the research that the impact of governance and regulation affects all facets 
of Islamic finance. Central regulatory standards would impact the development of risk 
management tools and strategies under a Shariah framework. There has to be a balance 
between uniformity of regulatory standards across the global Islamic financial system and 
scope for financial innovation (Asutay, 2007a; 2007b). However, it is felt that better 
fundamental central regulation (such as a standard set of Shariah-compliant rules) would aid 
greatly for the growth of Islamic finance. This would make it easier for mainstream 
participants to engage in the Shariah financial system without fear of varying and subjective 
financial standards. The regulators play an important role in any financial system. In the case 
of Islamic finance, there is the additional challenge of striking the right balance between 
objective financial practice and subjective religious tenets. There is no denying the growth of 
Islamic finance on a global scale. Its acceptance in the Far East and in the Middle East as a 
parallel financial system indicates its ability to function alongside conventional finance. This 
argument for Islamic finance is further bolstered by its development in Western finance 
systems such as that of the United Kingdom and recognition within the conventional financial 
systems as a viable alternative to mainstream finance (Dar and Presley, 1999).  
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7.2.5. Mapping the Conclusions 
 
One of the main objectives of this research project was to approach both the concept of 
Islamic risk management and governance from a conventional, mainstream perspective. 
Through the empirical work, it has been indicated that there are benefits to incorporating 
Shariah-compliant products within a conventional portfolio. Should this be taken as an 
indication that Islamic finance is more than a niche market? The simple answer is yes and no. 
No because Islamic products and services should not be seen as only for Muslims. There is 
tangible benefit from holding Islamic financial contracts within conventional portfolios as 
demonstrated by the empirical findings conducted in this study. On the other hand however, 
Islamic risk management products are still not as efficient as their conventional counterparts 
just yet and in this regard are still very much niche. With regards to whether, Islamic risk 
management tools could be used in conventional financial strategies, the practical consensus 
is that while Islamic risk management tools are able to manage certain types of conventional 
risk, these instruments are considerably more expensive than mainstream risk management 
contracts.   
 
The implications of financial innovation for any financial system are huge and more so for a 
financial system that is trying to make its mark on the global scene. This research addressed 
the issue of financial innovation in Islamic finance with the aim of creating a new Shariah-
compliant risk management. The research has highlighted that there is scope for financial 
innovation and there are benefits to incorporating risk-sharing within risk management 
strategies. Whilst Shariah-rules may seem like a significant obstacle towards promoting 
financial innovation, it is in the face of these obstacles that innovation takes place. This 
development of innovations in Islamic finance is once again supported by its growth in the 
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conventional market place and this can only serve to drive the innovative process forward. In 
this respect the Islamic financial system has a robust foundation for its financial innovative 
processes.  
 
However, there has to be some semblance of regulatory control and standards of best practice 
in terms of governance. With new market entrants, the Islamic financial system has to ensure 
that it promotes itself in the right vein. More effort has to be made to educate new entrants to 
the market. The continual development of Shariah-compliance could aid in this area by 
providing Western Islamic financial hubs, which lack the vast market knowledge of the 
Middle East and Malaysia, with a steady foundation from which to build upon. Effort should 
also be made to ensure that there is some trace of regulatory uniformity across the global 
Islamic financial market place. Institutions such as AAOIFI and the IFSB should be 
commended for their efforts in trying to establish regulatory uniformity however there is still 
much development to be done. 
 
The Islamic financial system has to be modest with its impression of itself. It cannot regard 
itself as the white knight that is here to rescue conventional finance from the depths of 
recessions. On the contrary, Islamic finance should see itself as complementary to 
conventional finance. The growth of modern Islamic finance since the 1940s signifies that it 
is here to stay, however, at this point in time, it is still seen a very niche market but with the 
path that it is on currently, that could change very soon. 
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Figure 34: Mapping the Conclusions of the Thesis 
Islamic Finance in the Global Economy: An 
Exploration of Risk Management and Governance 
Islamic Finance in 
The Global 
Economy 
Perfomance 
•inclusion of Shariah-compliant equity index 
within conventional portfolio. 
•Using modern portfolio theory, portfolio 
demonstrates superior performance over 
conventional equity index. 
Diversification 
•Cointegration analysis highlights lack of stochastic 
relationship indicating diversification benefits from 
inclusion of Shariah-compliant equity index. 
Emperical Literature 
•Islamic finance is growing rapidly. 
•Has become a viable alternative to 
conventional finance 
Risk Management 
Under a Shariah 
Framework 
Empirical Literature 
•Risk management is a big issue in Islamic 
finance 
•Increased calls for financial innovation 
and product design 
•There is a need  to keep pace and a 
market need for new products. 
Hybrid Structure 
•Hybrid structure combining both wa'ad with risk-sharing. 
•New structure highlights the benefits of incorporating risk-sharing into 
risk management tools 
•Trade-off between efficiency and accountability between contracting 
parties. 
Governance in 
Islamic Finance 
Interviews 
•Interviewees concurred with many of the issues raise in the 
literature. 
•New issues raised included the possiblity of standardization. 
•There cannot be a single model for Islamic finance. 
Empirical Literature 
•Highlighted several notable issues of 
governance in Islamic finance such as 
transparency, uniformity, SSBs, 
development of new financial 
instruments and lender of last resort 
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7.3. Contribution to knowledge 
The contribution to knowledge is an essential facet of any research study. Both terms, 
contribution and knowledge, carry a weight and meaning of context. Knowledge refers to key 
elements that have been established within a particular discipline – in this circumstance the 
empirical literature that presents the views, beliefs and works of finance and Islamic banking 
and finance. In order for a researcher to contribute to this body of work, it has to be ensured 
that all empirical findings from the study are verified either by existing literature or 
concluded from evidence via a process of examination.  
 
The growth of Islamic finance over the past decade has resulted in not only its acceptance by 
the mainstream financial world but also a proliferation of academic research into its 
fundamental underpinnings. The evolution of both the practical and academic knowledge of 
Islamic finance has grown substantially and in tandem. The expansion of Islamic finance into 
non-Muslim and more conventional markets has meant that there is an increasing amount of 
research that attempts to look at Islamic finance from a mainstream financial perspective and 
this is where this research study will be positioned.  
 
The research study initially set out to examine the performance and diversification benefits of 
Shariah-compliant equity indices. Shariah-compliant financial products have been a recent 
trend in the Islamic financial world and from an international financial perspective could 
provide, both the conventional and Islamic investor a viable outlet for not only risk reduction 
but also significant performance benefits.  The scope of knowledge behind assessing the 
performance of Islamic equity indices has evolved substantially over the past decade. Initial 
published research into this aspect of Islamic finance involved ‘pigeon-holing’ the returns of 
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Islamic equity indexes with that of ethical mutual funds and it was believed that he screening 
processes behind choosing equity constituents resulted in similar risk-return profiles.  
 
Seminal works such as that of Luther and Matatko (1994), M’Zali and Turcotte (1998) and 
Hamilton et al. (1993) have shown that there was no consistent outperformance of ethical 
funds to that of conventional equity funds. The growth of Islamic finance resulted in better 
access to data pertaining to Shariah-compliant equity indexes and increased published 
research. Works such as Hassan (2001), Hussein (2007), Elfakhani et al. (2007) and Hayat 
and Kraeussi (2011) have attempted to compare the performance of Islamic and conventional 
equity indexes and have also found that there were not consistent arguments for 
outperformance by Islamic indexes. An interesting observation from these studies was that 
the comparisons were made on an insular basis i.e. a base comparison between ethical/ 
Islamic against conventional indices with no semblance of modern portfolio theory.  
 
This inherent gap in the literature formed the inspiration for the first aspect of this study. 
Essentially, if Islamic finance is being widely accepted as an alternative financial system, 
then in this regard, investors, both conventional and Islamic, should have the opportunity to 
include Shariah-compliant assets within a portfolio of assets. As such, this research looks to 
examine the performance and diversification benefits of incorporating an Islamic equity 
index within a portfolio of assets comprising. Fundamentally, modern investment and risk 
management strategies place great have shown the benefits of multi asset portfolios. Thus, it 
was felt that an analysis of the performance of an Islamic equity index would be better 
assessed within the context of a portfolio rather than the base comparison of Islamic versus 
conventional finance which is widely used in the existing literature. 
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The study uses Islamic equity indexes from the two largest Islamic financial hubs in the West 
– the US and the UK. As it was agreed that, the portfolio would be utilized by an 
international investor, the study abides by a cointegration and Markowitz portfolio 
optimization methodology. The results from this empirical aspect of the study indicate that 
the inclusion of Islamic equity indexes not only provide diversification benefits but also 
demonstrates improved risk-adjusted performance. These conclusions contribute new insight 
into the performance and diversification benefits of Shariah-compliant equity indexes. 
Fundamentally, the empirical results extend existing academic knowledge on the 
performance and diversification characteristics of Shariah-compliant equity indexes. Whilst 
the existing literature focuses on a simple comparison of Islamic against conventional index 
performance, this study furthers that precept by incorporating conventional financial 
strategies and Islamic finance. Additionally, the results of diversification benefits and 
improved risk adjusted performance further validate the notion of Islamic finance as not only 
for the Muslim investor but also for the conventional investor. 
 
The results from the analysis Islamic equity indexes led the researcher to further question the 
risk profile of Islamic finance. With its substantial growth in both Muslim and non-Muslim 
markets, was there an increase in the risks and were there adequate tools to deal with these 
risk? An examination of the existing literature indicated that the need for financial innovation 
in Islamic finance is not a new topic. Works such as that of Dar and Presley (2000) and Jobst 
et al. (2008) have highlighted the need for further development of the Islamic base of risk 
management instruments. Essentially, these arguments relate to Islamic finance’s use of PLS 
and increased emphasis on real transactions.  
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Whilst there is a need for further financial innovation in Islamic finance, the process of 
engineering new financial instruments in Islamic finance has been relatively difficult due to 
Shariah financial rules and regulations. In what is regarded as the most comprehensive study 
into derivatives in Islamic finance, Kamali (1995, 1997 and 1999) has suggested that there is 
nothing inherently wrong with derivative structures in Islamic finance and a further 
examination of the scope of risk management instruments within Islamic finance yielded 
interesting results with the unearthing of numerous innovative Islamic risk management 
structures such as an Islamic profit rate swap and an Islamic call option, both of which 
perform in the same vein as their conventional derivative counterparts albeit structured in an 
Islamic way. The empirical results from the performance and diversification analysis of 
Islamic equity indexes above already provides strong arguments towards support for Islamic 
finance as a viable alternative to conventional finance and this research aimed to further 
bolster that support by creating a new risk management tool. The creation of this tool would 
be to extend the existing knowledge base on Shariah-compliant financial innovation and to 
theoretically add to the current based of Islamic risk management instruments.  
 
An examination of many of these new Shariah-compliant risk management structures 
indicated that they were highly innovative in restructuring conventional payoffs in a Shariah-
compliant manner. However,  the product construction still suggested a risk-transfer modus 
of risk management and with Islamic finance placing increased emphasis on PLS it was felt 
that there was scope for incorporating risk sharing in a risk management tool without 
sacrificing risk-management flexibility, which, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, is 
an exercise that is not present in existing literature. The study embarked on creating an 
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entirely new risk management instrument, thus adding to the existing theoretical spectrum of 
Shariah-compliant risk management instruments.  
 
The product structure consisted of a hybrid combination of a wa’ad (Islamic option) and 
murabaha (cost-plus financing) to create, what is principally a risk-sharing, option structure. 
An examination of existing literature yielded no reference to a similar structure once again 
illustrating an original contribution to knowledge. Moreover, an examination of the payoffs 
of this hybrid structure has also indicated that that the notion of risk sharing has benefits to 
the parties involved within the transaction. While the want for risk sharing has meant that the 
product is not as efficient as a conventional derivative or wa’ad, the risk sharing element 
makes the overall cost of the hybrid product cheaper. Once again, taking these results into 
account, this study adds further fuel to the arguments supporting Islamic finance as a 
financial system that is not only for Muslims, but also a viable alternative for conventional 
risk managers. 
 
Throughout the process of creating a new risk management tool, every attempt was made to 
keep the instruments in line with Shariah-compliant standards. However, what was 
discovered was that there was a lack of consistency in Shariah-compliant regulatory 
standards. This made the financial engineering process more complex and led onto the final 
facet of this research study. The existing literature highlighted several pertinent issues of 
governance and regulation (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.) in Islamic finance these discussions 
are very abstract and do not possess any empirical research into determining the validity of 
these problems. Recent work such as that of Rehman and Masood (2013) might be an 
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exception as they have interviewed individuals to ascertain if there were differences in 
regulatory standards. However, they have not addressed the implications of those differences.  
 
This research aimed to fill that gap in the literature by garnering the views of market 
participants on the issues that have been highlighted within the literature to ascertain if the 
theoretical concerns of the existing literature matches those of individuals ‘on the ground’ 
through data saturation and triangulation.  Moreover, in order to provide a rounded view of 
the issues individuals from both an academic and practical background were interviewed to 
examine their thoughts and opinions on the subject area. With Islamic finance still relatively 
“new” it was thought that it would be good to balance the views of academic and 
practitioners with an interim group of individuals who were involved in both the academic 
and practical side of Islamic finance.  
 
Aside from wanting to discover the empirical views of market participants on issues of 
regulation and governance in Islamic finance, the aspect of the research also adopts a novel 
approach to analysing the data in terms of data saturation of precepts. The empirical facet of 
the research essentially evolves the framework set out by Francis et al. (2010) for testing data 
saturation and uses a starting sample of three interviewees with a stopping criterion of three 
interviews. What was discovered from a methodological standpoint was that larger interview 
samples did not guarantee saturation and that saturation could be achieved by samples as 
small as three or nine. 
 
Aside from the methodological discovery, the actual analysis of the interviews yielded very 
interesting results. Existing thematic discourse highlighted thirteen significant issues of 
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regulation and governance in Islamic finance but the empirical analysis of the interviews 
suggested that there was triangulation amongst the three interviewee groups for only eight or 
the thirteen issues – ‘The Perception of Islamic Finance’, ‘Risk’, ‘Development of New 
Instruments’, ‘Shariah Supervisory Boards’, ‘Transparency’, ‘Uniformity’, ‘Lender of Last 
Resort’, ‘Future of Islamic Finance’. What was even more interesting was the consensus 
amongst the interview groups about these eight nodal themes highlighting that the views of 
market participants are very much similar to that of the literature. However, there interviews 
did yield more detail about each of these eight nodes.  
 
In terms of how conventional operators viewed Islamic finance, there was a general 
conclusion that Islamic finance is growing in prominence within the modern financial world 
and is garnering greater acceptance but there is a need to further educate the market 
participants about Islamic financial practices. This finding adds further weight to the 
empirical conclusions on the performance of Islamic equity indices conducted in this study. 
Essentially, Islamic finance can prove to be a viable alternative and is a financial system that 
is not only for Muslim investors but also conventional investors. However, there is a need to 
adequately manage the level of risk in Islamic finance and as it currently stands there is 
insufficient development of financial risk management instruments. As highlighted by the 
interviewees, there is always scope for growth of product innovation and this would aid 
greatly in the management of emerging Islamic financial risk. The views of the interviewees 
essentially support the creation of a hybrid risk management instrument conducted by this 
research. The development financial innovation, however, has been linked to Shariah-
compliance standards and as such the composition of SSBs. The literature was very critical of 
SSB composition however the views shared by the interviewees were less acute. The 
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consensus amongst the three groups was that there was a lack of expertise in terms of man-
power in the Islamic financial industry which resulted in similar board members on different 
SSBS. What were more pertinent issues were the consistency, transparency and uniformity of 
these Shariah judgements. While the interviewees quickly concurred with the literature for 
the need to be more transparent and uniform, not only in terms of Shariah-judgements but as 
a financial system as a whole, there was an interesting underlying tone that was not addressed 
in the existing literature thus further indicating contribution to knowledge. 
 
On the transparency front, interviewees highlighted the fact that many Islamic financial 
contracts were just as transparent as their conventional counterparts and that privacy laws 
dictate that the level of transparency suggested in the literature could not be achieved in light 
of privacy laws. In terms of uniformity, the interviewees highlighted that complete 
standardization could not be achieved by Islamic finance. Moreover, conventional financial 
systems each had their individual idiosyncrasies which meant that they too were not entirely 
standardized. The underlying conclusion from this node was that there was a need for further 
clarification of a fundamental set of regulation but the notion of complete standardization 
would only serve to hurt the overall Islamic financial system in terms of growth and 
development. These arguments stretched to cover an Islamic lender of last resort. 
Interviewees suggested that a lender of last resort would aid the formation of a fundamental 
set of rules but as per the literature little was said in terms of whom or what central body 
should undertake this role. Finally, all interviewees were very positive on the future outlook 
of Islamic finance once again adding further fuel to the arguments for Islamic finance as an 
alternative to conventional finance. 
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The aim of this research objective was to ascertain the views of market participants on issues 
of governance and regulation within Islamic finance. In this regard the research has definitely 
demonstrated contribution to knowledge through not only the collection of views but also the 
synthesis of these views to that of the existing literature. In this regard the context of the 
analysis adds new insight into the actual feelings of market participants on issues of 
governance and regulation already highlighted by the literature. Fundamentally, the need for 
continual development would relate to Islamic finance as an alternative to conventional 
financial system and addressing these issues will invariably aid growth and help new market 
participants, from both a Muslim and non-Muslim demographic, in utilising Islamic financial 
services and products on offer. 
 
In summary, there are three main areas of significant contribution to knowledge within this 
research study. The first significant contribution to knowledge arises from the analysis of the 
diversification and performance benefits of Islamic equity indexes using the conventional 
theoretical notion of an efficient portfolio. Secondly, the analysis and creation of a 
completely new and hybrid Shariah-compliant risk management structure by incorporating a 
wa’ad with risk-sharing principles. Finally, the study examined the views of actual market 
participants on the theoretical issues of regulation and governance within the Islamic 
financial system. All three aspects of this research study aims to fill gaps highlighted in the 
literature and further the knowledge base on Islamic finance in the international economy. In 
sum, the three significant contributions to knowledge from this research study provide further 
robust foundation towards the argument that Islamic finance is a financial system for both 
conventional and Islamic financial participants. 
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With the current financial crisis the concerns about Islamic finance imitating conventional 
financial practices are understandable. However these worries are to a certain extent 
paradoxical. For Islamic finance to grow there is a need for innovation but innovation is 
about circumventing the regulatory dialectic established to promote this growth. Islamic 
finance is not supposed to replace mainstream finance but rather adopt a role as an alternative 
financial system that runs parallel to conventional finance. Moreover, the Islamic financial 
system cannot be closed off to mainstream finance by suggesting that Islamic financial 
instruments and services are only for use within the Islamic financial system. As an 
alternative, Islamic services and products should be able to provide for both conventional and 
Islamic financiers and bankers. The analyses on the performance of Shariah-compliant equity 
indexes, the creation of the hybrid risk management structure and the understanding of the 
views of market participants attempt to address this notion of inclusivity and it is believed 
that the arguments presented from these empirical facets of this research provide strong, 
relevant and new arguments for Islamic finance as an international financial system and not 
just as a Muslim financial system. 
 
7.4. Research Limitations and Scope for Further Work 
This section highlights the limitations of research and areas of possible further research. 
There are essentially three central themes to this research project – assessing Islamic finance 
in the global economy, an assessment of risk management under a Shariah framework and an 
analysis of governance within Islamic finance. Throughout this study much has been learnt 
about these facets of Islamic finance but there is always scope for further research. 
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With regards to the performance assessment of Shariah-compliant indices future research 
could also examine the use of Shariah-compliant indices in a multi-asset portfolios. The 
scope of this aspect for this research was limited to equity indices and as such the inclusion of 
other Shariah-compliant assets and conventional financial contracts could further bolster the 
argument for the inclusion of Islamic financial contracts with conventional investment and 
risk management strategies. Furthermore, this would also provide important insight into 
whether there is an additional ‘Shariah-cost’ for Islamic financial products and services. 
 
Moreover, adjusting the portfolio mix could also yield additional insights. For instance 
indices were only selected from the USA and the United Kingdom for the simple reason of 
the availability of long, unbroken time series for the years before the 2007 financial crisis. 
Future research would benefit greatly from the inclusion of more geographically diverse set 
of indices as and when they become available. Moreover, additional research could also 
assess the periods after the 2007 financial crisis.  This would enable the research to assess if 
Shariah-compliant indices have the same diversification and performance benefits beyond the 
American and British Shariah-compliant hubs.  
 
It has to be understood that the hybrid product has to be assessed by a Shariah Supervisory 
Board before being actually deemed Shariah-compliant. This is outside of the control and 
overview of the study, with access of SSBs limited. Whilst it has been indicated from this 
research that there are benefits to structuring risk-sharing within an ‘option-like’ product, the 
only way to assess its validity in the Islamic financial marketplace would be with access to a 
Shariah Supervisory Board. This could be scope for further development of the product in 
future research.  
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A further area of research for financial innovation within Islamic finance would be an 
extension of the hybrid structure presented in this study. Fundamentally, this would involve 
the creation of an Islamic put option with risk sharing.  This would invariably lead on to an 
analysis of Islamic risk management strategies using both Islamic put and call options with 
inference to conventional option risk management strategies incorporating option ‘Greeks’. 
 
There is always a worry that the interview analysis would comprise of some element of 
cognitive bias but every effort has been made to address these issues such as cross-checking 
transcripts by sending them back to the respective parties for validation, cross-check by the 
supervisory team and pilot interviews. Scope for further research could involve more node 
subsets to further break down the individual issues. This could provide further perspective 
into issues of governance and regulation. 
 
7.5. Concluding Remarks 
This research was undertaken with the purpose of contributing to the existing literature on 
Islamic banking and finance. This research was not undertaken with the view to change the 
spectrum of Islamic banking and finance but rather more modestly to examine risk 
management and governance of the Islamic financial system from a conventional perspective.  
Through the use of innovative methods in terms of portfolio creation, hybrid financial 
engineering and data saturation of participant precepts this study has provided useful insight 
into the workings of both risk management and governance of Islamic finance and more so, 
from a perspective outside that of Shariah finance. What has resulted from the undertaking of 
this research is that the study has arrived at fresh and original arguments for Islamic finance 
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as a financial system for the international investor.  It is further hoped that this research 
would provide the foundation for further works into product design and development and the 
advancement of Islamic finance within the global financial markets. 
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Appendix 1 – Strengths and Weaknesses of Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
Strengths of Quantitative Research 
 Testing and validating already constructed theories about how (and 
to a lesser degree, why) phenomena occur. 
 Testing hypothesis that are constructed before the data are 
collected. Can generalise research findings when the data are based 
on random samples of sufficient size. 
 Can generalise a research finding when it has been replicated on 
many different populations and subpopulations. 
 Useful for obtaining data that allow quantitative predictions to be 
made. 
 The researcher may construct a situation that eliminates the 
confounding influence on many variables, allowing one to more 
credibly assess cause-and-effect relationships. 
 Data collection using some quantitative methods is relatively quick. 
 Provides precise, quantitative, numerical data. 
 Data analysis is relatively independent of the researcher. 
 The research results are relatively independent of the researcher 
 It may have higher credibility with many people in power. 
 It is useful for studying large numbers of people 
 
Strengths of Qualitative Research 
 The data are based on the participants’ own categories of meaning. 
 It is useful for studying a limited number of cases in depth.  
 It is useful for describing complex phenomena. 
 Provides individual case information. 
 Can conduct cross-case comparisons and analysis. 
 Provides understanding and description of people’s personal 
experiences of phenomena. 
 Can describe, in rich detail, phenomena as they are situated and 
embedded in local contexts. 
 The researcher identifies contextual and setting factors as they 
relate to the phenomenon of interest. 
 The research can study dynamic processes. 
 The research can use the primarily qualitative method of “grounded 
theory” to generate inductively a tentative but explanatory theory 
about a phenomenon. 
 Can determine how participants interpret “constructs”. 
 Data are usually collected in naturalistic settings in qualitative 
research. 
 Qualitative approaches are responsive to local situations, conditions 
and stakeholders’ needs. 
 Qualitative researchers are responsive to changes that occur during 
the conduct of a study (especially during extended fieldwork) and 
may shift the focus of their studies as a result.  
 Qualitative data in the words and categories of participants lend 
themselves to exploring how and why phenomena occur. 
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 One can use an important case to demonstrate vividly a 
phenomenon to the readers of a report. 
 Determine idiographic causation. 
 
Weaknesses of Quantitative Research 
 The researcher’s categories that are used may not reflect local 
constituencies’ understandings. 
 The researcher’s theories that are used may not reflect local 
constituencies’ understandings. 
 The researcher may miss out on phenomena occurring because 
of the focus on theory or hypothesis testing rather than on 
theory of hypothesis generation (called the confirmation bias). 
 Knowledge produced may be too abstract and general for direct 
application to specific local situations, contexts and individuals. 
Weaknesses of Qualitative Research 
 Knowledge produced may not generalise to other people or 
other settings. 
 It is difficult to make quantitative predictions. 
 It is more difficult to test hypotheses and theories. 
 It may have lower credibility with some administrators and 
commissioners of programs. 
 It generally takes more time to collect the data when compared 
to quantitative research. 
 Data analysis is often time consuming. 
 The results are more easily influenced by the researcher’s 
personal biases and idiosyncrasies. 
Strength and Weaknesses of Quantitative and Qualitative Research (Source: Hoover, 2004) 
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Appendix 2 – Academic Interview Transcripts 
 
Academic 1 
 
Q: How do you think conventional finance views Islamic finance? 
 
I think the Islamic finance and the conventional finance, it’s a different structure of the 
relationship between the customers and the financial institutions.  In Islamic finance it’s all 
based on partnership.  It’s the money which is involved between the two parties, the 
customers and the financial institution from Islamic finance perspective.  It’s a partnership 
but the conventional finance, it is the lender as opposed to the customer, the depositor money 
and the financial institution and the conventional finance and they pay for them the interest 
fixed rate.  The customer does not have any say where their money will go, where their 
money will invest and what is the real return of their investment but in Islamic finance it is 
working as a partnership.  The customer provides the money to the financial institutions and 
they have to confirm for them where they would like to invest their money and this is why we 
have, what we call it, the restricted account and unrestricted account.  The financial 
institution, they devise a non-protected rate of interest but a return dependent on where they 
invest the money and what is the real return from their investing and the share, the return 
between the depositors and the bank in terms of what they will get from their investment.  
 
Q: Sure.  Fair enough.  How do you think people see Islamic finance?  I mean say for 
example how do you think people in the marketplace see Islamic finance? 
 
I tell you there is a steady finding about using Islamic word because the media now, when 
you see Islamic, when they see Islamic cultures but you are not seeing Islamic finance as a 
new model.  A new model, it is not like a new today but it is a model which is the people they 
don’t know before because the structure of this model it is different.  For there is a 
stereotyping about Islamic finance model and sometimes as well the stereotyping it is coming 
from the practice themselves because some of the financial institutions which they call 
themselves Islamic finance or Islamic banking, they practice exactly like the conventional 
banking but just only change the name and this is why some of the people they didn’t get the 
right meaning of Islamic finance.  From the practice of some of the Islamic banking which 
they don’t have to use the same word.  For some of the Islamic banking, just to change the 
name of interest and they call it rent for example or sometime they call it return but when you 
look in details with this what should be, look at details how they calculate the rent or 
calculate the return, they can create it exactly the same way like the conventional finance and 
they come up with the same amount but they call it something different and this is why some 
people they start now to not believe there is something called Islamic finance which it is not 
true.  If we practise the Islamic finance with the way it should be which is the finance is tied 
and embedded to the real transaction and the finance always should serve the real economy 
and the return on financing is paired with a wealth creation and as well you should have this 
linked with the financial needs for some of the conventional finance you are not give any 
particular interest or something important for the community work for any SMEs because 
they always judge them about the profit they make but in Islamic finance we have a 
community element.  We have what we call it the social responsibility to build this 
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relationship with others for I think if we start talking about the Islamic financials only one 
product like the conventional finance because the conventional finance it’s all, whatever you 
call the name, call it mortgage, call it overdraft, call it credit card, call it short loan, all based 
on loan, on debt but in Islamic finance we have at least five or six products which they can 
use it.  We have like a joint venture like Musharaka they have al-Salam, they have the ijarah, 
they have a mudaraba, they have a lot of features which is different because the main five 
pillars of Islamic finance is very important which they always base on relationships, based on 
partnerships and very important it’s based on PLS which always we call it the profit and loss 
sharing and very important as well it’s asset packing principle.   I think Islamic finance we 
have a lot of developed and the way to provide the right product to the right customers but 
unfortunately the Islamic finance they have a lack of financial involvement, a new product or 
what you call it, R&D, research and development which it is not the way we should actually 
provide more development on this area, something like a micro finance which would work on 
this and start to cater the needs for the society by the Islamic finance and the final draft, it’s 
always Islamic finance embedded within the value which always link to the basics or work to 
the ethical investment and work as well with the community, community banking for 
example, so we have to build on this value of good governance or the central to Islam as a 
whole. 
 
Q: You associate Islamic banking to ethical banking.  
 
Yes.  
 
Q: What do you think about this?  Are they very similar or are they very different or 
should Islamic finance be considered the same as ethical banking? 
 
I think it’s very important to define what ethical means because when I say ethical I am not 
considering it a legal site because sometimes you can do a legal but unethical.  When you do 
something it is ethical but maybe it was not legal.  For always we have to think about what 
ethics means and what ethical means because maybe it’s different for you from different 
ethical, for example the ethics or the ethical finance you always link to the social responsible 
investing.  Sometimes it is related to the environment and the community and the governance 
which if you have a green product it’s ethical.  Some people they always link to the ethical 
banking by helping the society through the charity organisation.  For if you think the ethical 
banking and the ethical finance, it is part of the Islamic finance because the Islamic finance 
has more to offer, not only ethical because sometimes it is not ethical for example to sell the 
alcohol because if you found now how much the NHS they pay in UK through the diseases 
related to the alcohol, how much money they pay for the smoking disease and smoking 
related as well and you can see how much money they reduce from the NHS for example the 
heart disease and the other disease but they spend more money on the smoking related.  How 
much money and business they lose through the smoking disease as well, how many people 
are ill and off sick, how many people they are like passive smoking.  If you see now the 
Islamic finance it is all embedded all of this.  Islamic finance always liked to invest where we 
help in the community.  Islamic finance we invest where there is equality on sharing the 
profits and sharing the loss as well.  For ethical finance they only work on the environment 
for example where we invest but the ethical finance it’s more than that.  It’s not only where 
we invest for something should help in the community and not harm the society but as well 
Islamic finance has extra miles on that which the relationship between the financial situation 
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and the customer which should be on profit and loss sharing which you can see the ethical 
finance they have shared area with Islamic finance in terms of where we should invest our 
money.  This is shared together.  Islamic finance says we have to invest where we help with 
the community, not harm the community.  Where will be environmental friendly, we are not 
investing on arms, weapons, on alcohol or tobacco or child labour, we as Islamic finance we 
cannot invest on that.  Exactly the same and this what we shared with the ethical banking, we 
share the same value, what you call it shared value, we share this value together but Islamic 
finance will go beyond this where we invest but as well how we invest which what is the 
relationship between us as a financial institution and our customer as a depositor which the 
relationship between them will be coming as a profit and loss sharing but the ethical banking, 
you don’t mind if they lend the money by loan and charge interest paid.  For the Islamic 
banking they allow to charge the interest but the Islamic finance no, we can’t allow to have 
the interest as all the money as a commodity itself.  The money, it is like a medium of 
change, it is not the commodity but the Islamic, sorry the ethical banking they don’t have a 
project to make the money as a commodity but the only thing they share with Islamic finance 
is where we invest which it is an ethical investment for something to help in the community 
and help the society as well.  
 
Q: Sure.  You also mention that there’s a lot of stereotyping with Islamic finance, 
there’s a lot of misunderstanding about Islamic finance.  A lot of research has said that 
this is down to the lack of transparency in Islamic finance in terms of, say for example, 
regulation and Sharia supervisory board decision, so on and so forth.  How do you feel 
about this? 
 
I think we have to discuss this issue with more transparency and to be honest, there will have 
to be a transparency with you about discussion.  One of the reasons behind the stereotyping 
about Islamic finance is the Sharia board committee themselves because if you found a 
product devolved by bank A, the financial institution A, as they have approved this product 
from scholars and the same product from another institution, maybe the same Sharia scholars 
or different one, it’s not good to accept this product and reject the project.  For the customer 
now will get confused.  It is the same product, the same structures, the same development.  
Why one bank will not approve it from the Sharia committee scholars and although the bank 
is indebted and this leads off to the regulatory organisation which should bring a credibility 
through the standardisation of the practice and this is one of the issues I always came to talk 
about it, it’s the standardisation.  The same product, the same product is accepted by Sharia 
committee or scholar committee member and approved in one bank should approve as well in 
the other and this will be like a standardised and the problem is as well, some of the products 
in a different region of the world in different ways.  For example South Asia they can 
approve one product but the same product never go to approve in the Middle East because of 
the different madhhab, different scholars accept it so we don’t have a standard which we say 
this is standard should apply for every situation and in the same time as well we have a 
different regulatory group, we have the AAOIFI which is it the auditing and accounting 
organisation for the Islamic financial institution which is based in Bahrain. We have as well 
the IIFM as well, this will be based in Bahrain as well which it is Islamic global, Islamic 
capital and money market and we have as well, another one is called the GCIBFI which as 
well this is something related to Bahrain.  Even in Bahrain itself there is a full regulatory.  
AAOIFI, IFM and GCIBFI and LMC as well.  For all of these they have a different and don’t 
forget as well we have the IRRA which as well in Bahrain and we have the International 
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Financial Board as well as regulatory on Malaysia.  For if you can see now it’s a different 
regulatory organisation and they issue different products as well.  So we have the accounting 
and audit organisations, AAOIFI, we have international Islamic financial markets, we have a 
general council for Islamic banks and the financial institution.  We have the Islamic financial 
services board.  We have an international Islamic rating agency as well, IRRA, so at least 
four or five regulatory and I think this is what makes the people confident as well.  For what 
we need now, we need to make the Islamic finance standard and you have a standardisation 
of a practice.  We need to filter all the products which are all over the world and make one 
organisation umbrella for all of them which is only one organisation.  Like we have 
international financial reporting for the accounting for example, we have the financial 
accounting standard board in America so we have to have this mandatory, not compulsory, 
not actually should be compulsory, we need to have not options, we need to have this 
regulatory and I think as well another issue which come out of this which I think it’s very 
important, it’s qualifications as well.  You can see how organisations in Malaysia, another 
one in London, another one in America, another one in Dubai, all of these you don’t have a 
knowledge of the qualification as well.  You see CIMA, Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants provide as well as qualification with Islamic finance, we see as well a lot of 
association of business practice as well, providing a qualification.  You see the Islamic bank 
and the insurance organisation in London or Dubai as well.  You have in Malaysia as well.  I 
think there’s a stereotype coming as well from the practice itself so I have to be honest with 
you and tell you this is stereotyping, we as Islamic finance practice people whether in 
academia or its practice, we are the reason behind that and make confusion for the normal 
people no details about the Islamic finance because they are not need from us details, just 
only need common practice and will be standard practice.  
 
Q: How do you think the lack of standardisation and lack of a common practice is 
currently affecting the Islamic financial system? 
 
Yes I think the lack of the transparency of the Sharia board affect a lot on the Islamic finance 
and even we still have a different way to provide Islamic banking through the window for 
example or through the microfinance or through the full branch of Islamic finance product.  
Even if you have all of this in place but still as well the lack of the common practice among 
in Egypt and even the Soviet country because you found here in London for example one 
bank in London to provide a product, another bank in Manchester provides another product 
and plus they are contradiction for each other. 
 
Q: In terms of AAOIFI and the IFSB, I mean they are central regulatory bodies that 
are meant to basically bring together Islamic finance under a big umbrella, do you 
think they’re doing their job? 
 
I think they do the job but the problem because it is not mandatory.  Their standard it is 
optional.  It is not something you have to use it but if you make their standards mandatory 
and compulsory you have to do every organisation and this will be the solution for that 
because these institutions are playing a key role in setting up and the standard edition Sharia 
yes.  In financial the account be standard yes but this is not something we really embedded as 
a ‘should-be’ but it is like our options, the bank they can take it or not use it.  
 
Q: Sure.  How do you feel about a lender of last resort in Islamic finance?  So say for 
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example in the UK we have the Bank of England, do you think the Islamic financial 
system would benefit from a lender of last resort? 
 
What do you mean? 
 
Q: Would Islamic finance benefit from a lender of last resort, so in essence a central 
financial bank to aid Islamic financial institutions globally? 
 
I think if you mean about the support you can get it from your government for example.  I 
think they already start and do that, for example in the last global Islamic finance conference 
which the first time it is in London and I think it’s David Cameron the Prime Minster of the 
UK, he announced about government will issue a sukuk for next year around £350 million for 
sukuk is Islamic way and this has boost actually, boost as well the Islamic finance and started 
people thinking about that as well.  I think Islamic finance they have to use this facility 
especially as well we have a lot of companies now, they bankrupt because the level of debts 
which already the mountain on it, so if these companies they start to utilise the Islamic 
finance or the Islamic finance people like Islamic finance institution if they start, think about 
how we can use this climate to provide a real, and this is what I mean, a real Islamic finance 
product, it is not only a copy of the conventional banking and they change the name because 
you have to be honest when you go to structure the financial product and maybe there is 
another issue as well about the profit maximisation because we know now the capitalisations 
and the profit maximisations and the globalisation, all of this too has a bad impact on the 
society.  When we have the profit maximisations target this will be a problem and this is why 
the Islamic finance comes here and said okay, we are not targeting the bottom line and to 
make a profit maximisation.  No, we’re looking for a reasonable profit which is a profit they 
can make plus you can make as well a contribution to the society and this is why the Islamic 
finance has a role to play here in the West and even as well in the East as well because the 
problem is the problem.  We have the social justice problem, we have the lack of resources 
and the banking sector now has started to dry up and there is not enough resources to help the 
small business as well and even the government, when they go to bail out the bank, they try 
to help the bank to stand up and they help the business people and they help the individual as 
well.  If we’re helping the individual plus helping as well the companies because if the 
company it is up and running again, you will create jobs, will create product and we use it but 
Islamic finance has a role to play here, therefore Islamic finance you can come up and say yes 
we have a model here which we can prove it is the right model for the financial crisis which 
we are for the last five years now, from August 2008 until today and will come from bubbles 
to another bubbles from problem to another problem and is not sorted because we are not 
looking for the root causes of the problem but to try to solve the symptoms of the problem, 
looks like if you have a headache, you don’t have to give treatment paracetamol, you have to 
diagnose for it.  What is the cause of the headache?  Maybe it is from the eye, maybe from 
the blood pressure, maybe it’s another reason and after you diagnose the reason behind the 
headache, you can start to write a prescription and remember, when you go to the GP he can 
explain to you one hour to ask you about questions to identify exactly where the root cause is 
of the symptoms you’ve got and within five minutes he can write the prescriptions which we 
sort out so we need to spend more time to think about what is the root causes of the financial 
problem we’ve got and the social justice we got problem of all the problems we got, 
financially or economically we have to spend more time to diagnose the problem, to identify 
where exactly the problem and within this time we can describe it and Islamic finance have 
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this which if the Islamic finance practice academia, they can play a role on that but to give 
straightaway the paracetamol without knowing why the root cause is the problem and this 
what is the problem now when the government and the companies they start to reduce their 
deficit, they would like to reduce the debts.  Why?  Creating more debts and more loans and 
this is the same problem because the main on the principle of the problem is the root cause if 
the problem it’s the relationship to areas the relationship between the finance organisation 
and the customer which as the customers you are a company.  If we can’t get this relationship 
correct, the structure of the product according to this correct structures, we can solve the 
problem within this time but to go around, around, around by talking about we need to push 
the economy by putting more debts and debts and debts and this is a problem and you can 
notice as well for a lot of years, it’s not only the individual you corrupted or the individual 
they bankrupted, no but we have as well the company bankrupted how many companies you 
already out of the business and it’s not only the individual or the company, they are countries 
as well and you notice as well for the last couple of years how many countries you already 
and you have the Greece, it is not far from us and the protocol is not far from us as well, it’s 
all here in front of our eyes and you can see how all of this, the Islamic finance has a role to 
play on the global, the local, international level and the individual for the company and for 
the country as well.  
 
Q: Sure.  In terms of standardisation, do you have any proposals as to what can be done 
to standardise the Islamic financial system? 
 
Yes I have actually a proposal on that which if we can filter what you already have, whether 
it is in the practice.  If we have 350 financial institutions call themselves Islamic finance or 
Islamic banking or asset management or fund manager or pension fund or whatever, or 
insurance company, if we can look on this product, if we have allowance maybe 100 or 200 
products, if you can make those products common products and you can see exactly where 
the product which will suit the people in America, the people in England, the people in 
Indonesia, the people in Egypt, the people in Syria, the people in Iraq, we have the product 
but first we have to look what is existing and we try to eliminate the one it is has not common 
product and they take it out and we can have a filter which is telling us which product will be 
fit because there is the Islamic principle and rules and this will be the standard and will go to 
measure this standard.  If you know if you have a different method, different method like we 
have Hanafi, we have Hamberley, you have Malik, you have different ones, I mean we try to 
make sure those four they agree about as well, about something.  Even if we say the Maliki 
for example he do not agree about bay al’dayn for example when you go to sell the loan 
another scholar say no we can’t do that.  If we cannot agree about the difference, all we can 
work on what we agree upon before we agree about what or we can standards what we agree 
upon and eliminate what we are not agree upon and this is my proposal.  First I don’t like to 
re-invent the wheel and produce a new product which will be a standardised product but I 
would like to filter what we already got and we can take it forward and we can use as well the 
four organisations which I mentioned.  These four organisations you can sit together and see 
exactly what’s your standard on that, what’s your standard on that and you can see the 
standardised of that like the international financial reporting done with a local accounting 
standards because we have a local accounting standard for example in the UK and you have a 
local accounting standard in America as a national standard and now we have international 
accounting standards therefore we have to make sure we have the international standard 
which fits all the four or five organisations. 
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Q: Sure.  Just the final few questions.  In terms of the problems of standardisation, how 
do you think that will affect the governance of Islamic financial institutions? 
 
Yes, we affect by reducing more people taking more money and it makes the product really 
expensive because once you’ve got a standardisation means you can have an organisation not 
an individual scholar and you can apply for this in organisation which is international and all 
the scholars are now all the financial institutions, you can see like one scholar he working as 
a scholar for the Sharia committee for 50 banks therefore he didn’t have time. He was like all 
his time just to transport from bank in Malaysia to bank in Saudi Arabia to another bank in 
India to another bank in Australia or the bank in Canada or the bank in Germany because 
now we start to expand.  All of the Sharia scholars should qualify it and it is something we 
don’t have yet. We don’t have organisations which graduate  or a give a qualification to be 
Sharia scholars.  All what we’ve got now, it’s the people they are educated on Islamic 
institutions like other university and they study this and they don’t have enough knowledge 
about financial transaction in the reality and this was the problem as well for if we can make 
a standardised of the qualification with the Sharia scholars should have, it means there is a 
curriculum and this curriculum it is based on the standardisation as well for all the Sharia for 
only go to teach accounting for example in the student in England, they teach accounting to 
the students in America the same principles, assets, liabilities, equity, expense, revenues so 
we know what is the matching concept means for if you have a concept and principles, all of 
this will be standardised as well.  Therefore if we can go for the standardisation will affect the 
scholars and this is maybe they are not deal with me because it’s a business, it’s a business 
for them because they’re working for different banks but if those people they think outside of 
the box and say we are clear about the future for the Islamic finance and if you come up with 
how many scholars for the Sharia government, for example Sharia committees for all the 350 
institutions for example plus, we’re talking about 1,000.  Less than 1,000.  If you think these 
1,000 pupils they can work under the one institutions which you come up and those people 
are still working as well, they are not going to lose their business but they’re still working but 
to be honest because there is more money involved and this is something like, what they call 
it?  Selfish interest not the interest on Islamic finance as an industry.  
 
Sure.  
 
Sorry, I am very honest.  
 
No it’s fine.  
 
Thank is why I am just telling you what I’m feeling and what I can comment on that.  
 
Q: That’s what I’m looking for, for someone to be honest as opposed to just beat around 
the bush.  You mentioned basically one Sharia scholar sitting on five Islamic boards, do 
you think that’s a good thing or do you think that’s a bad thing?  Do you think that’s a 
problem there? 
 
I think it’s a problem here.  Why?  Because maybe it’s the same scholars if you work in 
Malaysia who will approve a product there and the same scholars go back to Middle East 
which do not approve of the same product will approve as well so looks like a contradiction 
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because the same scholars he works for two banks and the two banks based in different 
region.  In this case it’s no good for the industry and makes confusion as well and the more 
stereotyping for of course we are stereotyping about Islamic finance but if you have all these 
facts, they got approved from one institution and those people they work it under these 
institutions which will give them the standardised.  This will be the good thing for the 
industry but it’s a bad thing for him, for him or her, as an individual because they go to work 
only at one institution but you are not working for the different five banking for which you 
can get more money.  To be honest, this is what I see.  Maybe it’s not all of them the same 
but this is what I see.  I see different scholars, they work at different banks and they charge 
huge money to approve the product to be honest and as well once they charge as well the 
huge money of the product this will cost of the product itself and this will cost the customer 
but if you can have single institutions with a single approval will make the cost for the 
product less in this case.  When they good for the society come back again to the society 
which is helping the society by providing them the right product with the right price and as 
well not a confused product. 
 
Q: Sure.  Just the final two questions.  What do you think are the risks for Islamic 
finance in the future? 
 
What do I think about what sorry? 
 
Q: What do you think are the risks for Islamic finance going into the future? 
 
Risking as an investment, like a business risk or a risk like risking the Islamic finance 
system? 
 
Q: The financial risk.  
 
Yes the financial risk, yes.  I think we should take in the Islamic finance as a conventional 
finance we should take consideration of the risk but what we call it in Islamic finance call it a 
calculated risk.  You have to take consideration of the risk because you still have a risk when 
you have a partnership with your customer, if you open a business and you still have a risk 
for losing your money.  With them you have to be careful with who you go to give the money 
to and very important as well, you had to do what is called a risk assessment.  Risk 
assessment of their capability to run the business and the risk assessment that they have the 
ability to pay that or to pay the return when the business is up and running and they make a 
profit because the Islamic finance it is helping, not helping the failure but you should 
recognise the successor and give the incentives for them to start up another business but to be 
honest the conventional banking, they reward the failure and it gives them a lot of money 
they don’t deserve but the Islamic finance we have to as well be careful where we go to get 
and who will be partner with, whether they got suitability, they got qualification, they got the 
way to run the business efficiently and the effectiveness and profitable as well but when I say 
profitable, not a maximum profit but will be the reasonable profit and profit which does not 
harm the community which always I say nothing wrong if you can do good but at the same 
time you do well.  Doing good while you’re doing well. 
 
Q: Final question, where do you see Islamic finance in about five or ten years? 
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To be honest if we didn’t start from now to identify what is the problem with Islamic finance 
we go to stay as it is in five years but if we start to identify where our problem within the 
people in the Islamic finance, not the outsider and try to say where the standardisation, where 
is the development, where is the qualification, where is the education, where all this if you 
have got the solution for all of this because what I can see, the problem now with the Islamic 
finance it’s standardisation.  It’s Sharia scholars’ qualification and the third one it is 
development of the product which the scholars research and development.  We have a lack of 
that.  We just only copy what is the conventional banking and started to sell it as we change 
only the name and the fourth element it’s human resources which I call it human capital so if 
we know where we can do in these four areas and this lack of the problem, we will tell in the 
same way, like exactly five years ago we have the financial crisis and we’re still in the 
financial crisis and we will go to stay in the financial crisis.  Why?  Because we didn’t start 
where is the problem and what is the plan to solve this problem.  If you can say Islamic 
finance will grow, it will grow only if we can identify this problem and start to put a solution 
as action plan for the future.  If you don’t do that I think we will be just only a bubble like the 
normal financial problem and bubbles  and also we said Islamic finance grew by 15%.  Yes 
but it’s not real Islamic finance, it’s just only a bubble and it might have again a problem and 
we saw the problem in Dubai and the United Arab Emirates as well when they have the 
collapse of the properties and you have a problem as well with the debts. 
 
END 
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Academic 2 
 
Q: How do you think conventional financial systems view Islamic finance? 
 
I think it depends in part what you mean by conventional so I think in the UK context 
certainly the last Labour government were very interested in Islamic finance because it ticked 
various boxes about social inclusion.  The former Labour government were very interested in 
the social inclusion of Muslims so the idea that people weren’t getting mortgages because it 
offended their religious faith they saw as a problem.  They also saw a very clear economic 
agenda with it which is about positioning, the city of London as being always at the cutting of 
what is going on in financial markets, be it Islamic finance or carbon markets or whatever it 
is so I think they saw, yeah I think it in part depends what sort of flavour of government you 
have in place.  With the new coalition government I would say there’s less.  Islamic finance 
is a harder sell or there’s still a very clear economic rationale for it in its various 
constituencies the city of London are interested in but I think the whole sort of social agenda 
has sort of fallen, well is less significant than it used to be and there’s lots of, you know 
there’s lots of popular media about, you know post 9/11, you know about the dangers of 
Islam and precious civilisations and all this and a lot of sort of cynicism I think about it, so it 
varies, I think it’s very difficult to talk across the piece about how conventional finance views 
the Islamic finance and again there’s so many different variants of Islamic finance.  If you 
look at the differences between the Malaysian version which is much more liberal than the 
Gulf version, you know it’s not one sort of homogeneous entity that you’re talking about or 
trying to sort of generalise about. 
 
Q: Sure.  I mean in terms of that social inclusion facet of Islamic finance, I mean it gets 
very much pigeon holed with ethical financing, do you think they’re very similar in 
nature in that respect? 
 
Well certainly the way that Islamic finance has been trying to position itself, again I mean I 
talk primarily from looking at a UK context yet they certainly, I mean people like the Islamic 
Bank of Britain have looked to market themselves as an ethical bank and whether they, and 
they’ve said, you know, you can come in here and get an account and people who would 
normally use like the Co-op Bank, you know, can come here or people who want a more 
ethical version of finance, so they very much position themselves as an ethical entity and not 
a religious entity but yeah, I mean you look at some of the principles, things like profit and 
loss sharing and they sound, you know they sound very nice, they sound very sensible about, 
you know, keeping the sort of financial economy and the productive economy closely 
tethered together.  It all sounds very good and they are very clear about whey they don’t like 
interest and why they deem it as exploitative and unfair and, you know, fundamentally 
asymmetrical so I would see, yeah I would see very close links between at least the principles 
and not necessarily the practice.  
 
Q: Sure.  In terms of the social inclusion in terms of ethical financing, do you think like 
that’s the main selling point behind Islamic banking and financing in terms of being a 
more social solution to finance? 
 
I mean I think there is certainly a political space at the moment for thinking about alternatives 
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to business as usual but that’s talking all sorts of forms so that, you know, it could be crowd 
funding, it could be, there’s all sorts of new sub-prime lenders moving in, there’s you know 
credit unions of Islamic finance, there’s all sorts of institutions.  I think the real test is 
probably for all of these things is going to be economic so I think the economic interest in 
Islamic finance and, you know, getting London a space where it can secure lots of fee income 
by looking after all that excess liquidity in the Gulf States and things is probably going to be 
more important in what drives it and the government’s interest in it than any kind of social 
inclusion agenda.  I mean there’s lots of talk about alternatives to mainstream banks, about 
making our big banks smaller and more socially responsible but you know actually 
remarkably little has changed in my opinion since the crisis of 2008 and the banks are 
extremely well organised to prevent any kind of major change.  So I think if Islamic finance 
is going to do well, it will do well because it’s a vehicle for getting access to money from 
parts of the world that have got more money than the UK.  I think it will probably be the 
economic agenda that drives it.  
 
Q: Sure.  I mean being socially responsible plays a big part in the whole scheme of like 
conventional corporate governance.  One of the main issues with corporate governance 
and Islamic finance would be the transparency of the Islamic financial system.  What do 
you think about that? 
 
Well I mean they’re famously opaque, I mean in terms of ... one of the interesting things, we 
had this project with a guy called Michael Samers who is at the University of Kentucky and 
we were looking at the role out of Islamic finance in the US and UK and one thing that 
becomes clear very quickly is the reliance on this very, very narrow base of Sharia scholars 
and you would talk to people about where those scholars come from and what qualifications 
you have to have and it’s very much a taboo subject and it’s not about educational 
qualifications or there aren’t any transparent criteria about, you know, what you have to do to 
be a Sharia scholar, it’s shrouded in mystery and that’s part of the whole sort of cache of 
getting one of these positions, it’s about religious authority, it’s not about, you know, 
education per se or experience, so it’s famously opaque how certainly this tier of Sharia 
scholars, where they come from and how they’re formed and that’s been a huge issue because 
the industry has grown, there’s been a huge growing shortage of these scholars.  A lot of 
them are guys in their 50s, 60s or 70s who now sit on 50 or so Sharia boards and there’s not 
enough of them, they’re now very expensive.  There’s delays in getting things approved and 
sanctioned because they’re so over-worked.  So the question of where this new generation of 
scholars are coming from and whether you can increase the supply of them is a huge issue 
and it’s a very difficult issue for people, certainly I think Muslims to talk about.  When we 
talked to people about the FDIC they would just say how they do that, you know it’s not our 
problem it’s theirs and they had absolutely no idea how about that sort of layer of government 
and as long as it didn’t sort of interfere with, you know whether those are reasonable people 
to be running a bank then it was, you know as long as it was outside the boundaries of what 
they had to deal with, they thought it’s not their problem but yeah I think the whole 
transparency thing is a problem but I would say it’s also a problem for the whole, yeah what 
has corporate social responsibility done for transparency of Barclays or HSBC or Lloyds I 
mean so I think they have problems with transparency in maybe different ways.  
 
Q: This issue of Sharia supervisory boards and Sharia scholars is quite a pertinent issue 
within the literature, I mean how do you feel about the notion that Sharia scholars are 
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headhunted or, you know, basically selected for leniency in terms of the interpretation 
of Sharia law? 
 
Well I mean people in the industry say it’s absolutely crucial.  I have a PhD student at the 
moment who, he’s a Nigerian man, you know Muslim and said yeah, you know, people 
follow different scholars and people from you know a certain demographic, from the Gulf or 
particularly a part of Islam will follow certain people and not others and it’s absolutely 
crucial they are what, you know, and it is the word of the Sharia scholar and not the property 
of the mortgage that is crucial and people like Bill Maurer who’s done a lot of work on 
Mortgage market in the US has pretty much found the same thing but recruiting the right 
scholars is absolutely, if you want to have any credibility in these markets then you have to 
have your scholars lined up and also you need your local Imams to be saying yes this is halal, 
it’s reasonable, it’s okay and if your local Imam is saying no, no, no this is all smoke and 
mirrors, you know it’s invested under another name then people are not going to go for it so 
the role of the scholar, yeah I mean I know HSBC were very, very careful in recruiting who 
they did but yes you have to know who your demographic you’re targeting is and which 
scholars they will listen to. 
 
Q: Do you think there’s also a lack of transparency when it comes to legal and 
regulatory standards in Islamic finance? 
 
Well I mean there are, I mean there’s things like IFSB and AAOIFI, I mean they now are 
trying to sort of harmonise things, I mean they’re doing the equivalent of Bal and they’re 
doing the equivalent of sort of Islamic accounting standards so, but yeah I mean there’s 
always going to be an extra layer in there of adherence to religious authority which, you 
know for people who are not of that persuasion or you know we’ll always see a strange extra 
layer of accountability but yeah I mean there’s been issues with regulatory harmonisation but 
again that is AAOIFI and IFSB are trying to do things about that then there’s also, you know 
when we talked to people in London about that they said oh yes, you know, we always like to 
talk about the need for more harmonisation but you must remember how many lawyers are 
making an awful lot of money out of the fact that there isn’t this harmonisation and that, you 
know lack of overlap of harmony between different sets of regulations creates a lot of work 
which is very good for all sorts of people involved in financial services so, you know, making 
Islamic finance work in the UK regulatory context it creates jobs, I mean it creates work for 
people which you said, you know, so people might complain about the lack of harmonisation 
but actually it’s a good thing for the people who have to work about, you know, being 
consultants at IBB and telling them what they have to do to get a licence to bank in the UK, 
etc.  
 
Q: What do you think can be done to kind of improve the level of transparency, because 
it’s very opaque at the moment, it’s very much ... do you think it needs improving or do 
you think that the level of transparency is kind of like the way it will be in the future? 
 
I think, I mean the signs are that there’s more and more, certainly through things like AAOIFI 
and IFSB, that they are doing things that in many ways mimic, you know, super national 
regulations that affect non-Islamic banks and indeed one of the critiques of the Islamic banks 
is that the more mainstreamed they look then the harder it is for them to assert their 
difference from mainstream finance, so on the one hand they need to sort of harmonise and 
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become more transparent and then if they do that it makes them look more like the kind of 
institutions that they’re supposed to represent and an alternative to so they’re sort of damned 
if they do and damned if they don’t so I think, yeah I think AAOIFI and IFSB will oversee 
more harmonisation but I’m not sure that that lack of transparency per se is going to be, well 
you know Islamic finance is still growing very rapidly so I’m not sure it’s going to be a huge 
stumbling block in the next little while.  
 
Q: Sure.  Onto this notion of harmonisation, I mean you kind of indicate that 
harmonisation in the UK or the lack of harmonisation in the UK is kind of a good thing 
because it creates more jobs but if we were to look at it from an international context, 
say for example throughout the Islamic financial hubs, Malaysia, the Gulf, the UK, do 
you think that lack of harmonisation is a problem in that respect? 
 
It’s difficult to say.  I mean I think it depends in part, you know, who wants to use Islamic 
finance and for what ends so I think if you’re doing, you know if you’ve a sovereign wealth 
fund or if you were doing international trade deals then yes the lack of harmonisation or if 
you’re a government looking to issue a sukuk or something, that lack of harmonisation might 
be something that would worry you.  If you’re a middle class Muslim in the north of England 
with an Islamic mortgage in the UK then you know I think as long as you’ve decided it’s 
halal and that it’s Islamic then I think it’s probably irrelevant to you.  So I think it depends on 
which sorts of markets we’re talking about and who is using these products.  
 
Q: Sure.  If we were to look at it from let’s say a multinational prospective or even a 
sovereign perspective in terms of trying to develop the Islamic financial system so we’re 
looking at the macros perspective of Islamic finance, I mean would the lack of 
uniformity be an issue for Islamic finance? 
 
Well I think yes, I mean I suppose at that level it would be but I think also there’s a lot of, 
you know there’s a lot of stuff being written in the sort of the IPE literature about the need for 
a more plural and polycentric international financial system so you know one of the things 
that happened out of the 2008 crisis is people look to the Canadian banks and the Australian 
banks and said why weren’t they, you know why haven’t they suffered as badly because they 
weren’t playing in the same derivatives markets as UK and US banks and they weren’t 
allowed to join the dance and had come out looking, you know, relative so there is, I think we 
need to be careful about not representing you know interest base finance again as this sort of 
transparent homogeneous entity that is harmonised because there clearly are a difference 
between you know the German banks and the UK banks and some economies are much more 
financialised than others so I think, you know, I think there is plurality in the international 
financial system and the Canadian banks have been working in different ways to British 
banks, even though they would get called, you know, HSBC or whatever, so I think the fact 
that there are these different models of Islamic finance, I think the interesting thing is I think 
that it’s still growing and how it positions itself as an alternative and then there’s this, yeah 
there’s this huge internal debate about what kind of alternative and is it, you know, capitalism 
with an Islamic face or is it some kind of alternative and there is no agreement on that within 
Islamic financial circles so you know I think it’s going to take a long time and a lot of people 
wouldn’t want sort of harmonisations or want model.  I think part of its, the lure is it says that 
we’re different to this and that there’s difference variants of it and in the same way that, you 
know, the co-ops now are getting more attention in Germany and that there’s more interest 
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again in regional banking and, you know, socially responsible banking, there’s all sorts of 
different variants, whatever kind of flavour of finance we’re talking about that people are 
interested in so it’s difficult to sort of say at that macro level really. 
 
Sure.  I mean one of the few criticisms in terms of you make a very salient point in a 
sense that no financial system is actually completely similar to another financial system.  
I mean in terms of one of the criticisms would be the underlying regulatory framework.  
Say for example in conventional finance we have the Basel Accord dictating capital 
adequacy levels.  Do you think something like that would be needed in Islamic finance, 
say for example just a fundamental framework to kind of work around by? 
 
Yeah my understanding is that people like IFSB are basically starting to do that thing, I mean 
they are basically looking at capital adequacy issues and trying to get people to sign up to say 
right this is, you know we’re all going to have, you know, reserve ratios and X and things like 
that so I think they are trying to do that and they very clearly looked at Bal as a model that 
they can use in the Islamic world which again some people see as a good thing and other 
people say well, you know, if you’re going to start doing what Bal is doing then why don’t 
we just call ourselves regular banks yeah so it’s very difficult for them if any kind of Islamic 
institution look to form sets of standards, you know, whose standards, where do the standards 
come from if they’re just going to ape the standards of Bal then some people will say that’s a 
great idea, it makes it much more clearer, it’s easier to harmonise and others will say well 
what are you doing, you know, why do you want to harmonise with them so this is just sort of 
constant jostling about, you know, how they position themselves as being different to 
conventional finance but how they also, yeah, position themselves as being, you know, safe 
and responsible and being transparent and having reasonable capital reserves if they get into 
difficulty.  But I think IFSB have certainly looked at Bal as their model for how they come up 
with a set of capital adequacy rules for Islamic banks. 
   
Q: Sure.  What do you think about AAOIFI and the IFSB, do you think they’re doing 
their job?  Do you think they’re evolving? 
 
Well I haven’t done any sort of work in particular on AAOIFI.  I mean they are basically, you 
know, sorting out the accounting, I mean they sort of have the accounting standards that a lot 
of the banks are signed up to and they, although a lot of their rules are not binding, they are 
this beacon that when what’s his name made his sukuk ruling, when Ismali made his secret 
ruling that he thought something like most of the Islamic sukuk in circulation had moved 
away from the spirit of Islam, you know, and he was the head of the AAOIFI committee that 
looked at it, I mean they’ve since changed their mind again but there’s been a huge dent in 
the sukuk market globally so they were very, very powerful organisations.  Whether or not, 
you know, they could be doing a better job or not, I don’t really, I don’t have a sort of strong 
sense of that.  
 
Q: Sure.  I mean in terms of a central regulatory body there’ve been calls for, say for 
example, an Islamic central bank in order to like, you know, basically regulate the 
market and provide a lender of last resort type role.  What are your thoughts on that? 
 
I think, well it would make, I mean a key element of any banking system is yeah the notion of 
this sort of hierarchy and where the lender of the last resort is so I think, again it depends on 
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which context they’re working in so the Islamic bank of Britain to get a licence to bank in the 
UK has got to meet, you know, it’s got to meet, play by the same rules as every other British 
bank which also then gives it a licence to, if it wants to, go to the Bank of England as lender 
of last resort if they’re short of money yeah so they do the same things if they’re short of 
money as if, you know, Barclays got into trouble so yeah there’s always an issue.  I mean one 
of my interests in this is that I’m a geographer so these things, these institutions I’ve always 
embedded in particular context which have a whole set of rules and regulations which is 
different in the US than it is in the UK or in Germany or in Dubai or in Malaysia, yeah so 
there’s always local rules about capital adequacy and who the lender of the last report is and 
then the question is whether you build these, you know, either national versions of a, you 
know, whether you’d like go in Malaysia route and have dual track banking and you have, 
you know, an Islamic lender of the last resort or whether you have some sort of super national 
agency but I think it’s very difficult to sort of think about Islamic central banks I suppose in 
the sort of abstract without thinking about which territories and legal contexts they’re actually 
going to be plot down in and how they again, they’ve always got this issue of adapting to 
what rules are already in place about how banks function and what they do if they get into 
difficulties so again it’s not like you’re sort of designing a system from scratch, you are 
always going into the context where there are other institutions that deal with, okay, you 
know, financial institutions have got into difficulty, what happens now so for Islamic Bank of 
Britain it’s the Bank of England, that is their first port of call and then it’s, you know, 
presumably whatever funding streams they may have from the Gulf if they need to raise new 
capital beyond that, so there’s always going to be a particular context institutions have to be 
embedded in which will determine how they, you know what the lender of the last resort is 
and what it can be, if that makes any sense? 
 
Q: Sure.  I mean one of the main idiosyncrasies about Islamic finance would be the fact 
that it’s trying to balance kind of like a social religious corporate governance objective, 
you know, motion with that of a financial system that’s meant to make money, I mean 
in terms of corporate governance, what do you think are the main issues that could 
plague Islamic finance?  
 
Well I think it is probably the tension of deciding what they’re there for so there’s this real 
tension between, you know, there’s loads of liquidity in the Gulf.  Is it about big, I mean one 
of the criticisms of the industry is that it’s not done a lot of profit and loss sharing, it’s done 
an awful lot of murabaha deals which look, walk and talk like interest and that it’s been the 
rich clients in the Middle East who want to come and, you know, buy up commercial 
property in London.  He’s not done a lot to help, you know, the poorest of the poor, you 
know he’s not done a lot to help, you know, working class and middle class Muslims buy 
their own homes or to help, you know, small entrepreneurs start businesses in the east end of 
London yeah so one of the critiques is that it’s been about, you know, it’s used murabaha 
deals that most resemble interest based finance and it’s helped large property developers and 
rich people rather than getting involved in retail markets and I think that’s a crucial issue for 
how it rolls forward and people in the industry would say well don’t judge us too quickly, the 
industry is still very young, you know, we’re getting more involved in smaller loans and 
micro finance but things like profit and loss sharing which goes to the heart of the morality of 
Islamic finance, you know it’s very hard to price those contracts so there has been this sort of 
default to making money the easiest way and the quickest way which is murabaha so I think 
there is this real struggle for the sort of soul of Islamic finance and whether it is just another 
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niche and another way of making money very quickly or whether it is going to be different 
and try and do something else.  
 
Q: Do you think this notion of like mimicking or even following conventional finance, 
you know, do you think that’s hurting the Islamic financial system? 
 
Well again I mean it depends who you ask so I think for people who like to think that Islamic 
finance is something different, they just say well, you know, the industry has sold its soul, 
yeah if it’s now got a Dow Jones Islamic index then you know we might as well pack up and 
leave yeah, we’re just becoming part of the mainstream and we’ve lost our sense of 
difference and there’s others who say, look we have to be more practical, we need a Dow 
Jones Islamic index, we need to be in the city of London, we need a division in HSBC 
because that’s part of making Islamic finance accessible for people in the UK or the US or 
whatever so there is a battle between the sort of more religiously inflected people who are 
interested in the morality of Islamic finance versus I think more of the sort of banking 
mentality that says look we need products, we need to be practical and yes we need to make 
money and one of the attractions of capitalism is that in various parts of the world at various 
times it has produced lots of economic growth and that’s what we need in places like, you 
know, the Gulf and if we can harness capitalism for Islamic ends through things like Islamic 
finance then, you know, in places like Malaysia it’s been pushed as a way of generating 
economic growth and it’s the economic sense of it that has won through and scholars there 
have been told to not be constrained by Sharia law but explore the boundaries of Sharia to be 
innovative and to make things happen in the name of economic growth so I think it depends 
which constituency you talk to.  Some would already say Islamic finance has sold out, you 
can forget it, others who would say no it’s been very pragmatic and practical and if it’s going 
to grow and become an alternative, it has to get embedded in places like London and you 
know wherever so again I think there’s a real tension in the industry about whether it’s a 
good thing or a bad thing, the mimicking and you can find people who will tell you both sides 
of that argument. 
 
Q: You kind of mention innovation being very important to the Islamic financial system 
in terms of growth and development, I mean how do you, are these constraints in terms 
of uniformity and transparency, are they placing increasing constraints on the level of 
innovation or would that be, you know, just another day at the office really in terms of 
financial innovation? 
 
I think, I mean there are places like Malaysia, I mean initially when Malaysia came up with 
sukuk, you know the Gulf states refused to recognise them but now you know that’s moved 
so I think my sense is that if the industry is making money then I think that will drive 
innovation and there’s now talk about, you know, Islamic derivatives which again will make 
some people want to just turn off the light and go home, other people are saying this is great, 
you know if we can now start having derivatives in Islamic finance then we can really start 
making some money so I think you know the fact that Islamic finance is popping up all over 
the west and it’s having to make itself a home in all sorts of legal and regulatory 
environments means that it’s always innovating and sort of compromising and fudging and 
making itself fit in so many environments, I think it’s very good at innovating and making do 
and doing those sorts of things so I don’t sort of see the innovation as a big problem.  
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Sure.  Do you feel there’s a need for more innovation in terms of product structures and 
governance standards? 
 
Well yeah I mean I think, I mean one of the things I’ve been interested in is the retail markets 
which are tiny now in the UK and there’s a very, very small, there’s very little action going 
on in things like mortgage markets and if you’re going to talk about or if they’re going to talk 
about the social inclusion agendas then you know they have to somehow convince three 
million Muslims in the UK that Islamic finance has got something to do with them and isn’t 
just about big sovereign wealth funds and rich investors from the gulf so I think products that 
make sense or that, you know I once did a project in, I used to work at the University of 
Birmingham before I was here and I had a colleague who was working in ethnic minority sort 
of entrepreneurship and he said that, you know, Somali entrepreneurs who were very devout 
Muslims in Birmingham and they would have their businesses go to the wall rather than go 
and get a loan from an interest based bank so for them, you know, had there been some sort 
of halal funds that supported small businesses then, you know and he was making a series of 
policy recommendations about these funding gaps of small businesses, I think products, yes a 
different demographic and a lower income Muslim I think are very much needed if Islamic 
finance is going to become anything other than for the very rich.  I would say the key area 
where they need to do more to innovate and also to try and persuade people that they are 
interested in them. 
 
Q: So develop more as a microfinance institution or a microfinancial system providing 
finance needs to small/medium enterprises? 
 
Yeah and also just things like mortgage funds, so not even microcredit but just loans for 
businesses, you know loans under £1 million.  There’d be people in the clothing industry in 
Bradford who might think about going and getting halal loans rather than loans from interest 
based banks but those products would have to be competitively priced and they would have 
to be, you know, have the endorsement of scholars that were credible in those constituencies 
but at the moment there just aren’t those sort of things.  I think the US has a more developed 
market in terms of like business lending that is halal but it’s certainly not happening in the 
UK at the moment.  
 
Q: One of the recent developments in Islamic finance in terms of the academic literature 
would be the fact that, if we look at it from a prospective of the users of Islamic finance 
there is not much legal protection or not much legal standards protecting them from 
should anything happen.  What are your thoughts on this? 
 
I’m probably not the person to ask.  My understanding with certainly like the retail end of it 
is that you know Islamic Bank of Britain are regulated like any other UK bank so one of the 
sticking points when they first wanted to get their licence was that they had to, to get their 
licence, they had to like guarantee your deposit, you know 100% if I put my salary cheque 
every month in the Islamic Bank of Britain and they go bust next month then they can’t, you 
know I have to get that money but yeah I’m guaranteed 100% to get that money back and of 
course the issue of IBB was well, you know, nominally they would be profit and loss sharing 
so, you know, if they make a loss they can’t guarantee and if they make a profit then you get 
something that doesn’t get called interest but looks like interest and one of the things they had 
to do was persuade what was then the Financial Services Agency that they had to take an 
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undertaking that if necessary they would borrow money from the Bank of England which the 
Bank of England couldn’t guarantee would be Sharia compliant that they would use to make 
good any money they lost on current accounts and they had to do that to get a licence but you 
know there was no category of like deposits in Islamic Finance, it doesn’t exist so that was 
one of the biggest sticking points is that how do you guarantee that customers will not lose 
money in those kinds of products.  Now I don’t know how it works in, if you’re talking more 
about large corporate clients who are trading in different products but I know there’s like a 
deposit guarantee now that works as IBB but is the same as Barclays or Lloyds or whatever 
so in that sense consumers have exactly the same protection as they would have in 
mainstream retail banking and that had to be done for them to get like, it would not be 
possible for them to function here without that or to have that.  They couldn’t have a banking 
licence without it.  But yeah how it works for Islamic whatever, private equity firms or 
whatever, I couldn’t tell you. 
 
Q: Sure.  Just a final few questions.  In terms of Islamic finance going forward, what do 
you think are the main risks involved with the whole financial system?  Do you think 
there are any areas that need improving?  Do you think there are any areas that are 
improving drastically or is everything okay at the moment? 
 
I think the key thing is that lots of Muslim consumers don’t know what Islamic finance is and 
they’re very cynical about it and they say well how can I get a mortgage, you know how does 
that not involve interest and they see it as using smoke and mirrors to try and ... I think the 
whole issue about what is Islamic and people seeing that that is authentic, however they 
define that, is absolutely crucial to the credibility of the industry and you know so lots of 
people were very excited here about Islamic Bank of Britain because it was a completely 
Islamic Bank whereas people have looked at HSBC and the Amana division within it and 
they’d say well how on earth can they really ring fence the Amana division, how do we know 
that that’s really, you know it’s not an Islamic enterprise, you know it’s a profit centre within 
an interest based bank so people were often uneasy about that, even though it gave much 
more exposure to the market so I think there’s a lot of cynicism out there about Islamic 
finance because lots of Muslims don’t believe in it and I think the key danger for it is just 
being seen as another sort of fashion or fad that’s about making some rich Muslims some 
money.  So I think that’s the key thing about how they persuade people it is an alternative and 
that’s a huge problem for, you know, whether you’re the Co-op Bank or whether you’re a 
Credit Union or whether you’re a Pay Day lender or whether you’re an Islamic Bank, you’ve 
got this huge problem of how do you persuade people that you’re alternative because you 
have to sustain yourself by making money and you’ve got to make a sufficient amount of 
money to stay in the business and to grow and to keep investing in your IT systems and to be 
easy to use and all these sorts of things so that’s a very, very difficult tension. 
 
I mean in the current economic climate, what do you think is the scope for growth for 
Islamic finance? 
 
Well part of me would like, I mean I’m fairly cynical I suppose about the way it’s been 
practised in the UK, I mean I would like to see, I would like to believe in Islamic finance, I 
would like to think there are institutions out there that are genuinely more interested in 
supporting economic growth and in, you know not just making, not just getting rich quick but 
are interested in supporting entrepreneurs and doing things and working in tandem with the 
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product and economy.  I think it’s a very nice set of ideas so I would like in that sense to see 
some institutions be able to do that, whether they’re called Islamic Banks or whether they’re 
called government industry banks that they’re now setting up to fund small businesses and I 
think there is a huge need, there’s a huge hole for institutions that can come in to these sorts 
of places and provide credit at reasonable cost to people who need it and I think Islamic 
financiers are one group who could be in there but I think they need to develop their product 
base to deal more in those markets and yes those markets are very difficult and they’re hard 
on the price and they make less money and in all sorts of ways they’re less attractive in terms 
of their economic potential but they are hugely important in terms of supporting economic 
growth.  Part of me would like to see it do well and I think there is certainly a niche for 
different kinds of institutions that sell themselves as something different. 
 
Q: Do you think Islamic finance will ever be viewed as a viable alternative to 
mainstream finance or do you think that it will always be a niche product in terms of 
what it offers? 
 
I think in the foreseeable future in a UK context it will be a niche product.  I mean there’s lots 
of different alternative institutions but they’re all small and again if they stop being small and 
start becoming big then people start saying well, you know people it then becomes this 
problem for them although they seem to have been mainstreamed or co-opted but yeah I think 
Islamic finance and again the levels of sort of Islamophobia in the UK, Islamic finance is 
going to be a niche product I think for the foreseeable future. 
 
Q: Do you think the whole notion of Islamophobia could ever be eradicated in terms of 
developing the financial system or marketing the financial system? 
 
Well I think, I mean I think there’s lots of professional people in the city of London who are 
very happy with Islamic finance while they’re making money for it.  I think in terms of sort 
of the development in more consumer markets, I think the right wing press would just have a 
field day with it and I remember when I was in Australia looking at Islamic finance, there 
was all this stuff in the press about it’s outrageous, Islamic Banks here offering immigrants 
loans with no interest and us poor Australians, we have to pay interest, it’s not fair, you know 
it’s like immigrants getting free houses and all this and then you point out well actually 
they’re paying all sorts of other things for these loans.  It’s not called interest but I think if the 
Daily Mail started getting hold of Islamic, you know if Islamic finance started looking too 
good you can be sure the Daily Mail or somebody would get hold of it and be talking about 
how it’s a threat to British sovereignty or something crazy like that but at the moment it’s too 
small to worry about on that score but I think certainly since 9/11 and I think with the change 
of government there is more Islamophobia and less interest certainly in the arguments about 
social inclusion of Muslims and the debate moved much more to immigration and why don’t 
we deport more folk and all this kind of stuff rather than understanding how things work in 
the east end of London or what possibilities, what sort of progressive politics could be built 
around these kinds of alternative financial services.  
 
END 
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Academic 3 and 4 
 
Q: How do you think conventional financial systems or conventional financial 
participants view Islamic finance? 
 
Aca 3: I think they are, I just want to say sceptical but I don’t think it’s so much sceptical as 
an inability to understand how it differs so it’s a lack of understanding of the principles and a 
perception that it’s essentially a religious practice and if it’s seen on that basis, they probably 
feel that it is not accessible to non-Muslim users, so the image is of a banking system based 
on religion, fairly closed in terms of its target audience and just a general lack of 
understanding as to what it means.  I mean if you say to somebody, what do you think of the 
basic principles of Islamic finance then I’d say 95% wouldn’t have a clue.  The other 5% 
would say something about the prohibition on payment or receipt of interest, but that’s about 
it.  
 
Aca 4: I’m less pessimistic than Simon.  Having gone now twice to Islamic conferences, what 
I see is actually quite the opposite.  From the point of view of Western banks, I see this as a 
market niche to be exploited.  The reason being is that when they see how banks in Islamic 
countries like Pakistan operate, it actually doesn’t look that different from what they do.  It’s 
just a marketing issue and this was something that came through time and time again at this 
conference.  Is Islamic banking the way it’s practised now truly a theological and a religious 
issue or is it simply a way of branding?  You know it’s a bit like the Co-op branding 
themselves as ethical banks that if you say you’re an Islamic bank you’re branding yourself 
and you’re not really doing anything that’s supposedly/Islamic according to Islamic scholars.  
I’m not an Islamic scholar.  And what was interesting about this was that there was some 
econometric results that looked at the segmentation of the market.  In a country like Pakistan 
it turned out that, I mean something like 80% of deposits are still held in non-Islamic 
accounts and the elasticity of substitution between them, because the Islamic counts as profit 
sharing and in the non-Islamic it’s interest, that the elasticity of substitution based on exposed 
yields is very, very high so that means Islamic people are willing to substitute from one 
account to the other for their small change in interest rate, you know, so what was driving 
them is the profit motive again and that made me think about this, you know, that if that’s 
true for Islamic people in Islamic countries, that could be equally true for Islamic people in 
non-Islamic countries, so HSBC will be able to offer accounts or mortgages, will be able to 
offer accounts that will sit alongside conventional ones and people can choose these.  These 
then become much more of a branding issue, a marketing. 
 
Aca 3: As opposed to the banks themselves because you have Islamic windows, so it’s that 
rather than the niche so, yeah in terms of knowledge amounts, non-Islamic banks, it’s very 
high.  You know the conferences I’ve attended it’s been non-Islamic bankers, they know 
about the basic funding techniques and so on but you know I’m talking about the layman I 
guess. 
 
Aca 4: The layman, okay. 
 
Q: I mean you bring up a pretty interesting point in a sense that Islamic banking was 
kind of like, you know, random in the same way as ethical financing was as a mode, not 
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as a mode of investment, I mean do you think Islamic finance gets that a lot in a sense 
that it is pigeon holed with ethical banking finance as in it’s a form of screening your 
investment spectrum? 
 
Aca 3: Definitely. 
 
Aca 4: I find that’s the same.  Ethical banking, Islamic banking, at this conference many of 
the bankers themselves were offering Islamic banking as a counter to the greed of Western 
banking following the 2008/2009 crisis.  They saw themselves as, this is the new, this is the 
opportunity.  Here we’ve been branding ourselves as ethical banks, as religious, that’s what’s 
attractive to the West.  Not that we’re Islamic but we’re ethical.  You know you don’t invest 
in tobacco product stuff or alcohol stuff and you can push the range out, you know, 
armaments, the lot and that’s, I can see that that’s very attractive but my reply to them was 
that, you know, I was a discussant and a key note lecturer, the same ... if you think a banking 
system that’s been going around since the Medicis is not going to reinvent itself and survive, 
you’re wrong, you know, I mean they can suddenly turn round and be we’re ethical too, and 
they can remarket themselves and they will survive so Islamic banking has to offer something 
more than that and as far as I can see, because of their different requirements of equity 
capital, you know, within, I don’t know why that is but that seems to be the case, they are less 
profitable, you know, and they’re less efficient which you can explain these because of their 
different internal religious requirements, you know, for them but, you know their customers 
who are the Islamic population aren’t weathered to Islamic banks, they don’t do Islamic 
banks because they’re Islamic.  You know they do Islamic, a lot of them do Islamic banks 
because it actually gets them a higher yield or something like that, you know.  
 
Q: Okay, that’s a pretty interesting point because a lot of the research gets pushed to 
the fact that Islamic banking or participants of Islamic banking participate in the 
financial system because it basically advocates their religious beliefs but I mean that’s 
a ... 
 
Aca 3: I’m a member of Islamic banking network on the internet and there was an email that 
was circulated a few months ago from the marketing director, the former marketing director 
of a major Islamic bank here in the UK and he left his post so he was able to say what he 
really thought and he said we have never made a profit, we are unsuccessful because of our 
image.  We assume that if we say it’s an Islamic bank we automatically have entitlement to 
the business from some students, for example, and he said that’s not true.  We’re not offering 
comparable services so the religious principles are important but they’re clearly not enough 
to catch Muslim business as opposed to non-Muslim business and he said we continue to 
make losses and it’s funny because shortly afterwards I was going to London through the 
East End in a taxi and just by chance I passed by the office of this particular bank and there 
was nothing about it which was appealing.  I looked at it and thought yes this is a marketing 
prop to some extent, compared to other banks they didn’t seem to be offering the same sort of 
services and if your marketing is ethical, I think there is a difference between ethical banking 
and religious banking, so we have for example the Co-op advertise themselves as ethical and 
there are other banks that say they are ethical but when you say to the Islamic bank yes of 
course it’s fundamentally an ethical issue but it’s the religious dimension as well so I don’t 
think you can look at it as entirely ethical banking necessarily and as you say, Islamic 
business will look at returns, it’s not just the religious principles which is the sole concern.  
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Aca 4: It always interests me, in an Islamic country where they allow non-Islamic banks to 
survive you know because in Saudi Arabia it’s very difficult to do that but in places like 
Malaysia or Indonesia or Bangladesh which is more than 50% Islamic banks, they still have 
non-Islamic banks.  I asked myself a question, how do the non-Islamic banks survive?  You 
know it’s a Doug North type question of institutions, you know, economic argument which 
say if their people are staunchly Islamic, how come non-Islamic things survive?  It’s a bit like 
saying, you know, in countries where they don’t ban alcohol, Islamic, you know how does 
alcohol survive if we’re all meant to be Islamic and the thing is it’s a question of choice.  
People make these choices and that’s how they survive and they survive, even allowing for 
those who are not Islamic with a big I, you know who might want to, you know, do it because 
they’re offering a service, it’s a comparative advantage, you know, it’s like asking how small 
merchant banks in London or wholesale banks survive in a market of universal banking 
where Deutsche Bank offers you everything.  Okay?  It’s because of specialisation and a 
service, comparative advantage.  Standard old fashioned economics.   
 
Q; Sure.  I mean this whole notion of image actually leads on to our next point in that 
respect which is a transparency of Islamic Bank and finance, I mean transparency from 
the legal perspective, transparency from product perspective, transparency from, for 
example, a Sharia supervisory board perspective, I mean what are your views on 
basically transparency of Islamic banks, do they need to, in terms of legal side of things, 
do they need to be more open with their rules, do they need to be more, you know ...? 
 
Aca 3: Well as far as I’m aware, fatwas are not publicly available so you have banks 
developing new products.  The decision making process is opaque.  The religious ruling is 
opaque.  The competence of the Sharia boards themselves is a question mark as to the 
availability of expertise and using Sharia scholars who give you the answer that you want.  
So I think the system, it’s opaque and lacking in expertise and lacking in terms of provision 
of information to the public so if you’re going to develop a consistent or standardised 
product, you have to have standardised rulings and standard understanding and that is lacking 
at the moment. How you’ll overcome that is difficult because it doesn’t seem that the banks 
would not want to have the fatwa made public if it was negative.  If they were trying to 
develop products which failed so I don’t think you’re going to get transparency there either, 
so I think there is an image problem. 
 
Aca 4: It’s complicated isn’t it?  We were talking about the innovation and the creation of 
new products because a lot of the stuff that comes out of the West, so the derivatives of bond 
markets have still got the time value of money somewhere along in this and one of the themes 
I had from one Islamic banking scholar who was based in Oman or Kuwait or something was 
that nothing that involves the time value of money is Sharia compliant.  Well that just cuts 
out just about everything, you know, I mean because a lot of the innovative products you’re 
talking about have got some time value of money in the calculations, it sounded to me like, 
you know, if truly Islamic banks followed this, they’d have a very narrow market and it’s 
obvious that they’re not following it.  So it probably pays for banks to have this opacity, to 
have this differences in Sharia interpretation because if there was one that laid out the law, it 
would probably cut out quite a lot of their market, okay?  I mean so in a way it’s a bit like, I 
mean I don’t know what you think Simon but it seems to me like you can, you know, you can 
buy the right Sharia law if you went to the right person.  
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Aca 3: But then you’ll have inconsistent products, you’ll have products that trade in some 
markets but not in others.  I had an MSc student a couple of years ago and we were looking at 
Islamic finance in shipping and I said well we need to look at hybrids and I’ve been given a 
hybrid financing model by a law firm in London for financing an oil tanker and I looked at 
this complex arrangement and I saw the features of it and I asked the partner where is the 
Islamic part to this and he pointed to one part of the diagram, he said that’s the Islamic part.  
So it was a mix.  So when I mentioned to her that we would look at hybrids she said I’m not 
going to look at hybrids, it’s either Islamic or it isn’t, we don’t recognise hybrids.  So you 
have differences on what is allowed in some markets and what isn’t.  You’ve got the conflict 
between the various schools of interpretation.  If you don’t have harmonisation, you don’t 
have products that have been traded between markets, there’s a lack of liquidity, so keeping 
things opaque and having separate rooms, separate schools and separate interpretation is not 
going to lead to a deep market. 
 
Aca 4: But isn’t it the case Simon that, although the market for individual Islamic products 
might not figure in the Islamic markets, it doesn’t mean to say that the non-Islamic markets 
wouldn’t use these products as part of a general portfolio and therefore, you know, I mean 
there are two ways of looking at the selling of an Islamic product.  You sell it to your Islamic 
constituency and that’s a reasonably high, or you sell it in the capital market, and that’s a 
bigger constituency, okay, and many portfolios would like to have Islamic products in there, 
not because they’re Islamic but because it’s a form of diversification.  
 
Aca 3: But then how are you going to work out the risk?  The problem that working out the 
riskiness and if you have certain religious perspectives on collateralisation and security which 
is not allowed, it’s very difficult for you to look at something and say well what is the 
security on this instrument and what’s the underlying collateral and there are no assurances, 
you can’t take any guarantees. 
 
Aca 4: No you can’t, but then you expect a higher return on it and you expect it.  Remember 
the principle for portfolio diversification is not just the risk but the covariance between that 
and other areas so you could incorporate into a portfolio a high risk, high return instrument 
provided it’s got negative covariance with all the others. 
 
Aca 3: Yeah but how would you understand it?  How would you be able to understand the 
risk? 
 
Q; Do you think it will lead to inefficiencies in the marketplace as well having maybe 
different standards for two types of products that could essentially lead to the same? 
 
Aca 4: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
 
Q: Fair enough.  Kind of going back to the Sharia supervisory boards, I mean you 
mention basically head hunting Sharia supervisors and Sharia scholars, the kind of like, 
do you think that’s ... how do you think that could be alleviated in that respect?  Do you 
think it happens, do you think like banks actually go out there and they look for the 
Sharia scholar that is the most lenient or do you think that, you know, there is some 
sense of integrity in that respect or if there actually is a problem in that in the first 
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instance? 
 
Aca 4: Well the answer is I don’t know.  I’m just talking about incentives.  If there’s an 
incentive, at the margin I expect more of one thing to happen than another and if it came back 
to me and said, you know, banks in Indonesia use this Sharia rules and banks somewhere else 
use something else, my first question is to ask why?  Why aren’t they using the same thing, 
okay?  And my suspicion would be, it’s not all to do with religion unless there are different 
Muslim interpretations of it, and that may well be.  Protestants and Catholics, you know, but 
if it’s not that then it’s got something to do with economic motive.  
 
Aca 3: Buying of scholars is a serious problem.  How you get around that, I think you have to 
have transparency in terms of what they are paid, to whom they’re accountable.  Greater 
transparency on their reports and their reasoning but it seems to me particularly in context of 
Malaysia that the quality of some of the people issuing fatwas is not as good as it could be 
and there is an allegation that they’re in the pockets of the banks and that leads to distrust, not 
just from other banks but also from your stakeholder.  
 
Aca 4: Is that information that you read something recently? 
 
Aca 3: There was a PhD on this very point that I was the internal examiner last year and that 
was the conclusion.  
 
Aca 4: Oh right, interesting. 
 
Aca 3: So it is a big problem. 
 
Aca 4: Right.  
 
Q: I mean, do you think that with more transparency that could be, as you put it Simon, 
that there could be more uniformity just in a sense that if you know what the fatwas are 
about, if you know what products are allowed and what aren’t allowed, that could be 
more uniformity in Islamic financial system? 
 
Aca 3: Eventually it will come, yes. 
 
Aca 4: Yes I think that’s probably true but the speed of convergence will depend really on 
market conditions, I mean the transparency is two ways, not just from the point of view of the 
bank but also from the point of view of the customer.  If it were shown through transparency 
that customers prefer one type of Sharia interpretation to another unless, you know, it’s 
dictated, you know if there are ... I think of this as currency competition, okay?  If there are 
two interpretations of the same product there will be a natural market solution.  If there was 
complete transparency and we knew exactly what were the differences and that would be 
dictated by, you know, what people want to have and I suppose, let’s try and give a heuristic 
equilibrium here.  Suppose there are two instruments, both having different interpretations on 
Islamic banking but there is no opacity.  Everyone knows exactly what the differences are, 
okay?  One of these will be preferred to another, okay?  Suppose the more trades you get in 
one of these instruments, the more liquid that market becomes and the more that market 
grows.  If there is suddenly through transparency, a desire for one particular instrument, more 
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people will use it.  That means it will become more liquid.  As it becomes more liquid it will 
grow, it will drive people away from the other one.  So through a kind of natural selection, 
there will be a convergence to the one that people want but it can only do that through 
transparency.  Opacity will actually limit that, you know, the more opaque you can be, the 
less likely the market’s going to converge. 
 
Q: Sure.  So in essence you’re saying that for the market to kind of grow they need to 
kind of put everything out there in the open, let people choose and from there you grow 
your market on that basis. 
 
Aca 4: That’s right.  
 
Q: That’s a pretty interesting point.  That kind of leads us on to uniformity in that 
respect so we’ve seen these divisions like as standard for Sharia compliance in Malaysia, 
as a standard for Sharia Islamic banking in the Middle East and as a standard for 
Sharia compliancy in the West, I mean do you think uniformity is important to the 
Islamic financial system in terms of the legal precepts in terms of product structures, in 
terms of underlying regulatory standards, do you think it’s an important factor? 
 
Aca 3: I think it’s important but not attainable.   
 
Okay.  
 
Aca 4: So it’s important but not attainable?  Well ... 
 
Aca 3: I think there are too many fundamental differences on interpretation.  I remember I 
supervised a PhD a couple of years ago on arbitration in the Middle East.  He was a 
Palestinian student and he gave me an example of the difference between the approach at 
schools.  He said with one school if you go to a bank and you say I want a loan, they’ll say 
for what purpose?  I want to buy grapes.  At one school that would be acceptable. 
 
Aca 4: You want to buy grapes? 
 
Aca 3: I want to buy grapes.  If you go to another bank under another school and say I want 
to buy grapes, they would say for what purpose? 
 
Aca 4: Yes okay.  I understand where this question’s leading.  
 
Aca 3: I want to make wine and that’s not allowed so it seems that there are different 
interpretations.  When you can’t have agreement on what is riba and what isn’t in Middle 
Eastern markets, you have disagreement on what is permitted and what isn’t, you can’t have 
uniformity and I think it is a barrier to liquidity and to tapping bigger, wider markets.  I think 
you will end up with the localised markets trading in local products that are not necessarily 
tradable in other markets. 
 
Aca 4: Okay, that’s interesting.  I hadn’t realised it was as simple as that, you know, in terms 
of the purpose of the loan.  In some ways the first bank is not asking that question because 
they don’t want to know, alright?  The second bank is pushing it further along, you know. 
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Aca 3: So there are fundamental differences.  So you’ll end up with differences between 
Islamic scholars, on interpretation, on what instruments are like.  Look at Musharakah, 
Mudarabah, you look at some of these instruments that have been thrown up and they come 
very close to the non-Islamic, when you have mark-up finance for example is concealed 
interest. 
 
Aca 4: That’s right, yeah. 
 
Aca 3: And that discredits the system. 
 
Aca 4: Yeah there’s quite a lot of talk about that with these conferences, market finance, 
yeah. 
 
Aca 3: Because it looks as if you are providing non-Islamic instruments under the disguise of 
an Islamic label and that doesn’t do anybody any good but at the same time, it was interesting 
for you to say well how do non-Islamic banks compete, how do they survive as if they are the 
weaker entity?  I always think the other way.  I think how does the Islamic bank survive in 
Islamic country when there’s non-Islamic bank which can do anything? 
 
Aca 4: Yes, yes, so they’re not focused on one particular area. 
 
Aca 3: It’s just like money lenders in Italy in the 15th and 16th Century, there were some who 
were allowed to be involved in money lending and paying and receiving interest and there 
were some particularly Christians at that time would say well no you’re not allowed to pay or 
receive interest so we’ll get somebody else to do it and so in a non-Islamic bank that can do 
anything, that can provide any kind of loan without looking at the religious framework, they 
have a competitive advantage because they’re not constrained and they have another 
advantage in that they can take security.  They can charge up-front fees and be open about it 
instead of disguising it as a mark-up finance, this sort of thing, so they have greater flexibility 
and non-Islamic bank in Islamic country has got greater capacity. 
 
Aca 4: I’m always interested to understand how banks offer both Islamic and non-Islamic 
products within the same house. 
 
Aca 3: Separate subsidiaries. 
 
Aca 4: Well they can do, I mean I did some study with someone who is now at the Reserve 
Bank in Pakistan who looked at the demand for money using Divisia construction of different 
types of deposits and some are Islamic and they were very good, they were able to identify 
the yield, exposed yield on the deposit of Islamic and the interest rate on non-Islamic account 
and they were able to find a cointegrated relationship so there was an equilibrium, you know 
it was not as if one was trying to outdo the other, they both had the same I1 properties, you 
know, and to me that says that the market finds an equilibrium, even within the same, you 
know, bank.  
   
Q: So this is the lack of uniform, I mean the lack of uniformity could actually, is 
actually an effect of the marketplace itself in a sense that it cannot be standardised 
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firstly on the basis of belief and secondly because each market drives its own. 
 
Aca 4: That’s right, I mean the market finds a segmentation, you know if you kept 
differentiated, the market will try to identify these things, simply because that’s what markets 
try to do.  They try to garner information, they try to, you know, exploit this information and 
if they’re efficient, ultimately we tend to think that markets will tend to a deficiency in the 
long run then they’re trying to separate out these products.  So it seems to me that it’s not, 
well I mean I might have a slightly different view to Simon here, it doesn’t seem to me that 
important that it’s useful to have clarity but if you had opacity, the market will try and find a 
way round it to try to, you know, identify what the differences are.  It’s just more costly that’s 
all.  So it’s more efficient to have transparency but so what?  I mean central banks, you know 
central banks will try to obviscate the market by trying to influence expectations.  We spend 
many, many, pay a lot of teenage scribblers in the city to try and interpret what is in the mind 
of Mark Carney or Ben Bernanke.  It’s because if there was complete transparency we don’t 
need these people.  We don’t have to pay them so much.  Everyone would just get it off the 
internet but in fact they’re trying to interpret markets and that’s about information so the 
same will happen with Islamic instruments as well. 
 
Q; I mean what do you think about these large regulatory buy-ins that have been set up 
in Islamic finance in terms of like AAOIFI the accounting standards and then the IFSB, 
International Islamic Financial Services Board that admit to be there to kind of like 
oversee the overall, do you think they actually play a significant part within the 
marketplace or do you think that, you know, it’s just an ancillary role in terms of ...? 
 
Aca 4: I think they have to, you know, because people like the FSB have to understand, even 
in the loosest way, what are the risks, and if it’s a product that they know very little about, it’s 
better to know something than to know nothing and these advice, these boards can provide 
some information about the risks and they have to then construct regulations consistent with 
where that risk class is, you know, to them, you know is it up here or is it down here?  So I 
think there is something but how good it is I don’t know. 
 
Aca 3: It depends what the function of the body is.  Is it to promote common standards?  Is it 
to protect stakeholders by making risk more transparent and so the impression I get is that 
these bodies are a little bit unfocused as to what they’re trying to achieve and are they saying 
that they should promote harmonised standards, common standards and is that necessarily a 
good thing?  The PhD on arbitration, commercial arbitration in the Middle East, the 
conclusion was that harmonisation was a bad thing because differences represent local 
cultures and if you have differences you’re more likely to have acceptance by local cultures 
instead of trying to impose from outside the common sense standards so the view in that 
dissertation was that you should accommodate international standards if possible but at the 
same time don’t try and force everything into a standard template so it might be that those 
bodies are trying to force everything into a standard template when it can’t be done and 
maybe if by doing so you deter a whole range of stakeholders who are looking for genuinely 
Islamic products. 
 
Aca 4: Yeah that’s an interesting, you know, conception isn’t it, to think that actually what 
you observe, it’s very much in Doug North’s theory of economic institutions.  Things have 
evolved because they are following an efficiency pattern, you know, things have evolved 
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through a market solution. 
 
Aca 3: There’s a need for it. 
 
Aca 4: There’s a need for it and that’s the differences.  Now you try and force them together, 
well you’re creating a new equilibrium.  It may be less efficient. 
 
Aca 3: And less acceptable.  
 
Aca 4: Well I mean we know for instance the Euro is the construction of an artificial currency 
that covers, you know, one size fits all.  You can do it, you can actually force it, okay?  But it 
creates inefficiencies elsewhere, you know as by doing it but you know it’s a bit like 
squeezing on a balloon, you can say I can control the air by squeezing on it, it just goes 
somewhere else and creates these inefficiencies elsewhere so yes you can construct a single 
body but is it desirable?  Well, you know, it’s not clear that it is.  
 
Aca 3: I was going to say, to which standards would it bias itself?  If you’re going to look at 
international standards or local standards, the view from this Palestinian student was that 
international standards had been hijacked to some extent by history and Western values and 
so on and he said if you impose that from either side and then local businesses would find it 
unacceptable. 
 
Aca 4: Interesting, yeah.  
 
Q: What about the notion of a central bank or a lender of last resort for Islamic 
finance?  Because if you think about most conventional financial systems you have 
essentially this fall back, I mean do you think that could add to the value or do you 
think that could be beneficial?  I mean obviously it goes back to your argument of need 
but do you think it would be beneficial to the Islamic financial system? 
 
Aca 4: You see there is a tension here because Islamic banks have constructed the, my 
understanding of it is a bit like free banking, you know, they can stand alone, you know, after 
all they’re profit sharing okay and so their customers, their clients, their depositors are 
expected to take this as part of the, alright, why do we need a lender of last resort?  A lender 
of last resort is needed if by chance there is a run on the liquidity of a bank, okay, and that 
occurs if there’s a perception that there are losses in the offing, people try to withdraw their 
money, the bankrupt, that’s why you need a lender of last resort to put this in but in fact this 
shouldn’t happen under Islamic rules so I’m not at all, you know, there’s the tension, I 
believe that there should be a lender of last resort, it will create stability, but there’s the 
tension with Islamic thinking is to how that fits in to it, you know because after all, I mean 
you’re meant to take the risk on yourself, you’re meant to share that risk.  It’s not meant to be 
shared with the taxpayer which is a lender of last resort will eventually, you know, finance 
that, so it’s a puzzle, I don’t know what the answer is, you know.  I think in practice there 
should be one.  I also think there’s lots of problems with, for instance bond financing.  How 
do governments bond finance and therefore control the money supply in Islamic countries if 
interest rate is barred?  How do they?  You tell me.  
 
In terms of bond financing issues, the sukuks, I mean as far as I know about it, I think 
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sukuk issuance is based upon an underlying Islamic asset so as opposed to having that 
interest proxy, you essentially have an actual asset that will, in essence if you think 
about cost plus financing, what happens is that asset is, you have multiple Murabahas 
selling that asset on at periodic times which generates that extra cost plus mark-up 
which the market element will then be that interest finance on the one payment so that’s 
how they generate the liquidity.  
 
Aca 4: But the underlying asset in the case of the bond finance for a government is future 
taxation, it’s not to observe now, you know, it’s your next generation who’s going to pay for 
that.  
 
I think what Dubai did was use their government, remember Dubai World, that large 
amusement park, they actually used that as an underlying, as a Sharia compliant asset 
to basically add that one.  
 
Aca 4: Oh I see, what they built with it.  
 
Yeah what they built with it so that was ... 
 
Aca 4: But how then do you finance your army or an invasion?  Oh well the assets you’re 
going to steel.  I mean there are lots of issues, I mean a Western government will send bonds 
to finance not just the NHS or road building which might have some underlying asset but 
current consumption okay?  So ... 
 
Aca 3: I think if you don’t have a central bank it seems that in the Middle East there’s a 
problem of holding of cash.  If you have a central bank it’s more likely that cash will come 
into the system.  Without a central bank the system will be more volatile. 
 
Aca 4: Well the central bank can lend to individual banks, okay, I mean that central banks do 
but the lender of last resort is lending to a system, it’s the banking system as a whole.  If 
there’s a generalised systemic run, okay I mean and if there’s a run it seems to me that, you 
know, Islamic banks should fail with their customers. 
 
Aca 3: Yeah but as you say, it’s just relocating risk somewhere else. 
 
Aca 4: Yes.  
 
Q: Just the last few more questions in terms of, I mean regulation obviously has a large 
impact upon governance and corporate governance structures in Islamic finance.  How 
do you think, you know, that that relationship will hold in Islamic finance in terms of 
like if we take all the issues that we’ve just discussed in terms of uniformity and 
transparency, how do you think that would impact the overall corporate governance 
structure of Islamic institutions or Islamic central financial systems? 
 
Aca 3: In terms of make-up of boards or fatwas or ...? 
 
Q: In terms of fatwas, in terms of basically composition of companies, in terms of 
Sharia even Sharia compliancy. 
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Aca 3: I think the problem is that when I look at credit crunch and the lead up to the crunch 
where you have interbank lending falling away, it seems that one of the reasons was a lack of 
trust between banks as to which were holding toxic assets and which were not.  A criticism of 
governance might be that if you have two parties in a room and they don’t trust each other, 
there is a problem.  If the government comes in and says well here’s the money anyway, there 
is no incentive for either party to open up and say what’s the nature of your distrust?  So we 
still don’t know where the toxic assets are really because there is no impetus to be more 
transparent and it seems ... 
 
Aca 4: In fact it would be better to be more opaque in the circumstance, yeah. 
 
Aca 3: Well you’re still going to get the money, even if you’re opaque, you still get it. 
 
Aca 4: Exactly. 
 
Aca 3: So it seems to me that if Islamic banks want to reach out and to widen their 
stakeholders and products, and so on, then the drive must be transparency and compliance 
with standards because if you’re not compliant then presumably you won’t have access to the 
same resources.  When you start having external structures, it’s a kind of, it’s almost like 
moral hazards and assumption that the system is better than it actually is and there’s no 
incentive for banks to be more transparent.  For example, why are fatwas not made public?  
So I think its move towards harmonisation may not address the underlying problems because 
you might have token compliance, tokenism, rather than a drive towards transparency.  If 
you’re on the board of an Islamic bank and you’re thinking well how do we expand our base?  
It’s through being more transparent and greater linkage between the religious principles by 
which you stand and the products that you offer so everybody understands that linkage and 
not selling products or offering products which everybody knows are either fictional in terms 
of the general Islamic products so I think there’s a danger that these frameworks that have 
been put in are not going to promote the transparency necessarily. 
 
Aca 4: I’m not going to say anything more than that that sounds right. 
 
Q: Okay, just final two questions.  What do you think are the risks for Islamic finance 
going forward and what do you think are the growth opportunities for Islamic finance 
going forward? 
 
Aca 3: That’s a tricky one.  The opportunities are to capture that ethical gap.  I still can’t 
really understand.  Maybe there’s some simple explanation as to why Islamic banks are not 
offering finance to SMEs that are non-Islamic.  Is there are particular reason? 
 
Aca 4: I don’t know.  I don’t think so. 
 
Aca 3: Because if you look at an SME in the UK, typical SME that feels has been let down 
by its mainstream bank, if you have an Islamic bank that’s making a presentation at let’s say 
a Chamber of Commerce, you say well the Islamic principles are really something for us, it’s 
not for you to worry about.  The implications of this method of financing are joint venture 
vehicle, prohibition on interest, share in profits and so on.  An SME director would say ah ... 
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Aca 4: Yeah he wouldn’t really care where it’s coming from, yeah. 
 
Aca 3: ... I don’t care about it.  I don’t care about the relationship, but you’ve explained how 
it works and it seems to me that it is a form of ethical finance.  
 
You’re given an option basically.  
 
Aca 4: Yeah. 
 
Aca 3: Yeah. 
 
Aca 4: But at this conference I went, I mean that’s exactly what Islamic bankers and Islamic 
bank scholars from the Middle East were saying, that there’s absolutely no reason why 
Islamic banks shouldn’t lend to non-Islamic clients, in fact that’s what they should reach.  
They have to do that if they want to expand and so there’s no reason, you know, 
ideologically. 
 
Aca 3: There’s a legal jurisdiction problem.  
 
Aca 4: No, if you’re an Islamic bank in Britain.  
 
Aca 3: Yeah well ... 
 
Aca 4: There are plenty. 
 
Aca 3: ... but in terms of enforceability of contracts, is it going to be through the normal court 
process, is it going to be through a tribunal?  We don’t have the equivalent of AAA (43.20) 
courts for example so you would have to have an Islamic commercial arbitration system in 
the UK to make, unless of course Islamic banks are prepared to strike out that fundamental 
clause that they must include which says that this agreement is in compliance with Sharia 
principles.  Now whether they be prepared to take that.  If I was director of an SME I would 
look at that and I’d say what’s that clause mean?  If there’s a dispute between us I know that 
you’re not going to take my home and throw me out on the street.  I know you’re not going to 
strip my assets but I need to know what is this jurisdictional point.  Which court will deal 
with this if there’s a dispute between us because you’ve got this Sharia compliant clause here 
so that is an important issue, the legal enforceability of contracts but marketing, it seems to 
me that Islamic banks in the UK are really missing out on a trick.  They should be going out 
and saying your local bank has let you down.  
 
Aca 4: Let you down, yeah that’s right, come to us. 
 
Aca 3: Look at RBS and the allegation was to what they had been doing. 
 
Aca 4: Yeah absolutely, yeah.  
 
Aca 3: So I think they should do that and also they should capture more of the young 
population, the student population in terms of products.   
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Q: I mean in terms of that legal jurisdiction, that was quite an interesting point, I mean 
do you think that Islamic finance lacks that protection for both parties in that respect, 
like an undeveloped protection mechanism for both ... 
 
Aca 3: Yes. 
 
... the institution that’s given you whatever finance and the person that’s partaken in 
that financial contract, I mean is there a big problem? 
 
Aca 3: Well it is because it seems that the Islamic bank it’s fundamental, Islamic lender I 
should say is based on trust.  I will not take security from you in the form of a personal 
guarantee, a charge over your home and so, I trust you and so on.  Whereas the non-Islamic 
model says I don’t care what you want the money for but if you don’t make the interest 
payments I’ll ultimately throw you out of your house and liquidate your business, so it’s a 
totally different perspective on enforcement and how would you take an Islamic contract 
which is what this is before a County Court Judge because that Judge would say I don’t 
understand this and there’s a clause in it, it’s a bit like jurisdiction clauses in London 
arbitration, where’s the centre for international shipping disputes to be resolved?  London, 
because they have an arbitration clause and a jurisdiction clause in the event of a dispute it 
will be dealt here, so you have that Sharia compliance and jurisdictional issue which would 
have to be understood because, as I say, it’s a matter of trust and if I’m director of an SME 
I’d feel a little bit pleased because I’d think to myself, the bank, Lloyds TSB or Lloyds as it is 
now, I wanted a loan from them and they really tied me up in all kinds of guarantees, they 
took charges over assets, they took floating charges over the contents of the warehouse and 
goodness knows what else, they’re absolutely secure but I’ve got this Islamic bank saying 
ultimately we trust you, we’re not going to charge you interest.  I’d be thinking now there 
might be an opportunity for me to get away with the cash and leave the Islamic bank with a 
thumping loss, so that is an issue but legal jurisdiction and enforceability of contracts, and I 
don’t see how an Islamic bank can move away from that fundamental clause which says that 
both parties understand this is Sharia compliant and then you’re back to the problem of 
marketing and understanding.  How do you say to a director of an SME from Yorkshire this 
is a Sharia compliant agreement and this is the nature of your obligations and ours and also 
there’s the business, if it’s based on trust, the Islamic bank is going to be more intrusive in 
asking for more information and ... 
 
Aca 4: But that might be a trade-off that he’s willing to accept. 
 
Aca 3: Yes. 
 
Aca 4: After all that would be what he would have if it was a venture capital type of 
agreement as well.  
 
Aca 3: Yes.  
 
Okay, thank you very much gentleman.  
 
END 
       
  
 
358 
Academic 5 
 
Q: One of the few things about Islamic finance is that it has grown over the past few 
years but a lot of people still don't know much about it. How do you think others view 
Islamic finance within the financial world? 
 
A: I think there is increasing knowledge about Islamic finance by people in the financial 
system. Obviously, it depends on their seniority and the kind of bank that they are in basically 
but certainly in investment banking circles there is a fair amount of interest and knowledge of 
Islamic finance, certainly in London as we have a significant Islamic financial sector in 
London. 
 
Q: What do you think are the inherent risks faced by Islamic financial institutions going 
into the 21
st
 century? (not in the sense of competing but being on par with mainstream 
financial institutions?) 
 
A: Islamic finance has got its own particular risk. Obviously, there is potentially more market 
risk of the Islamic financing facilities basically than there is conventional banking because 
Islamic banks can invest directly and take on ownership risk for example and regulators are 
necessarily terribly happy about that but that is something which is inherent in Islamic 
finance and one cannot get away from that really if the various facilities that they have to 
offer are to continue to operate but they have to be managed carefully. 
 
Q: One of the main issues of governance in Islamic finance is an issue of transparency –
transparency in the sense of transactions. What do you think about this? 
 
A: Well Islamic banks obviously have to abide by the regulation system in the markets in 
which they are operating basically. So in the UK, are financial reporting requirements, (2.18) 
by the FSA, so they do have to have properly audited accounts, they have to have interim 
statements. So there is reporting every six months but obviously they are not reporting every 
single operation but at the end of the day the financial services authority does have the right 
to look in to any operations if there is a complaint by clients. So they are pretty transparent; 
actually I wouldn't say they are less transparent than other banks. 
 
Q: Another criticism is the composition of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). You 
get conflicting view of having similar members on different boards over the different 
spectrum of companies. What do you feel about this? 
 
A: Obviously some scholars are basically, it is true that they serve on many different boards 
but they are not an on their own individual. They basically have back up staff doing research 
and investigating things for them so in a sense you can think of them as developing rather 
like accounting firms (3.24) matter of KPMG for example do thousands of audits and so on 
and that doesn't mean to say that they are not able to do that. So it is a question of how you 
want to go. You can either go and have single Shariah scholars working all by themselves in 
which case they can build up their businesses or you can have Shariah scholars, yea they give 
their name to the businesses if you like, but essentially they have a lot of people working for 
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them. So they can maybe handle serving on 50 Shariah boards. That is a lot but it is possible 
with enough back up staff. 
 
Q: How do you feel when people talk about ‘Shariah ala-carte’ or ‘Shariah Head-
hunting’ where certain Shariah scholars are scouted for certain boards? 
 
A: Well obviously most banks want to have the most prestigious scholars so they (Shariah 
scholars) tend to have a scarcity value and they are head hunted but the industry is open so 
others can come in so it is not impossible and others are coming in. The net is widening but 
obviously those on top, who have had a head start, are in a better position. 
 
Q: There is also talk about the transparency on how products are structured such as 
sukuks and murabahas. A lot of the general public do not really know about who buys 
or sells these products. What do you feel about that? 
 
A: Well obviously holdings can be confidential and people don't have to disclose everything 
they are holding to everybody. In terms of the actually structure themselves, most of them are 
basically devised by law firms like Norton Rose and so on but obviously they don't put all the 
details; they put broad details of what goes on but they don't put details of the structures they 
are recommending to individual clients as that would be a breach of confidentiality and 
obviously they are going through some effort to tailor these things (products structures) to the 
needs of individual clients who are paying for this service. So, like any banking contract, it is 
not in the public domain. So we know what murabaha, musharakah or ijara contracts look 
like but obviously we don't see the names filled in basically because they client wouldn't 
appreciate that action. I mean the banks wouldn't want it and their clients wouldn't want it.  
 
Q: All this negative talk about transparency in Islamic finance. What do you think 
could be done to make Islamic finance seem more ‘friendly’ to the public? 
 
A: Well obviously it is important to maintain proper standards and regulators do try to do 
that. If there are basically not such good standards in some jurisdictions it doesn't necessarily 
reflect on the Islamic banks or Islamic financial institutions; it reflects on the regulators and 
their effectiveness basically but on the whole most of the jurisdictions that they are operating 
in are pretty well regulated and there haven’t been really all that many problems in Islamic 
finance, some did happen in conventional finance. They (Islamic finance) withstood the 
financial crisis of 2008 pretty well but obviously some of them get into difficulties when 
there was a recession and in particular the crash of the property market. In cases like Dubai 
and so on, it obviously put some strain on Islamic banks as it did on every other type of bank 
but you know they have survived. Some have been recapitalised but that is not really a big 
surprise. 
 
Q: You mention regulation and that is another issue in Islamic finance. We have 
different regulatory standards across different regions in Islamic finance. The 
regulatory standards in Malaysia are different from the regulatory standards in the 
Middle East which are in turn different from the regulatory standards in the west. How 
will the lack of uniformity affect Islamic banking and finance? 
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A: Well just in the same way as conventional banking; it isn’t regulatory uniformity, it does 
vary from country to country and region to region and quite a lot in regions. Obviously it is 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) where they have Basel I, Basel II and now there 
is Basel III basically which will be implemented, including by Islamic banks over the next 
few years up to basically 2019 so there is basically a fairly long transition period but Islamic 
banks do have to comply with these sort of minimum regulatory requirements plus any 
additional regulatory requirements that individual regulators have. Any shortcomings in 
particular jurisdictions you can ultimately blame the regulator over the Islamic banks. Islamic 
banks will do what they have to but obviously they are not going to do more; like any 
institution because it is costly. So basically they will abide by the regulation as they could 
lose their license. 
 
Q: The divergence in the rules regarding the permissibility of Shariah risk management 
tools for example, a bai al-arbun will be allowed in Malaysia but not in the Middle East. 
How do you think that will affect risk management and financial innovation in Islamic 
finance? 
 
A: Well obviously Malaysia has been more kind of adventurous and things have been 
approved which wouldn't have been approved in the gulf for example but having said that 
there is a degree of convergence because Islamic banks and institutions from the gulf are now 
involved in Malaysia and obviously, so they (Malaysian Shariah finance laws) are very aware 
of the kind of requirements by the market operating there. I think Malaysia’s probably gotten 
more conservative in the last few years. So some of the things that used to happen don't any 
longer happen basically and obviously there are different schools of Islamic jurisprudence as 
well. So Malaysia is the Shaffi School, which is regarded as kind of more liberal when it 
comes to financial affairs than the others so that is obviously reflected through to the 
practices in Malaysia but I think these differences can be exaggerated and there is precinct 
degree of convergence. But you don't want standardization because that will obviously 
preclude innovation – putting everything in sort of a strait jacket, then there is not much 
scope for devising new methods of doing things. 
 
Q: Why do you think Malaysia is becoming more prudent with its Islamic finance laws? 
 
A: Well I think because they are influenced by the institutions that have come from the gulf 
to Malaysia, like Al-Rajhi bank, Kuwait Finance House and so on. Al Rajhi bank has quite a 
significant operation in Malaysia and obviously they tend to manage things, not exactly like 
they do in Saudi Arabia but at the end of the day the Shariah scholar is sent from Riyadh to 
sit on the board in Kuala Lumpur and obviously does look at what’s going on. (10.58) 
 
Q: There has also been talk about lenders of last resort. How do you feel about that in 
Islamic finance? 
 
A: Well what happens in practice is that the central banks or banks that are in difficulty, 
(11.16) usually not necessarily themselves, but they get their confidence from potentially 
stepping in and recapitalise banks and that effectively has happened with some Islamic banks 
as well – Amlak in Dubai for example which is basically an Islamic mortgage company, was 
obviously pretty much bankrupt from when the property market went down. So that (Amlak) 
has been recapitalised basically, bought by the government and also by merging it with 
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another entity to make it bigger and more viable so the same kind of things have to be done 
for Islamic banks. So obviously they can’t be the lender of last resort on the basis of interest 
but the recapitalisation can be done in many different ways and that's not a problem. It is 
needed unfortunately sometimes.  
 
Q: What are your thoughts on the two large central regulatory bodies at the moment, 
the IFSB and AAOIFI? 
 
A: Well AAOIFI is there basically to provide accounting standards and ensure that basically 
that there is consistency in how Islamic financing is reported. It is a very specific organisation 
and its concern should be consistency. for example how murabahas trades are illustrated in 
the same way across different banks which makes sense. They are not trying to replace the 
international financial reporting standards rather as a kind of add-on looking at the nature of 
different Islamic financing facilities. It is things like if you have a murabaha, for example, 
and payments are coming in not just 2011 but also 2012 when do you ‘book’ them. do you 
‘book’ them all in 2011 or do you ‘book’ them a little bit in each year. Basically, AAOIFI 
comes up with standards for that kind of thing so you can compare banks across jurisdictions 
and indeed within jurisdictions so that makes sense. The Islamic Financial Services Board is 
basically concerned with a whole host of issues primarily concerning governance of Islamic 
banks including Shariah  governance and also risk management. Essentially it is concerned 
with the kind of things that the Bank of International Settlements is concerned with and how 
it should be interpreted by Islamic banks and they produce guiding principles, all of which 
are on their website, and people find these quite helpful. It saves reinventing the wheel but of 
course the various central banks of all the countries where Islamic banks operate in 
represented on the Islamic Financial Services Board and are very welcome to participate in 
basically the development of these standards and they do participate and contribute their 
ideas. But it still doesn't make much sense for countries to be developing all these things in 
isolation so basically just like we have the Bank of International Settlements for conventional 
banking; we have the IFSB, which is recognised by the Bank of International Settlements, as 
the body which deals with Islamic Finance. 
 
Q: What do you think could be done to improve aspects of the IFSB and AAOIFI and 
regulatory channels in Islamic finance? 
 
A: I think they are doing quite a good job. AAOIFI does a good job on accounting issues and 
auditing issues and so on. The issue is really whether it over reaches itself with regard to its 
Shariah standards on whether it should have Shariah standards or not. It is primarily an 
accounting body and there is obviously overlap and indeed conflict between AAOIFI’s own 
Shariah board and the Shariah standards and also the OIC Fiqh Academy, which is 
recognised by the Islamic Development Bank and obviously represents 56 Muslim countries, 
so it is confusing having two different bodies basically but it has evolved this way historically 
and they are not totally in conflict but obviously there are differences and that is an issue 
because there is different people, different scholars serving on these bodies basically. 
 
Q: Do you think that these standards will help the growth of Islamic finance in the 
future with particular emphasis on risk management and product development? 
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A: Yes I think they have helped already and they will continue to help. I mean the industry is 
growing, it’s always going to be a niche, it’s not going to take over the global financial 
system or something, but it is an alternative way of doing things. It’s got a proven track 
record going back to the 1970s so it’s got a long history now, its withstood various crises, 
both global and regional and in particular countries, so it’s here for the long term and we’d 
expect it to continue to expand and grow. It is obviously easier to grow from a low base but 
as you get bigger the growth tends to slow down somewhat. 
 
Q: During the Durham Islamic Finance Summer School, you mentioned that 
practitioners in Islamic finance have to adopt a more modest view of the Islamic 
financial system. Could you expand on this? 
 
A: Well I think some people sort of expect it as the answer to all the problems of the global 
economy and the conventional system but it’s not. Well obviously Islamic finance is trying to 
do things a different way but we have to be realistic about essentially where it is and where 
it’s heading and it makes a contribution to the debates but obviously it is unlikely that all the 
principals and all the ideas are going to be adopted internationally. Conventional banks are 
very strong willed companies and they are going to continue with the kind of activities that 
they have done. 
 
Q: In the current economic climate, what do you think is the scope of growth for Islamic 
finance? 
 
A: The scope is still pretty good but the problem is that there is a lot of difficulties in the 
global economy basically with major restructuring occurring. Islamic finance is not terrible 
well represented than some of the faster growing markets and that is an issue. Obviously the 
situation in the gulf is stable and the governments are spending more and that's all helping 
Islamic finance. Situation in the Mediterranean-Arab countries, since the Arab spring, is 
extremely uncertain and obviously the countries are in growing economic difficulties. We 
hope that things will stabilise but who is to say what will happen. We have to wait and see 
essentially and it’s going to take a while. It is an opportunity for Islamic finance in places like 
Egypt and so on but obviously Islamic finance is very much in the margins there, nobody is 
going to be investing significant amounts of money in Egypt in the coming months until all 
the political uncertainty is resolved one way or another, so that's an issue. The middle east, 
particularly northern countries in the middle east are plugged into the European union and 
Europe and because the European Union and the Kingdom are basically pretty stagnant that 
means that there is not much growth (in Islamic finance) which is unfortunate. There is 
obviously, not much growth in North America either which has its own jobless recovery. So 
really you are looking at China and India but the problem basically is that India is kind of 
hostile to Islamic finance and China there is very little and they have their own issues. There 
is an eye on Islamic banking in western China but the whole issue of Islam in China is a very 
difficult issue for the Chinese. So there is either outright hostility, as is the case of the BJP in 
India and India is a very rapidly growing economy, that not helpful or basically suspicion and 
unwillingness to do too much in China so that's unhelpful given that these are the fastest 
growing regions or the world. 
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Q: A lot of people pigeon hole Islamic finance with ethical financing and there is a 
religious issue at hand such as in India and China. How do you think this will affect 
Islamic finance in the west? 
 
A: Well Islamic finance has obviously got its own criteria and you can draw parallels with 
the criteria used in Islamic finance and those used by ethical funds for example. Obviously 
the criteria are different but there are some similarities and I think one can learn for the other 
basically. Probably at the moment Islamic finance can learn more from ethical financing than 
vice versa but essentially ethical people are concerned about how their money is used and 
ethical funds take those concerns on board. Similar people who want Shariah-compliance you 
can have Shariah-compliant funds where again they take these concerns on board but the 
criteria are different. There is a little bit of influence from one to another for example there 
are issues in Islam about smoking and so on but the issue is that because this has been 
something that has been taken on by the ethical finance industry, you find that most Islamic 
funds don't invest in things like tobacco companies for example despite the popularity of 
Shiska. So there is some crossover basically. 
 
END 
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Appendix 3 – Academic-Practitioner Interview Transcripts 
 
Academic-practitioner 1 
Q: Islamic finance has grown rapidly over the past few decades, how do you think 
others view Islamic finance?  How do you think conventional finance views Islamic 
finance? 
 
In general they view it positively, in particular I think in 2008 and the financial advisors, 
people in general they started, you know, looking at Islamic finance as maybe an ethical and 
different approach to finance.  There was a huge interest, you know, from the media 
regarding Islamic finance and how Islamic finance was different from the conventional and 
how it works and this is evident basically here in the UK.  You see there are five fully Islamic 
banks, independent Islamic banks for investment and the IPP is the only fully Sharia 
compliant bank.  In addition to some conventional banks they offer one or two Sharia 
compliant products like Lloyds, Barclays, RBS, HSBC. In total I think there are in the last 
report they report there are around 22 Sharia compliant providers in the UK only providing 
Sharia compliant financial products, that includes (Shariah) windows or conventional banks 
specifically providing one or two Sharia compliant products.  
 
Q: Sure.  Well you mentioned something about ethical banking, do you think Islamic 
finance is very much compared to a lot of ethical financing like let’s say green 
investments, do you think Islamic finances compare to that? 
 
In a way yes, however it in terms of basically its requirements to be Sharia compliant are 
more than just ethical investment or the ethical approach.  Maybe the ethical approach they 
don’t see you know the payment or receipt of interest as an issue, however they are looking at 
their investment basically into ethical investment vehicle that excludes certain parts of 
investment.  From basically Sharia complaint perspective in terms of offering financial 
products, the payment and receipt of interest, one of the main elements that should be 
eliminated or excluded from any financial transaction in addition to basically the selection of 
investment is based on the Sharia and ethical principles so normally any unethical investment 
is considered from Sharia perspective that to being Sharia compliant and Islamic banks are 
not allowed to invest in.  However, this extends even beyond that.  For example shortening 
that might be in a way acceptable from ethical perspective, it is not allowed from Sharia 
compliance perspective basically because that principle of pretty much all transactions in 
terms of buying and selling from Sharia compliance perspective that the commodity or that 
there should be an underlying commodity or asset for any transaction and this commodity 
should exist and as you see maybe the majority of financial transactions now in the financial 
markets, whether short setting or options and futures, basically if you had raised the 
transaction itself or track it, there is no underlying assets of commodity so the items sold 
basically bought and sold over and over without any transfer of legal proprietor of the 
commodity or of, you know, or of the commodity being there as the subject matter or the 
financial transaction itself.  So this is not permissible for Islamic bank to do so basically it’s 
more like the real economy and that there always should be an underlying asset in terms of 
any financial transactions, not just money against money which is basically the typical 
borrowing lending relationship in terms of generating interest which is basically not allowed. 
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Q: Sure.  You mention basically riba and essentially ownership of assets before they can 
be sold which is kind of like the core principles of Islamic finance.  
 
Sorry say again, I couldn’t hear you.  
 
Q: You mention riba and basically ownership as several of the core principles of Islamic 
finance.  
 
Yes. 
 
Q: Do you think that, how do you think conventional finance has reacted to having, you 
know, these new constraints on a financial system or these new approaches to finance? 
 
Sorry just the last bit of the question wasn’t clear.  
 
Q: Sorry.  How do you find, how do you feel conventional finance reacts to let’s say the 
concept of riba, the concept of ownership having actual ownership, so how do you think 
conventional finance reacts to a financial system that does not operate on an interest 
basis? 
 
Okay just repeat maybe the last bit to make sure that I got your question correctly.  You’re 
asking about how conventional banks perceive this sort of transaction that this will be 
underlying assets … 
 
Yes.  
 
… from Islamic banking? 
 
Q: Yes so how do you think conventional finance perceive like a non-interesting 
banking system, a banking system that does not operate on interest? 
 
Okay.  I mean it depends.  If you look at let’s say in terms of, you know, just normal people 
who are basically they are the target market for financial institutions or they’re Islamic or an 
Islamic, you know some of them basically they are not bothered about it.  Some of them who 
would be looking at an ethical perspective, it would appeal to them.  From financial system 
perspective there is basically a positive view about Islamic finance, however you can say, you 
know, the mainstream is basically the conventional system which in a way it’s dominating 
the scene.  However, you know, Islamic banking is growing and basically this positive view 
about it is also growing.  Some Muslims are basically taking up Sharia compliance products 
because basically in a way they are fed up with the current conventional financial system as 
we saw, you know, a while ago when, you know, people start protesting against the current 
financial practices and the current financial systems.  So it’s basically more than in a way that 
the practices by conventional banks which is looks into the individual benefit of that financial 
institution and it is basically management shareholder but it doesn’t look at or maybe it 
doesn’t look fully at the financial benefit of its customers.  Basically it’s the society in a way 
and the economy overall and this is what we saw that, you know, these sort of practices were 
harmful to the economy as a whole and we all were affected by that on different levels.  So 
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there is in a way basically a positive look at it but I think for maybe some financial 
institutions it is not suitable, maybe the approach for them because maybe that will impact in 
a way some of their financial practices that currently they do and that perceived maybe from 
Sharia compliance perspective as non-ethical you know because of certain elements in those 
practices.  
 
Q: Cool.  In terms of growth of Islamic finance, what do you think, for the foreseeable 
future, what do you think would be the main areas of risk when it comes to Islamic 
banking and finance?  What areas need to be addressed at this point in time? 
 
Sorry can I ask please just to repeat the question? 
 
Islamic finance going into the 21
st
 century …  
 
Yeah. 
 
Q: … what do you think are the main areas of risk relating to Islamic finance?  Which 
areas have to be addressed, which areas are weak, which areas are strong in Islamic 
finance? 
 
Okay I think the main thing is basically the educational aspect of it, the awareness about 
Islamic finance, how Islamic finance is different from conventional, I think maybe lots of 
people mainly, you know, non-Muslims they think when you, you know, you mentioned 
Sharia compliant, you know, financial products or Islamic banking they will say okay it’s 
just, you know, something related to the Islamic law or to Sharia, it’s for Muslims so 
something, nothing to do with them or maybe they don’t have this interest maybe to know 
more about.  Some people they do maybe they have this sort of interest to know more about it 
and then they will basically get educated more about it.  The main thing is basically 
explaining how as in a way the financial system or which basically follow certain rules in 
Sharia are related to finance and conducting financial transactions how it works, how it 
basically would offer maybe a different approach to finance that would consider maybe all 
stakeholders in the society or in the financial system and look into their benefit as a whole 
rather than the benefit of maybe a few individuals or smaller group of people in the society or 
in that financial institutions.  Also the main element how products are structural, maybe they 
see that the economical or the economic outcome of this product is in a way the same but that 
the working back, the back of this operation, basically the structure of the product itself and 
how it works is completely different, there is always, you know, an underlying asset, there is 
always sort of trade commodity, etc. selling and buying so there is an economic activity in the 
background happening to offer this financial product does not apply, for example the 
convention is just lending and charging interest for that, you know for the mortgage for 
example or for that personal or business loan, etc.  So it’s mainly basically there are the 
education around that. 
   
Q: With regards to education, do you think Sharia finance needs to be more 
transparent or is there an issue of transparency when it comes to Sharia finance? 
 
I don’t think there is an issue around transparency.  On the contrary I mean in terms of 
Islamic banks particularly they have regulatory obligations in terms of monetary reporting so 
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they have, you know, this sort of obligation and the extra obligation from a Sharia 
compliance perspective that they have to report and this is also included in their financial 
statement in terms of during a certain period of, you know, Sharia compliance audit or the 
bank’s operation that the bank was operating in line with ethical and Sharia principles so then 
basically Sharia has provided a committee which is an independent body to supervise the 
bank with a Sharia reportable statement that about their opinion about the bank’s operations 
during a certain period and there is of course review now Sharia compliance audit to ensure 
that they review all the documentation, the transactions or some of the transactions show that 
fact.  In addition the Sharia compliance provision it offers an extra layer of governance for 
Islamic banks.  Basically they are not employees of the bank, the committee does not report 
to the board or to the senior management of the bank, it’s an independent committee and 
there is also a Sharia compliance department in the bank to basically monitor the daily 
operation of the bank and they report directly to the Sharia supervisory committee to ensure 
their creditability and independence from the bank’s management.  It is something that you 
don’t see basically or you don’t find in conventional banks so and everything basically should 
be transparent and clear in terms of the product itself, documentations of the product.  Certain 
things, key risks, key issues in the products should be made prominent and clear to customers 
and that is basically monitored and signed off to ensure that everything is transparent with 
our own, you know, products and customers’ level or in terms of financial reporting level and 
basically the length of the required regulations.  
 
Q: So do you feel that basically these arguments for transparency are due to the fact 
that it’s more a marketing issue than it is essentially an issue of transparency so the 
knowledge has to be disseminated better to the public, do you feel that that is the case?  
 
It is, yes it is in a way, yeah it’s basically, this is as we, maybe we know from different 
practices and conventional banks and maybe some statement like from the former governor 
of Bank of England, Mervyn King, who said basically we need a cultural change in our 
financial system in terms of, you know, the practices of bankers, etc.  In Islamic banking case 
this, basically the Sharia compliance aspect or of course Sharia compliance governance in the 
bank to avoid in a way control for these financial practices and I think an aspect of it ensure 
that basically the Sharia requirements are adhered to in all aspects of the products when 
developing the product itself, when launching the product, when selling the product and the 
processes of after, you know, selling the products so during the whole cycle of the product 
itself and operation of the banks which ensure this in a way, you know, this change of culture 
and we, I mean we see them for example when, you know, the bank of course we’ve got, you 
know, employees from different backgrounds, Muslims and non-Muslims, so even, you 
know, with employees who join IPP they are Muslims or non-Muslims, they see basically a 
different culture here, the way that, you know, a customer is put first in terms of the way, the 
transparency, the conduct of business and these things so they see a difference between what 
they used to and sort of a new approach to finance.  
 
Q: There is also a lot of criticism in terms of Sharia supervisor board composition.  A 
lot of the literature and a lot of the criticism stem from the fact that the Sharia 
supervisory board is not transparent, the Sharia supervisory board has similar 
members on different boards.  How do you feel about this? 
 
Maybe in a way I can understand this criticism.  First of all maybe the issue of bias, maybe 
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the same members of the Sharia supervisory committee they sit basically on maybe ten banks 
or something like that or they are the same on maybe many banks.  It is, the reason why 
basically now there is sort of some initiatives to, in a way, to develop the next generation of 
scholars, increase the number.  As you know Islamic finance as an industry is still a new 
industry or a new system and basically those scholars, it requires qualified scholars who 
basically have the Sharia knowledge, the knowledge of our Islam financial transactions and at 
the same time the understanding of the banking system, the conventional banking system, 
how basically they can interpret or the application of the Sharia knowledge in terms of the 
current banking practices, what needs to be done and unfortunately they are the qualified 
scholars in that domain, they are currently few, that’s why you find maybe the same names 
are repeated on, you know, on the Sharia supervisory committees of different banks so that’s 
one aspect.  The other aspect in terms of the transparency, usually they issue for example for 
each product they’re what we call a fatwa or Sharia legal opinion on that product and they 
say we reviewed this product, this product works on this particular aspect which we believe 
that it is Sharia compliant as long as the management of the bank applies our guidance or 
how this should be done because it’s the responsibility of the management and the bank to 
apply this basically so in a way they give transparent and a clear opinion in their fatwas but 
this maybe sometimes has to be limited because basically if it’s a new product, a new 
innovation, you can’t disclose everything, you know, otherwise basically the institution or 
that particular institution would be giving everything to its competitors because this fatwa has 
to be published on the website or basically anyone can have access to it.  We know that this 
financial product normally got copied, you know, after a while but at the beginning maybe 
it’s the right of this institution maybe not to reveal everything but it’s a requirement that at 
least this Sharia legal opinion issued by the Sharia supervisory committee, it’s adequate. 
 
Q: How do you feel about some of the criticisms levied at basically different Sharia 
banks headhunting specific scholars to get the desired approval in terms of Sharia 
compliance, do you think that exists or do you think that is just not true? 
 
I mean they just attract maybe who, scholars who basically in a way they have liberal 
views … 
 
Yes. 
 
… so to speak.  This is again, as I mentioned, it’s in a way more, you know, it’s more having 
scholars who are qualified and basically understands the legal regulatory and the operation 
system of, you know the financial system or the banking industry itself.  It’s not, it’s not any 
Sharia scholar would have these sort of qualities or skills.  I mean there are, for example, the 
typical or in a way traditional Sharia scholars.  Yes they are knowledgeable, they are 
qualified about Sharia but maybe they don’t have the required skills in order to apply this 
knowledge on the current financial system or products or maybe they don’t understand how it 
works fully so that in a way will be an obstruction for them.  That’s why maybe those 
scholars who have this sort of expertise and skill or maybe they have in a way that, you 
know, academic qualifications on both sides, you know, economics, finance and at the same 
time they have the Sharia qualifications and the experience as well, there would be maybe 
more preferable or well known in a way in the industry and maybe taking on more 
responsibilities in terms of being on various Sharia supervisory committees. 
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Q: What do you think could be done to make Sharia finance look more transparent, you 
know, within the global spectrum? 
 
So the middle bit of the question wasn’t clear? 
 
Q: In terms, so basically I mean a lot of effort has gone in to make the structures of 
products available online, you know Sharia rulings online that all the information’s 
available … 
 
Yeah. 
 
Q: … but certain people still feel that Islamic finance is still very confined and we don’t 
know much about it.  What do you think can be done to improve this image? 
 
Sorry again, the last bit this time wasn’t clear.  I’m sorry just the voice is not clear.  
 
Q: Sorry, apologies, no it’s my fault.  What do you think can be done to make Sharia 
compliant more transparent? 
 
Okay.  I think maybe in a way some maybe a few Islamic banks need to be in a way more 
transparent and when I say more transparent in terms of maybe products and I would say that 
maybe because of the regulatory requirement, for example here in the UK as a bank we’ve 
got to put everything on the website and from Sharia compliance perspective that we should 
give all the information and make it available to customers to make an informed decision for 
any products.  In some parts maybe or maybe in other countries, this sort of requirement is 
less strict or not adhered to fully.  It’s in a way you can relate to maybe best practice and in a 
way understanding the importance of, you know, of doing that.  Maybe the competition 
would be a reason for that in a way that the bank doesn’t want to reveal everything, you 
know, because of the competition element.  However, I would say in general there is a very 
good level of transparency in terms of, you know, Islamic banks.  Maybe it’s good but maybe 
there is also room for improvement or making these sort of practices better at the same time.  
 
Q: Okay, one of the main elements of my research is looking at financial innovation in 
Islamic finance, more specifically financial innovation under Sharia compliance.  
 
Yes. 
 
Q: Do you think there is, I mean Islamic finance has got several major hubs, one in 
Malaysia, you have the GCC countries and you have the UK as some of the few major 
hubs but there’s a lack of uniformity when it comes to regulatory standards or basically 
uniformity as the financial system as a whole.  Do you think there’s a lack of uniformity 
in Islamic finance? 
 
In a way the short answer, yes and no. 
 
Okay. 
 
It’s basically you would expect, when I say yes because you would expect that as a new 
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industry or, you know, Islamic banking as a whole it’s considered a new innovation basically 
in a way of providing this approach or the structure of the Sharia compliant products so you 
would expect this sort of standardisation of the industry will take a time basically or will be 
done over time gradually which we noticed over the last maybe two to three decades where, 
you know, certain bodies were separated by the accounting and auditing organisation for 
Islamic financial institutions, the Islamic financial services board as well.  Those bodies 
basically issue standards regarding Sharia compliance of the products on offer to regulate this 
product and they start, you know those bodies started basically to gain high level recognition 
in the industry so it’s something in a way work in progress and it’s getting there but that will 
happen over time.  In terms of the different approaches in Malaysia, it’s perceived as sort of 
taking little approach to Islamic finance.  In a way they do adopt in a way exceptions 
approach to certain things like other maybe scholars or Islamic finance hubs like Goldsmiths 
here in the UK, they may disagree with.  It’s the way they are taking basically this approach, 
you know, in comparison to the Malaysian approach that the industry is giving you and 
basically if you start making exceptions from the beginning and then more exceptions, this 
will divert the industry from its main purpose and basically, as you say, main slogan or 
approach that is an ethical Sharia compliance alternative and basically that’s why many of 
those raise their concerns about that and those basically exceptions or this sort of in a way 
was a logical approach should be looked at carefully and unless there is a need or a necessity 
to make an exception on certain financial transactions this should be avoided if possible in 
order to maintain, you know, the Sharia compliance element sound intact as possible.  
 
Q: So you mentioned that Malaysia has a different approach, I mean they’ve got a more 
liberal approach to Islamic banking, the UK has a different approach to Islamic 
banking, this is based on interpretation of Sharia.  Do you think that this will have an 
impact on let’s say product development in Islamic banking? 
 
In a way yes.  When I said they have sort of like more liberal approach in Malaysia, it’s not 
basically for everything, it’s not like, you know, they are coming up with completely 
different approach.  It’s basically mostly it’s in line with the mainstream or let’s say the GCC 
countries’ approach and the UK approach, however they differ with them on certain maybe 
let’s say principles adopted or certain elements regarding maybe some products that they use 
maybe in a way a juristic opinion, opinion that it’s not that strong in contrast to maybe to the 
opinion adopted by, you know, other regions like GCC and the UK so maybe in order to 
precipitate certain transaction so that’s basically the main reason and it’s not like completely 
different approach, you know, it’s pretty much the same it’s just, you know, there are some 
differences regarding certain elements in their approach.  Mainly the interpretation is 
governed by, I mean in terms of any different financial institutions always refer or in most 
cases to the Sharia standards issued by AAOIFI, the accounting and auditing organisation and 
those scorers on the AAOIFI board basically represents nearly all or most Muslim countries 
so they represent different regions so and this sort of approach is done on consensus basis, 
that’s why it will be more adoptable approach and acceptable to everyone. 
 
Q: In your experience have you ever seen an Islamic product that is deemed Sharia 
compliant in one region but deemed not Sharia compliant in a different region?  Say for 
example it’s Sharia compliant in the UK but not Sharia compliant in the GCC 
countries? 
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Not really no.  No I don’t think so. 
 
Sure.  
 
Maybe something that I didn’t see but I heard about in terms of maybe certain financial 
transaction that practised in Malaysia that would maybe the majority disagree with but I 
didn’t see, you know, any actual documentation for that.  
 
Sure. 
 
It’s basically related to what I was mentioning in terms of maybe, you know, they use 
different interpretation on the specific issues related to that transaction other than what 
basically the majority of other scholars that, you know, that shows in terms of interpretation.  
 
Q: Do you think this could have a negative impact on Islamic finance for the future?  
Say for example from a conventional financial perspective, having different standards 
say for example in Malaysia and the UK, do you think this would be a bad scenario? 
 
I don’t think it’s that big to have this negative impact as long as it’s kept controlled in terms 
of its judgement and basically provide the criteria so any individual financial institutions or 
countries they will not cross any red lines basically because this would be rejected from the 
industry and from the people themselves taking up this product, you know, so it’s important 
for them, for the financial institutions or, you know, and that reason that they stay within the 
overall agreed upon framework or Sharia compliance parameters.   
 
Q: Okay.  How do you feel about AAOIFI and the IFSB, do you think they are meeting 
their requirements as central regulatory bodies? 
 
In a way they are doing a really good job in terms of standardising and the industry help and 
the industry issuing those standards.  The IFSB in terms of the regulatory aspect, you know, 
pass the regulations and how this can be interpreted for Islamic banks because basically the 
structure of the product is different in a way and on the other side are usually in terms of 
basically the Sharia standard for financial products and putting different governance for 
basically Sharia compliance governance and in banks so showing lots of guidance on these 
issues.  This is basically the passage for standardising this industry as it goes, these basically 
standards and this will grow with it as well.  
 
Q: Sure.  Some have indicated that for more standardisation, Islamic finance needs a 
lender of last resort.  How do you feel about this, like a central bank to support Islamic 
finance, how do you feel about this?  
 
There is in a way lack of resources or skilled people especially in key areas like products of 
Sharia compliance, certain areas for example like a credit, maybe IT and system in terms of 
banking system, they are not that bad because basically it’s pretty much the same with some 
adjustment.  Operations maybe to some extent as long as basically the procedure and 
processes are replaced, finance or to some extent so the issue of resources in certain and 
particular very specialised areas that basically may be there is a huge gap or lack of resources 
in that area. 
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Q: In Islamic countries such as Malaysia and the Gulf region, Islamic banking gets a lot 
of support from the government, do you think there’s enough support from let’s say the 
governments in non-Islamic countries? 
 
Yes I think the UK may be the best example for that in terms of, you know, amending the 
regulation, the tax regime, to accommodate Islamic finance, however it’s something sort of 
ongoing process.  In a way it doesn’t stop, for example the first step or the second step of this 
amendment because the industry is developing this requirement especially also developing 
and adjustment of this regulation is also needed further and in a way maybe it’s moving 
slowly but there is good progress done here in the UK. 
 
Q: What do you think could be done to help improve the overall standardisation of 
Islamic finance going into the future or do you think there’s a need for overall 
standardisation going into the future for Islamic finance? 
 
I think there should be in a way yes standardisation in order to, in a way to maintain this 
industry and to basically keep it in the right direction.  
 
Q: Okay we’re coming down to our last theme so basically we’re now looking at finally 
corporate governance in Islamic finance, how do you feel, what do you think is the level 
of corporate governance in Islamic finance at the moment? 
 
I think in a way it’s very structured and it’s good governance as long as it satisfies the 
requirement of the financial institution basically in terms of having adequate resources, 
Sharia compliance department in the institution and that would be subject of the size of the 
institution as well having Sharia supervisory committee in place for the institution and 
basically having tried and skilled people to operate those functions. 
 
Q: In your experience, has Sharia compliance been a big issue in terms of governance, 
having to manage Sharia compliant governance, Sharia governance, do you think that’s 
been a really big issue when it comes to elements such as new products, product design, 
risk management? 
 
Yes it is because basically for Islamic banks Sharia compliance is the main risk that they have 
to account for in everything because if the bank is perceived to being not compliant with 
Sharia basically this is in a way very damaging to the bank and the bank’s reputation and 
there will be a huge loss of business as well so it’s one of the main and very important risks 
that the bank has to control and manage efficiently.  
 
Q: Okay this is basically the final few questions.  Where do you see Islamic finance 
heading in the future?  Do you think it will continue to grow at the high rates that we’ve 
seen so far or do you think, you know, how do you feel about Islamic finance going into 
the future? 
 
I think it’s basically developing steadily and gradually still developing even in the tip of the 
financial crisis, you know there was development and new products launched, new players 
again to the market and the industry kept growing and I think it will stay on that path in the 
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future, I would say maybe it’s getting bigger, more interest generated, maybe more countries 
is trying to look at it and adapt or amend their financial system or regulations that 
accommodate for Islamic finance? 
 
Q: And how do you think Islamic finance perform during the current financial crisis, do 
you think it performs better, do you think it was a better alternative? 
 
Sorry I didn’t hear the first bit.  You mean how they came out of the financial crisis or how 
they ? 
 
Q: Yes, how do you think Islamic finance basically performed during the financial 
crisis?  Do you think they out-performed conventional finance?  Did they under-
perform conventional finance or were they able to deal with the risk better? 
 
I think in general they were able to deal with the financial crisis better than the conventional 
system because, you know, the different approach to finance and the way they operate so the 
impact, although in general as basically part of the economy as a whole there was a general 
impact and you know they were in a way affected as part of the overall economy but as an 
institution basically in contrast to a conventional financial institution they survived the 
financial crisis much better than the conventional banks because of course of their approach. 
 
Q: Do you see any areas of Islamic finance that require improvement? 
 
Of course there is always room for improvement, in a way maybe improvement in Sharia 
compliance governance or showing that they maintain this aspect because in a way this is 
their key selling point and from ethical approach basically this is the differentiator between, 
you know, their approach and a conventional approach.  In terms of maybe in a way 
providing instruments and solutions for money markets shows in certain aspects Islamic 
banks are disadvantaged because they don’t have enough instruments maybe for money 
markets or short or long term liquidity and strong assets so there are still lots of work to be 
done.  
 
Q: You mention new instruments, one of the, in terms of liquidity, one of the major 
users, one of the big players in commercial finance would be the use of derivatives such 
as options and futures, I mean these are explicitly disallowed in Islamic finance, how do 
you feel about that? 
 
For example in certain areas as you mentioned like equities, Islamic banks they can’t use the 
same instrument that conventional banks use because those instruments are not being Sharia 
compliant and that in a way basically pushed the Islamic finance industry to create suitable 
instruments for them in order to address this issue, however this has not been addressed fully 
and it’s in a way work in progress and more development is, you know, being achieved on 
that front but more needs to be done with that regard. 
 
Q: Great.  Okay final question.  Where do you think the main areas of growth will be 
for Islamic finance in the future? 
 
Sorry, say again.  
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Q: Where do you think the main areas of growth will be for Islamic finance in the 
future? 
 
The main areas of … 
 
Of growth. 
 
Sorry, of what? 
 
Of growth, so main areas of development. 
 
Development. 
 
Yeah.  
 
It pretty much, you know, it goes back to addressing certain issues regarding certain financial 
instruments in terms of inter-banking and financial markets, more structure, maybe Sharia 
compliance governance and in a way developing more products and innovations.  
 
END 
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Academic-Practitioner 2 
Q: Islamic finance is something that’s relatively, well we won’t say new but sort of 
mainstream economy it’s semi-new to a certain extent.  How do you think people within 
the mainstream financial system view Islamic finance? 
 
Well, some people view it as sort of a niche industry, targeting Muslim communities in the 
world.  However, in practice, or even in theory, Islamic finance is targeting all the types of 
consumers, Muslims and non-Muslims.  Some people view the industry as a sort of bringing 
foreign direct investments to each society or each country or the host countries.  Some others 
view Islamic finance as a way of offering new banking services to certain segment of people, 
new products maybe generation of new jobs and contribution to the economy, so it has been 
viewed from many angles and many perspectives and I think it serves all these perspectives 
but it’s not considered as a niche industry for Muslims, it’s an industry for everyone.  
 
Q: Sure.  You say it’s viewed from different angles, could you elaborate further on those 
different types of angles? 
 
Well I mean if we are considering the expansion of Islamic banks or Islamic finance all over 
Europe for example, you will find that the host countries like England, France, Germany may 
view this from an economic perspective so they won’t have new fold direct investment, they 
want a creation of job, they want to get some taxes, they want to get also more contribution to 
the industry, also from maybe a small political perspective, people look at the industry as 
maybe serving their aims of providing a global hub of financial services and from the other, 
from the Muslim community, you look at the angle that the view the industry as a way to 
serve their needs in an Islamic perspective which is a religious wise, religious perspective.  
 
Q: Sure.  Well one of your main points would be that people kind of view Islamic 
finance as a particularly niche industry in a sense that some people say that it’s only 
meant for Muslims, do you feel that that is a very strong view in terms of let’s say, 
within practice do people come up to you and say, you know ?  
 
Well initially most people come with that but when they know that we can provide services to 
each and every one then they start to look to the fundamental aspects of any banking service 
which is the price, the risk, the investments, the tenors, and so on.  But initially people think 
that it’s for Muslim only.  When we do proper marketing and we do proper advertising that 
this service is for all then people will start to look at the fundamental aspects of the banking 
services.  
 
Q: Do you think it’s been tough in that sense trying to get people to understand that it’s 
not only for Muslims? 
 
It’s not difficult but when we come to the point of convincing people which we don’t, do not 
take time then they look at the course, the revenue and the risks of the Islamic bank itself so. 
 
Right so it comes down to … 
 
The fundamentals.  
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… the fundamentals, that’s fair enough.   
 
Yeah, yeah.  
 
Q: Right going into like, with all, you know with the current situation with the financial 
crisis and so on and so forth, what do you think are the inherent risks faced by Islamic 
finance, you know, in a current financial system? 
 
Well if we look at the Islamic banks in general compared to the financial crisis, you will find 
that use of derivatives are very limited so the industry was not that much exposed to 
derivatives because all of the transactions are being hedged normally.  You will find all the 
problem is in the real estate aspect of the prices.  If you consider that Islamic banks had some 
sort of exposures to real estate things during the crisis then there is a problem and to equity 
funds definitely, there is a risk in equity funds and there is a risk in real estate because during 
the financial crisis when they started with the mortgage issue or the real estate issue in the 
US, equities went down and accordingly some sort of equity funds went down and some went 
below 50%, that means liquidation in the Islamic banking industry, so the risk I believe is 
concentrated in the real estate and the equities and investments.  However, the other risks, I 
mean the foreign exchange risk, the money market risk and the other types of credit and 
market risks are normally hedged by sort of underlying assets.  
 
Q: Sure, I mean from what you’re, from what I’m gathering from this, I mean the risk 
profile of Islamic banks is very similar to that of conventional banks, would you say 
that? 
 
It’s not because if you consider the real estate investments and at the end of the day you will 
be having an asset.  Okay?  If you consider the equity investments at the end of the day we’ll 
be having companies which is trading in the market and there is a sort of also of an asset but 
Islamic banks are not exposed to speculation by any means so dealing with uncertainties is 
very, very tough in the Islamic banking industry, we don’t like uncertainties and we don’t 
like volatilities so I can say that each and every transaction has to have a sort of underlying 
asset as a hedging or as protection to their investors but the conventional banks you’ll find 
that taking speculative positions, derivative positions, options and so on, options in Islamic 
banks for example are just useful hedging, they cannot be used for speculation of trading so.  
I think the risk, the risk you will find is more conservative than conventional banks.  
   
Q: Fair enough, that’s cool.  Would you think that issues such Sharia risk are 
important?  In essence we’ve got this whole concept of Sharia compliancy and non-
Sharia compliancy, do you think that’s a big risk in trying to, if you design a new 
product or if you start trading these products that there’s an increased risk there? 
 
Well I think the risk is very low simply because on board we have a Sharia auditor and this 
Sharia auditor is responsible for approving each and every new product and even the existing 
products he do like a frequent, certain annual, review on these products and if he finds that 
any of these products are not Sharia compliant, he simply will take the product, we will go 
outside this product and the profit made of this product will go to charity.  
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Okay, great.  
 
So I think the risk is very low because we have two levels of Sharia compliance, the first one 
is the on-board or the onsite Sharia auditor and the second thing is the Sharia board, the 
Sharia supervisory board where this auditor onsite is reporting to the Sharia board directly 
and this Sharia board has really strong powers to stop anything which is not Sharia complaint.  
 
Q: Sure.  So you actually have an onsite Sharia board within the bank.  
 
We have an onsite Sharia auditor.  
 
Right okay.  
 
Then this Sharia auditor’s report to Sharia supervisory committee which is hired by the bank 
but it’s independent, so it’s not onsite it’s off-site.  
 
Q: How do you feel about, let’s say the Sharia compliant rules within the UK, say for 
example the FTSE has its own Sharia compliant rules in terms of what companies are 
allowed within, you know, what companies are Sharia complaint, how do you feel about 
that? 
 
Well actually any Sharia compliant committee has its own guidelines and risk guidelines, 
they consider the companies that they should not trade in wine, for example, alcohol, 
entertainment, pornographic, weapons and all of these things, so I think the Sharia 
compliance limitations or guidelines are fine with the FTSE thing but again they consider 
also the debt, the level of the debt in each and every company so the screening has the 
activity port and has also the red port because the debt of the company is above or below 
certain level, this may not be acceptable to go for it. 
 
Q: Okay, that’s great.  I mean I think it’s kind of reducing now at the moment but I 
think when, let’s say about ten months ago Islamic finance was very much compared to 
ethical investment funds like environmentally friendly investment funds, would you 
draw that distinction between them?  Would you say there’s a similarity or would you 
say there isn’t a similarity? 
 
Well I think it’s not environmentally friendly, most definitely.  It may be considered as a sort 
of ethical banking.  We are trying to do ethical banking but I don’t think it’s related to the 
environment.  Islamic finance try to put some sort of weight on the corporate social 
responsibilities but I think there is a slight difference between those.  
 
Q: Okay that’s cool.  Right okay you mentioned something about, I mean you say that 
basically derivatives are not allowed.  I mean derivatives are, well derivatives are 
allowed but they are only meant for hedging. 
 
Well there are some sort of derivatives which are allowed for hedging and this is like FX 
forwards, FX swaps okay and FX options so just the simple plain vanilla type of products of 
each one of these so what I can say that it is FX for the FX swaps and FX options, this is the 
only way but for example if we consider the FRS it is not allowed.  
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Right okay. 
 
So it’s just the three types.  
 
Right okay so I mean in terms of the forwards you’d be looking at bai salam or a 
similar, a salam contract.  
 
No we name it unilateral promise, Wa’d. 
 
Right okay, okay Wa’d. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Q: In that sense, I mean wouldn’t the Wa’d structure be similar more to an option or 
would it be more to a forward? 
 
Well we use the Wa’d for both, for options and for forwards.  
 
Okay. 
 
So there is no more, there’s no underlying commodity.  
 
Sure. 
 
The problem is one party is promising the other … 
 
Yeah. 
 
… and it is, sometimes it is a binding contract, sometimes it’s not binding but again the 
similarities, it’s similar to the conventional ways in terms of calculation but again it is just a 
promise, it can be implemented and cannot be implemented so it’s … 
 
Q: Sure.  I mean how do you feel about, your risk management is quite tough within 
Islamic banking, I mean why would you say that?  What would you attribute that to? 
 
Well the risk management framework is conservative in Islamic banks.  I work with Islamic 
banks and I work with conventional banks so what I can say that it’s more conservative in 
Islamic banks and I think this is to the sake of protecting investors, not to the sake of being 
like achieving low revenues, just we try to protect investors and I think the risk management 
framework does not allow you to go below investment rate in some cases and consider the 
rating factors and fundamental analysis of each and every security or an investment vehicle as 
a major issue to be dealt with before putting the money somewhere or somehow. 
 
Q: I mean in that case I mean do you think, I’m sure you have loads of people coming 
up to going we want to manage some risk, do you think you have enough instruments to 
manage that risk?  Do you think you have the adequate tools to manage that risk? 
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Well again the tools of managing risk is the same as the conventional ways, there is no 
difference on this, it is almost the same.  Again we say the VAR, the market value, the market 
risk, the PPV value, it’s all the more the conventional ways of managing risks.  
 
Q: Sure, I mean in that sense so the way in which we manage, the fundamental way of 
managing risk in Islamic finance would be similar to that of conventional finance.  
 
Yeah. 
 
It’s always about mitigating that, sure.  
 
Yeah.  About mitigation it is just conservative way but it is always the same.   
 
Q: How do you feel about product development within Islamic finance?  How do you 
feel about, you know, the new products?  Like the Wa’d is a relatively new product, you 
have profit rate swaps which are relatively new as well.  How do you feel about product 
development within Islamic banks? 
 
Well this is where you find the Sharia risk, the product development is where you find the 
Sharia risk somewhere.  Because again you have many Sharia boards, you have some Sharia 
boards in Malaysia, you have Sharia board in London, you have Sharia board in the Gulf, you 
have in Egypt, you have, you have, you have.  Unfortunately the interpretation of the Sharia 
law varies among these boards so what is permissible in Malaysia may not be permissible in 
London.  What is permissible in Egypt may not be permissible in Malaysia because everyone 
has his own interpretation of the Sharia law or the Quran.  
 
Yeah. 
 
So this is the risk of the product so if somebody comes with a product which may be 
approved in one place and rejected in another place.  
 
Right okay.  
 
This is the only risk we have.  The product development is good but it’s slow. 
 
Right okay.  
 
Because it takes too much time to be approved.  
 
Right okay.  
 
So if we are saying on example we are trying to develop a standard format of the ISDA which 
is similar to the International Swaps Dealers Association agreement. 
 
Okay.  
 
International Swaps Dealer Agreement.  This has been taken like maybe four years now to be 
developed because again the ISDA which is an agreement to trade derivatives is not Sharia 
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compliant so reaching a Sharia compliant version of this ISDA is really something difficult so 
the product development is going on but it’s a slow process.  
 
Q: What do you think could be kind of, how do you think, do you think it can be 
improved in that respect? 
 
Yeah we were able to develop a sort of product in terms of structured notes like doing the 
capital protected note with a basket  of equities managed by an investment agent according to 
the Sharia law so the components of the basket is Sharia compliant equities or Sharia 
compliant fixed income instruments.  The Sharia approved it because they said or we said 
there is a sort of capital protection so if the capital is protected then the Sharia normally is 
happy because this is protecting investors dealing with uncertainties and avoid losses to the 
people who put the money in so I think it will keep taking time but this will reduce gradually.  
It will develop but slowly so we can say that the proper term is slowly but surely.  
 
Slowly but surely, fair enough.  
 
Yeah.  
 
Q: I mean it kind of feels like basically a lot of the development in Sharia finance and 
Islamic finance comes down to basically establishing a sound regulatory base because I 
mean that’s the vibe I’m kind of getting in a sense that if we have a good regulatory 
standard, if we have, you know, we can actually progress forward.  Would you agree on 
that? 
 
Well the regulations in the UK are about the full weight of regulations we have to consider 
this.  The problem is the regulatory framework to Islamic banks or for Islamic banks is 
almost similar to the conventional banks a part of some things like the buffer, for example the 
liquidity buffer.  
 
Sure.  
 
Conventional banks are able to place on the cabin floor facility with Bank of England.  
Islamic banks found this facility is not Sharia compliant.  
 
Right okay.  
 
Okay so what was approved to the Islamic banks as a liquidity buffer or liquidity facility is 
the Sukuk or the Islamic bonds or of Islamic Development Bank which is IDB in Jeddah 
because it is the only Islamic institution that is treble A rated.  The case is all of the Sukuk 
here or all of the bonds of the Islamic bank or Islamic Development Bank are in US dollars 
and we are sterling based bank.  
 
Right.  
 
All the Islamic banks are sterling based banks so you will find again a foreign exchange 
exposure between the dollar and sterling.  
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Right okay.  
 
Also you will found the liquidity of the product is a hassle so the regulatory framework in 
this aspect is not the same between Islamic and conventional banks so I think if we dealt with 
the liquidity management thing or the liquidity buffer issue, the regulatory framework will be 
the same and it will won’t make a difference because again the regulatory framework in the 
UK is very tough and old so it’s trying to protect again the overall investors.  
 
Q: Right, I mean you say the liquidity management side of the Sukuk in that sense, 
would that be down to the fundamental structuring of the Sukuk requiring a tangible 
asset? 
 
Yes I think so because we are trying now with Islamic Development Bank to issue a sterling 
Sukuk and to provide liquidity on the current Sukuk because the liquidity is very tough in 
terms of buying and selling such type of Sukuk.  Triple A rated Sukuk, a lot of people have 
lots of demands on triple A rated but you find the supply is very limited so when you need to 
buy something for your own buffer, it’s a little bit of a hassle together.  So I think this is the 
only variation in the regulation between the Islamic and conventional banks in the UK 
because the liquidity management stuff, if we were able to tackle this issue I think the 
regulatory framework will be the same and it will be tough on all of us. 
 
Q: I mean with the UK side, you’ve just said that there’s different interpretations of the 
Quran and you know in Malaysia, do you think the lack of uniformity within, let’s say 
the UK, the Middle East, the Gulf countries and Malaysia in the Far East, do you think 
that’s hindering, you know, do you think that’s a problem? 
 
Well I think yes, I think yes it’s a problem and I think standardisation won’t be achieved 
easily in this arena.  However, the Malaysians have applied a very nice version on 
standardisation, they have made an association in AIBM, or AINB, I don’t remember but 
again this association is responsible for Islamic banking in Malaysia.  They developed 
standard agreements to be used by all the Malaysian banks, Murabaha, Wakala profit rate 
swaps, what you can imagine, all the agreements have been done there.  They have provided 
standard format of Sukuk, ijarah, leasing, whatever, you know, Wakala management Sukuk 
so they succeeded, I can confirm that the Malaysian version of standardisation succeeded, 
however this is not it implemented in the Middle East or in London, I think we need a sort of 
again association maybe or something like this but in addition to the RIFM or the AAOIFI 
are already in place but somebody to force the standardisation because again you will find the 
agreements in the UK, this agreement differs from our agreements differs from the other 
banks’ agreements and in the Middle East it’s the same hassle so I think Malaysia was able to 
achieve a regional standardisation which may be the case if we were able to achieve like four 
regional standardisation, one in Malaysia, one in Europe, one in Middle East and one maybe 
in North Africa, it will be something good but overall standardisation I think this would be 
different because there are four Mazhab, there are four branches of interpretation to Sharia 
law, if you are unaware of this, there are four, we name it Mazhab, Mazhab is somebody, 
some scholar who developed a way and some others with them so we have Mazhab, Shafi, 
Imelki, Hanbali and Hanafi so it’s four sectors and four scholars.  You’ll find the Egyptians 
for example following the Hanafi, finding Malaysians following somebody else, Iraqi follow, 
it is different. 
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Q: Do you think that basically I mean in terms of uniformity I mean you say it’s 
difficult to have, I mean the Malaysians have standardisation, the UK doesn’t really 
have standardisation in the Middle East, it’s extremely tough to have standardisation I 
mean in terms of let’s say financial innovation, so you develop the product in the UK 
that you want to trade that you, you know, think is a good product and you want to 
have Sharia approval in the UK and you want to advertise that product in the Middle 
East, would you encounter a lot of problems? 
 
Well in some cases you find the same Sharia scholars on the board. 
 
Right okay. 
 
So if we say one of the famous scholars as in Sheikh Nizam Yakubi for example, he is on our 
board and he is on other 46 boards. 
 
Right okay. 
 
So if you find the same scholars on other boards, it’s very easy to sell your products in the 
Middle East.  If you find different scholars then you have to put these scholars in front of 
these scholars.  Normally they come with a middle ground of agreement.  In very few cases 
they didn’t achieve an agreement and that’s why the product stopped but this is very few 
cases. 
 
Right. 
 
Normally they sit with each other, even on the ‘phone or conference call or video conference, 
whatsoever, and they agree a middle ground of doing that. 
 
Sure.  I mean … 
 
So we have to keep everybody happy. 
 
I’m afraid that’s a really tough job that one. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Q: Coming down to that, so you basically have, so I mean it was one of the criticisms of 
the Sharia supervisory boards in a sense that you have one scholar sitting on many 
different boards.  Do you think that’s a big issue?  Do you think that is a problem that, 
you know, that affects? 
 
No I think this is an indirect way of achieving uniformity. 
 
Right. 
 
Because at the end of the day if you find one, if you are on the Sharia board and you approve 
this in London, how you would be able to reject it in the Middle East?  Yeah it’s a little bit of 
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a tough job.  You will be contradicting yourself or he will be contradicting himself.  
 
Fair enough. 
 
So I think this is an indirect way of achieving uniformity. 
 
You make a very fair point there.  
 
Yeah.  
 
Q: I mean another thing basically with uniformity there’s also the issue of the lender of 
the last resort, you kind of indicated that in the UK you have, you know, buffer levels 
better established with the Bank of England.  With Islamic finance you’ve got the 
Islamic Development Bank as semi lender of last resort, do you think that could actually 
be, you know, do you think that could be further developed? 
 
Well the lender of the last resort for Islamic banks in the UK are normally the parents, in the 
Middle East because all of them are Middle Eastern, having a Middle Eastern linkage.  
However, the Islamic development bank will remain the lender of the last resort but there is 
no official facility, there is no, the Bank of England overnight facility is not there for Islamic 
Bank so the bank is there, when you go and negotiate with them, when you go they help you 
and when you go to them and they help you, however the facility itself is not there. 
 
Right. 
 
For example in other institutions, conventional institutions, if I have a lack of liquidity 
overnight, I go to the central bank, I have my limits, I go online, I go and get the money 
overnight and return it next day or the day after, whatsoever, this facility itself is not there so 
I think there is a need to develop a sort of facility even managed by Islamic Development 
Bank or any other association that helps the Islamic banks to cover the liquidity.  
 
Q: I mean would you like this to be let’s say the bank in the host, the central bank in the 
host country or would you like this to be a separate entity from the central bank? 
 
Well I think it should be the bank, the central bank in the same host country simply because, 
you know, there are different time zones and different liquidity requirements and different 
even rules so the rules in the UK is not the same as the rule in Jeddah and Saudi Arabia where 
Islamic Development Bank is there and it is not the same in Qatar so I think it has to be done 
through the central bank or the regulatory entity in the host country.  
 
Q: Fair enough.  Another thing that was interesting in the sense that if you, sorry I lost 
my train of thought there.  Okay, in terms of AAOIFI and the IFSB, you know the two 
large regulatory bodies within Islamic banking finance, how do you feel their role, how 
do you perceive their role within the financial system? 
 
This will come to one aspect which I read in your paper on the governance.  Okay they are 
very good in doing that and they’re establishing like a sort of even Shariah certificates, 
training, whatsoever and governance, okay what is important here?  Okay if you are 
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achieving say that this is standard document developed by AAOIFI, Islamic banks has to, 
Islamic banks have to apply this.  Okay if one Islamic bank didn’t do it, if any of the banks 
didn’t do that where would be the problem?  There would be nothing because this will, they 
already laterally or they are overseeing the industry but without enforcement powers.  If you 
have a liquidity requirement from the FSA and you did not meet with this liquidity 
requirement, somebody who is the treasurer who would be fired and the bank will be paying 
penalty so the sort of enforcement and governance by government I think these institutions 
are good as long as the Islamic banks agree themselves that they apply the same standards on 
100%. 
 
Q: Do you think that both AAOIFI and the IFSB then should be given enforcement 
powers to basically imply? 
 
Yeah. 
 
Q: I mean would you think that could ever happen, would you think that’s, you know, a 
way? 
 
Again it’s very difficult because you find again the IFSB and the AAOIFI are in Saudi Arabia 
and you have different regulators and regulations in the UK, I think in terms of agreements 
and contracts, they can have this but in terms of liquidity and some other regulatory stuff I 
think it’s difficult. 
 
Q: Okay that’s a very interesting point there.  Right I just realised what I forgot to ask 
you in a sense that because Islamic banks don’t have that ability to depend on let’s say 
the host country central bank because it’s not like banks technically are, you know, they 
operate in different way in terms of, you know, the way they trade, the way the funds 
invest in, do you think that there is a competitive advantage to either one of them 
conventional banking or Islamic banks, do you think there’s a competitive advantage 
for conventional banks over Islamic banks at the current situation? 
 
Well at the current situation I think yes in terms of pricing.  Standard banks are not able to 
compete with pricing.  If you look at the standard mortgages versus the conventional 
mortgages in the UK as just a little bit of an example, just all of the Islamic banks are just 
small in size or medium sized, so just compare the mortgages provided by Islamic banks with 
some other small UK conventional bank entity, you will find Islamic banks are asking for 
20% deposit, some other banks are asking for 10 or 15.  You will find the price here is 4.99, 
the price here is 3.49, so again the customer, from a customer perspective, if you are not that 
much tough on religion on the Islam you will go for the good pricing.  Why you pay 4.99 if 
you can get it for 3.49?  However, the uniqueness of Islamic finance you will find many 
people going for the 4.99.  Why?  Because they want to go to an Islamic product.  Again this 
is how the conventional banks have a competitive advantage on this.  I think also the market 
accessibility for conventional banks are wider than the market expected for Islamic banks.  
Islamic banks have strict rules to be with.  If you find how many Islamic banks in the world, 
are you able to deal with all of them?  The answer is no, you have to deal with any risk 
management standard and country limits and country risks so again we are not able, for 
example, to deal with Islamic banks in Afghanistan for example there is a country risk just on 
example okay but you find accessibility of the conventional banks are really good.  If you 
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have a small bank in the UK you can just place money in anywhere in the world if he have 
the approved limits and risk framework but again we find all over the world Islamic banks, 
100 banks, 74 banks, so it’s very different.  
 
Q: Yeah.  What do you think could be done to make it more of a level playing field?  I 
mean like how do you think you can, you know, what proposals could go? 
 
I think the transactions and legally the operation of course itself it’s hard for Islamic banks.  
If you go to any lawyer asking him to develop documentation for Islamic banks, he would 
charge you almost double, he would charge you high because it says this requires more effort, 
this requires more consultancy, we have to ask our experts.  Like on the transaction of course 
at the time being it’s high, there is of course the commodity involved in each and every day 
because of the commodity involved aspect so again if you were able to take the operational 
costs down plus using more technology and innovative product development and innovation 
of the products, you will be able to do something otherwise it will be again the same way. 
 
Q: Fair enough.  Do you kind of find that innovation within Islamic finance, financial 
products is at par with financial innovation within conventional finance because if you 
think about conventional finance we have evolution of products, we don’t really have 
new products coming out year on, year out whereas with Islamic finance you have new 
interpretations and so on, do you think that, you know, they are? 
 
I think the revolution of the products are going better than the innovation of the products.  
Again I think the cost factor and I think also that we need to access the market and do well 
marketing for the Islamic banking products so if we were able to do that, there are some 
products in the Islamic finance arena performed well so performed really well and some 
funds performed really well, maybe better than the conventional line but who knows? 
 
Fair enough. 
 
It’s again the accessibility, the marketing accessibility, how we do market the product. 
 
Q: Right.  I think one of my, you know what I would really want to see from Islamic 
finance would be like its ability to kind of integrate itself but basically having 
mainstream customers kind of use Islamic products, so on and so forth, and you know 
across like if you want Islamic products you can use them, if you want conventional 
products you can use it, how do you feel about that in terms of integrating, let’s say, an 
Islamic Wa’d into a conventional risk management strategy, how do you feel about 
that? 
 
Well okay the risk management strategy is comparing to bases, to the market movement of 
the Wa’ad whatever, market risk or whatsoever, so I don’t think there is a problem of 
benchmarking a product to conventional risk management because simply the product in 
reality, you will find the same calculations as the conventional way.  The only difference is in 
the underlying contract all the operations, accounting, processing so the contract is different 
but again the calculations are the same so it’s fair to benchmark it to our conventional risk 
management thing.  However, is Islamic banks you cannot mix conventional money with 
Islamic money but you can again you can benchmark your thing.  Again look at the reality.  
       
  
 
386 
99.9999% of the Islamic banks in the area are benchmarking the profit rate anticipations or 
expectations to Libor which is a conventional facility.  Again when they tried to, when 
Islamic banks tried to adapt or develop a market tool or a formation tool with BBA, the 
British Bankers Association, similar Islamic LIBORS, it’s in a very premature stage and even 
it is there by the way, it is already in place but you’ll find contributors are very low and you 
will find also maybe the same people who contribute to the Islamic Libor is benchmarking 
according to the conventional Libor which is a contradiction but I think this would be fixed 
over time, it would take too much time to be there because you need more contributors.  
Again you need many people to put, to contribute to the Islamic Libor facility.  It’s not like 
three or four big banks and that’s it. 
 
Q: Sure.  How do you feel about the uptake of Islamic banking, you know, in that 
respect because you need more contributions?  How do you feel like is the market place 
readily accepting Islamic? 
 
Well actually the market is accepting finance, Islamic products but the problem is that 
Islamic banks, specifically in the UK are very small in size so they are not, I believe they are 
not well capitalised by their parents, I don’t mean a criticism but I mean that the parent 
companies in the Middle East aimed at having small entities not big entities so their 
competitive edge would be by default smaller in nature to the competitive edge if anything.  
If you are talking about the average capitals in the UK, a bank of 50 million, a bank of 100 
million, which is very again very, very tiny comparing to the industry itself.  
 
Q: That’s fair enough.  How do you feel about the expertise with an Islamic bank and 
like do you think there’s better, I mean you know you’ve got loads of little Islamic 
banks being set up, you’ve got new Islamic banks being set up and year and year on, 
how do you find the expertise within the market place, is there enough to basically go 
round or do you think it’s a struggle to find people that know what they’re doing? 
 
Well I think Islamic banks needs the blend of the western banking expertise with the good 
Muslim professionals, or good people in the profession, for example most of our industrial 
practitioners are from the UK or British people and they have the previous conventional 
experience in HSBC and Europe, whatsoever, X, Y, Z banks but this expertise is running 
alone, it won’t achieve anything.  Without having the people from the Muslim community 
who know what Islam and how to do this but yeah I mean they’re good people, I think there 
is a problem on the human capital.  The level of expertise, our expertise is not as we expect 
and I think most expertise in the Islamic banking comes in the Middle East. 
 
Q: Sure, okay.  Do you also find like a problem, I mean because you have loads of 
conventional people within the commission market coming into Islamic banking, do you 
find that there is a bit of, you know, a bit of a shock to their system when they’re 
coming and going, okay it’s a different way of doing things? 
 
Well I think most western professionals do not do the proper study before moving to an 
Islamic bank because most of the people do it for better position, for better money, for better 
salary, for fundamental financial remuneration and packages but if they looked on how they 
are going to do the things, I think they will think deeply whether they can do it or not because 
some of them comes and they are really able to do the job and they are happy to do the job 
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and some others are struggling, they don’t understand this and they don’t maybe struggle to 
understand things so again it will depend on the person himself because some people are 
really good in this and some others are really not so. 
 
Right, fair enough. 
 
I think that maybe we need to have like a sort of qualification which is, again the IFQ which 
is developed by the CISI is not sufficient. 
 
Right okay. 
 
I see that as a very fundamental qualification and even the language of the book itself is not 
clear and it’s not reflecting the real way of doing things but again I think if we have a sort of 
proper qualifications by a proper institute but CIMA is trying to do something, maybe CFA is 
trying to do something, it’s something tough and something good and some accredited 
training providers we can achieve something.  
 
Q: Fair enough.  Okay that’s cool.  Right another issue when it comes to Islamic 
banking that’s been highlighted within, you know, the Islamic role will be the 
transparency of Islamic banks in terms of, you know, when it comes to the way products 
are structured, I mean a lot of people complain that oh I go into an Islamic bank and I 
don’t know what the products are about, how do you feel about that? 
 
The transparency of the product is available.  The product structure is available but it will 
come to the person who is conveying the message to the client.  Does he understand the 
product he is marketing or not?  Is he aware of what are the risks or not so it will come to the 
human factor but again to reach the stage of approving the product by the Sharia board is 
very difficult and it has to be transparent so each and every step is one, two, three, four, very 
clear.  The problem here will come to the human factor who is conveying the message, also 
to the marketing and advertising strategy which may be a little bit vague in some cases.  But 
not all.  I think in some cases it is vague, it needs like a sort of more clarity and more 
explanation to the difference between this product and that product. 
 
Q: Right.  So it’s down to the institutional level where basically the problem lies. 
 
Yeah I think it’s not about the transparency of a product, it’s about the way of marketing and 
the human capital.  The human factor who is conveying the message to the client, I have dealt 
with people in other banks maybe in my careers who are marketing the products which they 
don’t know anything about it. 
 
Right. 
 
You ask them is capital productive, you know when he start to do that you will definitely, 
something wrong here. 
 
Sure. 
 
So I think the human factor here has … 
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Q: What about large transactions, because one of the things like if you think about it, in 
terms of Sukuk structure and I think Sukuks are large transactions … 
 
Yeah. 
 
… I mean I think one of the main concerns was basically down to how, who was 
participating within these Sukuks, who was buying a large proportion and, you know, 
and people wanted to know with disclosure of that information, do you think, you know, 
is that an issue in your ? 
 
Well I think well who is buying, I don’t think this is the problem with Islamic banks, I think 
the problem is the structure is to be Sharia complaint, the asset to be Sharia compliant in the 
investment of the Sukuk proceeds itself to go in a Sharia compliant manner.  Who is buying?  
I think this is similar to the bond market.  You can buy, I can buy, everybody can buy and I 
don’t think that all the bond holders of each and every conventional bond insurance are 
disclosed.  You will find maybe the liquidity provider, you’ll find their ranges.  You’ll find 
the big players, maybe the major holder, the core arrangers but you don’t find the one who 
buys two hundred grand and three hundred grand.  And you know you have to consider 
something that most of the Sukuk or some of the Sukuk goes to private banks and funds.  If it 
goes to the funds then investors I think are clear in the prospects rather than the prospectus of 
each and every fund.  The types of investors or the geographical locations.  However for 
private banks how you will be able to tell that this Sukuk was sold to X, Y, Z investor 
because you have for example KFC private bankers buying three million of Sukuk but this 
bank is not buying the Sukuk for themselves, they are buying for their ultra-high network 
individuals who are clients of these banks so you cannot ensure they’ve got disclosure of this. 
 
That sounds like it’s pretty much similar to the conventional banks … 
 
Yeah exactly. 
 
… because you don’t get full disclosure within the conventional markets as well. 
 
Exactly so I think again it is about the product, the structure and the investments of the 
proceed not about who is buying the case. 
 
Q: That’s great.  I mean in terms of transparency as well there was a bit of a concern 
about, you know, the processes in light of the financial crisis, I think Dubai had a bit of 
an issue with Sukuk issuance and there was a bit of concern in terms of the protection 
for its customers.  How did you find the overall protection of customers of Islamic 
finance? 
 
Well again it depends on the structure of the Sukuk itself.  If the structure of this, for 
example, ijara then you have the asset, you can liquidate the asset and do the pari passu and 
that’s it.  But if the structure is Wakala management, Wakala management you are giving the 
money to a company to invest it in it’s something, again how it is going to be done, this is to 
the company and its investment strategy and whatsoever.  If the company defaulted then we 
have again the pari passu and all the government support but with government backed 
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companies they will find that normally government backed companies, you will find the 
government will interfere and do something which I think was the case in Dubai World 
because the Sukuk is trading at premium now so that’s … 
 
Q: Do you think there is a need for an overall framework as to, you know, to highlight 
the protection that customers get when you participate in Islamic banking, you know 
like litigation, so on and so forth, is there a way forward?  How would you recoup the 
money? 
 
Well I think the things are there in the prospectus of each and every Sukuk but I think nobody 
reads.  Yeah because you find the prospectus is like 300 pages.  Nobody reads.  I read it once 
but afterwards I read just certain points, the risks, the pricing, the investments of the proceed, 
so I think it is there.  I think maybe it’s not well indicated to the people.  So I think it is there 
but I think it is either not communicated properly to the client or I mean to the retail and 
individual client because it’s communicated by default and institutional investors so when 
there is a Sukuk in the market I do not put a single penny in the Sukuk unless I have the 
prospectus and this prospectus I read it as from a treasury prospective and it is being sent to 
the Sharia and to the risk management and to the compliance and it goes through a long 
process of approval.  So if these things are not there, it will not be approved but I am telling 
you about the Sukuk specifically, everything in the prospectus but nobody reads simply. 
 
Q: Do you think that it’s down to marketing once again that basically you need to 
market the product? 
 
What I think it’s done to marketing, to retail and individual customers for institutional 
customers I think they have the expertise to deal with such things again.  If you have, it’s by 
default if you have a general support, you have asset.  If you have a leasing you have an asset.  
If it’s Wakala I don’t have the assets so it will depend on the credit risk of the company. 
 
Right.  Just a few, last few questions. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Q: You mentioned at the start basically the exposure of Islamic indices or Islamic equity 
funds is, you know, less to risk compared to conventional funds because we don’t have 
banks, we don’t have insurance companies within equity funds and Islamic finance.  Do 
you think that that is actually the case?  Are Islamic equity funds really lower risk than 
conventional funds? 
 
Well for me equities are of high volatility and of risk but again it will depend on a lot of the 
construction of the fund.  If you are looking for example at one of our products which is IFI 
Fund, Islamic Financial Institutions Fund, you will find that this is only dealing with the 
shares of Islamic financial institutions so yes there is a concentration risk because of the 
Islamic banking industry when down the fund will go down.  However, the distribution with 
foreign banks and Dubai banks and London banks and Singapore banks and Malaysia, all 
Islamic banks, I mean here, here, here, there so again the markets in the whole universe will 
not be falling down unless there is a disaster and in this case the disaster will come to 
everyone, not to a certain type of investors, so again it will depend on the construction of 
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each and every fund.  The risk weighted average of each security and the geographical 
distribution of the security.  So there is a risk.  It may look lower than the conventional but 
again it will depend on the fund manager’s construction of such components. 
 
Q: Okay so equity funds is that, what about the Islamic financial system as whole, do 
you think that there’s a lot of talk that basically if you invest in Islamic finance you 
essentially get a low risk asset regardless of which facet is … 
 
Yeah I think how people view Islamic finance are like a bit more conservative about 
conventional banks and yes they consider it low risk. 
 
Q: But I mean in terms of basically let’s say if you have an Islamic Sharia compliant 
index within the UK that includes a, for example, let’s think of an Islamic finance, let’s 
say it includes a company that access the conventional finance because it’s just based in 
this, do you think that basically to the sixth degree, to the seventh degree that company 
still borrows funds from conventional banks, you’re still kind of exposed to 
conventional shocks that a system, do you think that Islamic finance is, you know, is not 
affected by the financial crisis? 
 
No it is affected, it is affected.  Surely it’s affected, surely it’s affected.  Again maybe they 
were well protected on the derivative side but they were affected on the equities on the real 
estate.  Again, no it is a risk I think. 
 
Right. 
 
Even if it’s on FTSE Islamic or in SPU, Dow Jones Islamic it is a risk. 
 
Q: Fair enough.  Okay where do you see Islamic finance in the next few years, like how 
do you see Islamic finance moving forward? 
 
Well I think we need a mega Islamic bank.  It’s either through IDB or through any other 
shareholding structure, we need a mega Islamic bank which is overseeing the whole industry 
and we need again to try to achieve this sort of regional standardisation.  I’m positive about it 
especially with expansion, with horizontal expansion of Islamic banks and if you look at 
Europe, for example, you’ll find lots of potential on this, specifically Turkey, Germany.  
France is now trying to do something so it is going well, I’m positive about it.  I don’t expect 
it will be like matured as a, efficient as conventional banks in the coming few years but 
definitely within maybe 10 to 15 years it will be a different story. 
 
Q: Fair enough, I mean, you know, with the current economic climate, how do you see 
growth forecast, you think you know I mean for the past few years Islamic finance has 
grown exponentially, we’re looking at 20% growth, year on year, so on and so forth, do 
you think …? 
 
I don’t think it will be 20%, maybe around 5%. 
 
5%? 
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Yeah maybe. 
 
Q: Do you see it as a white knight in terms of, you know, when it first came on the scene 
with the financial crisis people were like oh we have to go to Islamic finance because 
that’s the main, because it’s an alternative we won’t get, do you see it as …? 
 
That’s part of the rumours and the fact so I think we got all the money at the financial crisis 
so we need another crisis to reach this 20%.  I think it will be growing but I don’t think it will 
be by 20% honestly speaking. 
 
Q: Where do you see the main growth areas in terms of? 
 
I think it’s fund management, asset management and the treasury standard I don’t expect that 
much because I think maybe on the real estate thing if we were able to develop some sort of 
real estate funds so I think the fund management and asset management are the main areas. 
 
END 
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Academic-Practitioner 3 
 
Q: How do you think Islamic finance is viewed by mainstream finance? 
 
A: Well I think I can answer that fairly directly because I was actually on a panel at 
Bloomberg’s just 10 days ago in London and we had a whole bunch of city people, we had a 
very good turnout, we had a number of people from Islamic financial institutions and a 
couple of us academics, myself and Khadom Shuber, who you probably know was at 
Westminster University and he has written a lot on Islamic finance. He is definitely 
somebody you should interview and he has translated a number of pieces, including a book 
on Islamic finance and he was the editor for some time of the journal that I set up which was 
the International Journal of Middle Eastern Management and Finance, so we are covering the 
whole thing. So how do people in the west see it? Well I think there is a good deal of lack of 
knowledge really. I remember many year ago when I was at Branford I was interested in this 
whole area and in correspondence with a number of people and I was a member then of the 
International Islamic Finance Forum, which you probably know is a conference that meets 
twice a year, so I was kind of in that network and I was discussing this with one of my 
professors of accountancy who just said “well its rubbish isn’t it?” and I just said “oh ok” and 
she said “yea it is complete rubbish”. She said that they don't have any idea how to price 
assets, they have no idea how to work out risk and essentially they are just lending to their 
mates and I said yes but I think that there’s a bit more to it. So the first thing is that there is 
still a fairly high degree of ignorance about what’s involved. The thing that most people 
fasten on is of course this kind of obvious thing – the lack of riba, the lack of an interest rate 
denominated return and I think if you go into where that comes from in Islamic thinking you 
understand why to them it is haram to be able to predict an outcome. This is the essence of 
the issue that under Islamic thinking only God can know what the future can be. No human 
being can know that. Therefore, you cannot put a quantity value; you cannot put a numeric 
value onto the future. If you claim to do that you are usurping the role of God. I think that is 
one thing that we need to get clear about it (Islamic finance). The second thing that I think 
people in the west find very hard to understand is the idea that the intrinsic thinking in this 
field in Islam is conservative. The chair at our panel in Bloomberg’s last month, we were 
having coffee together before hand and he was saying “well they are very risk adverse aren’t 
they?” and I said “yes, they are” because they think that that's the role of a financial system to 
conserve wealth because it is again haram, immoral, it’s spiritually wrong to waste wealth. So 
we talked about it and he said “well this is going to be difficult about investing in leading 
edge situations” and I said “by leading edge situations, if you’re talking about the way in 
which the western financial systems have got themselves into, the mess we are in, you can 
see why they are kind of suspicious about that because you start off with wealth and you end 
up with less wealth and under Islam that's really morally wrong”. Wasting other people’s 
wealth that’s one thing, but actually wasting God’s wealth because this all belongs to God. 
These are very simplistic notions but I think one of the reasons why we, in the west, just don't 
get it, is that we think risk, per se, has got to be a good thing. We have these kinds of little 
one liners like ‘high risk, high return’ but what if its ‘high risk and no return’? Do you jump 
down on to the underground rail track because you think it is ok to take on a risk and you can 
put it up on YouTube? No, there are something’s you just don't do and why in a financial 
system would you think it’s credible to lend money to people who can’t ever pay you back? 
So by the same token, if we are talking about ‘high risk, high return’ and it is a western 
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criticism of Islamic approaches to finance that they are quote ‘risk adverse’ which by 
definition a lot of our financial people think is a bad thing. Well how would you like it if I 
say I am going to build a bridge across a canyon and the guy is a really good engineer, he 
likes taking risk and he’s never done this before and its going be very exciting and your 
approach is probably going to be no, give me a rather conservative engineer who will put up a 
bridge under which people can travel every day and it’s going to be safe. So I think there is 
some deep, this is the area that interests me very much obviously, not the precise mechanics 
of how you denominate asset prices or how you value a sukuk and that kind of thing but, 
where in that psyche is this thing coming from with what we are calling Islamic finance and 
how does that differ from the way we look at money. So that's where I’m coming from 
basically. 
 
Q: People tend to pigeon hold Islamic finance with ethical financing. What are your 
thoughts on that? Do you think we can draw parallels between the two? 
 
A: Well in a way not, you see and I’ll tell you why because this distinction of ‘what is ethical 
and what is not?’ that is a very western kind of liberal capitalistic thinking that we have 
brought into it. It is almost as though we are saying “well there’s making money, there’s 
business and then there’s ethical making money and business” and the Islamic way of 
thinking, you’ve got to be the same, you’ve got to be made out of the same stuff all the way 
through. So I think the view that I come across is ‘why would you trust, in business, someone 
you wouldn't have to your home’ and when we say, and I hear this from colleagues, not just 
American colleagues, “oh its business! Oh I ripped him off! It’s fine. But that's business!” 
Well we don't think that is business. If you do business in that way then that means you are 
really not a very ‘OK’ person. So why would you need to have a special category of what is 
ethical finance? Does that mean that all the other finance is unethical? How do work that out? 
See I think that there is this idea that Islam really permeates all aspects of life. It is what you 
are in every aspect. So you got, in the sense, to be made out of whole cloth. You don't have 
an area which is ethical and then another area which is unethical. 
 
Q: What do you think is the inherent risks faced by Islamic finance going into the 21
st
 
century? 
 
A: Well of course there are inherent risks. Everything that I am saying is conditioned by the 
fact that we really don't have deep silos in international finance. So all money is involved 
with other money which is why, you have in the global economy, the grave danger that risky 
trades in one sector, for example the sub-prime effect, will affect transactions in other quite 
unrelated or apparently unrelated parts of the economy and many, many, many aspects of 
Islamic finance are actually exposed to the same market conditions as the global economy 
generally. So you can’t be insulated from it that's for sure, that's absolute. But I think there 
are two kinds of fairly big ideas which make you wonder whether Islamic finance might not 
be something we need to look at more deeply. First is this. It has been accepted, for I guess 
the last 50-60 years implicitly and in business education quite explicitly, that the western, 
liberal capitalist model is not merely the best way but is the way everybody is going to have 
to go because it is simply an economic reality. I think the events of the last few years have 
put a big question mark about that. I don't think , for example the Chinese, feel they’ve got to 
follow our rules and this isn’t to do with Islamic finance, it has to do with are we running a 
world economy on the same basis as its been run since, let’s say, the 60-s and 70s. And I 
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think the Chinese are saying “no, we can actually create and push through into a different 
state of economic development by managing capitalism in a different way from the way ‘you 
guy’ (the west) do. So when, for about 10 years, we are saying “hey hey hey big trade 
surpluses are building up, the Chinese are going to have to revalue”, I don't think the Chinese 
ever thought they were going to have to revalue. I think they thought “yea we a building up 
great trade surpluses and our balance of payments are actually looking very good”. So they 
had if you like, going back to an old idea, a more mercantilist kind of approach and a liberal 
open market approach, likewise with Islamic finance. one of the things that I find, I mean I do 
a lot of work in the middle east particularly, we’ve worked a lot with people from other 
regions, Malaysia and so on, Indonesia. One of the things that is very important about Islam 
is that it is a coherent culture, coherent (13.42), what the Germans call Vold Dam Skol, which 
is internally very strongly bonded and if you look at the history of Islam, it’s been internally 
well structured, and well supported even at times when it appears to the west to be not doing 
as well as it should. So my feeling about it is that it has great, the culture has enormous 
survivability. That's really what I think. I think if you look at inherent risks, I think that the 
way those societies are structured and organised, not always at all according to western 
expectations, they do stuff their way and they do seem to be able to deal with hard times as 
well as they deal with good times. 
 
Q: Do you think the lack of conformity, with the mainstream western model, will cause 
future problems down the line? 
 
A: Yes I think it does. I don't buy this Samuel Huntington thesis of a clash of civilisations. 
What I think we have to understand is that our way is not the only way. It kind of suits us, it’s 
our culture suits our temperament, some of the time, when it’s going well but I think we are 
seeing trouble on the streets here. I think this is only the start of the troubles that we are 
getting into. I am not at all positive or sanguine of the political situation either here or in 
Europe generally or even in the states because I think we  are still kind of reeling with the 
shock of what’s hit us  and u don't think we quite comprehend. I can remember hearing 
Gordon Brown say, I was at a dinner, when was it? 2007 when the credit crunch was biting 
and he said “No. people are saying it’s like the 1930s. It is not like the 1930s”. I’m think 
“Buster, this could well be much worse than the 1930s and the 1930s didn't actually work out 
terribly well until we got World War II to really recharge the economy and a lot of what we 
are seeing now does, frankly, remind me of the 1930s. So I think the future is going to be, 
well, very interesting. Yea, of course I’m worries about it. I think that the Islamic model is 
one of the new big players that we have to take account of.  
 
Q: Moving on to the second theme of this interview which is the transparency of Islamic 
finance. One of the criticisms of Islamic finance is the lack of transparency with regards 
to transactions, product structure and the composition of Shariah Supervisory Boards. 
What are your thoughts on this? 
 
A: Well I think you are absolutely right. I think that there is a lack of transparency and I think 
that is very, very true. I think that Shariah boards, which we see as quite an important link 
with CSR kind of concepts, but I’ve been in conferences where, I’ve been in meetings where, 
you have two Shariah scholars sort of screaming at each other that the others ones got it 
totally wrong. There are two types of Shariah scholar that you would get on your board. One 
is, if you (17.58) objective will say “look this is the way I read it and I have to tell you that I 
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think this is not right” and that's relatively rare.  Exactly as having a non-executive director 
on your board who says “I’m sorry it’s your company, you control the other directors, but I 
am here to tell you that I feel that this is not right” and non-exes on the whole tend not to do 
that. Now likewise the number two kind of Shariah scholar is the one who will find a way of 
getting an apparently Shariah-compliant answer to what it is that the board wants to do 
anyway and that is why, of course everyone will tell you we can’t go around investing in pig 
meat or alcohol, nothing involving gambling and so on, you’re going to find money which 
comes ultimately from impeccable Islamic sources in all of those sectors. Some Shariah 
scholar has found a way of shielding the reality. So I think just saying “we have a Shariah 
board and we have the notable Shariah scholar, so and so on the board” that doesn't 
necessarily mean that you are transparent. 
 
Q: You mentioned that companies would like the Shariah scholar that will push 
through for Shariah-compliancy. That is also known as Shariah head hunting or 
Shariah ala’carte. How do you think we could alleviate or circumvent that? 
 
A: It’s hard to do that. The way the thing works is very often you make sure you do approach 
someone who you think is going to give you the answer you need. I think it is hard to put up a 
firewall against that kind of stuff. 
 
Q: Another issue is the transparency of Shariah-compliant instruments. No one really 
knows the details of these instruments. How do you think that will affect the Islamic 
Financial system? 
 
A: Well I think. I don’t know the answer to that. I share your worries. Sometimes you are 
getting in such a complex way of creating intermediary organisations to in effect handle all 
the risk and buy the outcome from you that sometimes it is very hard to see the wood for the 
trees in those things. I mean I am not a financial structures expert and my son in fact has been 
for many years in the field of asset management and we’ve several times talked about this. 
He does most of his investment in the Far East and in eastern Asia and from time to time I’ve 
introduced him to people who might have money to invest. We’ve looked at the middle east 
region and sometimes he just comes to me and says “look this is just too complex. I can’t see 
who’s doing what and I don’t see where the risk is really held from and so I’m not putting my 
client’s money into it”. 
 
Q: What do you think could be done to improve the transparency in Islamic finance? 
 
A: I think I am going to pass on that one because I am not close enough to it to really be able 
to give you an answer to that. I suspect that the way; what do people learn from? You will 
probably need some big sovereign fund to go belly up before people say “oh crikey, how did 
we get into this?!”. So I suspect that people don’t learn until bad things happen really. 
 
Q: Moving on to another theme of this research which is the uniformity of Islamic 
finance. We have different regulatory standards for Islamic finance in the west, in the 
Middle East and in Malaysia. How do you think the lack of uniformity of Islamic 
finance is affecting it? 
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A: I think it is inevitable. I have got to say that I don’t think there is any one thing which is; 
and this is difficult and I’ve made this point at the Bloomberg seminar; I’ve supervised a 
number of doctorial theses, not particularly in the area of finance but in other aspects of 
business and management and organisation and we’ve just had a doctoral student who’s 
graduated from Lancaster who did a thesis on Islamic management and the concept of 
learning organisation, who looked at a number of organisations and she’s a Malaysian and 
sometimes she would come around my office and says “Islam teaches that!” and I would say 
“no not quite. I’ve heard this version” and I suspect you’ve got at least three different 
dimensions. You’ve got what is Islamic. That very so much by the region and the culture, the 
kind of deep culture of how people have been doing business but I don’t expect everything to 
work out the same. I think the essence of complex systems and the world financial system is a 
highly complex system, is that there is always diversity and diversity is emergent and you get 
both adaptative changes but you get acceptative changes and that is one of the reasons why 
learning after a disaster is often a pretty logical thing because what happens after a big 
disaster is that the pieces are still there but they are just put together is a different kind of 
array, different structure so my answer to it is I don’t think there ever will be one uniform 
matrix into which everything will conform. 
 
Q: If there was no one similar matrix. Would this problem affect mainstream finance as 
well? 
 
A: Yes, I think so. 
 
 
Q: Within mainstream finance there are lenders of last resort. With Islamic finance, it is 
hard to see a central regulatory body adopting this position. How do you think this will 
affect Islamic finance? 
 
A: I think it is a very interesting question and I think it is a very good question. Lenders of 
last resort. We have institutionalised risk over the past 200 years or so and this is the essence 
of the liberal capitalist model. The way we have developed the banking system and the way 
we set up state or para-state or inter-state organisations so the European central bank or the 
Bank of England and we developed a concept of a Lender of Last Resort out of those kinds of 
institutions. Now lender of last resort quite often tend to be an individual but in the Islamic 
model, at the end of the day when you say well who’s backing this and what is our guarantee 
and are we in it for 5-25 years, an institution that we probably don’t study as much as we 
ought to and I’ve done some work with them – I did one project with them in Jeddah – is the 
Islamic Development Bank which was set up effectively to fund development projects in 
parts of the third world. How does it work? Well it basically works through the rich guys 
helping the poor guys and their model for that is of course Zakat. That under zakat it is 
offensive to the system if you have someone who is extraordinarily rich and someone who is 
starving that they could be helping. I suspect that one of the things that is going to be 
happening over the next few years and I know this is happening for example in southern 
Africa, sub Saharan Africa, there are people who look at the Islamic finance model for 
development projects and they are not going to say ‘who’s backing this?’ or ‘what institution 
is backing this in terms of the lender of last resort?’. They are going to say why are these 
guys interested in us and can we trust them? In a way that’s an older model. If you go back to 
the Hansiatic system, go back to the Foggers, if you go back to what we call the medieval 
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way of bankrolling projects you do find a higher degree of personalisation.  A book that I find 
very illuminating on that is a book by an Irish author Origo, an anthropologist, called The 
Merchant of Pranto which is based on basically the day books and diaries of someone who 
was an Italian merchant in the city of Pranto during the renaissance period and you do I think 
in that see some of these highly personalised transactions backed in a sense by personal 
credibility. So the lender of last resort idea is a very interesting one and I think it is leading to 
some quite fundamental differences in the way Islamic finance is justified. 
 
Q: What about a central regulatory body such as the ECB is to the Eurozone? Would 
that be beneficial to Islamic finance? 
 
A: Well I think it would. It is probably going to happen because it is a trend towards making 
their map on to our way of looking at things. My point I think is that underneath it all you’re 
going to have a trust based system and what they are really going to be saying is how much 
do you trust these guys. 
 
Q: What do you think would be good governance in Islamic finance? 
 
A: I think what you’re dealing with in this whole world view is a system that is based on a 
personalisation of trust and the way trust is built into relationships and so you have this idea 
of (30.00) whasta which is networking and business networking, I’ve written quite a lot about 
that. Many, many Muslims hate it when you tell them about whasta and in fact after the 
Bloomberg seminar a young Saudi academic came up to me and said “please don’t talk 
anymore about whasta. It is a really bad thing and we must have a society in which whasta is 
not so important” and of course if you’re young Saudi professional, well trained intelligencia, 
you definitely think like that because you think Whasta is the old guy who is highly 
networked and that’s the glue that holds our society together but it’s really bad. It is also the 
glue that creates oppressive regimes and it is stopping us getting anywhere. However if you 
do then turn the tables and then ask “ at what point in the near future do you think you will 
have abolished whasta?”, he is just going to laugh and say “it doesn’t work like that”. Of 
course it doesn’t work like that because Whasta comes out of much, much deeper cultural 
tradition which basically says that a Whasid is a middle person, maybe an entrepreneur but 
someone who both sides trust, so the approach is something that is much deeper than just 
through the financial sector. Now what does that mean in practice? How would an Islamic 
finance institution seek to protect its investment? This is what I studies with Ahmed Al-
Genahi who became CEO of an Islamic investment bank and what we find of course is how 
do you deal with a situation of a business failure. The answer is you really find it very hard to 
handle business failure so you do everything you can in an early a stage as possible so you 
can make sure that the failure is not transparent. So you network, you support, you find out, 
you get involved. Why are you doing that? Because you are not in a lender borrower 
situation. You are in a situation which is essentially a joint equity and therefore you are 
always just as much as the borrower and do you want that to be known on the streets and 
that’s the kind of thing you do and the answer is definitely not. So you get in as early as you 
can, you try and handle it in a way that the whole thing doesn’t become transparent. So I 
think again that this idea of corporate social responsibility and transparency are coming out of 
different places in the western ideology from what they are in the Islamic ideology and I am 
not saying that either is better, I am just saying that you have to understand that these guys 
are thinking about it in totally different ways. How does it work? Well it works essentially 
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because you it and you talk and you listen and then afterwards someone may say “oh well, 
I’m having second thoughts about this so let’s take a little bit longer”, therefore they have 
doubts so what does that mean and eventually you get into this area where you might say 
“look I need to know. Are you putting money into this or are you not?” and they say “well I’d 
love to be doing business with you and so on and so forth” and you have to formulate your 
own conclusions that they probably aren’t going to be going with it. So I think we tend to 
think transparency is a good thing, regulation is a good thing, corporate social responsibility 
is definitely a good thing but they are kind of thinking in a much more, if you like, gut level 
but the one thing you can’t do is for example you cannot say to the other party in a 
relationship are you a virgin or have you been sleeping around. Those are the kind of 
questions that you do not put on the table because you don’t want to know the answer either 
way actually. Not that he’s going to tell you the truth. Maybe you shouldn’t put that in your 
report! 
 
Q: What do you think the scope of growth is for governance and risk management in 
Islamic finance? 
 
A: Well I think it is great of course objectively they face the same problems that we all do. 
First problems is how do you safe guard what you have already? How do you not lose out of 
this? There will be growth in sophisticated instruments and I’m sure, I’ve been in meeting 
where people, because it is not my bag I tend to find it boring, how do you create a fund of 
funds and still be Shariah compliant and I think there are going to be millions of ways of 
making money out of creating instruments which show that a particular structure is or is not 
compliant. At the end of the day, which system is going to survive and I think both systems 
are going to survive. I think Islamic finance has been seen as marginal on, a bit different, 
probably not going to last the cause because it is inherently risk adverse and so on. Now my 
answer to that is that actually Islamic finance is very new although they love to do the kind of 
tracing it back to the Quran, and the Hadith and finding the intellectual lineage of the idea. 
Islamic finance as we know it has only been around since world war II and a lot of it doesn’t 
start in the heart lands of Islam – in Arabia and the middle east. It starts in Pakistan and 
Malaysia because these are societies that are saying we have chosen to follow a certain path. 
Pakistan is an interesting case because the growth of Islamic economics, you can I think, see 
a very clear line from the theorist in Pakistan thinking where we say we are an Islamic 
society, we say that this is for Muslims and what does that mean? We’ve never had to build a 
society around that kind of way of thinking before so this is new territory and its quite 
interest if you look at publications and so on. I started this journal through emerald about 5-6 
years ago, I head the idea about 10 years before that and all the time they are saying to me, 
it’s very marginal and finance people told me there’s nothing in it and so on and so forth. As 
soon as we started this journal they are now running two other journals in Islamic marketing 
and Islamic business so I think the growth, if it is not exponential, it is very good and very 
promising and that will continue I think.  
 
Q: You mentioned not trying to lose out? Do you think Islamic finance is in direct 
competition with mainstream finance? 
 
A: I think it is for them. Yes I think it is. For that world in that culture yes. There is a lot of 
restructuring going on I think. 
END 
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Appendix 4 – Practitioner Interview Transcripts 
 
Practitioner 1 
 
Q: How do you think mainstream finance views Islamic finance? 
In my opinion based on perception by the local industry, Islamic finance is considered as an 
alternative to the general public to choose their banking preference. For Muslims, it gives 
them the opportunity to conduct their way of living –“muamalat” based on Islamic concept. 
Whilst for non- Muslim, it is another opportunity to benefit from the various concepts which 
suit their preference. Thus, rather than viewing Islamic finance as a competitor it is 
considered as a factor to enhance conventional banking instead to attract or maintained their 
base market. Overall, it is a healthy situation. 
Q: What do you think are the inherent risks of Islamic finance going into the 21
st
 
Century
?  
The main risk faced by Islamic finance is the lack of understanding by the industry operators 
itself and the general public of the various Islamic concepts whereby are the basis of Islamic 
products creation. Therefore, the Central bank should stress on extensive training and 
knowledge to industry operators and conduct on-going programs to educate and create 
awareness to the public of its advantages and concepts. 
Secondly, the risk is the indifference in the Syariah rulings. This is obviously seen between 
rulings made by the Middle East countries and other Islamic nation i.e. Malaysia views on 
certain Islamic concepts i.e. Bay al-dayn differs from scholars from Middle East countries. 
The inconsistency could lead to complications in implementation and a disadvantage to the 
concern Financial Institution in cases of legal dispute. 
Q: Islamic finance tends to be compared to ethical banking and finance. What are your 
views on this? 
This is very true. The comparison is made in the light of lack of understanding in Islamic 
finance. As we know, Islamic finance is new in comparison to ethical banking and finance 
which has a strong base with track records. Thus, in a way the comparison undermine Islamic 
finance and slowed down its growth because the general public is sceptical and unsure of its 
results. Both types of finance should be looked at their respective advantages which are 
beneficial to the consumers instead of highlighting its weaknesses. 
Q: What are your thoughts on the issues of transparency highlighted above? 
I agree that to the above mainly because the Islamic concept is not understood by the general 
public. Therefore, the product structure seems complicated i.e. - Bai Bithamin Ajil (BBA) 
whereby there is selling of the non-existent item plus an “akad” that is an obligation to accept 
the agreement to sell and purchase. BBA is not a kind of sale rather it refers to the manner of 
payment via a deferred payment basis either in lump sum or instalment payment. The 
confusion arrives because often the concept is not explained to the customer thus, there was 
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no transparency and transactions are done just as a procedure instead. 
Meanwhile, there is no specific information to the public on the criteria needed for selection 
of the Shariah Supervisory Board. Though there are some criteria set, the selection is still 
based on discretion of the specific FI which can be influenced by internal or external factor 
for the benefit of the FI concerned. This could divert from the main purpose which is to 
uphold the Islamic concept. 
Q: Would it improve the Islamic financial system to be more transparent?  
Yes, definitely because once the public understood the Islamic concept and its benefits to 
their banking transaction, it would boost the growth and ultimately improve the Islamic 
financial system. It would eliminate the element of uncertainty and curiosity of the products 
and its enforcement. It would become one of the norms or way of life and will be treated as 
another choice of option for their banking preference. 
Q: How do you think the Islamic financial system could be made more transparent? 
The key factor to be more transparent is by educating the general public of anything with 
regards to Islamic financing – what, why, where and how. Example of Islamic concepts that 
are used to structure products are Mudharabah (Fixed Deposit), Musyarakah (Joint Venture) , 
Qard al Hassan (Interest free loan), Al-Rahn (collateralized borrowing), Al-Kafalah 
(guarantees), Al-Hiwalah (remittances),Al-Wakalah (agency), Bay al-Salam(purchased with 
deferred delivery) and Al-Ijarah Thumma al-Bay(AITAB)-hire purchase should be explain 
clearly to the consumers. 
There should be easy access of information with regards to its concepts, product structure and 
governance. Only through understanding can the Islamic financial system prosper and grow 
in the banking industry. 
Q: How do you think the lack of uniformity affects financial innovation and risk 
management in Islamic banking and finance? 
Yes definitely. Lack of uniformity reflects non- synchronisation in implementing the Islamic 
concept. One example is the different view between Shariah scholars in Malaysia and the 
Middle East on debt trading- the Islamic concept known as Bay al-dayn. In Malaysia, it is 
considered as permissible if the debt is originated out of an asset financing transaction. Such 
a debt can be traded at market value while a debt based on loan could be traded at face value. 
This concept is used for Islamic Bankers Acceptance and is limited to the Malaysian market. 
The Malaysian Securities Commission Shariah Advisory Council has unanimously agreed to 
pass a resolution on 21.08.1996 to accept the principle of Bay al-dayn as one of the concepts 
for developing capital markets instruments based on the condition that there is a transparent 
regulatory system in the capital market to safeguard the maslahah (public interest) of the 
market participants. The Council held that in the context of the sales of securitised debt , the 
characteristics of securities differentiates it from currency. Thus, it is not a legal tender and 
therefore not bound by the conditions for exchanging of goods. It is in line with Shafi’i 
mazhab. 
This distinction is not permitted in the Middle East as Bay al-dayn is simply means a sale and 
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purchase transaction of a quality debt. The selling of debts is to avoid the occurrence of 
“riba” between two debts and avoid “gharar” and “makhatara” which may arise at the level of 
inability of a buyer from possessing what he has bought as it is not permitted that the buyer 
sold before actual receipt of the purchased item. The Hanafi mazhab are unanimously in not 
permitting Bay al-dayn with reason that the debt is in the form of mal hukmi (intangible 
property) and buyer takes great risks because he cannot own the item bought and the seller 
cannot deliver the item sold. 
The above scenario reflects differences in opinion and interpretation of the mazhab which is 
the basis of the Islamic concept. The risk is purely in the implementation which could result 
in physical loss and whether it was implemented in accordance to Islamic concept or merely 
to suit the Islamic environment. In the end, the public is concerned whether the product is in 
accordance to the Islamic way of life-muamalat or otherwise. 
Q: With reference to lender of last resort, the Islamic financial system doesn't really 
possess one per se. would it be beneficial to establish a lender of last resort?  
Yes definitely it would be beneficial to establish lender of last resort if the Islamic financial 
system wants to establish itself as equivalent or even better than the conventional system. 
There is a large potential market for Islamic financial which would require the “assistance” 
when necessary, so it would be useful to establish a strong and stable lender of last resort 
whereby FI under Islamic financial system could rely on in case of contingencies arise . It 
would certainly add confidence to the general public knowing that their Islamic banking 
system has a secured back up and that means their physical investments are secured. 
Q: What does one think about the current level of Islamic financial regulation? 
In my opinion, the current level of Islamic financial regulation is sufficient to meet with the 
current level of Islamic financial system. However, moving forward some of the redundant 
regulation should be abolish to minimise stringency and more flexible and yet in compliance 
to the Islamic concept introduce to complement the existing regulation. A good governance is 
required to ensure that the Islamic financial are run on the right track in accordance to the 
Islamic rulings. 
Q: What about central regulatory bodies such as the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB)? 
The AAOIFI which was established in 1991 and based in Bahrain, has successfully met its 
objectives to determine the rights and obligations of all interested parties in accordance with 
principal of Shariah, to safeguard Islamic banks’ assets – its rights and rights of others, to 
contribute to enhancement of managerial productive capacities of Islamic banks and to 
provide useful information to make legitimate decisions in dealings with Islamic banks. It has 
enhanced the confidence of users of the financial statements of Islamic Financial Institutions 
(IFI) and ultimately promotes IFIs. However, lack of Shariah consistency, comparability & 
consistency on accounting treatment on recognition, measurement and disclosure of Islamic 
based transactions and sound regulation on accounting gives room for improvement, thus to 
further develop accounting principles in the Islamic banking. 
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Whilst the IFSB which began operations in 2003 and based in Kuala Lumpur has achieved its 
goals to promote the awareness of issues that could have an impact on the Islamic financial 
services industry. Among IFSB initiatives are to issue Shariah compliant standards, hold 
conferences and seminars, provides guidance and supervision. Moving forward, it needs to 
build and enforce solid foundations as the industry transitions into a new era of growth and 
development in this post crisis world, competitive financial landscape, evolving international 
regulatory reforms, rising consumer expectations will hinge IFSB to keep raising the bar in 
pursuit of an effective functioning and sound Islamic financial system. 
Thus, both bodies have managed to promote confidence and stability to the public of the 
Islamic financial services industry. 
Q: What possible remedies (if it is felt like the system requires remedying) are there? 
To summarise the above, some of the remedies are: 
i)  To be transparent to the users on the Islamic concepts, product structure, 
governance  
ii)  To synchronise in implementation of Islamic concepts so that it is acceptable by 
all  
iii)  To ensure sufficient level of understanding by all  
iv)  To enhance supervision level  
v)  To aggressively market and introduce the Islamic products and concepts to 
increase growth  
Q: Do you think governance would affect the development of risk management under a 
Shariah framework?  
Yes because it will be more stringent. However, it is also positive because it would help to 
ensure that the Islamic rulings are applied in accordance. Thus, good governance is essential 
to ensure that Islamic financial are on the right track which is to give an option for those who 
wish to conduct their way of life – muamalat, the Islamic way.  
Q: Where do you see Islamic finance heading in the next few years?  
Very positive. It is growing fast because the public is eager to try something new. 
Meanwhile, it is an avenue that the Muslims has been looking for and with benefits it gives, 
attracts the non- Muslims too. Again, bottom line is understanding of the product structure 
could lead to endless possibilities. Islamic finance is definitely a driving force in the near 
future.  
Q: In the current economic climate what do you think is the scope for growth for 
Islamic finance? Why?  
Probably to create as much investments as possible which could translate to gains during 
better economic climate? It would be wise for Islamic finance to get as much deposit as 
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possible by offering attractive profit sharing percentage for deposits to increase its depositors 
and thus, the market base.  
END 
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Practitioner 2 
Q: How do you think mainstream finance views Islamic finance? 
I think many mainstream financiers view Islamic financing as just a mere gimmick, a hoax. 
However due to various reasons, political, or perhaps out of  professional courtesy, they do 
not openly made known this point of view. What you see in much of Islamic finance today is 
an artificial replication of conventional financial products. Islamic finance should focus of 
creating products and instruments that are more in line with Islamic principles. 
Ethical banking and finance is just a mask to justify the existence of Islamic financing. They 
still charge “interest”, but they now call it “profit”. The substance is still the same, but just 
changes the form. Ethically, Islamic financing is not superior to mainstream financing. All 
types of financing require an element of ethics. 
In fact, the way they repackage the essential principle of mainstream financing and diverting 
and misleading the element of opportunity cost of money to fit the Shariah concept does 
contain certain degree of misleading implications. 
Money is money, when I take one dollar away from you contractually, no matter what you 
want to call it, “interest”, “profit”, “fees”, etc., I actually deprive you the benefits of the dollar 
and the loss of use of that dollar (except for the case of charity when the money is not taken 
away under contractual obligation ). If by calling the dollar taken away “profit” instead of 
“interest” will improve the transaction ethically, then we are all kidding ourselves. 
Q: What do you think are the inherent risks of Islamic finance going into the 21
st
 
Century? 
The inherent risks of Islamic financing would be its relevancy and cost effectiveness, going 
forward. In Islamic financing, the principle or substance is essentially the same as 
conventional financing, but they need to “repackage” the form, making it look like a buy/ sell 
activity with underlying assets hence increasing the cost of financing. If you are only 
repackaging the form of the product then fundamentally the problems that arise from the 
substance will still be the same. Changing the name of something does not make the 
problems go away. What you will be left with if Islamic finance continues in this direction 
would be the same problems of conventional finance such as the current financial crisis. 
Q: What are your thoughts on the issues of transparency of the Islamic financial 
system? 
Yes, one thing good that come out of Islamic financing is that they tend to be more 
transparent, when compared to mainstream finance. This is in the economic sense. 
Theoretically speaking, the ways in which Islamic products are structure pays a lot of 
reference to the real economy, to real markets to ensure that everything exists. Everything 
must be known before contracts are undertaken. How much am I going to have to pay? How 
much will you receive? What is the cost? All these have to be made known to the parties 
before contracting and in this sense Islamic finance is more transparent than conventional 
finance. In theory only of course! Transparency should always be encouraged in all forms of 
financing and contracts. 
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As in all contracts, including Islamic finance, the terms of the contract are negotiated and 
finalised between financier and the customer. So it is up to the parties concerned to require 
the degree of transparency in the contract. Transparency is relative and to different people 
transparency could mean different things and everyone has a different requirement of 
transparency. We cannot just say that we need more transparency for the sake of it. It is not 
like conventional finance is fully transparent and people still get on fine with the financial 
products. I think to a certain extent it boils down to trust and because people are more 
familiar with conventional financial products they are less like to question transparency. With 
Islamic finance being relatively new and the reputation of Islam there are more questions 
being asked. 
Q: How do you think the lack of uniformity affects financial innovation and risk 
management in Islamic banking and finance? 
The lack of uniformity, in a way, does impede the development of Islamic financing into a 
global model. As I know, different regions of the world practices different variants of Islamic 
financing, for example the Middle East model contains differences when compared to the 
Malaysian version. Hence such differences may sometimes give rise to grey areas, subtleties 
in interpretation and ambiguities, and even confusions. In the case of Malaysia, this has made 
court rulings on Islamic financing in litigation matters extremely challenging, and often times 
with no clear cut directions. There is confusion between whether Islamic financial issues 
should be litigated in conventional or Islamic courts. There needs to be clearer distinction 
between where the rights of the customers lie. 
This has clear implications on consumer confidence and the development of the Islamic 
financial system as a whole. Financial innovation would be difficult as practitioners do not 
know which set of rules to follow. You create a product that is valid in one country but not in 
another. This can only cause complications and confusion amongst customers and people in 
the industry. 
Q: With reference to lender of last resort, the Islamic financial system doesn't really 
possess one per se. would it be beneficial to establish a lender of last resort?  
As far as I know, countries with “mandated” support for Islamic financing extend the 
coverage of their central banks to Islamic financing.  This is the case for Malaysia. The 
Malaysian central bank – Bank Negara Malaysia provides a viable outlet for funds for Islamic 
financial institutions. If I am not mistaken in the UK, with HSBC’s Islamic banking branch 
and Lloyds Islamic finance branch they have the Bank of England as a lender of last resort 
and in terms of regulation they are still governed by UK law. I am sure there have been 
amendments law to accommodate the needs of these Islamic financial institutions. 
Current regulatory standards are still lacking of a strong and universally accepted body to 
regulate and provide guidelines and standards governing Islamic financing. The central 
bodies must be stronger and I think many Islamic institutions would like to see a set of 
uniform standards to follow. 
Q: What about central regulatory bodies such as the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB)? 
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Yes, these are fragmented interim bodies set up to provide some guidelines and standards, but 
their acceptability globally is still something we need to see. For me there is very much a 
concern that while these central bodies have been selected to create or even unify the 
regulation of Islamic finance the do not have the power to enforce their work. A lot of the 
standards coming out of both are only informative and Islamic institutions can choose not to 
follow. As a regulatory body this is not acceptable. 
Q: What possible remedies (if it is felt like the system requires remedying) are there?  
Basically, Islamic finance needs to stay relevant, and innovate itself, instead of copying 
mainstream finance’s model, and repackage them to fit the Shariah concept. By doing so , 
they inadvertently increase the cost of financing towards the customer, and of this is not 
remedied, they will be outdated and become obsolete in time to come. Currently, they are 
staying afloat because of “mandated” support from Islamic countries, and if these clutches are 
taken away, they will collapse owing to their non-competitiveness. 
Q: Do you think governance would affect the development of risk management under a 
Shariah framework? 
Good governance should be emphasised and enforced as part of risk management under 
Islamic financing. There is no Islamic framework for risk management. What we have are 
Islamic financing principles that have been adapted or we have Islamic products that replicate 
conventional financial instruments to manage risk. 
Q: Where do you see Islamic finance heading in the next few years? 
As I said earlier, they are staying afloat because of mandated support from certain nations . 
How far they will go without this support is rather uncertain. 
I think the future of Islamic finance is quite uncertain as their structure is non-competitive 
and they are lacking innovation to propel them further.  Essentially, they copy, and repackage 
and worse of all, they are non-competitive when compared to mainstream financing. They 
have to establish themselves as a viable alternative to conventional finance and not just 
copying. It should not be a case where Islamic finance is the same as conventional finance as 
this would then just mean that people would just use conventional finance. It is a tough 
balance between religious principles and meeting the financial needs of its customers. 
END 
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Practitioner 3 
Q: How do you think mainstream finance views Islamic finance? 
Not much difference to that of that of conventional finance except for the fact that it (Islamic 
Banking and Finance) is using the profit sharing method. The interest that the borrower paid 
is in fact very much the same between conventional and Islamic finance. There cannot be too 
much of a difference as this would then lead to an uneven playing field. 
Q: What do you think are the inherent risks of Islamic finance going into the 21
st
 
Century? Why? 
Can’t think of any. I strongly believe that both convention and Islamic finance will face the 
same risks in the fast changing economic environment. With the economy in its current state 
the notion that one financial system will be free from risk and not another cannot be true. The 
risks from the financial crisis will affect both Islamic and conventional banks. 
Q: Islamic finance tends to be compared to ethical banking and finance. What are your 
views on this? 
I do not share the view. Financial participants tend to suggest that Islamic finance is the same 
as ethical finance because there is a screening process for the selection on investments. What 
is not realized is that the screening criteria between Islamic and ethical financing are quite 
different with varying emphasis placed upon different social and moral aspects. 
The Islamic view where Halal and Haram is very much questioned is very important to the 
Syariah financial system. 
 Q: What are your thoughts on the issues of transparency within the Islamic financial 
system? What do you think about the composition of Shariah Supervisory Boards? 
For me it is very straight forward – Halal and Haram transaction. Since the committee  in the 
Syariah Board is all consists of Muslims, I do not think there will be issue of lack of 
transparency. Moreover, it is not exactly an issue of transparency but rather one of marketing 
and knowledge. More has to be done to educate both conventional and Islamic financial 
participants about the ins and outs of the Syariah finance. There is a feeling that Islamic 
finance is not transparent because people do not know what the financial products mean and 
this is an issue for the Islamic financial institutions and central regulatory bodies. More has to 
be done to provide the public with information of Islamic finance. Maybe then there wouldn’t 
be an issue or transparency. 
Q: Would it improve the Islamic financial system to be more transparent?  
As I mentioned above, lack of transparency should not exists but is rather a lack of 
information. Of course should more information be available that would definitely be 
beneficial to the Islamic financial system. 
It all depends on individuals who is interested to opt for Islamic finance to know more the 
terms and conditions, the Shariah principle etc. 
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Q: How do you think the lack of uniformity affects financial innovation and risk 
management in Islamic banking and finance? 
Minimal impact. Because I feel that different countries have different perspective. Leaders, 
CEO and all those Decision Makers definitely have different views in doing Business. For 
instance, even peer Muslim or peer Christian could have so much difference in Belief and 
understanding. However, this is not a major threat to the country as well as the Financial 
Institution or system.  
As I’ve said different countries have different ways of doing things and if you look at 
conventional finance of different countries, even this is not entirely the same.  
Q: With reference to lender of last resort, the Islamic financial system doesn't really 
possess one per se. would it be beneficial to establish a lender of last resort?  
This is a difficult question to answer. We can see the benefits of having a lender of last resort. 
With Islamic finance this could be even more important with the questions regarding the 
liquidity of Islamic financial institutions but the main issue here would be not if Islamic 
finance needs a lender of last resort but who should take on this role. Should it be the central 
bank of the country? If so then would there be issues of haram financing should an Islamic 
bank require money from the country’s central bank? Should there be an Islamic central 
bank? But then again this could create an uneven playing field with that of conventional 
finance.  
This issue has to be explored further and I certainly cannot give you a definite answer. I 
would say that a lender of last resort could be beneficial but I cannot say who should 
undertake this role. 
Q: What do you think about the current level of financial regulation is Shariah finance? 
So far, I have no objection or grievances, as I believe it is outlined according to the Syariah 
Principles. 
Whether good or not, I have not encountered any avenue to compare. We have been lucky 
thus far and the current standards of regulation in Islamic finance have not been put to the test 
just yet. Obviously, there is always room for evolution and development. The growth of 
Islamic finance in today’s economy requires it to keep pace. Continuous development is 
always good. 
I don’t have much experience with AAOIFI and the IFSB but from my understanding they 
have been set up as central regulatory bodies that oversee the Islamic financial system as a 
whole. As with all financial systems, a point of reference is required in terms of regulatory 
standards.  
Both institutions have a thankless job in trying to establish more understanding of the Islamic 
financial system. Not just understanding from within but also from outside the Islamic 
financial system. 
Q: How do you think governance would affect the development of risk management 
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under a Shariah framework?  
Definitely. They are the decision maker right? Governance under an Islamic financial 
framework is all about balance. Islamic financial institutions have to balance the religious and 
moral principles with financial principles and that is not an easy task. When it comes to risk 
management, Islamic finance has nothing against risk management. It is the tools that we 
have to be careful with and how these tools are used. There is a fine line between risk 
management and speculation. Moreover, should there ever be a breach of Syariah principles 
this would have a significant impact on the Islamic financial institution. 
Q: Where do you see Islamic finance heading in the next few years? 
Unless more advantages of using Islamic concept to be introduced such as stamp fee 
discount, people may opt to Islamic financing. People normally reluctant to take Islamic 
financing due to complicated Shariah compliance, terms and legal documentations. People 
reluctant to study or even to understand the concept. 
This is where the central bodies must step in to make improvements. Setting up dialogue 
between Islamic financial institutions and governments to create a framework that 
accommodates Islamic finance. More also has to be done about the lack of information out 
there about Islamic finance. 
Q: In the current economic climate what do you think is the scope for growth for 
Islamic finance?  
Unless the bank personnel as well as the consumer/customers are aware and fully educated in 
Islamic Finance, we can see the growth. 
Otherwise, people may just opt for conventional banking without having to understand the 
Islamic concept, Shariah etc. 
END 
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Practitioner 4 
Q: How do you think mainstream finance views Islamic finance? Islamic finance tends 
to be compared to ethical banking and finance. What are your views on this? 
Many main stream financiers view Islamic finance as a complement to them and is an 
integral part of finance eco-system. It is a financial system that exists and research has shown 
that it work so why shouldn’t it be regarded as an alternative to conventional finance. Just 
because it is based upon religious principles does not mean that it does not fulfil the role as a 
financial system 
I personally believe that all finance and banking matters should be conducted on an ethical 
ground, regardless of whether it is mainstream or Islamic finance. Just because we belong to 
a conventional financial system, it does not mean that we lose track of facets such as morality 
and integrity.  Business and finance should be conducted ethically. Although this is probably 
ideological rather than practical if you consider the practices of banks during the recent 
financial crisis 
Q: What do you think are the inherent risks of Islamic finance going into the 21
st
 
Century? 
The inherent risks of would be those risks normally associated with providing credit facilities, 
and are in essence not much different from mainstream finance. In terms of risk associated to 
methods of financing there is some risk for the availability of products. At this point in time 
the financial instruments available to manage risk in Islamic finance are slightly limited and 
there is increased scope for financial innovation.  The risks borne by Islamic finance are very 
similar to conventional finance but obviously there might be a separate importance placed 
upon different risks. In conventional finance this might be credit risk whilst in Islamic 
finance the emphasis will be on liquidity or default risk. Moreover, there is also the issue of 
Shariah-compliance and Islamic financial institutions have to take great care in ensuring that 
they adhere to Shariah principles. This however is easier said than done. 
Q: What are your thoughts on the issues of transparency in Islamic finance? Would it 
be beneficial to be more transparent? 
I believe one of the strong points in Shariah finance is its emphasis on transparency, wherein 
all terms and conditions should be clearly spelled out, and there should not be elements of 
uncertainty in the contract. In you think about it, the fact that there must be clear lines of 
ownership within Islamic financial transactions means that there looks like there is more 
transparency than many conventional transactions. 
In terms of Shariah scholars and the boards that they sit on, I feel that this is an issue that is 
quickly diminishing. When Islamic finance first started there was very much a lack of 
expertise in terms of Shariah scholars. With the growth that Islamic finance has experienced 
over the past few years, there has been a lot of emphasis on developing a larger expertise base 
which would mean that you will see new faces on different boards. For me it is not a question 
of similar members on different boards for the sake of a salary but rather there were just not 
enough people who possessed the knowledge. The central bodies have been making an effort 
to try and improve the amount of expertise in the area and it would also be good to have 
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individuals who possess not only an understanding of Islamic finance but conventional 
finance. 
 
Definitely, increase transparency would be beneficial to all financing contracts, whether 
Islamic or mainstream. I am not saying that Islamic finance is fully transparent but the level 
of non-transparency that people talk about is not that bad and is quickly disappearing. 
Q: How do you think the Islamic financial system could be made more transparent? 
As it is, Islamic financing has a highly transparent structure wherein all elements of 
uncertainty in the contract are clearly clarified and all terms clearly defined. In fact, many 
have viewed Islamic finance to be even more transparent than main stream finance. 
However, further attempts to increase transparency should be viewed positively. In light of 
the Shariah board members more can be published about the selection process. In light of 
transactions more information can be made know about the roles of parties. It is not like 
information about the structure conventional bond issuances are freely available. 
Q: How do you think the lack of uniformity affects financial innovation and risk 
management in Islamic banking and finance? 
Personally I think Islamic finance should not strive to come out a “one solution fit the world” 
model, as different regions of the world has its unique cultures and ways of doing business. 
Banking and financing  solutions, Islamic and mainstream likewise, should try to customise 
the financing models to suit the local scenarios rather than shoving a “uniform or universal” 
model on a world with  different cultures, and operating on different ways of going about 
their business  
I fact, most successful global brands have adopted the approach of customising to local 
scenarios such as HSBC with the slogan “The world’s local bank”, even the menus of 
McDonalds has a twist of differences in different parts of the world 
Q: With reference to lender of last resort, the Islamic financial system doesn't really 
possess one per se. would it be beneficial to establish a lender of last resort? 
The central bank usually acts as the lender of last resort, and in the case of Malaysia, the 
central bank, i.e. Bank Negara Malaysia acts as the lender of last resort, which also covers 
Islamic finance. I suppose the Malaysian situation is easier as there are efforts by the 
Malaysian government to push the issue. With Bank Negara Malaysia, Islamic banks have a 
Shariah-compliant lender of last resort but this would be more difficult in countries such as 
the UK. Legal provisions must be made to clarify this issue further. 
At the moment, the current regulation is deemed adequate to facilitate the operation of 
Islamic finance. But as business platforms and systems evolves, regular reviews should be 
done to monitor the adequacy of the regulations form time to time. 
Q: What about central regulatory bodies such as the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB)? 
       
  
 
412 
They exist to provide guidance and standards on accountings related issues with regard to 
Islamic finance. I do not have much experience with AAOIFI or the IFSB but from what I 
gather, any attempts to further develop any regulatory standard for the betterment of a 
financial system should be embraced. They have a task that is not easily achieved. 
Q: What possible remedies (if it is felt like the system requires remedying) are there? 
As it is, business models, approaches and platforms in the world is constantly evolving and 
changes and part and parcel of surviving in modern business.  As such, Islamic finance 
should also try to maintain its relevancy in the constantly changing business world by coming 
out with relevant and useful financing solutions and products. This in my view will be the 
main challenge going forward. 
Q: Do you think governance would affect the development of risk management under a 
Shariah framework? 
Yes good governance should always be the cornerstone of all financing structures. In 
developing a sound risk management structure for Islamic finance, good governance should 
always be an integral part in the framework. 
Q: Where do you see Islamic finance heading in the next few years? 
I believe it is gaining better understanding from the world which will result in higher 
acceptance and adoption. 
The potential for further growth for Islamic finance is going to be robust given that it offers 
an alternative to the conventional mainstream finance and the scope will widen to cover more 
areas as it gains importance in the global stage of finance and commerce. 
END 
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Practitioner 5 
Q: How do you think Islamic finance is viewed by mainstream finance? 
 
A: I think that there is a mix of views. Some people see it, especially in the western world, 
they see it as a real alternative to conventional financing, the conventional financial system 
and this view, I think, is becoming stronger with the waves of financial crises that we are 
receiving over the last 2-3 years. There is another group that has a view that it is something 
old-fashioned, it may not be adequate for the 21
st
 century and they associate it to some 
terrorist activities or political agendas more than anything else. They do not consider it as a 
serious alternative; they see it as more of a threat to the western culture and society. I must 
say that the latter of the two groups is much, much smaller in number. The general view is 
that it is actually something that is considerable as an alternative and it requires more 
research in how and why it behaves. It leads towards something that is quite different from 
what you see as an output from conventional finance.  
 
Q: How would you describe Islamic finance to someone who is new to the concept? 
 
A: Islamic finance for us an alternative way of financing. There is another perception that 
maybe it is interest-free and therefore that means it’s cost-free as well but of course we have 
to dispel this myth and you have to explain to people that being interest-free doesn’t mean 
that it is totally cost free as well. Of course there will be costs involved. We explain to people 
and people (in this sense) doesn't mean that we deal with individuals and small business, we 
deal only with either institutional clients or big corporates and these are the people who are 
actually look for either some strategic benefit or alternative opportunities. So we advise them 
that this is an alternative financial system and you have to understand the nature of risk 
involved in this so do not think that it is completely risk free, do not think that it is immune to 
any shock or any hazard. Of course there is a possibility of having issues with this type of 
finance also but they need to understand the nature of risk involved with Islamic finance will 
be completely different. Say for example if a corporate seeks our advice and they want to 
raise some fund for their projects and they are trying to make a strategic decision between 
issuing a conventional bond and a sukuk, an Islamic bond. So we have to explain to them in 
this case the underlying asset of an Islamic bond will be completely different from the 
underlying asset of a conventional bond. In a conventional bound you can just use a financial 
asset or the receivables. You can handle them as an asset and you can issue a bond and the 
return of that bond will be actually based on the performance of the financial asset and the 
rating of the bond will be based on the solvency of the corporate, the issuer. Whereas, when 
you talk about Islamic bond or a sukuk then the underlying asset will be completely different 
because you may have many receivables but that will be considered as debt and you will not 
be able to repackage that debt and use it as a financial asset. Here you need tangible physical 
asset and you have to give a legal recourse to the subscriber or bond holder that in case of a 
default, they will actually have recourse through the asset that you are putting as the 
underlying instrument for your structuring. So the risk profile of this instrument will be 
completely different. The return on the investment, that the sukuk holders will make in to this 
bond will be very much dependant on the performance of the underlying asset, whether it is a 
production facility, it could be a set of equipment; it could be a portfolio of real estates. The 
remuneration of those bond holders will be coming from the performance of asset and it is 
variable. It could go up and it could go down and also on the rating side it is not going to be 
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solvency of the corporate or how financially strong they are of what sort of backing that they 
have from any parent companies that they have. It is actually very much dependant on the 
underlying asset that is being used for structuring. So we have to advise them on these things 
and this is actually where the mains difference lies and they have to fully understand the 
dynamics of this risk and how they are going to manage this risk and how it have an impact 
on their overall business and their overall planning.  
 
Q: What are the inherent risks faced by Islamic finance going into the 21
st
 century? 
 
A: Well the inherent risks for me, for Islamic financial institutions are I think probably two or 
three. First of all, I think the biggest risk that they are facing is the concentration of their asset 
class. As Islamic finance or modern Islamic finance is relatively new there is a lack of 
diversity of instruments and a lack of asset classes and as a result, due to the restrictions 
imposed by Shariah, the Islamic banks are more likely to invest into certain types of 
portfolios, certain type of asset classes and we have seen this happening in the gulf. There 
most of the bank or Islamic banks are actually investing heavily in real estate sector and with 
the financial crisis there was a knock-on effect on the estate market, the prices went down, 
the market crashed and so did many Islamic banks. So although none of them actually came 
to the point that they required a bailout, as many western banks did, but still there was a very 
serious dent in their financial stability because of the loss of value in their investments and 
this is a technical limitation and a risk that they are running because of the lack of 
instruments and this will continue into the 21
st
 century because the sophistication and the 
innovation required to bring more instrument, to develop them and to bring them to the 
market will take time. It is not going to happen overnight so this is probably the first risk they 
are facing.  Second risk that they are facing is actually, we have observed as practitioners in 
industry that there is actually a strong tendency of mimicking conventional products to make 
them fit into Shariah-compliance and to make them Islamic, at least to dress them as Islamic 
and this is, we believe that it is very risky process because first of all it killed the objectivity 
of Islamic finance so it is not really an alternative. It was just a dressing up of something else. 
Secondly thing is that when you mimic the conventional product basically firstly you stop 
your innovation and you will remain facing the first inherent risk that I described. Secondly 
the mimicking of the conventional products will first of all create a very big question mark on 
the integrity of Shariah-compliance within the institution, whoever is doing that and it will 
send politically incorrect messages to the market and to other players. Third it will also lead 
eventually to the same sort (10.57) as the conventional market will running and eventually it 
becomes useless because you not really diversifying and you are not really steering away. It 
is not really an alternative you are just following the same footsteps and you are going to the 
same destination. So it means that if somebody is trying to do the existing conventional 
derivatives for example and trying to make them fit somehow, one way or the other, to call 
them Islamic, but then the bottom line or the underlying structure of the derivative is the 
same as the conventional then obviously they are running the same risk as the conventional 
and that is no good for the industry. Third, is very much again a case in terms of risk 
management. As I said the risk in Islamic finance industry are different but the risk is still 
there. So this is a very important message to communicate to the industry and to anybody that 
is looking into Islamic finance that it is not a risk free business. It is very much based on the 
risk because Shariah does require a risk and reward link in any transaction. So the risk has to 
be there but the risk could be fundamentally from conventional finance. So when, for 
example, an Islamic bank is funding a house or a building that will be completely different, 
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the risk involved with that will be completely different. However the financial outcome will 
be almost the same as a conventional mortgage or a conventional funding or leasing but the 
risk involved with that process will be completely different. Now what I am observing as a 
practitioner is that the risk managers currently working in the Islamic financial industry are 
not fully aware of this key difference and it is not their fault because the majority of them are 
coming from conventional background so they have their own education and qualification, 
their training and their experience will be all based on conventional finance. So their mind set 
is conventional and they see the risk in a conventional way whereas it could be dramatically 
different in Islamic and sometimes they are findings it really hard and difficult to fully 
understand and when you don't understand the risk then obviously when you don't understand 
the risk then you cannot mitigate or manage your risk effectively. So this is, from a risk point 
of view, I think this is one of the inherent risk any Islamic financial institution that if they fail 
to fully quantify their risk and to manage it adequately then they will be definitely a mistake 
somewhere and if things go well, they will go well, but the day there is an issue it could be 
very detrimental to the institution and also to the industry at large.  
 
Q: Transparency is a big issue in Islamic finance. Transparency in the sense of the 
transactions, the composition of Shariah supervisory boards and in terms of product 
structures. How do you feel about that? 
 
A: As a practitioner I don't think that there is any major issue with transparency. I think that it 
has been probably misinterpreted somewhere. All that you have mentioned is definitely a 
cause for concern within the industry and also within the consumer, if you refer to the retail 
market. It is not a lack of transparency, it is actually a lack of understanding and when people 
do not understand fully then it becomes a sort of mysterious way of doing things for them and 
that may eventually be interpreted as a lack of transparency. I’ll tell you what happens. For 
example, you have mentioned here transparency in terms of transactions, so until you explain 
to me otherwise, I understand that when a transaction takes place people do not really 
understand why this process is used, why the bank has to purchase the asset before they sell 
and so on and so forth. So all these processes or procedures may seem a bit odd or out of 
place to many people but it has been actually developed on the basis of fulfilling certain 
Shariah requirements. So say for example in a murabaha transaction. That requires precisely, 
it is a Shariah requirement that the asset or the subject matter, when it is sold that the seller or 
the vendor has to have possession. So if the bank is financing an asset on murabaha basis then 
that asset is effectively a funding that the bank is providing but in order to provide that 
funding the bank has to use the procedure of murabaha that is acquiring the asset, paying an 
agree price to the vendor, taking over the ownership of the asset and then making an offer of 
sale to the customer or to the end user or the client who is seeking the funding. So effectively 
this procedure will be different and it will be different from any ordinary funding that the 
client will be expecting and the reason is that if the sequence of events in a murabaha is not 
respected then the contract actually becomes void from a Shariah point of view. So if the 
offer was made to the client or end user before the asset was actually taken into the 
ownership of the bank then from a Shariah point of view it is not a valid transaction. So when 
the process is working in a certain way, it is due to certain reasons and those reasons are for 
Shariah purposes and as the clients or the customer they do not have a full understanding of 
the background of the transaction then they find it quite hard to understand and they think it 
is too twisted or it is too long or it is too complicated. Why all this lengthy procedure and so 
on and so forth and they start calling it a lack of transparency and they think we don't know 
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why they are doing all this, well it’s for a purpose and I’ll tell you where the failure is. The 
failure is actually on the part of the bank or the institution. It is their job to provide all this 
understanding and to provide the explanation. Either they have to print some explanatory 
material or they have to give the customer some advice and some background information 
which I believe is not there. The documents and agreements that I see, to be honest with you, 
if I read those agreements, about 50-100 page documents, if I am a lay man, if I don't really 
have the background knowledge I will not be able to make any sense of them and they don't 
even bother to give you the glossary of terminology at the beginning of the contract. So of 
course it will become very opaque and it will become a transparency issue. When it comes to 
the composition of the Shariah supervisory board, then there are the same issues over and 
over again. Always if you go to Islamic financial conferences, one of the hottest topics ever is 
only a handful of Shariah scholars are sitting on so many boards and conflicts of interest and 
all that debate will go on forever. I agree with most of these concerns for it can create 
conflicts of interest it can create governance issues but we also have to be realistic and we 
have to understand that this industry is going very fast. It is a double digit annual growth and 
it is very difficult and very hard for the industry to manage this growth by providing the 
resources that will be required including human and financial resources etc. etc. and this is 
something that you cannot develop overnight. You need time, you need to develop the 
knowledge, to grow your experience and to develop your resources accordingly so it will 
always be an issue to a certain point until there are enough scholars available who have the 
right experience, who have the right qualifications, who have the right understanding. So 
that's why all these things are happening. They have some sort of believity but again I don’t 
think that there is a transparency issue. It is actually a lack of understanding and I’m not 
saying, I am not trying to defend the industry here. The industry has to do more, the industry 
has to invest in research and development they have to invest in developing their resources, 
their human capital is a big issue in this industry and that is why as there are no or almost any 
genuinely home-grown authentic indigenous Islamic bankers so the majority of them are 
actually coming from the conventional grounds and that's even further complicating things. 
So this is my view of that. I don't think it is a transparency issue but it is actually to do with 
the understanding and the industry has to provide you this awareness and this explanation. 
This is not going to happen on its own. We cannot expect the institutional clients, or we 
cannot expect the individual customers to seek knowledge and to go an Google everything 
such as what is an ijarah or what could I expect if I buy a car or if I want a $10 mil loan for a 
installing a new factory etc. etc. so how is that going to work. So all these things they aren’t 
available on Google and they shouldn't be so this is the responsibility of the institution to 
provide all this background information and to provide a handholding to the client because it 
is a completely new concept. So given the non-Muslim clients and the non-Muslim people 
involved they don't have any background knowledge whatsoever and they are completely lost 
in this jungle of terminology. The majority of the terminology comes from Arabic which is 
very hard for people to pronounce and understand so it puts them off. The Muslims they have 
some background knowledge but again but none of them – the ordinary Muslim on the street 
does not have any significant understanding of Islamic finance. All of them they will know 
and they will agree that interest is haram, it is forbidden in Islam but it stops there. If you just 
stop anybody in Lime Street and ask them what they know about mudaraba, the answer will 
be a completely blank look and it is nobody else’s responsibility. It is the industry’s 
responsibility to make people aware of what mudaraba is and how it’s going to work if they 
are interested in that. There is actually no transparency issue. The issue is a lack of 
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understanding and that lack of understanding has to be address by creating more awareness 
and providing information by providing detailed information to the people.  
 
Q: How do you think the lack of uniformity within the different Shariah financial hubs 
is affecting the Islamic financial system as a whole? 
 
A: This is a major cause for concern but this issue is diminishing over time. If we were 
talking about the same issue a decade ago then it would have been a major cause for concern 
because of the regional schools of thought found in the Islamic world where Shariah is 
interpreted in slightly different ways. So this resulted in a situation where a certain type of 
transaction authorised by the Malaysian scholars or the scholars of that particular school of 
thought – the Shaffi school of thought – will not be acceptable for the Hanbali school of 
thought and that is mainly in the gulf region. So what happens is that if a Malaysian 
institution issues a paper and it was based on a certain type of underlying instrument that will 
be rejected by default by the GCC and they will not find any subscribers so basically they 
will then be confined to the regional investors of the far east where people follow the same 
school of thought and they will accept it as Shariah compliant and vice versa it could be 
completely the opposite way also. For example a bond or an instrument was issued from 
Saudi Arabia or from Bahrain and it was not accepted by the Malaysians. This was a very 
serious issue and it impeded the growth and development of the industry for a long long time 
but this issue is diminishing now, in my view, very rapidly and actually a lot more swiftly 
than anything else. First of all there are three organisations that I would name that have 
helped tremendously in addressing these standardization issues. First of all its AAOIFI based 
in Bahrain and with their Shariah standards and accounting standards they have actually 
made it really easy for people to structure their products and instruments in a way that are 
acceptable from the Muslims across the broad. OS those issues of schools of thought and 
interpretation etc. are no longer there if somebody wants to use AAOIFI Shariah standards 
which is the case in the majority of the industry now. It is very, very rare that you will find 
something outside those standards because it is in everybody’s interest. You have to know 
that AAOIFI has its own Shariah board and that Shariah board is actually a lot bigger and 
more comprehensive and extensive than any other institutional board. In an institutional 
board you will usually have 3 scholars or sometimes 5 scholars or in exceptional cases like 
Al-Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia where you will have 7 or 9 scholars and these are just a few 
institutions that you could count on your fingertips otherwise the majority of these 
institutions are 3 scholars on a board. AAOIFI Shariah board is actually much bigger. I think 
they have around 20 odd scholars on their board and they have taken a representation from all 
the different regions of the world and all the schools of thought and they have taken a 
proportion so there is a minority of Shia scholars on their board and a majority of Sunni 
scholars from all over the region and the whole board works as a team and what is accepted 
as a Shariah standard by AAOIFI is actually a ratification or validation of that standard by all 
those scholars unanimously. It means that whatever is given to the market, it will acceptable 
for all the schools of thought and all the hubs. This should be the case in principal. That has 
made everybody’s life very easy because now if you do structure an instrument that is based 
on AAOIFIF Shariah standards then it is almost acceptable in all the Shariah hubs. (Interview 
cuts off here…) 
 
Q: Islamic finance doesn't have a lender of last resort. How do you think that would 
affect the Islamic financial system? 
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A: I do think that there should be a lender of last resort but I do not understand why and how 
we expect only having one lender of last resort for the whole financial industry. For me it 
doesn't work because in the conventional industry, every country or every market has its own 
lender of last resort which is usually the central bank of the country. So either we are saying 
that the Islamic financial industry as a whole is just one market and its dynamics are 
completely identical from one and to the other only then I think we can of having a central 
lender of last resort. If that is not the case, which it is definitely not in my view, then I think 
we cannot imagine having one lender of last resort for the whole industry. What I would 
suggest is we definitely need a lender of last resort but this is where the central banks have to 
be considered and they have to start moving towards  a position where they will be able to act 
as the lender of last resort for Islamic institutions in an Islamic way. We have already seen 
this happening where for example in Malaysia or in Lebanon where by definition the central 
bank is actually accepting the reserves from Islamic institutions on Islamic principles. So it 
goes into an Islamic account held at the central bank and the reserves will be taken as a 
deposit on Islamic principles and it will be remunerated, if it is remunerated, in an Islamic 
way and similarly the central bank will act as a lender of last resort if required for an Islamic 
financial institution. Now it is still very early because it will be very difficult, for me, to 
imagine that the Bank of England or the Bank of France will start behaving in this way but in 
my view this is what is required and if the UK regulator, the FSA, has authorised 5 
standalone Islamic banks in the country then I think this is one of the things that they should 
consider and , to some degree, is their responsibility to discuss it with the Bank of England 
and find a solution because at the moment these banks do not have any lenders of last resort 
and they are working in a complete vacuum but before we expect the bank of England or the 
FSA to do anything like this we would expect from the central bank in countries with a 
Muslim majority and where the Islamic financial industry is much stronger like the UAE and 
the Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, I think, this is what they have to do first. They have to set up 
the example as the Malaysian and the Lebanese have set and only then will we be able to see 
the national lenders of last resort for Islamic financial institutions. I think that more practical, 
sustainable and easy to implement than anything else. 
 
Q: How do you think you could improve the standard of governance in Islamic finance? 
 
A: Good question. I think there are two things that we need to consider what we talk about 
good governance. First of all it will be good governance in general for the institutions and 
part of that good governance will be Shariah governance. Now this is one of the arguments 
that I have had with some of the  national regulators in the European countries where the 
regulators have taken a position steering themselves completely away from Shariah 
governance and saying that they are a secular organisation, we represent a secular country 
and we do not really want to interfere with the Shariah. Fine enough. I totally accept, as a 
practitioner I will accept and agree with this position that they have taken. However, I think 
that there is one point that is very serious and completely ignored by the regulators which is, 
one of the rules of the regulators is actually to protect the consumer of that market so when 
you authorise an Islamic bank to operate in the market as an Islamic bank then by definition I 
would expect as a consumer, from the regulator, to make sure that every measure has been 
put in place to ensure that what it says on the tin is what it contains as well and at the moment 
I do not see as a consumer, I am not fully satisfied, and this maybe one of the things that 
eventually translates into questions over transparency etc., that how Shariah governance is 
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taking place, how the decisions of the Shariah supervisory board are taken, how the scholars 
are appointed, on what grounds they are appointed, how the scholars are making decisions, 
how those decisions are being implemented and when I go, for example to an Islamic Bank, I 
am told that the home finance that I am applying for is Islamic and they show me a fatwa or a 
signed paper by their Shariah supervisory board members, is that all I should have access to 
as a consumer of an Islamic bank. I am not naming any bank here; I am just giving you an 
example so please try to avoid naming any bank. So as a consumer what I would like to see 
that there is open communication where an annual report is published or there is at least 
something referring to a sort of annual approval report of Shariah compliance that is part of 
the group report for instance or the accounts. So as part of the accounts you have the 
chairman’s report and the auditor’s report and the managing director’s report and another 
page by the chairman of the Shariah supervisory board that all of the business conducted by 
this bank is in accordance with the Shariah rulings and the rulings are provided by the 
Shariah supervisory board. So this is part of good governance for me. That is one side and 
this will not happen until there is more emphasis on Shariah audit. This is very important 
because everybody is putting a lot of emphasis on financial audits especially these days 
where certain practices of the banking industry have become very questionable and they have 
challenged the decisions etc. etc. So financial audit is extremely important and so is Shariah 
audit and there is not enough measures in place actually to ensure that there is an internal or 
ideally there is an external, independent Shariah audit being done and there is no sort of 
Shariah rating as well. On the other side the general good governance of Islamic financial 
institutions again, I think with what I have observed sometimes as a practitioner is that the 
individual who are sitting on the board of directors do not fully understand the implications 
of Shariah and they do not fully understand what will be required from them as the custodians 
of this institution and the custodians of the trust of the customers or the staff of the institution 
has placed in them, the board. In some markets, in Europe, I think it is quite stringent and 
people do understand but I have seen in some countries where corporate governance is treated 
as a secondary issue and not really something that is important. I have also seen interference 
going on as well with the day to day management of the business etc. So in my personal view 
this is something that has to be very strongly addressed and there should be very clear 
systems in place to ensure that good governance is actually good governance and people 
understand and they feel the responsibility that they are carrying in terms of providing they 
corporate governance or the direction to the institution and there is no chance of any 
interference or any malpractices between different layers of the governance including the 
Shariah governance. So I would not expect a Shariah scholar to intervene in an management 
decision or intervene into any headed decision of the financial institution regardless if it is the 
brother of the Shariah scholar or his father it should be completely indifferent for the person. 
I am not accusing anybody here; I am just thinking loudly that these are the things I would 
expect to see in theory and also in practice. They should be implemented. They (both Shariah 
and conventional governance) need to work together however I put more emphasis on 
Shariah governance. There should be a proper mechanism of external Shariah audit to make 
sure that what is being said is Shariah complaint is truly Shariah compliant. 
 
Q: How do you see Shariah finance progressing in the future? 
 
A: I think the overall perspective of Islamic finance is actually quite positive and very strong. 
There is big room for growth, I would say, internationally because it is not only the countries 
or the markets with the Muslim majority but it is also very relevant to the non-Muslim 
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population as well. It will be just a matter of creating the awareness and maybe also 
providing some alternative terminology because, and this is another observation I have made 
as a practitioner, that the extensive use of Arabic terminology, which is understandable, but it 
is not helping a lot in propagating this alternative to a lot of people. So if all these issues are 
dealt with in a constructive way then I think that overall Islamic finance has a very bright 
future and it has the potential to appeal to Muslims and non-Muslims alike and to become a 
part of mainstream finance as a strong alternative channel. I was actually very delightfully 
surprised to see a photo sent by a friend and that photo was taken on Wall Street in New York 
and American lady was carrying a banner, and she was Caucasian, that was displaying 
something like ‘maybe we should bank as the Muslims do…” or something like that. So what 
we have seen over the last two three years, how events are unfolding in the conventional 
financial industry and these issues of greed etc., I think they can be duly addressed with the 
implementation and introduction of Islamic finance but this will take time and it will require 
a lot of concerted effort of the industry to create this awareness and to make it a proper 
mainstream alternative channel but if they can do it and pull it together then I think that it has 
actually a very strong potential and the future will be very, very bright even if they continue 
doing what they are doing now, I think the future is still pretty bright for them (Islamic 
finance). 
 
Q: What do you think about the development of new instruments such as the wa’ad in 
Islamic finance? 
 
A: I think that the wa’ad is definitely one of the key instruments that could be developed and 
has a lot of potential but it will remain under very strict conditions and this is the unfortunate 
fact. When a murabaha is authorised by the scholars it came with a very strict set of rules and 
conditions to be respected. Unfortunately, over time people started feeling very lax about that 
and they started turning murabaha in to something else and eventually it came to the point 
where it became extremely controversial and many scholars who initially were happy with 
murabaha they declared that it was no longer acceptable in their view because the practices of 
murabaha today are far away from what they should be. If this is going to be done to the 
wa’ad then, of course, it will become very controversial and it will actually become another 
issue in the future. However, if it is managed correctly and when the conditions are provided 
or the set of rules are provided by the scholars then it has to be understood by the 
practitioners instead of arguing for the sake of arguing and trying to mould it to make it look 
more like a future than a wa’ad. That will be very detrimental and that will again put a dent in 
the confidence of the scholars, in the confidence of the consumers and it will become another 
joke like murabaha. However, if it is used, if it is implement and if it is research, and it will 
required a lot of research, and the Muslim scholars who will be taking the decisions and who 
will be providing the set of rules, they have to be fully informed as well of the implications of 
the future because they have to see both sides of the picture. So when they fully understand 
the future market and when they fully understand the Shariah implication of wa’ad then 
definitely they will be able, with the help of practitioners to come up with innovative 
structures where we can use wa’ad objectively while remaining true to Shariah and if we start 
going in the other direction then maybe we will damage this excellent tool and we will end up 
in a situation where a lot of people will be unhappy with the use of wa’ad. 
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Practitioner 6 
 
Q: So the first question is, how do you think conventional finance views Islamic finance? 
 
Right, you’re talking about mainstream finance, the conventional ones right? 
 
Yes. 
 
Right.  I’ll talk here in the MENA region you know because we are based in the MENA 
region.  They view it, you know, as it’s very competitive kind of banking or financing tools 
being used here in the MENA region okay, they view that as ethical system more than the 
conventional one.  Okay they find a lot of opportunities in this market as well as a lot of gaps 
you know because most of the banks are conventional so, and people are now trying, tend to 
go through the Islamic finance, Islamic institutions so there is a good gap in the market so in 
terms of view, as I said now conventional banks, they know exactly what Islamic banks are 
all about, they know the system, they know how it works.  In Kuwait specifically most of the 
big banks, mega conventional banks are now having an Islamic bank under its umbrella so 
it’s a must, so if I give you an example about National Bank of Kuwait, it’s one of the biggest 
banks here in the region, the MENA region, just two, three years ago it acquired an Islamic 
bank, it’s called Boubyan, Boubyan Bank, it’s an Islamic bank so now this bank owns both a 
conventional as well as Islamic banks so, you know, it’s now a must for any conventional 
bank to have an Islamic bank under its umbrella.  
 
Q: Sure.  You said people basically kind of see Islamic banking as a form of ethical 
financing, do you think that there is a difference between Islamic banking and ethical 
financing, say for example green investments, do you think there’s a difference? 
 
I’m not sure really, for the regular people they do not know the difference.  However, you 
know, it’s for us as Muslims here in the region, we more believe in Islamic related products 
and structures, etc. so if you offered me a green investment, a green investment from a 
conventional bank and I have any other structure or product from any Islamic bank here in 
the region, I will go for that Islamic product, I will not go with a product that came out of a 
conventional bank.  Now I’m talking about maybe 50 or 60% of the population, you know, 
most of the people now tend to respect more or to go to such Islamic institutions.  
 
Q: Is there a lot of competition between Islamic and conventional banks? 
 
Yes in recent years, in recent years so I’ll just give you a brief about, you know, here in 
Kuwait specifically 20 years ago they established a bank, it’s called Kuwait Finance House, 
okay.  Kuwait Finance House is the first Islamic bank established here in Kuwait and it was 
the only bank.  On the other hand the conventional side there was around five banks, mega 
banks, okay 20 years ago, not far from now you know, only 20 years ago so since then now 
we are talking, we have almost the same number of Islamic banks same as the conventional 
banks so we have about six conventional banks and we have almost another six Islamic banks 
here in Kuwait so we can see how this picked up in the last 20 years only in Kuwait and as I 
said, you know, in recent years now they almost they have the same number, almost the 
same, talking about same size region you know so they are 50/50 in Kuwait which is, you 
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know, it’s something we cannot ignore, you know, Islamic finance here in Kuwait now it’s 
picking up big time.  
 
Q: As an investment banker, how do you feel about the products available within 
Islamic finance? 
 
Right, to be very honest, in terms of investment products they are not as innovative as in 
conventional banks.  As you know financial engineering is most in the other side which is the 
conventional banking, however for Islamic banking the products are a little bit limited and 
what we call they are more concerned with the commercial side of the banking, you know, 
the retail side, not the investment banking side, I’m talking here about investment.  I’m 
talking here the investment side of the banks, okay, so if you notice you will see that 
conventional banks are having more sort of investment products than the other Islamic banks.  
Islamic banks, if we talk about investment they have direct investments, more direct 
investments than having Islamic products, structured products you know so I’ll give you an 
example about Kuwait Finance House which is the biggest Islamic bank maybe in the region 
for now, one of the mega banks, Islamic banks in the region.  They already have a lot of 
direct investments.  There are a lot of subsidiaries, a lot of investments they directly, that we 
call private equity investments so they invest in companies, in a lot of companies, they do not 
invest in portfolios and money markets, etc., etc. because a lot of these products are not 
Sharia compliant you know so we’re talking about Forex, etc., all these products are not 
Sharia compliant because of talking about, you know, Sharia sort of problem dealing with 
such products so what they do is they invest heavily in a lot of sectors so talking about 
healthcare, education, talking about investment so for example they own our company, the 
company I’m working for at the moment, the finance house, they own, well they partially 
own our company so they like to have their investments and companies not in investment 
products okay so this is the difference maybe between them and the conventional, across 
conventional, they have more free, they have a lot of options you know for the assets, you 
know, they have a lot of, you know, location wise they can put their monies among a lot of 
products regionally and globally but it is not the case for Islamic banks as you know.  
 
Q: So that’s from an investment perspective, what about a risk management 
prospective, do you think there needs to be more instruments for risk management in 
Islamic finance? 
 
A very broad question, we’re talking about risk management.  Risk management has to be in 
every department.  We are talking here about, if we are talking about investment banking 
department inside the bank, there has to be a risk management framework that govern the 
way people perceive the risk within an investment so we’re talking about risk management, 
we’re talking about risk management at the board level going down, you know, at the 
executive management level and then going down to the employees’ level inside every 
department, okay, talking about asset management, we’re talking about liquidity 
management, we’re talking about, you know, there are a lot of risks out there that has to be 
managed from different layers within the institution within a bank, so we’re talking about risk 
management, Islamic finance is very broad okay and it cannot be honestly here for example 
I’ve been given a task in this company, in this investment company to start making a 
governance, a corporate governance framework and the risk management framework.  It’s 
good to have it theoretically when we are talking theoretically, it’s very easy to have them 
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written and signed by the board and approved, etc.  The problem lies with the implementation 
of such a framework and how you monitor it, how you really implement such a risk 
management.  Okay we know that we have an investment, you have to make our risk 
management to analyse the risk, etc. to, you know, there are a lot of things you have to do 
within, you know, a criteria, specific criteria okay so, you know, this broad question cannot 
be answered at the bank level without, you know, going down to the bottom line of banks so 
what sort of bank is this?  Is it only working as a commercial bank or, you know, it’s working 
as an investment bank and, you know, the liquidity levels, is it a big, big massive bank that 
has a lot of market share or not, so the more the bank is, the bigger the bank is, you know, 
there are, the more risk here the bank is vulnerable for, you know, liquidity crisis so for 
example if people suddenly they call it bank run or whatever they go and just withdraw their 
monies and deposits, etc.  How the bank will react to this, you know if, yeah so. 
 
Q: I mean predominantly we’re looking more at basically portfolio risk management so 
say for example using financial derivatives within Islamic finance to hedge against risk, 
do you think there is a lack of innovation in that aspect of Islamic finance? 
 
Yes, yes there is, there is a lack of innovation maybe because Islamic finance is just what we 
call it?  It’s emerging, still emerging, it’s not developed, you know, it’s not like the 
conventional, there is no real system, you know, that is governed by, for example at the 
global level, not like the conventional.  The conventional system is known and uniform, etc., 
but for the Islamic, it’s not as uniform as the conventional yet.  So there is lack of innovation 
definitely there is.  In terms of risk management yes there is also still I think they are way 
beyond how other banks are managing their risk and liquidity also so yes they are still 
behind.  Because it’s newer than the conventional but it will pick up, it will pick up soon.  It 
will have to pick up.  
 
Q: How do you feel about new like how do you feel about the current level of 
innovation, say for example the new products such as the Wa’d. How you do you feel 
about them approximating let’s say a conventional option, do you think that’s the right 
way forward?  Do you think that’s not the right way forward? 
 
It’s in the very right way, the innovation is growing but as I said it’s still lagging so we will 
find conventional banks are way, you know, they are more innovative than Islamic banks and 
this is not as bad as people might think.  Because Islamic finance is very limited in terms of 
products, you know, there are a lot of investment products and derivatives that are not Sharia 
complaint, you know what I mean?  So in terms, if we are talking about products and new 
products and innovative products, you know, you will find most of them are not compliant 
with the Sharia law and therefore you will not find a financial engineer, investment products 
that are Sharia compliant.  
 
Sure. 
 
Therefore you will find, yeah Islamic banks are a little bit behind but the reason is not 
because the people are working are not at the innovative level as the other banks, no it’s 
about the Sharia law itself and how it limits the options we have in terms of investment 
products that we can offer within the bank.  
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Q: Sure.  In terms of Sharia compliancy, one of the main criticisms of Sharia 
compliancy with the lack of transparency behind what is Sharia compliant and what 
isn’t Sharia compliant, do you think there is an issue of transparency in Islamic 
finance? 
 
Yes definitely.  Look, transparency we always have problem with transparency.  I’m talking 
we here, talking about, you know, the MENA region and maybe a few countries in the Far 
East, you know, transparency is a massive problem.  We’re talking here at all levels so 
talking about the government level, we’re talking about companies of the corporate levels, 
there is no any transparency, all very minimal so the problem with data, you know, some 
people view it as very confidential and they do not want to disclose what they are doing sort 
of what is available for the public, you know, we don’t have this what we call it this culture 
of just being very transparent with each other so people can learn, people can analyse, look 
what you have done and then you can improve, etc., as what is happening in the, we’re 
talking here about, you know, the US, western Europe, you know, for us here it’s, you know, 
transparency is just at the lowest ever level, you know, in compared to the more transparent 
markets.  
 
Q: Do you think it would help Islamic finance if, say for example, the Fatwas issued by 
the Sharia supervisory boards were made available to the public, do you think it will 
help if, you know, basically product structures were made known to the public, do you 
think that will help Islamic finance immensely in the future? 
 
Definitely, definitely because people will start understanding more what is Islamic finance, 
how it works, whether it’s really, really hard to do or hard to implement or is just simple and 
have little principles here and there and can be implemented so it will help them grow faster, 
at a faster pace, you know.  If there is transparency definitely such principles will grow more, 
you know, more quicker than a space at this level at these days, you know, so the more 
transparent institutions are, the more people will know, the more the people will analyse, the 
more the people will look at the data and transactions and all, as you said there, Sharia 
supervisory board if they issue a report so there is an understanding what’s inside that report 
so here also about the product structure, how those products are structured, how they actually 
work, how they are Sharia compliant, all these data will help them to grow, you know, at a 
faster pace than the current pace they are having.  
   
Q: Okay.  Some people have said that the lack of transparency does not actually exist, it 
is in fact a marketing problem so for example Islamic finance does not market itself 
properly and people don’t want to accept it and that’s why people perceive there’s a 
lack of transparency, would you agree with this? 
 
I don’t think so.  It’s not a lack of marketing.  You know marketing is just to be very honest 
you know, people in the financial industry, they know each other, you know, we know, you 
know, what banks are there, what they are doing, who are the groups and those banks, what 
sort of exposure they have so talking here about people in the same industry, they know each 
other, we do not need the marketing, you know, Islamic finance do not need to be marketed 
by the institutions.  Rather if some interested personnel or institutions would love to know 
more about Islamic financing and Islamic structures, Islamic product structures, they can just 
search for the data and start analysing them, you know, that’s what we need.  It’s to have 
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something like data centre or something that has a track record of transactions, supervisory, 
you know, Sharia supervisory board reports, annual, you know, AGMs for banks available, 
previous funds or previous portfolios invested within banks, you know, it’s financial 
performance, all these data are very important to be analysed and then it can be used, you 
know, it can be used by researchers, can be used by, you know, other countries, you know.  I 
think in America there is a huge potential for Islamic banks.  Now in London there is Islamic 
banks started picking up in Malaysia already, you know, it’s the financial centre for Islamic 
finance so I think those people who need to know more about how Islamic finance works and 
this will never happen unless those who are actually working in this industry start disclosing 
and being more transparent with others, sharing with them how such things work, you know.  
Once this is shared through a platform and then those data can be analysed and understood, I 
think it will be very interesting.  It will be very interesting, I will have very interesting results, 
so for example for you as researchers, if you have a platform for data collection, you know, 
just you want to collect some data about banks, what sort of products they offer, what sort of, 
you know, we’re talking about transactions, previous transactions, something they bought, 
something they sold, how things actually work, I think it will help, you know.  
 
Q: I see what you mean, so it’s basically not about being transparent, only within the 
financial industry about being transparent with basically everyone else so you can help 
Islamic finance grow in that respect.  
 
Yes because transparent with the other in the same industry we already know, you know, 
when you are working in the same industry you know who are the key people, what they are 
doing, what are the products, you know what I mean so you don’t need that transparently 
because you are already inside that market but for others who are outside and talking not 
outside only at the sector level, I’m talking about the geographical level, so in, for example, 
in Saudi Arabia they might not know who are the key players here in the Islamic finance 
arena.  They don’t know what sort of products and they are talking here about our neighbour 
so imagine, talking about Japan, if they want to know more about Islamic finance in Kuwait, 
they I think there is no way to know, if you know what I mean.  So being transparent is being 
transparent at a global level at somewhere like, if you have somewhere like Thomson Reuters 
or something, Bloomberg, somewhere that you can share your transaction, your data your 
everything that can be analysed and then used, if you know what I mean.  
 
Q: What do you think can be done to basically, you know, what mechanisms do you 
think should be put in place or could be put in place to basically make Islamic finance 
more transparent? 
 
As I said, it has to be, first of all if you look at conventional banks, now how it spread all over 
the world at this pace, you know, and everybody knows how it works, because there is 
uniformity somewhere, there are some bodies or, you know, there are some, what we call 
them? 
 
Central bodies.  
 
Exactly, central bodies that they are sharing, you know, experiences from somewhere to the 
other and sharing the rules and regulations, etc.  I think this is not the case.  Yes there are a 
few bodies in the Islamic finance arena but they are not as active as in the conventional part, 
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you know.  So I think here are the bodies who have the connection, you know, if you start 
connecting people, using data, using information from one part of the world to the other part 
of the world, you will add value, you will definitely add value, you know, you will definitely 
add value and you will be like the bridge between the east and the west, between the second 
or third world and the first world as well call it, between Islamic finance and the people who 
doesn’t know anything about Islamic finance you know so I think those bodies have to start, 
you know, being more active because to be very honest I have no clue of any of the Islamic 
finance rates but there might be, there might be two or three or five or ten but we cannot, we 
do not know them, you know, they are not on the ground if you know what I mean.  They do 
not, they are not trying to approach, you know, Islamic banks, Islamic institutions like our 
company for example, an Islamic or Sharia compliant investment company.  We have other, 
we have, you know, procedures for lending, procedures for investing, etc. so I think these 
experiences can be shared through those bodies to other investment companies in other parts 
of the world and this is where, this will help definitely growing very faster, you know, at a 
faster level than the pace we are having now.  
 
Q: Sure.  Going back to the Sharia supervisory boards, there’s been a lot of criticism 
lately suggesting that you see the same Sharia scholars on similar boards with different 
companies and that companies are headhunting Sharia scholars for their judgements, 
how do you feel about this? 
 
Right, now in Kuwait for example, I’ll just, I’ll give you something in Kuwait now, we have 
a CMA, something called Capital Market Authority okay that is obliging companies to have a 
supervisory board from a Sharia companies that are approved by the CMA, okay?  So I’ll just 
give you an example.  If we have, you know, a Sharia consultancy in Kuwait say ten 
companies, they are all approved by the CMA okay so as a company, as an investment 
company licensed by this central, by the Capital Market Authority in Kuwait, we have to 
have them on board, one of those ten companies have them on our Sharia board, you know 
what I mean? 
 
Sure.  
 
Okay so it’s not about just, you know before, that was before right you are, what you just said 
is picking up scholars from here and there, trying to have those three scholars from, you 
know, from the market and that’s, but now recently just in the past three years, you know 
since 2010 all companies now are obliged to have those companies on board.  One of those 
companies on board of our Sharia advisory board, you know, so it’s more now regulated than 
before, so it’s not a mega problem, it’s not a problem for companies, it’s not a problem for 
banks or Islamic banks because they are available and they are working under massive 
organisation structures that are really in the market and, you know, regulated by the Capital 
Market Authority of this market so it’s regulated at the moment. 
 
Q: So the problem, I mean it was a problem before but because there’s more expertise 
and there’s more regulation in the market now, it’s no longer that big of a problem 
anymore.  
 
Exactly.  
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Q: From our conversation so far I can kind of tell that you’re very strong, you feel very 
strongly about the uniformity of the Islamic banking system.  In terms of basically 
Islamic hubs, what you find is that Malaysia is a central Islamic hub, you have the Gulf 
region which is also a central Islamic hub and then you have the UK in the west.  All 
three central hubs have, to a certain extent, different regulatory standards, different 
interpretations of Islamic law.  How do you feel that impacts?  So in essence it’s the lack 
of uniformity there.  How do you feel that impacts the overall Islamic financial system? 
 
Yeah this is what I just said, you know because there is no uniformity between those hubs, 
you know, every bank is different, every, you know, at the operational level, you know, there 
will be a problem with the compliance, there will be a problem with being no better, you 
know because there is a lot of rules and regulations that are different, so I will give you an 
example for the Kuwait finance house, they are already in Malaysia, they are already in 
Dubai, they are already in Kuwait.  Okay, they have different rules and regulations from 
Kuwait to Dubai to Malaysia.  Imagine how you can just manage under the one umbrella, you 
know, those three massive banks, we’re not talking only branches we’re talking about banks, 
banks that are the same, under the same, you know, under the same umbrella of this bank so 
this is the problem in that you don’t have uniformity, you don’t have yet centralised place 
that give you direction and for each rule and regulation, you know what I mean, there is no 
one place that gives you clear cut, you know, rules and regulations, policies and procedures 
and how to just follow them and act as best practice Islamic bank, there is nothing, there is 
not such a thing.  
 
Q: Sure.  How do you feel about the large, how do you feel about AAOIFI and the 
IFSB? 
 
As I said, I haven’t heard of AAOIFI.  I’ve heard of IFSB, I think it’s Islamic Finance … 
 
Services Board. 
 
… Services Board.  
 
Sure. 
 
They are not active.  From my perspective on the ground I haven’t seen, I haven’t heard may 
IFSB, I’ve read a few papers a few years ago about Islamic Finance but they are not on the 
ground my dear, and this is the problem, they are publishing, they are doing a lot of, you 
know, very high level, you know communications which, at the end of the day I think it will 
not add a lot of value.  You have to be a real bridge or otherwise you should not, you know, 
take a lead on such and such as a sector, you know what I mean?  You have to have more 
proactive role.  
 
Q: Sure.  There have been calls for a central bank to basically help Islamic support, to 
be a central regulatory standard for Islamic finance.  Do you think this role can be 
taken on by say a sovereign central bank? 
 
Yes why not but it has to be regulated somehow.  I don’t know how.  I have no clue how it 
can be done but it has to be done because now it’s not, I’m talking about 50% of the banking 
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system in a country like Kuwait which is a very wealthy country and it’s Islamic so it has to 
be regulated.  It is regulated by central bank but it has to be, you know, also under the central 
bank and somehow especially, you know, bumping money, etc. in the financial system, there 
has to be a mechanism.  I don’t know how it’s been done. 
 
Q: How would you feel about an Islamic central bank, so say for example a central bank 
created just for Islamic finance, would that be preferable or would you rather have a 
conventional central bank? 
 
Why not?  No, I think an Islamic central bank is a very good idea at the moment, you know 
but the problem, how they are going to implement. On the ground it’s a different case.  It’s a 
very different case especially, you know, just to let you know something.  Now in Kuwait if a 
crisis happened, okay, how a conventional central bank will bail out an Islamic bank.  There 
is no way, it can go insolvent without a helping if you know what I mean?  You know what I 
mean so there is a lot of problems Islamic banks are facing.  I am not sure how it can be 
solved to be very honest.  Yes it’s waking up, yes it’s having a huge market share but it’s still 
not supported by the government as should be supported.  
 
Q: Sure.  Well just a final few questions.  In terms of Islamic banking and governance, 
what do you think are the main issues of governance within the Islamic banks? 
 
Governance?  I mean now talking about risk management and talking about having a 
framework, you know the board of those banks has to make sure they establish a proper risk 
management practices including also something we call it business continuity plan, you 
know, the board has also to make sure they control all the financial and non-financial risks so 
those in terms of governance are, I think it’s to comply with all the other regulations with the 
central bank and capital market authority, etc., so those are I think this is the job of any board, 
you know, is to make sure they are governing the institution in a very robust way. 
 
Q: Going into the 21
st
 century, what do you think are the main areas of risk within 
Islamic finance?  Say for example we had the current financial crisis, we saw a few 
problems with Sukuk structures and so on and so forth, where do you think are the 
main areas of risk for Islamic finance going into the future? 
 
To be very honest, now we are having in our region we have political risk you know.  
Political risk is very high, you know.  If any of those countries are not, you know, supported 
and the finances are supported, you know, properly so I give you an example is Egypt.  These 
days they have … 
 
Sorry Salem you’re breaking up.  
 
As you might know there’s a co-op by, yeah this is such a problem, in fact the financial 
situation, the balance sheet of Egypt, you know, so they will need to pump in some money.  
These monies might be got from, you know, from some countries like the US or other 
countries like Saudi or Kuwait as we’ve seen, you know, so we’re talking here about political 
risk.  The political risk will definitely, definitely impact the Islamic financing institutions, 
you know.  There is also religious related risks I think.  Religious related risks, now these 
days also because Islam, I’m not sure what’s happening to it, you know, there are a lot of 
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problems happening and people are being more afraid of the idea of Islam.  We are all 
Muslims, etc. but you know what we call it, something I have to speak about which is, you 
know … okay so there is also religious risks I think so talking here about unreligious and 
political I think, financial also could be if there is a crisis or something, okay another crisis 
happened there might be a bank run which might impact the liquidity of the Islamic banks 
and a leap to solvency.  In those I think financial, political, religious, those three things, that’s 
what I think.  
 
Q: Sure.  Okay final question.  Do you see Islamic finance competing with conventional 
finance for the future, I mean in terms of, as opposed to an alternative, as opposed to 
basically being a niche product, do you think Islamic finance would be on a level 
playing field with conventional finance? 
 
Not now.  Maybe not before, you know, 10 to 20 years.  I’m not exaggerating but it will need 
a lot of time.  
 
Sure.  
 
Because there is you know, as we said, no uniformity, a lot of things are still missing, it’s a 
long way for them to … it’s now competing but at certain regions, certain countries, as I said 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc. so in this region only, okay, the competition is but to go beyond 
these regions I think it will need a lot of time and effort so not now, not now at all.  
 
Q: Sure.  As a practitioner as well, as a person that’s underground as an investment 
banker in Islamic finance, how do you think Islamic finance performed during the 
financial crisis?  Do you think it did well?  Do you think it rode it better than 
conventional finance?  
 
It is better, surprisingly better.  Surprisingly better than conventional finance because why?  I 
tell you why, because the basic idea of the Islamic Sharia structure is not to take a lot of risk, 
okay, not to be exposed to a lot of derivatives, you know to try to be conservative as much as 
possible and those banks all survived the most you know, the banks who do not carry a lot of 
risk, the banks who are not exposed to a lot of derivatives and a lot of risky investments and 
therefore they perform better because they are very conservative based on the Sharia laws, 
you know, the Sharia laws try always to, what to say, to save or to make sure no harm for 
anybody, you know what I mean? 
 
Sure. 
 
So to protect investors and to protect others so that’s it, that’s it I think.  That’s why they 
perform better.  
 
END 
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Appendix 5 – Interview Access Documents 
 
Interview Cover Letter 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
The purpose of this e-mail is to request a brief interview with you regarding your thoughts on several aspects of 
Islamic banking and finance. 
 
My name is Seng Kiong, Kok and I am a postgraduate research student at University of Liverpool Management 
School. I am currently undertaking research with regards to “The Evolution of Islamic Finance in the World 
Today: A Study of Risk Management and Governance”. This research essentially focuses on the development 
risk management concepts within the Islamic financial system and the continual evolution of its governance. 
Recent studies have shown that whilst Islamic finance does provide a source of diversification to the traditional 
western investor, risk management strategies are still very rigid and lack the dynamic nature of their western 
counterparts. Moreover, the lack of a central, uniform set of rules to govern the financial system as a whole has 
resulted in many a grey area. This research aims explore the various available risk management instruments 
presented by Islamic finance and the scope for the development of more proactive strategies. Additionally, this 
research also seeks to determine if the lack of a single regulatory standard is detrimental towards the continual 
development of Islamic Finance. 
 
An important element of the research requires critical discussion and dialogue in the form of interviews with a 
well-informed respondent group with in-depth knowledge and experience in the subject area. The interview 
should last a maximum of 1 hour where a number of issues within the area of Islamic Finance will be discussed. 
The interview process will include individuals from both an academic and professional background within the 
field of Islamic banking and finance, allowing for a well-rounded group of respondents to provide their views 
and opinions on the research area. 
 
I hope you would be able to provide your time as well as insight, which will be greatly beneficial to my 
research. I would be more than happy to provide you with a draft copy of interview questions in advance, if you 
require and would, of course, work around your availability and schedules. All information supplied will be 
treated with strict confidentiality and kept at the University of Liverpool Management School Campus. 
Information collected will be used solely for the purposes of this study and no other.  
 
Access to interview transcripts is restricted to me as principal researcher and my supervisory team. Participation 
in this interview is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw from this study at any time. If you wish to 
withdraw your participation, please contact me at the email address provided below and all informational related 
to you will be destroyed. If you would like a summary of the results of this research, I would be happy to send 
you copies of future publications. 
 
Please feel free to contact me via email at S.Kok2@liv.ac.uk with regards to any queries you may have, or my 
director of studies G.Giorgioni@liv.ac.uk or through telephone at +44 151 795 0560. 
 
Thank you for considering my request and I look forward to hearing from you soon. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
Seng Kiong, Kok 
Postgraduate Research Student 
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Participants Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Evolution of Islamic Finance in the World Today: A Study of Risk 
Management and Governance 
 
Name of Researcher and School/Faculty 
 
My name is Seng Kiong, Kok and I am a postgraduate research student at University 
of Liverpool Management School. I am currently undertaking research in the field of 
“The Evolution of Islamic Finance in the World Today: A Study of Risk Management 
and Governance”. 
 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This research essentially focuses on the development risk management concepts 
within the Islamic financial system and the continual evolution of its governance. 
Recent studies have shown that whilst Islamic finance does provide a source of 
diversification to the traditional western investor, risk management strategies are still 
very rigid and lack the dynamic nature of their western counterparts. Moreover, the 
lack of a central, uniform set of rules to govern the financial system as a whole has 
resulted in many a grey area. This research aims explore the various available risk 
management instruments presented by Islamic finance and the scope for the 
development of more proactive strategies. Additionally, this research also seeks to 
determine if the lack of a single regulatory standard is detrimental towards the 
continual development of Islamic Finance. 
 
2. Do I have to take part? 
 
Participation in this interview is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw from 
this study at any time. If you wish to withdraw your participation, please contact me 
at the email address provided below and all informational related to you will be 
destroyed. If you would like a summary of the results of this research, I would be 
happy to send you copies of future publications. 
 
3. What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
An integral part of this research is to collect information through the use of interviews 
from both academics and professionals within the field of business and finance, 
allowing for a well-rounded group of respondents to provide their views and opinions 
on the research area. Each interview should last no more than 45 minutes. 
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL 
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Interviews will be transcribed for analysis and access to interview transcripts is 
restricted to me, as principal researcher, and my supervisory team. Information 
collected will only be used for the period of this research and no more. 
 
4. Are there any risks / benefits involved? 
 
As principle researcher I do not foresee any risks or discomforts that would arise in 
conducting this research as all information will be kept confidential. 
 
5. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
All information supplied will be treated with strict confidentiality and kept at the 
University of Liverpool Management School Campus. Information collected will be 
used solely for the purposes of this study and no other. Information, once collected 
will be encrypted and stored in password protected folders. 
 
Contact Details of Researcher  
 
Please feel free to contact me via email at S.Kok2@liv.ac.uk with regards to any 
queries you may have, or my director of studies G.Giorgioni@liv.ac.uk or through 
telephone at +44 151 795 0560. 
 
Once again thank you for your time. 
Yours respectfully, 
 
 
    
Seng Kiong, Kok 
Postgraduate Research Student 
University of Liverpool 
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Interview Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
The Evolution of Islamic Finance in the World Today: A Study of Risk 
Management and Governance 
 
By: Seng Kiong, Kok  
Faculty: University of Liverpool Management School  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the 
above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily 
 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason and that this will not affect 
my legal rights. 
 
 
 
3. I understand that any personal information collected during the study will 
be anonymised and remain confidential 
 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant     Date    Signature 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date   Signature 
 
 
Name of Person taking consent   Date   Signature 
 
 
 
(if different from researcher) 
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The Evolution of Islamic Finance in the World Today: A Study of Risk 
Management and Governance 
 
By: Seng Kiong, Kok 
 
Faculty: University of Liverpool Management School 
 
Child (or if unable, parent/guardian on their behalf) / young person to circle all they 
agree with 
 
Have you read (or had read to you) information about this project?   Yes/No  
 
Has somebody else explained this project to you?     Yes/No  
 
Do you understand what this project is about?      Yes/No  
 
Have you asked all the questions you want?      Yes/No  
 
Have you had your questions answered in a way you understand?   Yes/No  
 
Do you understand it’s OK to stop taking part at any time?    Yes/No  
 
Are you happy to take part?        Yes/No  
 
If any answers are ‘no’ or you don’t want to take part, don’t sign your name!  
 
If you do want to take part, you can write your name below  
 
Your name ___________________________  
Date ___________________________  
 
Your parent or guardian must write their name here if they are happy for you to do 
the project. 
Print Name ___________________________  
Sign ___________________________  
Date ___________________________  
 
The researcher who explained this project to you needs to sign too.  
Print Name ___________________________  
Sign ___________________________  
Date ___________________________  
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL 
ASSENT FORM FOR CHILDREN / OTHER 
DEPENDENTS 
(to be completed by the child and their parent/guardian) 
 
